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Abstract 
 
This dissertation develops an analytical framework for studying the effects of health 
system devolution on the health policymaking process and policy choices made by 
subnational governments.  It addresses two research questions: (1) How does 
devolution change the structure and agency of the health policymaking process?  (2) 
What is the resulting impact on health policy priorities?  A critical literature review 
covers decentralization, devolution, and interest-based approaches for analysing the 
policymaking process, structure and agency.  An analytical framework for upper-
middle- and high-income countries is constructed by integrating (i) a modified version 
of Bossert’s decision-space approach for decentralized health systems; (ii) Blom-
Hansen’s combined policy network and rational-choice institutionalist approach, which 
analyses the intergovernmental relations within the national health policymaking 
environment; and (iii) an original conceptualisation and analysis of informal 
intergovernmental policymaking at the subnational government level.  Empirical 
evaluation uses information on Spain’s 2001 health system devolution reform, focusing 
on the regional cases of Extremadura and Madrid.  Primary data from stakeholder 
interviews and secondary data are analysed primarily using qualitative, case study and 
content analysis methods.  The decision space granted to regional governments in Spain 
is examined before and after the reform, developing a decision-space map for 
Extremadura and Madrid and showing the shifts in the range of choice allowed for each 
health system function over time.  Next, the compositions of the national and 
subnational health policy networks are determined for before and after devolution, and 
the policy priorities for each are estimated ex ante.  Finally, the dissertation analyses 
the ex post priorities and results of health policy decisions made by Spain, Extremadura 
and Madrid in the period after devolution.  Overall results show that the analytical 
framework is only partially successful in anticipating health policy priorities.  
Suggestions for improving the framework are proposed, and policy implications and 
lessons are drawn from the case studies.   
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1.  Introduction 
There is a growing interest in devolution across the globe, especially among 
European health systems.  The existing literature has primarily focused on the issues 
concerning fiscal and political federalism, examining the effects of the allocation of 
taxes and power to subnational authorities.  However, such literature has so far 
provided a very limited framework for analysing its effects on policymaking 
processes and on subsequent policy actions.  Most frameworks that examine 
devolution do so under the umbrella concept of decentralization, despite the 
significant conceptual and practical differences between the two.  Devolution, also 
known as political decentralization, entails a distinctive political arrangement in 
which multiple levels of government are autonomous in their decision-making yet 
interact interdependently (Rhodes 1986; 1992; Blom-Hansen 1999; D. Toke et al. 
2013).  Whereas decentralization refers to a wider phenomenon that encompasses 
devolution processes as well as reflects other forms of decentralization (e.g. 
administrative autonomy and power delegation) (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; 
2007).  The distinctive political arrangement of devolution uniquely structures the 
relationships between actors and, therefore, influences the policymaking process 
(Kontopoulos 1993; Hedlund 1994; Ansell 2000).  Health policy priorities in a 
devolved health system may then be estimated from the changes in the structure and 
agency of the policymaking process.  To date more of the research has gone to 
examine the political and fiscal effects of devolution, but we know very little about 
policy processes and priorities following devolution.  Furthermore, health care is a 
main policy area that is often devolved to subnational governments.   
1.1.  The Research Puzzle and Questions 
The present study develops a comparative analytical framework for studying health 
system devolution and its effects on the health policymaking process and, 
consequently, the policy priorities after devolution.  The framework uniquely 
comprises three components, which are modified or developed from the 
decentralization literature (which encompasses devolution) and public policy 
literature and then examined empirically on two regional cases in Spain that 
obtained health service responsibilities during the period of study. 
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This doctoral dissertation aims to answer two main research questions: How 
does health system devolution change the structure and agency of the health 
policymaking process?  What is the resulting impact on health policy priorities?  I 
hypothesise that, in a devolved health system, policy priorities are the result of the 
relative influence of key actor groups in intergovernmental health policy networks 
within the national and subnational policymaking environments.  The independent 
variable here is the relative amount of influence possessed by each actor group 
within these policy networks, which is partially defined through devolution; the 
dependent variables are the health policy priorities and decisions generated.   
Ideally, a comparative analytical framework for analysing health system 
devolution should use concepts that can be defined, measured and applied to all 
health systems or, at least, to the cases being compared.  It should represent the 
policymaking process as structured by the institutional rules and intergovernmental 
aspects of devolution, including an actor behaviour model that identifies the relative 
influence of the actors and considers the balance of power between them, their main 
goals and their interdependencies.  The framework should identify the main actor 
groups in the process and the relationships between them.  The actor behaviour 
model should contain behavioural assumptions for the actors involved.  
Furthermore, the framework should be examined to substantiate its effectiveness in 
representing the policymaking process and in anticipating policy priorities in a 
devolved health system.   
 The analytical framework of this dissertation addresses all of these aspects, 
drawing from mainstream models and theories for decentralization1, devolution, and 
policymaking and adapting them to the specific policymaking situation created by 
devolution in the health sector.  Specifically, to make it applicable to upper-middle- 
and high-income countries it modifies Bossert’s (1998) decision-space approach to 
defining and measuring health system decentralization (defined as the level of 
discretion granted for managing functions of the health system at the subnational 
level).  The framework then integrates the analysis of intergovernmental policy 
networks within the national policymaking environment explicated by Blom-Hansen 
(1999), which incorporates concepts of rational choice institutionalism.  For this 
                                               
1 The broader decentralization literature is examined in addition to the literature on devolution 
because it offers more theories, frameworks and empirical examples to pull from; overall, there is 
more published literature on decentralization than on devolution and it tends to have more depth. 
 Introduction 
   18 
 
environment, it improves on Blom-Hansen’s method by newly defining an index for 
assessing the strength of topocrats in their intergovernmental policy network.  
Finally, building on Blom-Hansen’s approach, the dissertation theorises and 
develops an approach for analysing intergovernmental policy networks within the 
subnational policymaking environment of a devolved health system.  The decision-
space approach and the intergovernmental policy network analysis are particularly 
important for examining decentralization, including its several forms devolution, 
and policy processes, respectively.  Together, they offer a unique perspective on the 
institutional relationships that constitute the structure and agency of the 
policymaking process in a devolved health system and its effects on health policy 
priorities within both the national and subnational policymaking environments.    
 This doctoral dissertation attempts to make four major contributions.  First, it 
develops the first analytical framework for understanding health system devolution 
from a policy process and public management perspective.  Second, it modifies 
Bossert’s (1998) decision-space approach for health system decentralization in 
developing countries so that it may be applied to upper-middle- and high-income 
countries.2  Third, it uses intergovernmental health policy networks and 
corresponding actor behaviour models in a way that facilitates analysis of the 
policymaking process and subsequent policy priorities within devolved, subnational 
policymaking environments.  Fourth, it creates indices for two of the major actor 
groups.  Fifth, it evaluates the framework’s effectiveness empirically by means of 
two retrospective, longitudinal, regional case studies from a single country that has 
relatively recently devolved health service competencies.  The method of 
subnational comparison helps to overcome the potential limitation of too much 
dependence on aggregate, national-level data.   
 In terms of research design, this thesis creates an analytical framework for 
analysing the policymaking processes and, subsequent, policy priorities in a 
devolved health system.  Then, using the case study method (Gerring 2004; Merriam 
1992; Van Evera 1997; Exworthy, Peckham, and Powell 2012), it applies the 
framework of the thesis to the case of Spain and two regional case studies.  Finally, 
                                               
2 The framework developed here is not applicable to lower- and lower-middle-income countries, 
because it does not account for two factors that are prominent in those nations: (i) the strong 
policymaking influence of international actor groups (the United Nations, the World Bank, NGOs, 
etc.) and (ii) the significantly different impact of decentralization on lower- and lower-middle-income 
countries, e.g. due to their lack of capacity.  These considerations lie beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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it examines and evaluates the results of the framework, which anticipate the 
direction of health policy priorities for the case studies, with a retrospective analysis 
of a select number of actual health policies.   
Spain was chosen for analysis because it underwent a significant devolution 
reform of health service competencies to a subnational level of government.  It is 
also a high-income country, whose health system and, in particular, health system 
devolution reform has been used as a model example for other countries, in 
particular “newly industrialised” ones (Rodríguez, Gallo de Puelles, and Jovell 
1999; Levaggi and Smith 2005; López-Casasnovas 2007; Carnicero and Rojas 2010; 
Simon-Cosano, Lago-Peñas, and Vaquero 2012; Walter 2012).  Spain’s most recent 
health system devolution occurred after 2001 (effective in 2002) and granted 
authority over health service responsibilities to ten of its autonomous communities 
(or regions) (Costa-Font 2013).  This doctoral dissertation focuses on two of these 
regions, Extremadura and Madrid, while at the same time incorporates relevant and 
available information on other regions in Spain to provide a richer analytical 
context.   
The uniform background and contextual conditions of Spain create a semi-
controlled environment for the regional cases and thereby limit the impact of 
potential confounding variables (especially the role of national-level legislation) by 
holding them constant.  The regions of Extremadura and Madrid in particular have 
three main features in common: (i) both are among the ten regions that received 
health service competencies in 2001, (ii) neither had active nationalist or separatist 
groups during the period of study, and (iii) in each region, one major political party3 
controlled the government throughout the study period.  The study period of the 
thesis was retrospective and longitudinal, spanning a decade (1996 to 2006); 
however, each empirical chapter focuses on a different, smaller period within this 
range of years, according to the objectives of their analysis.  I employ the method of 
temporal variation, which is useful in dealing with issues of sequencing and 
contingency in causal analysis (Pierson 2004).  
The use of qualitative interviews of institutional actors constitutes a major 
contribution of this dissertation.  In general, in-depth interviews provide first-hand 
                                               
3 Specifically, the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) 
governed Extremadura and the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) governed Madrid. 
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information on events that took place during the period under examination (Marshall 
and Rossman 1995).  They also facilitate the compilation of large amounts of data 
rather quickly, with the potential for subsequent follow-up and clarification (Saldaña 
2012).  For the regional and country case studies, I collected original primary data 
through 48 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and key 
informants involved in the intergovernmental health policymaking process in Spain 
and particularly in Extremadura and Madrid.  I designed the questions of my semi-
structured interview guide based on a stakeholder analysis, following mostly the 
works of Brugha and Varvasovszky (2000; Varvasovszky and Brugha 2000).    
Careful selection of the interviewees based on their professional background 
and experiences was essential to obtain a fair and accurate portrayal of the Spanish 
situation.  Key informants included university professors and lecturers of health 
policy, public health and health economics, as well as a few representatives of non-
governmental organisations and interest groups (e.g. one actor recounted his 
experience with Spain’s physicians association and another worked for a private 
health policy foundation).  Key stakeholders interviewed included a variety of 
Spanish national and regional politicians and bureaucrats, who held positions in the 
political system or the National Health System (NHS) and participated in the health 
policymaking process before and/or after the 2001 health devolution reform.  Initial 
interviews were obtained using the procedures of key informant and snowball 
sampling techniques, following the recommendations of Patton (2002).  This led to 
the identification of a small but impressive network of experts on the topic.  I 
personally requested interviews via email and followed them up when necessary, 
scheduled them and sent out thank you letters.   
I performed these interviews in three waves.  The first wave consisted 
mainly of preliminary interviews mostly with key informants and took place during 
the period December 2005–March 2006.  Then, I consolidated and began employing 
my semi-structured interview guide in the second wave, which took place during the 
period March–July 2007.  The third and final wave took place in October 2007.   
 To complement the interviews, throughout my preparation of the thesis, I 
collected secondary data from a variety of sources including research reports, most 
of which were published as peer-reviewed articles, newspapers, government 
bulletins and public documents, including relevant parliamentary debates, 
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regulations and legislation, and tertiary data, e.g. from the INEbase (a database for 
Spanish statistics).  
In terms of data handling and analysis, I used the scientific method of 
content analysis to analyse systematically the text from the primary, secondary and 
tertiary data that I collected.  This method is commonly used in the social sciences, 
including political science and public policy (Abrahamson 1983).  As a reliable, 
discreet and context-sensitive technique, it allows researchers to process and analyse 
relatively unstructured data in order to recognise meanings, patterns, systems, 
institutions, etc. and make valid inferences from them to the contexts of their use 
(Krippendorff 2012).  It is also constructive for answering policy questions 
regarding organisational phenomena, like decentralization.  To carry out this 
method, I employed the assistance of the qualitative data analysis software program 
NVivo 9 to collate, code, categorise and analyse the interview transcriptions and 
digital recordings, simultaneously, as well as some secondary and tertiary data.  I 
followed di Gregorio and Davidson (2008) for designing and conducting my 
qualitative research in the Nvivo 9 software environment and for implementing the 
research design.  I used Saldaña’s (2012) coding manual as a guide.  Data not 
analysed with Nvivo 9 were processed and analysed in the traditional way of 
employing the content analysis method.  The result of the content analysis was that I 
could draw inferences from it and validate them.  In particular, I juxtaposed and 
triangulated inferences that stemmed from the primary interview data with the 
secondary data; when not available, I crosschecked and compared the information 
provided by different interviewees and informants.  Finally, I used these inferences 
to give a narrative in the three empirical chapters of the thesis.        
1.2.  The Organisation of Chapters 
This dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 provides an extensive and up-
to-date literature review in two main sections.  First, to set the stage for addressing 
the research questions of the thesis, it critically reviews the literature on 
decentralization to locate devolution within it and to find a comparative and 
measurable definition for it.  The review argues that Bossert’s (1998) definition and 
measurement of the decentralization of health systems are the most advanced 
theoretical and empirical tools in the literature for comparatively analysing these 
organisational reforms; however, since they have never been applied to upper-
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middle- and high-income countries, they require some modification for use in this 
thesis.  Second, a suitable model for analysing the policymaking process and its 
structure and agency in a devolved health system is identified through an 
examination of the theory and empirics behind interest-based policymaking 
approaches.  In its review of interest-based policymaking, this chapter examines the 
policy network approach, rational choice institutionalism, game theory, and the 
principal-agent model, among other literature.  It does so to understand which of 
these best represents the structure and agency inherent in a devolved government 
setting.  It concludes that Blom-Hansen’s (1999) intergovernmental policy network 
approach, which incorporates concepts of rational choice institutionalism, is most 
appropriate for analysing the power structure of a devolved system and the 
interactions among significant intergovernmental policy actors as well as for 
explaining different policy outcomes.  The policy network approach and rational 
choice institutionalism overlap in their emphasis on actors and their behaviour and 
interests.  At the same time, they complement each other because the policy network 
approach highlights the additional value of including a relationship-based 
perspective when studying the policymaking process and its outcomes, while 
rational choice institutionalism stresses the importance of institutions.  
Consequently, Blom-Hansen’s approach provides a robust empirical analysis of 
intergovernmental relations within a decentralized policymaking environment and 
demonstrates its practical usefulness by applying it to the health, economic and 
childcare sectors of Scandinavian countries.  Third, this literature review chapter 
closes by proposing the integration of Bossert’s decision-space approach and Blom-
Hansen’s intergovernmental policy network approach as a suitable way forward for 
analysing health policy priorities in a devolved system.   
Chapter 3 presents the analytical framework of the thesis, which in addition 
to modifying and combining the two-aforementioned analytical approaches 
identified in the literature, develops an additional tool for analysing policymaking at 
the subnational level of government.  Specifically, the framework modifies Bossert’s 
approach to define the level of discretion (or range of choice) allowed for functions 
of the health system at the subnational level by adjusting it for use with upper-
middle- and high-income countries.  The range of choice is categorised as narrow, 
moderate or wide.  For a narrow range of choice at the subnational level, the 
framework turns to the national policymaking environment, incorporating Blom-
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Hansen’s approach, which identifies three types of actor groups—expenditure 
advocates, expenditure guardians and topocrats (topocrats are the representatives of 
subnational governments that seek to influence national policymaking)—whose 
abilities to pursue their self-interests are hampered and facilitated by the structure of 
their intergovernmental policy network.  The thesis presents a novel index for 
measuring topocrat strength as well.  For a wide range of choice at the subnational 
level, the framework examines the subnational policymaking environment using my 
original contribution to the literature: an intergovernmental health policy network 
with actor groups and assumptions for their behaviour that stem from Blom-
Hansen’s approach but are specific to the subnational policymaking environment in 
a devolved system.  This new intergovernmental policy network extends the concept 
of expenditure advocate and guardian actor groups from the national to the 
subnational level.  In addition, it uniquely identifies a new institutional actor group, 
which I call the kentrocrats and define as the representatives of national-level 
government who seek to influence the subnational policymaking.  It also presents an 
original index for measuring the stewardship of health-sector kentrocrats, stemming 
from the literature on health system stewardship.  For a moderate range of choice at 
the subnational level, the national and subnational intergovernmental policy 
networks share power and will need to be examined more closely with respect to the 
affected policy to understand whether one supersedes the other or if the two should 
be described as fully interrelated (which I believe is rather rare empirically).  
Consequently, the corresponding intergovernmental policy network and 
policymaking environment is then examined.     
In summary, Chapter 3 constructs an analytical framework that (i) provides a 
comparable definition and method of measuring health system devolution in upper-
middle- and high-income countries; (ii) provides a thorough description of the 
policymaking process in a devolved health system; (iii) analyses this process more 
precisely and accurately, using two new indices for measuring actor strength, to 
determine the effects of devolution on policymaking; and (iv) anticipates the policy 
priorities in a devolved health system.  Chapter 3 closes with a presentation of the 
research design and methods employed in the three empirical chapters that follow it.   
Chapter 4 empirically applies the first of three components of the analytical 
framework to the case of Spain: defining and measuring decision space for health 
system devolution.  In particular, it employs the modified decision-space approach 
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to Spain’s 2001 devolution of health service competencies, which affected 10 of its 
17 autonomous communities (or regions).  While I provide some information on all 
ten regions, the primary focus of the study is on the regional cases of Extremadura 
and Madrid.  This analysis examines the de jure decision space systematically for 
the periods before and after devolution: 1996–2001 and 2002–2006, respectively.  It 
results in a decision-space map for each period, which illustrates the range of choice 
allowed for specific functions within five health system functional areas.  The maps 
demonstrate how the 2001 devolution reform changed the decision space at the 
regional level in Spain.  It also discusses some de facto results that the analysis 
reveals.  
Chapter 5 empirically applies the second and third components of the 
analytical framework to the case of Spain: the integrated intergovernmental policy 
network approach for both the national and subnational policymaking environments.  
The chapter begins by describing the structure of the intergovernmental health 
policy networks and the model of actor behaviour in the Spanish national and 
subnational (informal) policymaking environments.  Primary interview data are used 
to validate the appropriateness of identified actor groups in Spain.  This chapter, 
then, analyses and establishes the positions of these actor groups within the 
intergovernmental health policy networks at both the national and subnational level 
for Spain and the regions of Extremadura and Madrid.  Finally, it discusses the 
resulting power-sharing situations, showing the trade-offs in intergovernmental 
health policymaking at both levels of government before the 2001 health system 
devolution reform and after it for the period 2004–2006.   
Chapter 6 evaluates the analytical framework empirically, combining the 
results from Chapters 4 and 5 (specifically, the de facto decision-space maps and the 
ex-ante trade-offs in intergovernmental health policymaking) and examining 
whether these health policy priorities hold for Spain and the regional cases of 
Extremadura and Madrid for the period 2004–2006.  This chapter analyses three 
health policies within the subnational health policy network—waiting time 
guarantees, common health benefit package expansions, and paying medical 
specialists in hospital ambulatory settings—, each of which belong to a different 
functional area of the health system.  Additionally, it analyses the policy for 
increasing health financing to the regions within the national health policy network.  
Although the analysis may be applied to health system functions with different 
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amounts of decision space, this chapter focuses the analysis on these policies, which 
belong to health system functions with a moderate amount of decision space after 
2001.  Moreover, the time-period of this part of the study ensures that the regions 
are fully in the implementation phase of their health service competencies and 
responsibilities.  It also guarantees—through a stable institutional architecture for 
both the health and finance sectors—that the balances of power within the 
intergovernmental health policymaking environments in Spain are unchanging.  
Once more, the focus of this analysis is on the degree to which ex-post health policy 
in these two regions reflects the ex-ante privileged position and goals of key actors 
in the decision-making process.  My assessment of this employs three different 
measures of the effectiveness of intergovernmental policy (as described in chapter 
3): policy efficiency, policy strategies and policy failures.   
In Chapter 7, I discuss the empirical findings of this doctoral thesis and 
present conclusions.  Limitations of the intergovernmental policy network approach 
are highlighted and possible improvements to the application of the analytical 
framework are outlined.  Overall, the findings suggest that the analytical framework 
of the thesis is adequate to define the decision space and policymaking process in a 
devolved health system and partially successful in anticipating ex-post health policy 
priorities.  Ways to improve the framework further are presented, along with 
potential areas of further research, policy implications and lessons learnt. 
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2.  Decentralization, Devolution and the Policymaking Process 
This chapter reviews the literature on decentralization, including devolution, and its 
relationship to the policymaking process, structure and actors.  The first subsection 
reviews the history behind decentralization reform, conceptualises it and discusses 
how it can be defined and measured.  Where appropriate, it incorporates details 
specific to the devolution-form of decentralization.  Because there is no established 
framework for analysing decentralization and devolution reforms in more 
economically developed countries (i.e. upper-middle- and high-income countries), 
the goal of this subsection is to present a broad summary of the general and health-
specific literature on decentralization and devolution with the hope that it provides 
direction on how to create one.  To complement this subsection, Appendix A 
reviews the literature on the theoretical effects of decentralization in the governance 
and political literature.  Overall, this first subsection buttresses the second 
subsection because decentralization and devolution are institutional reforms that 
affect the policymaking process and policies that follow it.  
The second subsection reviews the public policymaking process and 
different theories, approaches and models for the classical concepts of structure and 
agency.  Specifically, it covers the literature from the interest-based perspective, 
describing the theoretical and empirical literature on rational choice institutionalism 
and presenting the principle-agent model and the policy network approach.  This 
subsection addresses the current literature on the research questions of the thesis: (1) 
How does devolution change the structure and agency of the health policymaking 
process?  (2) What is the resulting impact on health policy priorities?  This 
subsection is also purposely broad in nature, narrowing to a discussion on the 
analytical approaches in the literature that have the greatest potential to offer insight 
into the “black box” of policymaking within a devolved health system.   
The final subsection of this chapter collects the most salient research 
emerging from the previous two literature reviews, and combines them to form a 
framework for the analysis of the research questions in upper-middle- and high-
income countries.   
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2.1.  Decentralization Reform 
2.1.1.  A Brief History of Decentralization 
Decentralization, and its specific form of devolution, is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in unitary states; that is, in non-federal states.  Prior to the 1950s and 
1960s, the governance trend in unitary states for centuries has favoured 
centralization (Treisman 2007b; Saito 2011).  Indeed, since the beginning of 
mankind, centralising power was the prevailing answer to the age-old question of 
how governments should be organised (Faguet 2012).  With the development of 
European welfare states around the mid-twentieth century, countries began to 
centralize some policymaking authority further from national to supranational 
unions, such as the European Union, though maintaining their sovereignty; for the 
most part, however, public and social policy remained at the national level of 
government.  Nonetheless, with the democratisation of several European countries 
(sometimes labelled the “third wave of democratisation”) and the increasing need 
for reform to adjust to new economic conditions, a new trend of decentralizing 
functions and powers to subnational and local governments arose.4  This doctoral 
dissertation focuses on the consolidation of this new, important, but less understood 
period of decentralization.  
Over the next half-century, the countries that decided to decentralize public 
and social policy and services, including health care, hoped to achieve efficiency 
improvements and address broader institutional needs.  By the early 1960s, 
centralized, industrialised democracies were challenged by increased, often 
heterogeneous, demands from their citizens, especially with regard to the provision 
of services (Saito 2011).  In such cases, advocates deemed administrative 
decentralization the solution to issues that could be managed locally (J. M. Cohen 
and Peterson 1996).  In the 1980s, economies began to stagnate, central 
bureaucracies began to show increased inefficiency, and reducing the size of the 
central government through decentralization of responsibilities to subnational 
governments seemed the best way to reverse these trends in industrialised and 
developing countries alike (Saito 2011; A. L. Schneider 2003).  For the Reagan 
administration in the United States (US), this meant modernizing the public sector 
                                               
4 Faguet (2012, 3) provides a thorough and concise account of the historical context of centralization 
and decentralization.   
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(including the health), accompanied by administrative decentralization and 
privatisation of public services (Saito 2011).  Meanwhile, international aid agencies 
piped and pushed decentralization strategies as a better way for developing countries 
to reach their urban and rural poor and increase their participation in the 
development process.  The most notable and effective of these strategies were 
included in the structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank (Saito 2011).  By the end of the Cold War, democratisation 
took a front seat on the world’s development agenda, and decentralization, 
particularly political decentralization, seemed to be a means to advance it (Cohen 
and Peterson 1996).   
During the same period, domestic voices also pressured for decentralization, 
although with a different goal in mind: increased local control and autonomy (B. C. 
Smith 1985).  Subnational politicians and civil society actors desired a higher stake 
in local affairs and thus were amenable to power and resource transfers.  Left-wing 
parties generally backed decentralization as a means to distribute more power 
following a democratisation agenda, while right-wing parties supported it because of 
its potential to make government more efficient by bringing some interjurisdictional 
competition.  In Spain, for example, decentralization was responsive to the demands 
of regional governments and their populations for more autonomy after decades of 
living under a dictatorship.  Other countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, 
maintained a decentralized organisational structure to continue allowing adjustments 
to specific local needs and coping with the heterogeneous demands of the 
population.   
In addition, central governments looked to decentralization as a way for off-
loading their sometimes burdensome management responsibilities for public 
services and, yet, still be able to offer them to their populations (A. L. Schneider 
2003).  Consequently, central government politicians looked to exchange power and 
resources for more support from subnational governments.  Trade liberalisation and 
international treaties (e.g. the European Economic Community) also affected the 
decisions of central governments  to transfer some of their public service 
responsibilities and authority to subnational governments.   
In the 1990s, many industrialised countries viewed political and fiscal 
decentralization or devolution in unitary states as a way to achieve greater choice 
without harming social equity.  Modernisation reforms and the privatisation trend 
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continued through this decade (Tanzi 2008).  Countries, such as Italy, that had 
already devolved their national health system and were providing access to services 
based on citizenship (and thereby experiencing reduced social inequities) turned to 
administrative decentralization to improve their effectiveness (France and Taroni 
2005).  Overall, then, since the 1950s, decentralization has been seen as a panacea 
for numerous systemic issues in unitary states.   
2.1.2.  What is Decentralization? 
Decentralization fundamentally means the dispersion or distribution of functions, 
powers and authority from a centre (Wolman 1990).  This definition, however, does 
not provide sufficient precision when applied to government.  Indeed, whereas the 
literature has a generally agreed-upon definition for centralization as “the 
concentration of power, resources and authority in a single head or center” (A. L. 
Schneider 2003, 34), it emits several definitions for decentralization.  Bennett (1990, 
1) describes decentralization as “a single term … [that] disguises a complex and 
highly varied set of phenomena.”  The real issue, however, is not with the varied 
meanings but rather that scholars need to proceed cautiously to avoid over- and 
under-specification (A. L. Schneider 2003).   
Until recently, decentralization has been studied differently in various 
countries.  The three largest distinct pools of literature on decentralization comprise 
(i) the development literature, which targets developing and transitioning countries, 
(ii) the more general literature, primarily on industrialised countries outside the US, 
and (iii) the US literature.  Saito (2011, 285) writes, “Attempts at comparative cross-
national analyses have been further fragmented by specific regional focuses.  For 
instance, while Western Europe has been relatively well studied, only recently have 
limited pioneering attempts been made to integrate assessments of industrialised 
countries with those of developing countries (e.g. Wibbels 2005; Rodden 2006).”  
Moreover, decentralization is a common term in many academic disciplines 
(Cohen and Peterson 1996).  Indeed, it has been studied in accountancy, 
administration, anthropology, economics, history, law, management, philosophy, 
psychology, political science, public and social policy, sociology, and theology.  
However, because of the different meanings of the word in these various disciplines, 
decentralization has been studied mostly in silos and not in an inter-disciplinary 
way.  Additionally, the term has been modified to fit the concepts associated with it.  
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For example, decentralization permeates the conceptual literature on agency theory 
(also known as principal-agent theory), central-local relations, public choice theory, 
and fiscal federalism.  Moreover, often the literature in a discipline uses different 
terms for the same concept (Peckham et al. 2005); for example, the term “central-
local relations” can refer to the organisational structure created by decentralization.  
Other terms may appear at first glance to also refer to decentralization but actually 
refer to only one form of decentralization (e.g. regionalisation), may embody key 
differences in meaning (e.g. regionalism), or may be interpreted in divergent ways 
within the literature (e.g. federalism).  Finally, decentralization is often linked with 
many related concepts, such as autonomy, power, and localism (Peckham et al. 
2005).   
The result is considerable confusion and misunderstanding about what 
decentralization is.  Because of this, researchers from different disciplines often talk 
past each other (Schneider 2003).  For example, on the one hand, economists tend to 
centre on the view of decentralization as a way to enhance competition at the 
subnational levels of government (Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956).  As such, 
governments are assumed to compete for regulatory power and resources (e.g. the 
right to make expenditures and levy taxes) and the beneficiary of such competition 
is the citizen who pays fewer taxes and/or receives more-efficient services.  This 
research is categorised according to the terms and sub-fields of the economics 
discipline, such as public choice, fiscal local choice and fiscal federalism.  
Meanwhile, political scientists focus more on the effects of decentralization on 
governance and political values, such as responsiveness, accountability, diversity 
and innovation at the subnational level, or policy stability at the national level.  Only 
recently have some researchers begun to cross the disciplinary divide, achieving a 
fuller understanding of decentralization and its processes (Smoke, Gomez, and 
Peterson 2006; Faguet 2012; Exworthy, Peckham, and Powell 2012; Costa-Font and 
Greer 2013).5   There remain, however, many unresolved questions regarding the 
conceptualisation, definition and measurement of decentralization and devolution, 
especially regarding health systems.   
  
                                               
5 See also Oliver’s (2013) account of the importance of interdisciplinary research.   
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2.1.3.  Conceptualizing Decentralization 
Scholars have reached a consensus on few issues related to decentralization.  It is the 
antagonist of centralization, but not an alternative to it (UNDP 1998).  Nor do 
decentralization and centralization form a simple dichotomy; rather, they are 
opposite ends of a continuum (Wolman 1990).  In addition, centralization and 
decentralization can co-exist in the same national system, as some functions seem 
most logically to belong at different levels of government – e.g. foreign policy with 
the central government and solid waste management with the local government 
(UNDP 1998).   
While decentralization refers to a specific structural arrangement of 
government, it also describes a process, or a means to an end.  Peckham et al. (2005) 
describe decentralization as “a process – one of a number of factors – that can be 
employed for achieving particular goals rather than an end in its own right”.  
Decentralization has no general normative implications; that is, it does not 
inherently produce good or bad governance (see Appendix A).   
Decentralization is often interchanged with the terms regionalisation, 
regionalism or federalism; and regionalism and regionalisation are often confused 
with one another (Tuñon 2013).  To disperse this confusion, I discuss how these are 
the same and/or different terms.  Regionalism is a political ideology, referring to the 
organisation of a community and focusing on the interests of a particular region 
(B.C. Smith 1995).  Caciagli (2006, 12) defines regionalism as a “process, first 
cultural and afterwards, but not always, political, produced by a community 
endowed with a strong feeling of territorial membership”.  The goal of regionalism 
centres on increasing a region’s influence and political power.  This is usually done 
to gain greater competencies because of anthropological, historical, cultural or social 
factors.  Regionalism is ascending from the bottom-up; therefore, if anything, it is 
the centralization of powers and authority but without destabilizing a state (Albina 
and Khasson 2008).   Often, states have pursued regionalism in conjunction with 
neighbouring states for the purpose of greater regional economic integration, such as 
in the formation of the European Union.  Therefore, regionalism cannot be 
understood as a synonym for decentralization.   
Regionalisation, in politics, is a process wherein “the state initiates a 
devolution process mobilizing the region to bring government closer to the 
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citizenship” (Tuñon 2013, 5).  It is a process of dividing a country into smaller 
subnational territories—particularly ‘regions’—and transferring power and authority 
to them from the central government.  Similar to decentralization, but contrary to 
regionalism, regionalisation is a top-down process, involving “a territorial planning 
based on already existing state powers” (Petschen 1992).  Different from 
decentralization—which does not specify the level of government to receive the 
transfers, which for example could be moved to a regional or a municipal level—, 
regionalisation transfers functions and authority from a central to a regional 
government.  Thus, regionalisation is a particular variety of decentralization and, as 
we will see later in this review, there are several varieties of decentralization.   
Federalism also has many variations in the literature.  It is generally agreed, 
though, that federalism describes a system of government in which sovereignty (and 
political power) are constitutionally divided between a central authority and 
subnational authorities (e.g. states).  Although by definition it has a decentralized 
polity and the same structure as a politically decentralized unitary state (B.C. Smith 
1985), a federation may be established through either a decentralization or a 
centralization process.  The more commonly known type of federalism is centrist, 
creating a federation from the bottom up when a “stronger central authority is sought 
by regions loosely allied in a confederation” (B. C. Smith 1985, 56).  The US, 
Australia and Mexico are examples of federations created by centralizing power.  
On the other hand, federations can be created through “a move from a unitary state 
to one in which constituent territories are given constitutional safeguards” (B. C. 
Smith 1985, 55), or “decentralist federalism” (King 1982).   One such example is 
Germany after World War II.  In sum, not all federations have experienced 
decentralization and a decentralized national system is not necessarily a federation.  
Furthermore, the difference between centralization and decentralization is not 
equivalent to the difference between federal and unitary states, as “unitary states 
may be characterized by decentralization while federal states may be characterized 
by centralized decision-making” (Wolman 1990, 30).   
Like decentralization, a federation may be symmetrical or asymmetrical, 
with all subnational governments having the same or varying power and status, 
respectively.  In a federal system, self-governing subnational governments share 
sovereignty with the central government, who cannot unilaterally change the 
existence or powers of the subnational governments.  In contrast, subnational 
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entities in unitary systems are not self-governing but may be changed – broadening 
or narrowing their powers – or abolished by the central government, which holds the 
supreme authority.  Biela, Hennl, and Kaiser (2013, 6–7) argue that federalism and 
decentralization are “two different dimensions of territorial organisation of state 
activity, i.e. multilevel systems which exhibit independent as well as interdependent 
effects”. 
2.1.4.  Finding a Comparative and Measurable Definition for Decentralization 
Before addressing any one particular definition or measure for decentralization, I 
present here the most widely accepted typology for decentralization in the literature: 
Rondinelli’s (1981) public administration “type-function framework” of 
administrative, political and fiscal forms of decentralization.  In an attempt to 
simplify the explanation of the different structural arrangements of decentralization, 
Rondinelli developed this typology and it has permeated the literature ever since, 
though, at times with modifications.  For example, Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema 
(1984) included political, administrative, spatial and market forms of 
decentralization; Wolman (1990) included administrative, political and economic 
forms; Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) included administrative, political, fiscal and 
economic forms.  Thus, I will discuss each form in detail separately to understand 
what it represents and how it differs from the others.   
The forms of decentralization most frequently mentioned in the literature are 
administrative and political decentralization.  Administrative decentralization is the 
hierarchical and functional distribution of powers and functions between central and 
subnational government units.  It has three variations, often called types in the 
literature: de-concentration, delegation and devolution.  First, the de-concentration 
type of administrative decentralization is the redistribution of decision-making 
authority and management responsibilities among different levels of government, 
but still under the jurisdictional authority of the central government.  Second, the 
delegation type of administrative decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for 
decision-making and administration of public functions from the central government 
to semi-autonomous organisations not wholly controlled by the central government, 
but ultimately accountable to it.  Third, the devolution type of administrative 
decentralization means the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance and 
management to quasi-autonomous units of subnational government with corporate 
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status granted under state legislation and accompanied by underlying political 
decentralization (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1984; Cheema and Rondinelli 
1983; J. M. Cohen and Peterson 1996).   
Political decentralization, also referred to as ‘devolution’6, is the transfer of 
decision-making power from central to subnational governmental units or to citizens 
and their elected representatives (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema 1984; Cheema and 
Rondinelli 1983; Cohen and Peterson 1996).  As Cheema and Rondinelli (2007, 7) 
indicate, it “includes organizations and procedures for increasing citizen 
participation in selecting political representatives and in making public policy”.   
The remaining forms of decentralization are fiscal, economic (or market) and 
spatial.  Fiscal decentralization is the transfer of financial responsibilities from 
central to subnational levels of government (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema 1984; 
Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; Cohen and Peterson 1996).  It “includes the means 
and mechanisms for fiscal cooperation in sharing public revenues among all levels 
of government” (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, 7).  Economic or market 
decentralization focuses on “market liberalization, deregulation, privatization of 
state enterprises, and public-private partnerships” (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, 7).  
Spatial decentralization is the transfer of excessive urban concentration in a few 
large cities to regional growth locations with the potential to become centres of 
manufacturing and agricultural marketing (Cohen and Peterson 1996; UNDP and 
Government of Germany 1999).   
In practice, these forms of decentralization are not (and cannot be) entirely 
discreet.  For example, fiscal decentralization should follow political and/or 
administrative forms of decentralization; otherwise, having little to no control over 
their revenue function, the subnational governments receiving the political and 
administrative competencies may not be able to execute effectively their newly 
acquired power, authority and responsibilities.  Moreover, political decentralization 
(or devolution) is the most complete form of decentralization and must be supported 
by fiscal and administrative decentralization to be successful.   
The same typologies have been applied to the literature on health system 
decentralization.  Building on Rondinelli’s forms and types, Mills et al. (1990) 
                                               
6 Not to be confused with the devolution type of administrative decentralization, despite the same 
name; though, these often go hand-in-hand. 
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determined that four types of decentralization are most common in the health sector: 
de-concentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation (also known as 
divestiture, and related to economic or market decentralization).  Any given country 
may have one or more of these types in its health sector at once (A. Mills 1994).  
Bossert (2004) describes the example of the Chilean health system, where different 
types of decentralization co-exist: while Chile’s Central Ministry of Health ensures 
the constitutional right to health protection and performs a stewardship role over the 
whole system; it has de-concentrated responsibilities for health service delivery to 
its Regional Health Offices, devolving the network of primary health care facilities 
to the municipalities; in addition, it has delegated responsibility for collecting, 
administering and distributing fiscal resources for the system to the National Health 
Fund, and it has privatised health insurance plans.   
Despite all the scholarly attention, this type-function framework provides 
little comparative utility and has never seemed to advance the literature much.  In 
fact, some authors have argued that this over-specification of decentralization has 
led more often to confusion and even stagnation (Peckham et al. 2005; Treisman 
2007b; Peckham et al. 2008; Faguet 2012; Costa-Font and Greer 2013).  Faguet 
(2012, 196) considers this approach to be a case of “definitional failure”:  
Instead of articulating a clear definition of decentralization from the 
start, many authors allowed themselves to be led conceptually by the 
phenomena they encountered.  The quasi-spontaneous definition that so 
emerged is opaque, malleable, and ultimately unstable.  It ranges from 
the de-concentration of central personnel to field offices in authoritarian 
systems, via the delegation of managerial responsibilities to 
organizations outside the regular bureaucratic structure, and the 
wholesale divestiture of public functions to the private sector, to the 
devolution of resources to autonomous, elected subnational 
governments.  …  All of these phenomena often find themselves jostling 
together under the rubric decentralization.  But these are instead 
fundamentally different institutional reforms that establish 
systematically different incentives and thus prompt government 
officials to different behavior.   
Costa-Font and Greer (2013, 4) illustrate this definitional failure with an empirical 
example: 
This definition creates a remarkable level of confusion: simply put, 
creating a Scottish Parliament, selling British Telecom, and moving the 
drivers’ license agency out of London are three profoundly different 
kinds of actions, and lumping them together does not make them easier 
to understand. 
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It is, however, possible to find an accurate, precise and measurable definition 
of decentralization in the literature.  While the common-sense definition for 
decentralization may be too ambiguous, here I discuss a few of the many example 
definitions of decentralization in the scholarly literature.  Faguet (1997) considers 
several general definitions of decentralization and highlights this one by Rondinelli 
(1981):  
The transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and resource-
raising and allocation from the central government to (a) field units of 
central government ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or 
levels of government; (c) semi-autonomous public authorities or 
corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or (e) 
NGOs/PVOs [i.e., non-governmental organizations and private 
voluntary organizations].   
This definition specifies the different responsibilities that may be transferred through 
decentralization as well as the various units or authorities that may receive the 
transfer of such responsibilities.  The definition may seem comprehensive, but 
decentralization has many more dimensions.  Later in his writings, Faguet (2012, 2 
bold in original) underscores the importance of having a clear definition for 
decentralization and uses the following definition in his study Decentralization and 
Popular Democracy in Bolivia:  
Decentralization is the devolution by central (i.e., national) 
government of the specific functions, with all of the administrative, 
political, and economic attributes that these entail, to democratic local 
(i.e., municipal) governments that are independent of the center within 
a legally delimited geographic and functional domain.   
In both this definition and the following passage from a publication by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Government of Germany (1999, 1), 
the many dimensions of decentralization are apparent:  
Decentralization is a complex phenomenon involving many geographic 
entities, societal actors and social sectors.  The geographic entities 
include the international, national, subnational and local.  The societal 
actors include the government, the private sector and civil society.  The 
social sectors include all the development themes – political, social, 
cultural and environmental.  …  Decentralization is a mixture of 
administrative, fiscal and political functions and relationships.  In the 
design of decentralization all three must be included. 
These definitions together highlight the multiple aspects or dimensions that 
may be present in a particular definition of decentralization.  The first dimension is 
the geographic or territorial aspect of decentralization.  The second dimension 
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regards the actors involved in the process, such as entities in the government, private 
sector or civil society.  The third dimension is the sectoral aspect of decentralization, 
which may have a significant bearing on the process because one form and type of 
decentralization may be more appropriate for some sectors than for others, and 
decentralization of a specific sector competency may be more appropriate to one 
subnational level of government rather than another.  The fourth dimension regards 
functions within a sector, which may be decentralized to different extents and to 
different subnational governments.  For example, Rondinelli’s (1981) definition 
included some of these functions: “planning, management, and resource-raising and 
allocation”.  The fifth dimension includes the different forms of decentralization—
administrative, fiscal and political—as defined by Rondinelli (1981).  The sixth 
dimension includes the relationship aspect, which varies according to the form and 
actor dimensions, shedding light on an often-overlooked aspect of decentralization: 
the intergovernmental relationships resulting from the decentralization, and 
particular devolution, process.  See Table 2.1 for a summary of these dimensions.   
Table 2.1.  The Main Dimensions of Decentralization 
 Dimension Description Examples 
1 Territorial/ 
geographic 
What major geographic entities 
are involved in the process? 
International, national, 
subnational (e.g. regional, 
provincial), local (e.g. 
municipal) 
2 Actor What main actors are involved?  Government (central, 
subnational, local 
politicians or bureaucrats), 
private sector, civil society 
3 Sector Which sector is involved in the 
process? 
Health, education, 
environmental, economic 
4 Function What sectoral functions are 
involved in the process? 
Planning, management, 
resource-raising, allocation, 
service provision 
5 Form What form(s) of decentralization 
is (are) involved?  
Political, administrative, 
fiscal 
6 Relationship What is the newly created 
intergovernmental relationship 
that results from the process and 
how has it changed the incentive 
framework among the main 
actors and the behaviour we 
should expect from them? 
E.g. an administrative 
delegation of functions to 
subordinate units or levels 
of government could imply 
a principal-agent 
relationship 
Nota bene: These numbered dimensions do not suggest any order of importance.   
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Thus, unlike the existing literature which focuses on one of these six dimensions 
(i.e., the form of decentralization), a good definition of decentralization for the thesis 
would have to consider most, if not all, six of these dimensions and be focused on 
the devolution type of political decentralization.   
In the following, I explore the most salient analytical frameworks of 
decentralization in the general works and health-specific literature that improve on 
or go beyond the type-function framework, comparing them against these six 
dimensions to understand their comprehensiveness and looking for the one that 
provides the most comparable measurement for decentralization.  Cohen and 
Peterson (1997) proposed an “Administrative Design Framework,” which focuses on 
administrative decentralization, and its three types, in order to help developing 
countries improve governance, accountability and performance.  Their framework 
studies the concentration of organisational and institutional roles and public sector 
tasks and identifies three administrative design strategies: institutional monopoly (or 
centralization); distributed institutional monopoly (or administrative decentralization 
with roles within one organisation); and, institutional pluralism (administrative 
decentralization with roles shared by two or more organisations).  Compared to our 
six dimensions of decentralization, the administrative design framework only 
addressed the territorial/geographic (or spatial) dimension, the actor dimension and 
the form dimension.  For the form dimension, it only focused on administrative 
decentralization and not political decentralization (or devolution).  Thus, despite 
reducing some confusion around decentralization by centring its analysis on only 
one form, this framework does not improve on the definition and measurement of 
decentralization much and not at all of devolution.      
Gershberg (1998) proposed rather a framework for analysing performance 
accountability in “decentralizing” social service delivery systems, considering the 
following seven aspects: finance, auditing and evaluation, regulation and policy 
development, demand-driven mechanisms, democratic mechanisms, service 
provider choice/mix, and civil service and management systems.  His framework 
emphasises determining who is responsible for providing services, what incentives 
exist for motivating effective service provision and how well the actual services 
function.  Gershberg applied his framework to the education and health sectors of 
Mexico and Nicaragua and recommended that lessons derived from these 
experiences should emphasise contingent recommendations (i.e., if X, then Y) rather 
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than blanket evaluations.  Compared to our six dimensions of decentralization, 
Gershberg’s framework examines the actor (the ‘who’), sector and function 
dimensions.  It does not specify a form of decentralization but rather points to, but 
does not elaborate on, the use of degrees of decentralization for appropriate 
definition and measurement of decentralization.  At the same time, Gershberg 
discourages using existing tools in the literature to determine this measure.  
Admittedly, Gershberg acknowledges that his framework does not result in a road 
map for decentralization.   
With the shortcomings of the above frameworks and our six dimensions of 
decentralization in mind, I find Bossert’s (1998) decision-space approach to 
analysing the decentralization of health systems in developing countries particularly 
useful.  Bossert’s main objective was to design a comparative analytical framework 
to determine the effectiveness of decentralization in achieving health system goals.  
Quite different from most of the approaches for analysing decentralization that we 
have discussed already, Bossert emphasises the degree of discretion allowed through 
decentralization as being more important than who gets the greater range of choice 
at the local level.  He sought to establish a consistent means of defining and 
measuring decentralization in different national systems, settling for this purpose on 
the concept of “decision space,” which maps the range of choice (or degree of 
discretion) that the central government has granted to local authorities for a series of 
key health system functions.  The map depicts the range of choice on its horizontal 
axis and defines it as narrow, moderate or wide.  On the vertical axis, it places a 
series of functional areas of the health system, including finance, service 
organisation, human resources, and access and governance rules (Bossert 1998); 
subsequently, logistics systems were added (Bossert, Bowser, and Amenyah 2007).  
For each functional area, Bossert suggests indicators that could be examined for a 
rigorous, comparative mapping of the decision space.  For example, for the 
functional area of finance, he displays four key functions.  One of them is sources of 
revenue, which he measures by the indicator of intergovernmental transfers as a 
percentage of total local health spending, with ‘a high percentage’ indicating a 
narrow range of choice.  A second example is income from fees, which he measures 
by the range of prices that local authorities are allowed to establish, with ‘no limit’ 
implying a wide range of choice (Bossert 1998, 1518).  Importantly, Bossert’s 
definition and measurement approach allows decentralization to be conceptualised 
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not as a single transfer of a block of authority and responsibility, but rather as a 
series of functions, for which different levels of discretion may be transferred to the 
local level.   
Bossert’s definition of decentralization becomes the foundation of his 
decision-space approach, which he combines with an interest-based approach to 
policymaking, namely, the principal-agent approach.  In doing so, he inherently 
focuses on the role of actors, and their relationships and interactions.  He uses this 
approach in particular to examine the principal’s use of channels of control (e.g. 
incentives, sanctions and monitoring compliance) over the agents in order to ensure 
that the agents work towards achieving the desired health reform objectives.  He also 
looks at how agents given a wide range of choice over a function choose to take 
advantage of this new decision-making power: do they innovate, do they reject 
central directives or do they just continue doing what they had done before?  Bossert 
evaluates the impact of these decisions on the performance of local health systems in 
achieving the national health system’s objectives.   
Over the years, Bossert and others have successfully applied his decision-
space approach, including his definition of decentralization, to several country 
health systems in developing countries:  
 Bolivia (Bossert 2000; Bossert, Larrañaga, and Ruiz-Meir 2000); 
 Chile (Bossert 2000; Bossert, Larrañaga, and Ruiz-Meir 2000; González-
Rossetti and Bossert 2000); 
 Colombia (Bossert 1998; 2000; González-Rossetti and Bossert 2000);  
 Ghana (Bossert, Beauvais, and Bowser 2000; Bossert and Beauvais 2002; 
Bossert, Bowser, and Amenyah 2007); 
 Guatemala (Bossert, Bowser, and Amenyah 2007); 
 the Indian state of West Bengal (Bossert et al. 2009); 
 Mexico (González-Rossetti and Bossert 2000); 
 Nigeria (Adebusoye 2009); 
 Pakistan (Bossert and Mitchell 2011); 
 Philippines (Bossert, Beauvais, and Bowser 2000; Bossert and Beauvais 
2002); 
 Uganda (Bossert, Beauvais, and Bowser 2000; Bossert and Beauvais 2002);  
 Vietnam (Bossert, Mitchell, and Blanchet 2009); and 
 Zambia (Bossert, Beauvais, and Bowser 2000; Bossert and Beauvais 2002).   
Notably, Bossert and Mitchell (2011) modified Bossert’s original decision-space 
approach, combining it with the concepts of institutional capacities and mechanisms 
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of accountability – which, they suggest, are responsible for producing improved 
outcomes – and measuring these factors in an empirical study of Pakistan.   
Bossert’s definition of decentralization and his approach to measuring it are 
the most advanced tools, both theoretically and empirically, in the health system 
literature today.  Bossert’s decision-space approach incorporates all six dimensions 
of decentralization.  It also offers a means for measuring decentralization, which can 
be applied to political decentralization or devolution.  However, since Bossert’s 
approach was designed for (and, prior to this thesis, has been applied only to) 
developing countries, the functional areas and functions needed in a developed 
country may not be directly applicable to a health system in an upper-middle- or 
high-income country.   
2.2  The Policymaking Process, Structure and Agency 
In the process of public policymaking, problems are conceptualized and 
brought to government for solution; governmental institutions formulate 
alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get 
implemented, evaluated, and revised (Sabatier 2007, 3). 
Understanding the complexities of the policymaking process requires knowledge of 
actors, institutions and issues over extended periods.  As such, analysts have 
developed different theories, approaches and models to simplify the process in order 
to understand it better.   
In this subsection, I review existing literature in search of the best theory and 
approach to employ in considering the following questions: (1) How does 
devolution change the structure and agency of the health policymaking process?  (2) 
What is the resulting impact on health policy priorities?  To answer these questions, 
it is important to use a theoretical approach that simplifies the policy process and 
focuses on the essential features of the empirical case.  The scholarly literature is 
full of theoretical approaches that do this; they can be categorised according to their 
predominant perspective on the policy process, as either macro-view (or structure-
based), meso-view (or institution-based) or micro-view (or interest-based).  After a 
more expanded critical review of the literature on all three perspectives (Appendix B 
presents a review of the literature on structure-based and institutional-based 
approaches), I centre on the micro-view and its interest-based approaches to 
policymaking.  I introduce each approach with reference to the general public policy 
literature and then present its development with respect to the health policy 
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literature.  The review is purposely broad—and not Spain-specific—as it looks to 
find a comparative analytical approach to studying and examining the policymaking 
process in a devolved health system.  
To understand the relationship between this review and the overall goals of 
my thesis, I kindly remind the reader of the key features of the policy process on 
which this thesis focuses.  My first research question concerns the influence of 
devolution (the independent variable) on (i) the structure and (ii) agency of the 
health policymaking process (dependent variables).  With regard to the independent 
variable and recalling the importance of a clear definition and our six dimensions for 
defining decentralization, the study uses the following definition for health system 
devolution:  
The transfer of power and authority over specific health system 
functions from the central government to subnational government units, 
with all the administrative, political and economic attributes and 
relationships that these entail, including the discretion to engage 
effectively in decision-making regarding health policies within their 
legally delimited geographic and functional domain.   
Thus, a key element is the transfer of decision-making power and authority over 
health system functions to the subnational government actors, who become new 
players in the policymaking process.  Consequently, the research focuses not only on 
the policymaking process itself but also on institutions and actors, as well as the 
relationships between them.  Accordingly, this subsection reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature on interest-based approaches and models to policymaking, 
which pay particular attention to institutions and actors involved in the 
policymaking process and the structure of their relationships, of which the latter 
delimits actor behaviour and interactions with each other.   
2.2.1.  Interest-based Approaches to Policymaking 
Interest-based models to policymaking focus on the role of actors, their relationships 
and interactions, and their respective policy preferences and strategies, offering a 
micro-level explanation of the policy processes and changes.  These models differ in 
three main ways.  First, they focus on specific types or groups of actors; for 
example, some models centre on the strategic actions of elites, others on bureaucrats 
and still others on private-sector interest groups (e.g. physician associations, unions, 
lobbyists, businesses).  It is important, then, to determine which actors are the most 
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significant players for a given policymaking scenario and issue.  Second, each model 
contains a way of representing actor interest and behaviour.  Generally, there are 
three major perspectives: homo recipricans, homo sociologicus and homo 
economicus.  Underlying many interest-based models are behavioural assumptions 
based on rationality.  Third, interest-based models address the links between actors, 
i.e., their relationships.  In these relationships, whether informal or formal, actors 
interact differently and design strategies for contributing to the process of 
policymaking.  The literature is well stocked with models and frameworks that can 
be used to analyse the strategic decision-making interaction between two or more 
actor groups and, depending on the strategies they employ and the choices they 
make, to determine possible policy outputs and outcomes.    
2.2.1.1.  Actors in Policy:  Actors in policymaking are “(groups of) 
individuals who participate in policy processes and whose preferences will 
ultimately determine the policy choice” (Knill and Tosun 2012, 40); see (Scharpf 
1997) for further discussion).  These actors may work independently, as individuals, 
or with others in a group.  Relatively few individuals (e.g. the president) are likely to 
have a significant influence on policy by themselves, so most work together in 
groups to coordinate their policy influence.  Accordingly, in the political science 
literature, the term “actor” usually denotes a group of individuals bound to each 
other by shared interests or common goals.   
These groups of actors are usually categorised as collective or corporative 
actors.  According to Laumann and Marsden (1979, 717), a collective actor is a 
group of individuals “who (1) share an outcome preference in some matter of 
common concern, and (2) are in an effective communication network with one 
another”.  Typical examples of collective actors are social movements, interest 
groups, social classes or ethno-religious groups who are united politically but not 
legally (L. C. Freeman, White, and Romney 1992).  The literature also supports the 
notion of government as a collective actor because it “is composed of persons who 
have preferences regarding the policy area they are responsible for and which they 
express in front of the other actors (mostly the legislature) in order to turn their 
preferences into public policy” (Knill and Tosun 2012, 41).  This description 
emphasises that actor preferences in government play a larger role in policymaking 
than the government’s internal organisation.  The collective actor, however, faces 
two weaknesses in its ability to act.  First, it often confronts changes in perceptions, 
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preferences and interest; thus, collective actors have a relatively shorter duration and 
their form of action is considered unstable (or changeable).  Second, it faces Olsen’s 
(1965) “free-rider” problem, whereby it can be an individual’s advantage not to 
invest effort in attaining a desired goal but rather to benefit from the efforts of others 
who are pursuing it already.  However, this problem describes the situation of 
individuals within a group, not an overall group or collective actor.  To circumvent 
these weaknesses, societies and organisations have developed ways to carry out 
collective action in a more stable fashion.  This generally has meant the 
institutionalisation of collective groups from purely political entities into legal ones, 
based on contractual arrangements.  When this happens, the actor group is 
considered a corporate actor.  Flam (1990, 6) refines Coleman’s (1974) original 
definition of corporate actors as “those organized actors which participate directly in 
(policy-oriented) decision-making, are formal organizations, have a real constitution 
and a real membership, but … can be said to also pursue autonomous, member-
independent interests.”  Scharpf (1997, 56)) adds that they are “typically ‘top-down’ 
organizations under the control of an ‘owner’ or of a hierarchical leadership 
representing the owners or beneficiaries.”  A firm is the prominent example of a 
corporate actor in the literature.   
Actors can also be characterised as public or private, with regard to whether 
their preferences and actions are on behalf of the state or their own interests, 
respectively.  In representative democracies, public actors are elected individuals 
who represent citizens through policymaking and appoint other actors to do the same 
in the different aspects of the policymaking process.  Key public actors include those 
in the executive, legislative and judicial branches who share power horizontally, as 
well as with the bureaucracy and political parties.  There is also a vertical division of 
power within a state and across levels of government (e.g. decentralization or 
federalism).  In addition to national institutions, supranational (e.g. EU or UN) and 
intergovernmental organisations increasingly influence domestic policymaking.  
Finally, there are private actors, interest groups and experts.  Private actors are not 
elected or appointed government officials, but they offer policymakers valuable 
information and potential solutions to social problems.  Key private actors in 
policymaking are interest groups (including lobbyists, interest associations, pressure 
groups and non-governmental organisations) and experts.   
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In a presidential system, the president as sovereign executive selects the 
cabinet and decides autonomously how much to rely on cabinet members’ opinions 
in his or her decision-making.  In parliamentary systems, the executive branch is 
more complex, as the head of the government (prime minister or chancellor) and 
ministers from the legislature form the cabinet.  Depending on their ability to garner 
support from a parliamentary majority, a cabinet is formed in one of two ways.  It 
may consist of members from only one party if that party has an absolute majority in 
parliament, but if there is a multi-party governing coalition, the cabinet usually has 
members from more than one party. 
The legislature functions primarily to enact policies but also provides 
legitimacy for the political system and, mainly in parliamentary systems, carries out 
oversight and control functions over the executive branch.  Legislatures can act 
positively to formulate and amend policies or negatively to block and delay 
policymaking (Kreppel 2011, 128).  Generally, the executive is more active in 
policymaking than the legislature, and legislatures in presidential systems are more 
active than in parliamentary systems.  In addition, there is usually little policy-
related disagreement between the executive and the legislature in parliamentary 
systems, whereas marked conflict between the two is typical in presidential systems.  
In addition, the legislature is responsible for facilitating communication between 
citizens and the government and representing citizens’ preferences in policymaking.  
This is how it imparts legitimacy to the political system.  Regarding its oversight 
and control activities in parliamentary systems, the legislature has an arsenal of tools 
for monitoring and evaluating the executive’s activities and controlling the 
budgetary process.  Examples of such activities include committee hearings, 
investigative committees, special inquiries and hearings, ombudsmen, and the 
preparation of reports for particular subjects.  In presidential systems, such activities 
are more limited.   
Judicial actors in policymaking are primarily the constitutional court judges, 
who affect the design and content of public policy in a profound way through their 
authority to interpret and apply the constitution and other laws.  Constitutional 
judges can influence policy directly through judicial review or by declaring a piece 
of legislation or a policy unconstitutional.  They become agenda setters when 
lawsuits addressing the neglect of social problems by the executive and legislative 
branches come before them (e.g. lawsuits on the harmful effects of smoking on 
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public health; see Daynard, Hash, and Robbins 2002).  In some countries, 
constitutional judges can even ban certain actors from participating in the policy 
process.  More generally, they can play a political role, as they usually have their 
own political preferences and have been nominated or selected by certain 
governments.  For example, the US Supreme Court justices are nominated by 
presidents and ratified by the Senate.  Presidents usually make Supreme Court 
nominations based not only on professional merit, but also on ideological 
compatibility and political support from the President and her cabinet.   
Bureaucratic actors are generally the implementers of policy, but they can 
also play a role in formulating policy due to their procedural and specialised 
knowledge (Knill and Tosun 2012, 60).  Bureaucrats are known for their technical 
capacity and autonomy in relation to elected politicians (Scartascini 2008, 64–65).  
Traditionally, they have been appointed based on their political loyalty rather than 
their experience or expertise (giving them low autonomy and low capacity).  
However, in most advanced Western democracies, bureaucrats are appointed 
according to experience and expertise and generally are self-governing in their 
actions; thus, enjoying high capacity and high autonomy.  This situation varies 
between countries and over time, and some bureaucracies are transitioning between 
these, meaning that they may have high autonomy and low capacity or vice versa. 
While not a branch or function of government, political parties also play an 
influential role in policymaking from the very beginning by recruiting, nominating 
and seating their members in political offices, and sometimes also in bureaucratic 
positions.  Parties coordinate many political functions including, most importantly, 
electoral campaigns.  They also structure competitions by selecting candidates for 
elections and appointed offices, represent their members within government 
institutions and society, and play a role in policymaking by influencing the ideas and 
beliefs of citizens about certain public policies, affecting electoral decisions and 
defining the strength of their party in the executive and legislative branches (Gilardi 
2010).  Political parties are generally defined by their ideological views.    
Private actors include a variety of interest groups and experts.  Interest 
groups are organisations that work to align government policy with the interests of 
their members.  As opposed to social movements, they are formally organised actors 
that interact with and access institutions in different decision-making arenas on a 
regular basis (Kriesi 2011).  They can also be a part of a social movement.  
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According to Wilson (1974), individuals join interest groups to pursue their specific 
goals, enjoy the benefits of group membership and/or make a political statement.  
Regarding the first of these three, interest groups can pursue the private interests of 
their members, which are often financial in nature, or public interests, whose 
benefits extend beyond its members.  Private interest groups usually represent the 
interests of professions, such as associations of doctors or teachers.  Public interest 
groups are not-for-profit organisations that pursue public issues such as the 
environment, health, or human and civil rights.  Interest groups affect policymaking 
primarily through lobbying politicians and exchanging resources—such as policy-
relevant knowledge on an issue—for access to politicians.   
While interest group members can also be experts, experts as understood 
here are distinguished by their unbiased influence on policymaking.  They are, 
according to Haas (1992, 5), epistemic communities or “networks of recognised 
specialists with policy-relevant knowledge in a particular issue area.”  Examples of 
such communities in the health arena include the Global Health Council and the 
Global Health Network.  Individual experts, including scientists, consultants and 
practitioners, can also influence policymakers’ decisions with their knowledge and 
information on a particular issue (Howlett 2009).  Often, individual experts serve as 
political advisers to a prime minister or to the cabinet (Eichbaum and Shaw 2007; 
2008).  Once experts accept such a position, their impartiality is often questioned.   
2.2.1.2.  Actor Behaviour: Homo Economicus and Rational Choice:  In 
addition to a focus on key actors in policymaking, the policy literature presents 
models for actor behaviour.  The three major perspectives on how to best represent 
actor behaviour are homo reciprocans, homo sociologicus and homo economicus 
(Dahrendorf 1968).  Both homo reciprocans and homo sociologicus take a mainly 
sociological theoretical perspective.  Homo reciprocans, or “reciprocal man”, 
characterises human behaviour as primarily motivated by reciprocity and a desire to 
improve one’s environment through cooperation.  Homo sociologicus, or 
“sociological man”, portrays human behaviour as fulfilling social roles and norms.  
These two perspectives, particularly the latter, are applied in structure-based and 
institutional-based approaches to policymaking (cf.  Appendix B).   
The homo economicus perspective on human behaviour is the one most 
aligned with this section’s focus on interest-based approaches to policymaking.  
Homo economicus, or “economic man”, is a concept widely utilised in economic 
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theories and other social sciences, representing human behaviour as rational and 
self-interested because humans seek to attain specific, pre-determined goals to the 
best of their ability and at minimal cost.7  This motivation subjectively influences 
judgements and decision-making.  In the policy literature, this perspective is more 
commonly referred to as the rational choice perspective, wherein rational actors seek 
to fulfil their preferences.  In contrast to other human behaviour perspectives, homo 
economicus takes more of a calculated rather than a cultural approach, seeing 
humans’ main objective as to maximise utility as a consumer and economic profit as 
a producer.   
The words rationality and self-interest in this human behavioural perspective 
describe how a decision is reached, rather than the result or object of that decision.  
More specifically, rationality describes the fact that choices are made to serve a 
certain purpose; it explain how actors seek to realise their desires and preferences.  
Self-interest does not mean being selfish or egotistical, but rather self-centred 
(Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 16).  For example, rational actors are self-interested in 
the sense that they “view the world from their own perspective and form preferences 
based on their interpretation of it” (Dowding and King 1995, 13–14).   
Moreover, a person acting rationally and with self-interest has ordered 
desires and preferences, and acts to fulfil them.  According to Hindmoor (2006, 182; 
Tsebelis 1990, 18), an actor’s desires and preferences can be modelled as axiomatic 
and optimizing.  The axiomatic approach means that people compare all their desires 
and preferences, rank them in a hierarchical order of importance, and pursue them in 
that order (Griggs 2007).  Given this understanding, the rational choice perspective 
in decision-making requires a top-down logic and deductive reasoning so as to link 
premises with conclusions in a transitive way—e.g. if A is preferred to B and B to 
C, then A is preferred to C.  Adding to this foundation, the optimizing approach 
suggests that actors also pursue their preferences in an optimal way, with perfect 
information and no limitations in expertise or ability.  This premise characterises the 
fully rational actor as it is often used in microeconomics and sometimes in political 
science.   
                                               
7 This does not mean that the actual goals of the actor are rational in a larger ethical and social sense, 
but that the behaviour used to attain them is rational. 
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As an approximation of what happens in reality, the idea of the fully rational 
actor is somewhat implausible, especially for policymakers, who lead potentially 
busier lives than most people do.  Behaving with full rationality would be 
impossible in view of the great number of decisions that they make every day.  It 
would be particularly hard for policymakers to obtain all the information and 
knowledge necessary to understand the policy alternatives comprehensively and 
determine which one is most likely to serve their own agenda.   
To this end, Herbert Simon (1957) amended the concept of full rationality 
previously used to model human behaviour to bounded rationality – bounded, most 
importantly, in the amount of information that people can gather and cognitively 
process in a meaningful way within the finite amount of time available to make a 
decision.  The concept of bounded rationality still assumes that people are goal-
oriented, but in a “satisficing” rather than optimizing way.  Simon (1947) first 
posited the term satisficing to explain the behaviour of decision makers when an 
optimal outcome cannot be reached, indicating that they seek satisfactory solutions 
to issues rather than optimal ones.  Thus, a decision made with bounded rationality 
does not require top-down, transitive logic.  Rather, it can be based on the imperfect 
information available and the decision maker’s assessment of the outcome that is 
most likely to be satisfactory.   
Rational choice theory is based on the assumption that individuals employ 
either full or bounded rationality in their decision-making.8  It applies this axiom and 
other theoretical tools advanced in economics to produce models that depict the 
essential features of political processes in the real world, along with likely human 
behaviours and their consequences.  It boils down individual decision-making 
behaviour to its very essence under particular conditions in order to create a model 
for predicting aggregate human behaviour.  Then, it combines these models with 
detailed assumptions regarding how individuals relate to one another in specific 
institutional settings and what their preferences are.  Finally, it runs these models to 
examine the extent to which they can confirm or refute assumptions and predictions 
and, ultimately, to explain socio-political outcomes by establishing causality.   
                                               
8 This is as opposed to other motivations in decision-making such as “habit, tradition, or social 
appropriateness” (MacDonald 2003, 552).   
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The assumptions for individual preferences can be either simple or complex, 
“thin” or “thick”.  A thin set of assumptions, for example, might include that actors 
optimise, their preferences are ranked by priority and they are transitive.  A thick set 
of assumptions is more detailed and offers specific assumptions for preferences and 
beliefs (Tsebelis 1990, 30).  For example, Sheple and Bonchek (1997, 17–18, 33–
35) modelled the effect of uncertainty and imperfect information on an individual’s 
ability to pursue his or her preferences.  As another example, Hindess (1988, 69, 80) 
modelled uncertainty while taking into consideration bounded rationality, which 
emphasises “satisficing” rather than optimisation.  These assumptions can also be 
described as either weak or strong, depending on the consistency of preference.  In 
the end, however, the discussion about assumptions for individual preferences 
comes down to the same trade-offs as in other fields: either explaining a lot with a 
little or a little with a lot – the choice between the law of parsimony (Occam’s razor) 
and the law of miserliness.    
Rational choice theory does have its critics.  Some authors (Laver 1997, 4–
10) have contrasted it with methods that employ inductive reasoning and generalise 
from observed patterns of behaviour, such as Immergut’s (1992) study of health 
politics in France, Sweden and Switzerland.  Other authors have critiqued its 
“degree of variation of characterization of actor behavior in the different models” 
(Stoker and Marsh 2002, 6).  Many have argued that its models have little to do with 
reality and real-world actor behaviour (Green and Shapiro 1994; 2005; Udehn 1996; 
S. Parsons 2005).  These authors, however, tend to hold rational choice theories to 
higher standards than most other theories face (Laver 1997; John 1998; Ward 2002; 
Hindmoor 2006).   
Despite these critiques, rational choice theory has proven to be particularly 
useful in answering questions about institutions, especially how people manoeuvre 
within them.  It can demonstrate a tendency towards a particular behaviour or at 
least provide a convincing explanation for why it occurs (Hindmoor 2006, 212).  In 
this sense, models of rational choice theory can offer conditional predictions of 
policy outcomes (Dowding 2001, 92; Hay 2004, 57).  Rational choice theory also 
has an advantage over other approaches (such as inductive reasoning): it requires 
simplification of the real world in its model building.  This is where some critics 
have misinterpreted the value of simplifying reality.  Such simplification forces 
researchers to formalise their argument, clarify their assumptions and choose the 
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aspects they consider most relevant and worthy of study (Ward 2002).  At the very 
least, a rational choice theory model is useful in enabling a comparison between its 
results and the real-world situation (Dowding 1991).  Ward (2002, 70) agrees and 
further adds that the “instrumentally rational9, self-interested self” can actually be 
utilised as a standard point of reference to actual human behaviour.10  Furthermore, 
rational choice theory contributes to the understanding of questions about 
behaviours that it cannot address directly, such as “why individuals have the 
interests they do, how they perceive those interests, and the distribution of rules, 
powers and social roles that determines the constraints on their actions” (Ward 2002, 
65). 
The issues raised by rational choice theory inform most aspects of public 
policy, including the rules of government formation, the power of bureaucracies, and 
the extent to which institutions can be used to solve collective action problems.  
Rational choice theory can therefore fulfil a normative role, dealing with questions 
such as “How can we hold people accountable when they deliver public services?”  
It is often utilised in situations regarding public goods, such as communicable 
diseases in public health, where everyone needs to work together towards a joint 
policy but where “free riding” can also occur (Cairney 2012, 134; Ostrom 1990).  
Moreover, rational choice theory has been used to explore government solutions, 
which are often far from optimal, and may be costly and produce unintentional 
consequences.  For example, Ostrom (1990) demonstrated that non-market and non-
institutional solutions to collective action problems could be more cost-effective and 
efficient.   
2.2.1.3.  Actor Relationships and Interactions:  Interest-based models of 
policymaking focus on the different types of actors and their behaviour, addressing 
the relationships among them.  Actors are influenced not only by the institutions that 
surround them but also by the presence of other actor groups.  To understand 
policymaking fully, it is necessary to model and examine how actors interact with 
one another.  There are various representations of the relationships and interactions 
of rational actors in situations of strategic decision-making; the most basic of these 
                                               
9 Instrumentally rational individuals fulfil their preferences according to their beliefs regarding the 
most appropriate means to achieve them.  This is intentional behaviour based on the goals of the 
individual (Elster 1985, 8) and not motivated by “habit, tradition, or social appropriateness” 
(MacDonald 2003, 552).   
10 Laver (1997, 9) does this with the alternative “socially-oriented, norm-driven self’.   
 Decentralization, Devolution and the Policymaking Process 
   52 
 
is game theory.  After discussing game theory and its relation to rational choice, I 
will discuss the main aspects of community power and influence.   
Game theory allows the researcher to consider more than one rational actor 
or actor group in isolation while also paying attention to the interactions between 
actor groups and the institutions that surround them.  It represents decision-making 
as a game in which the actors choose between two or more possible strategies and 
the outcomes depend on those choices.  As in chess, each strategy tells the actor 
which choice to make in response to the actions of other players, the anticipated 
choices of other actors and the expected “payoffs” for all actors (Hindmoor 2006, 
106–7).  In addition, each game defines the information available to each player 
when he or she makes a decision, especially whether it is perfect (fully rational) or 
imperfect (boundedly rational) information (McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007).   
The main purpose of game theory is to “identify points of equilibrium when 
actors make a choice and stick to it, such as the ‘Nash equilibrium’ when players 
have made their best choice and there is no incentive to change behavior” (Cairney 
2012, 138).  “The ‘best choice’ refers to the ‘best co-strategy to what one expects 
the other person(s)’ choice will be’ rather than a choice which necessarily produces 
the best overall outcomes” (Chwaszcza 2008, 145).  In the realm of public policy, 
game theory furthers the principles of rational choice institutionalism in particular 
by looking at how institutions and public policies are created to address collective 
action dilemmas.  By finding the equilibria of games, game theory helps to predict 
how actors will behave in similar policymaking situations.   
One well-known example of game theory with imperfect information is 
Albert Tucker’s “prisoner’s dilemma”, which demonstrates how two fully rational 
individuals might still not cooperate, even if it seems to be in their best interest to do 
so and achieve the optimal collective outcome (Poundstone 1992).11  This is not a 
realistic representation, however, of how policymakers might interact.  Modelled 
after the prisoner’s dilemma, Hardin’s (1968, 1247) “tragedy of the commons” 
                                               
11 “Puzzles with the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma were devised and discussed by Merrill Flood 
and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporation’s investigations into game theory 
(which Rand pursued because of possible applications to global nuclear strategy).  The title 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ and the version with prison sentences as payoffs are due to Albert Tucker, who 
wanted to make Flood and Dresher’s ideas more accessible to an audience of Stanford psychologists.  
Although Flood and Dresher didn’t themselves rush to publicize their ideas in external journal 
articles, the puzzle attracted widespread attention in a variety of disciplines” (Kuhn 2011).  See also 
Flood (1952; 1958). 
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presents a scenario that is more widely applicable, especially to situations with 
limited common resources.  In this scenario, individuals act out of rational self-
interest and use common resources (e.g. air, pastures, public health resources) for 
their own gain and with no regard for others; if they do this without any regulation 
of the common resources, then they are likely to consume more than their fair share 
of the resources (free-riding) to the point where these resources are eventually 
depleted.  This may be a particular problem when a collective group is large and the 
potential to free ride is greater.  Olson (1971, 2 emphasis in orginal) commented, 
“Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is 
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or 
group interests”.  As a result, the literature suggests that larger groups should make 
collective agreements with selective (or members-only) benefits or incentives to 
reduce the negative externalities of free riding.   
While the prisoner’s dilemma and the tragedy of the commons portray 
structural decision-making situations addressing conflict and cooperation among 
actors, they still tend not to accurately portray the real-life situations faced by 
policymakers—who can speak and interact directly with each other, gather more 
information and additional resources on the issue at hand and make decisions based 
on more than a limited number of choices.  Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) study on 
Governing the Commons criticised Hardin’s work and provided empirical evidence 
of how common concerns requiring collective action can sometimes be solved by 
voluntary organisations and not only by state or market solutions.  In her Nobel 
Prize Lecture (2009), Ostrom stated: 
The classic models have been used to view those who are involved in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game or other social dilemmas as always trapped 
in the situation without capabilities to change the structure themselves.  
This analytical step was a retrogressive step in the theories used to 
analyse the human condition.  Whether or not the individuals who are 
in a situation have capacities to transform the external variables 
affecting their own situation varies dramatically from one situation to 
the next.  It is an empirical condition that varies from situation to 
situation rather than a logical universality.  Public investigators 
purposely keep prisoners separated so they cannot communicate.  The 
users of a common-pool resource are not so limited. 
From these examples of game theory, we should keep in mind that when 
assumptions are changed, the nature of the problem also changes.  For example, 
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Capraro (2013) posits that when given the opportunity, individuals prefer to form 
coalitions and cooperate in order to achieve the most optimistic forecast in a one-off 
social dilemma.  Another example is the extended “iterated” version of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, where a “tit for tat” strategy is employed when the game is 
played repeatedly with the same prisoners (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 
1984).  Furthermore, still considering the “iterated” game, Tsebilis (1990, 2) 
proposes that, if the number of rounds is known, then it may actually be an optimal 
strategy for a prisoner to act irrationally in the short term to achieve a longer-term 
goal.  This means that institutions, defined as the “rules of the game” by Ostrom 
(1986), are many and may affect actors’ behaviour differently (Dowding and King 
1995, 10).  Thus, it is important to define the type of institution at the centre of one’s 
research.   
Just as in the original prisoner’s dilemma and other games emulating rational 
choice, an institution (or an institutional solution) does not always result in an 
optimal outcome for all persons.  When policymakers make policy choices, 
inevitably, some people’s preferences are satisfied and others are not.  Governments 
cannot solve everyone’s problems; “they solve some, ignore some, and make others 
worse off” (Cairney 2012, 143).  Therefore, the basics of game theory as described 
above may not be enough to explain policymaking processes.  Indeed, there is 
evidence that actors are not only influenced by the presence of prior or anticipated 
choices and the strategies of the actors around them (as suggested by game theory), 
but also by other factors, most importantly the amount of power (i.e., authority, 
resources and information) and influence (i.e., exerted power) of other actors in the 
decision-making situation.  This point was famously stressed by Machiavelli (1513) 
and more recently by Hunter (1953; 1980), Mills (1956), Dahl (1958), Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962; 1963), Lukes (1974; 2005), and Flyvbjerg (1998).   
The concept of power pervades the political science literature and is central 
to the decision-making process.  Power is often an explanatory factor of policy 
instability and change; policymakers, for example, often exercise their power to 
obtain the policies they desire or resist the efforts of others.  Elitism and pluralism 
are two of the most common interpretive models of community power in the 
literature; the two assume very different understandings of where power is held.  
Elitism treats power as “concentrated in the hands of a small number of people or 
organizations that control policy processes”, whereas pluralism views power as 
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being diffuse, fragmented and specialised, with no actors holding overall control of 
the policy process (Cairney 2012, 46–47).  Accordingly, some authors theorise a 
“ruling elite” (Hunter 1953; Mills 1956) while others believe that actor power varies 
depending on the policy issue (Dahl 1958; Lindblom 1959).12   
In broad terms, power has been defined as having three dimensions (or 
faces).  Its first face of power can be directly observed: power lies with the ‘one who 
wins’ (Dahl 1958).  The second face is less visible, declaring that power lies with 
the ‘one who sets the agenda’ because s/he often decides what the issues are and 
who participates in decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz 1962).  In line with this, 
Schattschneider (1960) described the exercise of power within policy communities, 
or close-knit policy networks, which determine which topics will receive attention.  
While these first two faces are overt uses of power, the third face is a covert process 
of manipulation.  Posited by Lukes (1974), this third face of power highlights how 
those in power can manipulate others to act in agreement with a powerful group’s 
preferences rather than their own interests.  The first face of power is easier to 
identify than the other two, but these last two can be theorised from an examination 
of social, economic and political relations in the structured environment 
(institutional rules) that affect how actors exercise power (Dowding 1996).   
Since the 1700s, societies have shifted from dominance by an elitist ruling 
class (an oligarchy) to greater pluralism (Dahl 1961).  Initially, people with high 
social standing, education and wealth held leadership positions in government, but 
over time, people of lower social status have gradually gained political influence.  
Today, the latter group occupies a far greater portion of elected positions in 
government than in earlier times and, although some inequality persists, in most 
modern-day societies social status and money do not go along with control of 
government.  In addition, according to Polsby (1960, 482), “the individuals who 
spend time, energy and money in an attempt to influence policies in one issue-area 
are rather different from those who do so in another” (See also Dahl (1961, 
126,169,180,273-4) and Moran (2005, 15)).   Today, most political systems are so 
large and fragmented that one actor cannot influence all areas of public policy; 
therefore, public policy is specialised by issue and area.   
                                               
12 Lindblom (1959, 85) characterizes “good” policy as that which is reached through consensus 
among many actors negotiating within the political system (e.g. pluralism).   
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Despite the more pluralist nature of modern society, this characterisation of 
directly observable decision-making does not take into account “non-decision-
making” power (i.e., the second face of power, or excluding some people from 
participation; see Bachrach and Baratz (1970, 49–50)) or unobservable manipulation  
(the third face of power), both of which are very difficult to demonstrate 
empirically.  When lacking all the facts, authors usually turn to ideological norms to 
fill in the gaps.  As such, Hindess (1996) and others have suggested a normative 
perspective centred on the right to exercise power.  Based on this perspective, 
elected governments are expected to act on behalf of the populations who elected 
them.  Accordingly, Hindess (1996, 13) suggests, “At the heart of such relationships 
is the notion of a contract in which those vested with the right to exercise power are 
under certain obligations not to abuse that right, in part by upholding the values of 
those who consent.”  At the same time, he writes, “since one function of government 
is to regulate the attitudes and behavior of the citizens for the collective good, it 
produces a circular effect: consent for government action is based on government-
influenced attitudes” (Hindess 1996, 43).   
2.2.2.  Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Along with historical and sociological institutionalisms (see Appendix B), rational 
choice institutionalism falls under the umbrella of “new institutionalisms”; 
nonetheless, it is considered more of an interest-based—rather than an institution-
based—policymaking approach.  Rational choice institutionalism is the main 
interest-based approach in the public policy literature.  Born in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, it was pioneered by political scientists trying to understand American 
congressional behaviour (most notably Shepsle (1986; 1989)).  Previously, 
majoritarian models to understand the effects of decision-making on legislative 
behaviour and policy outcomes.  These models predicted that policy outcomes 
would be unstable; that is, they expected that secure stable majorities for legislation 
would be difficult to attain because a simple majority could always form a coalition 
to overturn existing legislation.  When they looked at decision-making in the US 
Congress, where legislatures have to order multiple preferences on a multitude of 
complex issues, they found to their surprise that the empirical results for 
congressional outcomes actually showed considerable policy stability (Riker 1980).  
When rational choice theorists began to research possible explanatory factors for 
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this paradox of collective action, they found that institutions mattered (Shepsle 
1979; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Riker 1982).  For example, Shepsle (1979) 
argued that congressional committees could change legislative behaviour through 
the rules of procedure governing the agenda-setting process, for example by 
allowing or disallowing policy alternatives or by structuring the voting and veto 
powers of actors in the policymaking process.13  
As an interest-based approach to policymaking, rational choice 
institutionalism places actors and their behaviour at the centre of policy analysis.  In 
this regard, it generally employs a characteristic set of behavioural assumptions for 
individuals, conceiving human nature (in contrast to historical and sociological 
institutionalisms) as rational and self-interested, and contending that human 
decision-making is driven by this nature and guided by a logic of consequentialism.  
In this context, consequentialism means the presumption that behaviour is rational if 
and only if it is explicable by its consequences.   
Although rational choice institutionalists believe that humans behave in a 
rational and self-interested way, they also view humans as intentionally strategic and 
calculating in their endeavours to obtain what they want.  As noted above, they take 
a more calculating approach than do the devotees of the historical and sociological 
perspectives, postulating that actors are motivated by a strategic calculus to 
maximise their own objectives and utility.  Moreover, they assume that actors adapt 
their strategies and utilise their resources to pursue their preferences (i.e., their fixed 
and ordered interests) to the fullest potential possible under the presumed 
consequences of their own actions and the actions of others in each decision-making 
situation (March and Olsen 1984; 1989; 2008).   
Consistent with the calculus approach, rational choice institutionalists 
employ the methods of deduction and “methodological individualism” in their 
policy analysis.  They derive their hypotheses from theory and then test them with 
empirical data, making assumptions regarding actor behaviour and modelling actor 
desires and preferences axiomatically and transitively (as discussed above).  Finally, 
rational choice institutionalists aggregate the decision data of the individual actors in 
an attempt to explain socio-political outcomes (Cairney 2012).  This is different 
                                               
13 As mentioned above, Ostrom (1986) further defined them to be “the rules of the game”, showing 
how they mattered.   
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from, for example, the “cultural approach” of historical institutionalists, who 
inductively derive empirical generalisations and theories from the data.   
Each behavioural approach and method has its advantages and 
disadvantages.  For example, the deductions used in the calculus approach can result 
in competing explanations, while inductive analysis and the cultural approach more 
clearly differentiate between possible competing explanations.  The calculus 
approach, however, allows rational choice institutionalists to demonstrate causality 
more precisely between institutions and actor behaviour, and between strategic 
interactions among actors and political outcomes.  The resulting insights have 
greatly advanced traditional approaches to policymaking (see structure-based 
theories in Appendix B).  Moreover, the behavioural assumptions in rational choice 
theory provide a micro-foundation for more systematic analysis and theory building 
than the other “new institutionalisms” or more traditional approaches to 
policymaking do.  However, as we have seen, rational choice institutionalism is 
often criticised for its simplistic view of human behaviour and motivation (see also 
Cook and Levi (1990); Mansbridge (1990)).  The trade-off, then, involves pursuing 
a more precise casual chain that lends itself to greater systematic theory building and 
analysis (including game-theoretic models of political processes) at the cost of a 
relatively crude theory vis-à-vis human nature and behaviour.   
Since the early 1990s, though, rational choice institutionalists (e.g. Garrett 
and Weingast (1993)) have been adding the cultural approach onto the calculus 
approach in their analyses in order to distinguish between competing explanations.  
They have justified this extended analysis by arguing that a strategic and goal-
oriented actor is likely to comb through competing policy choices or options and 
take action on the one that is more culturally agreeable (Hall and Taylor 1996).   
Building on these ideas of rationality and rational choice theory, rational 
choice institutionalists emphasise the role of institutions in the policymaking process 
and outcomes.  They broadly define institutions as the rules that structure or 
influence behaviour and that shape the strategic choices and interactions of 
policymakers and other actors (Steinmo 2008).  They consider both formal and 
informal (or structured and unstructured) institutions in their definition.  Rational 
choice institutionalists have usually favoured studying formal rules (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005, 10–11), but some scholars have treated institutions as both formal and 
informal or as solely informal rules (Shepsle 2006).  According to Cairney (2012, 
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90), informal rules and norms of behaviour transcend formal rules.  Moreover, 
rational choice institutionalists believe that institutional structures have a major 
influence on how actors perceive and calculate the costs and benefits of their 
actions; however, in most cases, they believe that actor interests and preferences are 
exogenously given.14  As such, they believe that institutions provide the context 
within which actors operate, offering information to actors regarding the possible 
consequences of their actions (Hall and Taylor 1996).  Such information limits the 
actions of individuals or groups and/or incentivises them to act in one way or 
another.  As such, institutions play an important role in the policymaking process 
and outcomes.   
Rational choice institutionalists believe that not only the structure or 
institutional arrangements of the political system (polity) but also political interests 
affect policy priorities and choices.  For example, in the case of decentralization and 
other macro-organisational policies, the institutional rules define a specific amount 
and distribution of powers and resources between different levels of government, 
and the particular interests of the different levels and policy areas help to define 
further policy choices and priorities within the boundaries of the institutional rules.  
Compared to historical and sociological institutionalists, then, rational choice 
institutionalists place less significance on institutions in their policy analysis.  
Indeed, they tend to think of institutions as secondary intervening factors while actor 
interests serve as the primary independent factors for explaining political outcomes 
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast 1996; Shepsle 2006).  Consequently, they 
contend that while institutional structures determine the extent to which actor 
preferences may be translated into public policies (i.e., just how much a priority is a 
specific policy?), actor interests and preferences ultimately determine the policy 
choices.   
2.2.2.1. Empirical Studies:  Rational choice institutionalism has treated 
institutions as solutions to various public policy problems; for example, institutions 
may solve collective action problems, situations with high transaction costs, and 
problems of policy instability.  First, collective action problems affect primarily 
interest groups and arise when there is a high potential for individual choices to have 
                                               
14 According to Shepsle (2006), there are two standard ways to interpret institutions: as exogenous 
constraints (e.g. North (1990)) and as equilibrium (e.g. Calvert (1995)).   
 Decentralization, Devolution and the Policymaking Process 
   60 
 
adverse effects on society (cf.  Olson (1965), Moe (1981), and Ostrom (1990)).  
Governments often justify their involvement in areas where groups are unable to 
cooperate on their own.  Their intervention, however, can create other problems 
within government, such as principal-agent problems where discord arises between 
government mandates and their implementation by functionaries.  Because the 
present thesis centres on already-organised actors in government, I will not delve 
further into the literature on collective action problems.   
Second, stemming from the literature on the “new economics of 
organization”, rational choice institutionalists have employed institutions as a 
solution for reducing high transaction costs as well as decision and information costs 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, 945).  The premise of this approach is that institutions are a 
set of formal rules that can minimise certain costs when established (or amended) 
appropriately.  Decision costs are those that result from an agreement, whereas 
information costs are acquired while one searches for the information needed to 
make a decision (B. D. Jones and Baumgartner 2005) and transaction costs occur 
after the agreement is reached (generally for monitoring and evaluation procedures).  
This understanding of transaction costs has been applied to the operation and 
development of institutions in public policy by Thompson (1998), Epstein and 
O’Halloran (1999), and Arias and Caballero (2003) and to the design of political 
institutions by Estache and Martimort (1999) and Huber and Shipan (2002).   
Third, rational choice institutionalists have utilised institutions to explain 
problems of policy instability.  As noted above, political scientists pioneered rational 
choice institutionalism in their efforts to explain why policymaking in the US 
Congress paradoxically appeared stable, and they found that institutions mattered 
(Shepsle 1979; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Riker 1982).  Rational choice 
explanations for institutional change rest on the idea that, since people and 
policymakers will make choices or changes that are in their interest, the continued 
existence of an institution over time depends mostly upon the benefits it delivers.  It 
is thus rare for an existing institution to fail so thoroughly to meet the preferences of 
the people or policymakers that they would be motivated to create a completely new 
institution or set of rules.  As Cairney (2012, 80) explains, “Overall, institutions 
represent sets of rules that influence choices, often producing regular patterns of 
behavior.  This regularity can be expressed in terms of equilibrium when we identify 
a stable point at which there is no incentive to divert from these patterns of 
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behavior.”  Indeed, policymakers most often face a Nash equilibrium situation when 
deciding whether to generate a new institution.  Thus, this interest-based 
policymaking approach actually lends itself to explaining how existing institutions 
continue to exist.  And, as observed by the punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993), a major turning point, event or window of 
opportunity is needed to motivate people to take on the cumbersome and sizeable 
task of creating a whole new institution.  It is thus understandable why rational 
choice institutionalism is relatively successful in addressing the problem of change 
or instability.   
Rational choice institutionalism has been widely applied to explain cases of 
policy instability (or stability).  While some researchers (Shepsle and Weingast 
1994; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Moe 1987) looked at the relationship between 
congress and congressional committees, Cox and McCubbins (2007) focused on the 
impact of political parties, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) looked at congressional 
oversight, Ferejohn (1995) examined the relationship between Congress and the 
courts, Laver and Shepsle (1990) looked at coalitions and cabinets, and North and 
Weingast (1989) researched the influence of constitutions and other commitments.  
Still other authors expanded rational choice institutionalism research to cover 
democracy and the market (e.g. Przeworski (1991)), democratic transitions (e.g. 
Marks (1992)), and politicians’ dilemmas (Geddes 1994; de Nardo 1985).   
Moreover, rational choice institutionalism has been extended into the 
literature on multilevel governance, especially that concerning the European Union 
(Scharpf 1988; Tsebelis 1994; Martin 1994; Pollack 1996; 2005) and international 
organisations (e.g. Martin (1992)).  Scharpf (1988), for example, argued that specific 
institutional rules like unanimous decision-making, along with the challenges of 
intergovernmental relations, caused inefficiencies and rigidities in EU policies.  
Subsequently, Tsebelis and others used rational choice institutionalism to examine 
the adoption, execution and adjudication of public policies in the EU.  Tsebelis 
(2002) famously modelled the role of veto players in policymaking, using rational 
choice institutionalism and addressing the issue of policy instability (see Appendix 
Section A.4 on Tsebelis’s veto players theory and others, e.g., Immergut’s veto 
points).   
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2.2.3.  The Principal-Agent Model  
Still other authors have combined rational choice institutionalism with different 
structural models in an attempt to explain how relationships are structured and 
interconnected.  Most commonly, rational choice institutionalism has been 
combined with the principal-agent model (or agency theory).  This theory departs 
from the behavioural assumption that human beings are self-regarding and driven by 
self-interest.  It represents a situation in which a principal contracts with an agent to 
act on its behalf.  However, the principal is highly dependent on the agent to carry 
out the tasks and activities necessary for attaining the principal’s interests and 
objectives.  The principal monitors the agent’s activities, but the agent has more 
information than the principal does on these actions.  This asymmetry of information 
can lead the agent to act in his or her own interests15 rather than the principal’s 
interest.  For this reason, the principal is likely to employ mechanisms that induce 
the agent to fulfil the agreements in the contract, such as incentives, sanctions and 
rules, and to obtain the desired outcome.  Early empirical studies of this combination 
of rational choice institutionalism and the agency model in government looked at the 
relationship between politics and the administrative bureaucracy (North 1990), 
especially between the US Congress and the regulatory agencies it oversees (Pratt 
and Zeckhauser 1991; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Moe 1984; Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991).  In addition, Huber and Shipan (2002) explored more deeply the 
problem of agency with an emphasis on bureaucratic autonomy and discretion.   
In the health literature, two uses of the principal-agent model stand out.  Le 
Grand (2006) explored how the public sector may design policies with incentive 
structures that better align the interests of the principal and the agent toward 
achieving the desired outcomes.  With respect to health care policy, he considered 
the general practitioner-patient relationship in various institutional settings of the 
British National Health Service and how policies may be designed to “go some way 
towards empowering patients, but … avoid the problems of unfettered patient 
choice” (Wetherley and Lipsky 1977, 105–6).  Bossert (1998) also applied the 
principal-agent model to health policy, focusing on decentralized health systems, 
                                               
15 For example, bureaucrats might aim to increase their income and prestige by climbing up the career 
ladder and by seeking to realize their private interests when drafting legislation (Muller 2011).  They 
may also be interested in maximizing their utility more through bureau-shaping than by budget 
maximization (Dunleavy 1991). 
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with the ministry of health as principal and the local health authorities as agents.16  
After defining decision space, he used this model to examine how the local health 
authorities used the decision space granted to them (e.g. do they innovate or 
continue doing what they had done before?) and how their actions affected health 
system performance.  His decision-space map illustrates the range of choice that the 
agent is allowed within each functional area and how the agents’ decisions in each 
functional area can influence performance (e.g. equity, efficiency, quality).  He also 
examined the sanctions, incentives and other mechanisms that the ministry of health 
could use to keep the actions of local health authorities aligned with national health 
system objectives.  Bossert (1998a, 1521) stated, though, that “the ministry’s ability 
to change the decision space and even to provide incentives and punishments is 
limited by decisions made by the other institutions of the central government.”  This 
suggests that, while the principal-agent model as employed by Bossert may be 
sufficient for drawing conclusions on the performance of devolved health systems, 
looking also at what other institutions at either the central or local level participate in 
decision-making in a devolved health system and incorporating them into the model 
might tell a more complete story.   
2.2.4.  The Policy Network Approach  
The policy network approach is a model used to explain how relationships are 
structured and interconnected.  Policy network analysis initially developed in the 
political science literature in the 1970s (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974b)17 in response 
to a growing dispersion of resources and powers, followed by increasing 
interdependence and coordination, among numerous public and private actors 
(Marin and Mayntz 1991; Héritier 2002).  This development looked at a variety of 
political environments from community politics in cities to the EU’s multi-level 
governance.  It occurred simultaneously but independently on both sides of the 
Atlantic, in the US, Britain and continental Europe (Enroth 2011).18  In the US, 
policy networks evolved naturally from the literature on sub-governments, 
                                               
16 The principal-agent model that Bossert uses can be applied to a centralized system and can 
accommodate more than one principal.   
17 The idea of policy networks is now common to many social science disciplines, including 
organisational theory, public administration and economic sociology in addition to political science 
(Rhodes 2006; Ansell 2006).   
18 See also Rhodes (1981; 1988; 1997), Borzel (1998), Kickert, Klijn, and Koppernjan (1997), 
O’Toole (1997), and Salamon (2002). 
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subsystems and ‘iron triangles’.  In Europe, this dispersion of resources 
accompanied strategies of regionalisation (also known as administrative 
decentralization or devolution to the regional-level government) and 
Europeanisation, which were ignited by a fiscal crisis and a major process of 
industrialisation (Ansell 2000).  Through regionalisation, national governments 
increasingly transferred more responsibility and authority over various competencies 
to regional-level governments.  It is well documented that many countries around 
the world have regionalised or decentralized since the 1970s.  Consequently, centre-
regional partnerships or stewardship relationships have evolved (Hooghe and Marks 
2003; Rhodes 1981), partly due to the limited capacity of most regional 
governments in the late twentieth century (Le Galés and Lequesne 1998; Levy 1999) 
and also to ensure continued coherence in policymaking across governments (both 
vertically and horizontally).  As a result, the concept of contemporary governance, 
also referred to as modern governance (Kooiman 1993) or network governance, was 
born (Ansell 2000).  This model of networked polity has become progressively more 
important as it has been applied across different levels of government. 
According to Rhodes (1997), contemporary governance is represented by a 
highly differentiated political structure and processes, comprising a diverse range of 
actors.  It suggests an organised disaggregation of the traditional state into 
overlapping jurisdictions as well as the replacement of command-and-control 
governing strategies by vertical stewardship or both horizontal and vertical 
partnerships within and across territories and organisations (Ansell 2000).  Bellini 
(1996, 66) explained contemporary or network governance based on partnerships as 
the “intertwining of decision-making between national and subnational actors 
according to patterns that can be defined as basically non-hierarchical, network-like, 
based on inter-institutional bargaining and political exchange.”  While the principal-
agent model fits well with the analysis of a polity in general, it has limited ability to 
inform the analysis of a differentiated polity.  In addition to better representing a 
differentiated polity, the idea of policy networks suggests that actors are linked by 
their mutual interests or interdependence in specific policy domains.  Similarly, the 
literature on multi-level governance suggests that powerful actors gather around 
“centres” and exert informal influence on policy.  With regard to our previous 
discussion of power and influence, the model of structure presented by policy 
networks encompasses the emphasis of pluralist theories on differentiation and elitist 
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theories on connectivity (Ansell 2006).  Finally, policy network analysis adds value 
to rational choice institutionalism by conceptualizing the policymaking process as 
involving a range of diverse, mutually independent yet interlinked actors, permitting 
the combination of an overall institutional structural perspective with an actor-
centred focus.  This also provides a more accurate representation of the ever-
increasing complexity of the political environment today.  As Rhodes (1990, 313) 
notes, the concept of policy networks “directly confronts, even mirrors, the 
administrative and political complexity of advanced industrialized societies”.   
2.2.4.1.  A Definition:  Policy networks have several definitions in the social 
science literature.  For the term’s use in political science, Rhodes (2006, 425) 
captures the foundational aspects:  “Policy networks are sets of formal institutional 
and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around 
shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and 
implementation.  These actors are interdependent and policy emerges from the 
interactions between them.”  From the rational choice school of thought, Marin and 
Mayntz (1991, 16 emphasis in original) provide a more detailed definition: 
While policy networks are predominantly informal, decentralized and 
horizontal, they never operate completely outside power-dependence 
relations, i.e. outside asymmetric interdependencies and unequal mutual 
adjustments between autonomous actors, imbalanced transaction-
chains, and vertically directed flows of influence…What distinguishes 
bureaucracies and complex organizations in general from policy 
networks is not so much hierarchical vs. horizontal relations, but single 
organizational vs. inter-organizational relations and the nature of power 
relations permeating both, but in different ways: the control over 
strategic rigidities in tight or loosely coupled systems, the conditions of 
entry/exit, inclusion/exclusion/expulsion, membership or other 
adherences, etc. …Policy networks are explicitly defined not only by 
their structure as inter-organizational arrangements, but also by their 
function – the formulation and implementation of policy. 
With regard to the macro-structural organisation of the state, the definition of a 
policy network is nuanced.  On one hand, the concept applies in a relatively 
straightforward manner to a decentralized unit in a unitary state, entailing vertically 
overlapping authority and shared governance, as well as high degrees of horizontal 
coordination and communication across functional boundaries.  In theory, the central 
government of a unitary state has the ultimate power to modify or even abolish 
decentralized units or subnational governments.  However, in reality, central 
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governments also depend on decentralized units and subnational governments for 
political support and resources, such as sectoral expertise, information from the field 
and policy implementation.  As a result, these formal institutions are, to a certain 
extent, buttressed by the informal policy networks of intergovernmental (and 
private) actors in their efforts to formulate and implement policies (Heclo 1978).  On 
the other hand, a federal state structure implies the jurisdictional autonomy of 
subnational (decentralized) units, because they have constitutional protection.  In 
this case, federalism would have to be characterised further with either the concepts 
of vertically overlapping jurisdictions and shared governance (cooperative 
federalism) or horizontal coordination (competitive federalism) in order to construct 
a more complete definition of a policy network.   
The policy network literature is divided into two broad schools of thought.  
First, the power-dependence approach characterises the relationships between actors 
in the policy network as resource-dependent; that is, the actors need resources that 
they do not have and employ strategies within the limits of the rules governing their 
actions in order to swap resources.  This approach looks at all types of actors, both 
public and private, and views networks as having a large degree of autonomy 
(Rhodes 2006, 430).   
The second school of thought, the rational choice approach, includes the 
concept of resource dependence but uses rational choice institutionalism to explain 
how policy networks work.  This approach characterises networks as informally 
organised institutions in permanent, rule-governed relationships (Blom-Hansen 
1999; Rhodes 2006).  According to Ansell (2006), these types of relationships 
display “a stable or recurrent pattern of behavioral interaction or exchange between 
individuals and organizations”.  As such, the rational choice approach emphasises 
the structural relationship between political institutions and not the inter-personal 
relationships between individual actors within those institutions.  For them, policy 
networks are specific structural arrangements of institutional actors (or 
organisations) in government that address policy problems in specific issue areas, 
and the connections between them are channels for communication and resource 
sharing (Kenis and Schneider 1991).  Game theory, based on rational choice theory, 
can be used to analyse and explain the interactions between actors within a network 
and the outcomes.  Mayntz, Scharpf and their colleagues at the Max Planck Institute 
developed the most prominent examples in the literature of this approach to policy 
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networks (Marin and Mayntz 1991; Scharpf 1997).  Scharpf (1997, 195) calls his 
version of policy networks “actor-centred institutionalism”, arguing that “policy is 
the outcome of the interactions of resourceful and boundedly-rational actors whose 
capabilities, preferences, and perceptions are largely, but not completely, shaped by 
the institutionalized norms within which they interact”.  In the following paragraphs, 
I focus on the literature regarding the rational choice approach to policy networks, 
which is the nexus between rational choice institutionalism and the policy network 
approach.   
2.2.4.2.  Conceptualizing Policy Networks:  Policy networks across the 
public policy literature have some common features.  First, they are characterised by 
a patterned distribution of decision-making powers, e.g. devolution.  Second, the 
actors involved in the policy network are those who de facto make up the 
policymaking process; they are generally interdependent, yet formally autonomous.  
Third, the structure and mode of coordination within or between organisations is 
important (Powell 1990; Podolny and Page 1998).  For a policy network, 
coordination is “both a driving force of governance and one of its goals” and it 
happens whenever “one or more policy actors pursue a common outcome and work 
together to produce it” (Bevir 2009, 56–57).  Policy network actors are not arranged 
in a hierarchical, pyramid-type network with one-to-many relationships, but are 
rather in an enmeshed web of “many-to-many” relations (Kontopoulos 1993).  Thus, 
networks operate horizontally as well as vertically or, to use Hedlund’s (1994) term, 
they operate in a heterarchy19 and thus achieve consensus through coordination and 
mutual agreement rather than by command-and-control methods (Lindblom 1965).  
Furthermore, the relationship between decentralization (with its “many-to-many” 
relations) and cross-functional linkage is important and depends on the degree of 
autonomy granted through decentralization (Ansell 2000).  Fourth, markets cannot 
be policy networks because the discreteness and social content of their exchange 
relationships are different (MacNeil 1980; Granovetter 1985; Blau 1964; Marin 
1990; C. Jones, Hesterly, and Borgati 1997).  As opposed to the exchange 
relationships in markets, goods, actors and time frames are diffuse (rather than 
                                               
19 According to Hedlund (1994, 87), a heterarchy exhibits the features that “several strategic apexes 
emerge, that these shift over time, and that there are several ordering principles at work.”  As 
opposed to a hierarchy, in a heterarchy lower-level units can have relationships with multiple higher-
level units as well as lateral links with units at the same organisational level.  The network is 
multilateral rather than bilateral. 
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discrete), communication is thick (rather than thin), and the actors have extensive 
and usually long-term knowledge of one another in policy networks.  Whereas the 
exchange relationships in a market are valued as a means to an end, those in a policy 
network are an end in themselves.  Fifth, policy networks exhibit a mix of pluralist 
and corporatist ideas.  As mentioned in the section on power and influence above, 
policy networks are portrayed by pluralism rather than elitism, as power is shared 
among many actors within the same area or overlapping areas of jurisdiction (Enroth 
2011).  Corporatism, however, emphasises the mode of governance more than the 
number of people wielding power in a society or government.  It stresses a 
cooperative way of governing based on long-term exchange (Ansell 2000).  In the 
corporatist mode of governance, people cooperate to achieve social agreement by 
stressing collective rather than individual interests.  See more below on this 
perspective. 
Policy networks can differ on several dimensions.  Rhodes (1988) identifies 
five such dimensions: constellation of interests (e.g. variation by service, function, 
territory), membership (e.g. public vs. private sector, or elites vs. professionals), 
vertical interdependence (e.g. between central and sub-national actors), horizontal 
interdependence (e.g. relationships between networks and those that develop from a 
modified distribution of power), and the distribution of resources (e.g. actor control 
over different types and amounts of resources, which influences the previous two 
dimensions).   
Authors adopting the policy network approach generally agree that policy 
networks can vary along a continuum depending on the closeness of the relationship 
between actors.  The continuum ranges from tight policy communities to looser 
“issue networks”20(Borzel 1998; Dowding 1995; Bevir 2009).  Policy communities 
have a limited number of participants with similar values who interact frequently in 
high-quality activities and discussions on all matters related to a specific policy 
issue; the participants seek to make decisions on the specific policy issue by 
consensus and through negotiation, bargaining and exchanging resources.  In a 
policy community, the members of the network tend to see themselves as in a 
                                               
20 Heclo (1978) coined the term “issue network” to describe more diffuse forms of linkage than were 
implied by the terms “sub-government” or “iron triangle”.  Rhodes (1985) distinguished Heclo’s 
concept of “issue networks” from “policy communities” in terms of the stability and restrictiveness of 
networks.   
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positive-sum game.  Contrastingly, an issue network is a communications network 
of people interested in a specific policy area.  Here the participants include 
government legislators, academics, journalists and private interests (e.g. lobbyists), 
or a myriad of actors with relatively few resources, little access to decision makers, 
varying degrees of interactions with each other and an unequal balance of power 
between them.  The literature on policy networks includes many more typologies 
and dimensions (e.g. van Waarden (1992a) and Marin and Mayntz (1991)); 
however, these are only useful for descriptive and not analytical purposes, and a 
description of all of them lies beyond the scope of the thesis.   
Characteristically, networks are made up of actors in an inter-connected 
relationship, with the most basic unit being a relationship between two actors or a 
dyad.  Policy network approaches are largely interested in “networks” or aggregates 
of inter-connected relationships, and the most modest form of these requires three 
inter-connected actors or a triad (Ansell 2006).  Riply and Franklin’s (1981) iron 
triangle is a famous example of a triad that has been used profusely in the literature.  
Freeman and Stevens’ (1987) policy subsystems or “sub-governments”, Richardson 
and Jordan’s (1979) policy communities, Heclo’s (1978) issue networks, and Haas’ 
(1992) epistemic communities are other examples of prevalent descriptions of 
networks in the literature.  Laumann et al. (1982) identified policy networks with as 
many as eighty participants.  Most studies, however, analyse only a few actors (or 
actor groups) because it is not very realistic for more than this number to interact 
meaningfully and strategically with each other.  In terms of membership, these 
actors are usually formal organisations or actor groups (not individuals) that interact 
on an informal basis.  The actors in a policy network can come jointly from the 
public and private sectors, as in most cases, or exclusively from the public sector, as 
in intergovernmental relations (Marin 1990).  The actors can also vary across 
different territorial levels: international, national, regional and local.  Thus far, the 
policy network literature has focused mostly on policy networks at the national 
level.  Although autonomous, policy network actors generally have divergent but 
mutually contingent interests.  Furthermore, policy networks and their sets of actors 
change structurally over time with changing conditions and new policymaking 
demands.   
In a policy network, the relationship between institutions and actors is unique 
and very different from that described by the traditional principal-agent model.  
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Indeed, according to Wasserman and Faust (1999, 6, emphasis in original), “The 
fundamental difference between a social network explanation and a non-network 
explanation of a process is the inclusion of concepts and information on 
relationships among units of study”.  Policy network actors see their relationships as 
conduits for information, ideas and resources and are thus interdependent on each 
other.  This interdependence motivates them to engage in relationships of exchange, 
which naturally generate a mutual obligation and reciprocity between them (Ansell 
2006).  Some studies go further, taking more of a Durkheimian view of corporatism 
(or corporate solidarism) and emphasizing the element of social solidarity and 
harmony that can be found in many policy networks.   
To the assumptions contained in rational choice institutionalism, the policy 
network approach adds five more.  First, it assumes that relationships (precise 
patterns of connections) matter in explaining policy outcomes and, as such, it views 
social, political and economic action through a relational lens (Ansell 2006).  
Second, it supposes that relationships in a given policymaking situation are complex 
and non-hierarchical (or heterarchical), overlapping and crosscutting others (Elkin 
1975).  Third, in addition to the rational choice institutionalism view that institutions 
limit behaviour, networks are considered institutions as well as resources, channels 
of information and assistance that can be utilised to achieve particular objectives.  
Fourth, networks provide varied access to information, resources and other 
assistance in very different ways.  Last, unlike the relationships in the principal-
agent model, the policy network approach assumes that the actors involved in 
relationships are largely autonomous.   
The process of collective decision-making between policy network actors is 
not always united, harmonious and collaborative.  Indeed, the characteristic 
dimensions of collective decision-making can contain any of the following 
characteristics: consensus vs. opposition, symbiotic collusion vs. competition, and 
cooperation vs. antagonism vs. antagonistic cooperation21.  According to Marin 
(1990), antagonistic cooperation is the most prevalent characteristic of inter-
organisational arrangements.  Adam and Kriesi (2007, 134) typify networks using 
two dimensions: the distribution of power (which can be concentrated or 
                                               
21 Although this seems an oxymoron, it is rather the two or more people or groups, who are able to 
work together to achieve common interest by suppressing their minor differences.   
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fragmented) and the predominant mode of interaction (conflict, bargaining or 
cooperation).  They utilise these dimensions to create six types of policy networks 
(dominance, competition, asymmetric bargaining, symmetric bargaining, 
hierarchical cooperation and horizontal cooperation), which help to determine the 
potential for and type of policy change.  In his investigation of the relationships 
between autonomous state actors and interest groups in Britain and the US, Smith 
(1993) shows that state actors’ interests can shape policy development and that the 
type of policy network affects policy outcomes and changes.   
Finally, policy networks can be identified by observing which actors 
participate in the bargaining, consultations and negotiations that take place before a 
particular policy decision is made.  The amount of decentralization in society and in 
the state and the difference between the two are essential factors in the 
determination of policy networks (Katzenstein 1978).  The action focus of policy 
networks is generally macro-political, sectoral or oriented to a single issue.  
However, most studies look at sectoral or issue-specific networks rather than macro-
political ones (Lembruch 1984).  Decision-making on a single issue within a sectoral 
policy network tends to mobilise the essential actors within that network (Laumann, 
Marsden, and Prensky 1982).  Moreover, within the same sector, policy networks 
can also differ between nations.  The use of general country characteristics to 
explain variations in policy network structures across policy sectors is limited (V. 
Schneider 1992; W. D. Coleman, Skogstad, and Atkinson 1997; M. M. Atkinson and 
Coleman 1985).  Kriesi, Adam and Jochem’s (2006) study of policy networks in 
seven Western European countries, for example, demonstrates the complex interplay 
of domestic and policy-specific contexts as well as the EU context in forming 
domestic power structures in the areas of agriculture, European integration and 
immigration.   
2.2.4.3. Critiques:  Despite its usefulness in policy analysis, the policy 
network approach has undergone some criticisms.  Though an excellent framework 
for describing the characteristics of policymaking (e.g. its political and social 
complexities), some have said that it has very little explanatory power and few 
testable causal arguments.  However, proponents of the policy network respond that 
it is particularly equipped to produce good descriptions and that, as Ansell (2006, 
85) states, “a good description is the necessary foundation of a good explanation”.  
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Although some earlier policy network studies fell short in the area of explanatory 
power, this has very rarely been the case since the late 1990s.   
Next, there is little to no synthesis of the findings of policy network analysis 
in the literature (Rhodes 2006).  This is because of the variance in the several 
dimensions that characterise policy networks, the conditions that surround them and 
the particular sectors and countries in which they are studied.  For this reason and 
others, Dowding (1995)  critiqued the policy network approach as a ‘metaphor’, 
questioning its analytical usefulness.  Rhodes (2006, 434–35) responded:   
It is no more a metaphorical term than bureaucracy.  The term’s 
resonance and longevity stem from the simple fact that for many it 
represents an enduring characteristic of much policy making in 
advanced industrialized democracies.  …  Policy networks are but 
political science writ small.”  That is, these and most other recurring 
problems of policy networks reflect the major issues that bedevil all of 
political science.   
Another common criticism is that policy networks do not explain policy change 
well.  Richardson (2000) most famously argues this point.  Rhodes (2006, 434–35) 
counter argues:  
There is no consensus in the political science community about how to 
explain, for example, political change, only competing epistemological 
positions and a multitude of theories.  Students of policy networks can 
no more produce an accepted explanatory theory of change than (say) 
students of bureaucracy, democracy, or economic development.  
Debates in the policy network literature mirror the larger 
epistemological and ontological debates in social sciences.   
Several authors have utilised policy networks to analyse policy change.  In the US, 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) advocacy coalition framework model 
represents that country’s federal and decentralized government well.22  Other 
examples, in addition to those presented below, include Marsh and Smith’s (2000) 
dialectical model and Bevir and Rhodes’ (2003 Chapter 3) decentred study of policy 
networks.   
Overall, the policy network approach allows researchers to describe and 
analyse the power structure and interactions among all significant policy actors and 
to explain different policy outcomes (Knoke et al. 1996).  Policy networks are a 
meso-level concept that links the micro- and macro-levels of analysis, dealing with 
the role of interests and government in policy decisions as well as broader questions 
                                               
22However, it has not been successfully applied widely outside the US (W. Parsons 1995, 201).   
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about the distribution of power in modern society (at the macro-level of analysis).  
According to Atkinson and Coleman (1992; 1989), policy networks go beyond the 
bureaucratic-political models for understanding the policymaking process.  They are 
most often used to solve problems in political science that involve complex 
bargaining and coordinating relationships between interest groups, public agencies 
and states – especially those regarding multi-level or intergovernmental governance 
(Hanf and Scharpf 1979).  This is because, unlike in purely formal institutions, the 
decision-making rules of policy networks emphasise negotiation, bargaining, 
coordination and sounding out (Lindblom 1959).  Furthermore, policy networks are 
particularly effective at managing complex problems in public sectors, such as 
health and education (Rhodes 2006).   
2.2.4.4.  Empirical Studies:  Empirical research on policy networks, as in 
rational choice institutionalism, tends to test assumptions about policymaking; in 
particular, it can look at the structures that shape the policymaking process and 
outcomes (Marin and Mayntz 1991).  In this way, policy networks emphasise the 
power of structured social relationships to explain policymaking and its outcomes 
(Wellman 1988, 31).   
Empirical evidence, methodologies and techniques for policy network 
analysis have varied.  Many studies combine quantitative network analysis with 
qualitative policy analysis, which is demanding in terms of research time and 
resources, but offers greater precision in identifying otherwise hidden details and 
patterns and, consequently, a more complete analysis as well as more accurate and 
reliable results.  Most empirical studies compare policy networks across nations or 
sectors or over time.  They look at sets of collective actor groups or institutions, 
using individuals as representatives of these formal organisations.   
In the general public policy literature, a number of authors have discussed 
policy networks in Europe (Scharpf 1988; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Rhodes, 
Bache, and George 1996).  There are several policy network studies on the different 
types of decentralization.  Sabel (1993; 1995; 1996) explores the state’s role in 
creating trust and mutual learning among decentralized market actors.  Dorf and 
Sabel (1998) observe similar patterns among decentralized public administrative 
units and in federalised states.  Compston (2009) uses policy network theory to 
derive and test prepositions about major long-term technological, economic, 
environmental and social policy trends (or what he deems ‘king trends’) in 12 EU 
 Decentralization, Devolution and the Policymaking Process 
   74 
 
member states from 1990 to 2005.  Van Waarden (1992b) demonstrates that pluralist 
policy networks with greater participation by private actors developed in cases of 
weaker states and poorly organised civil society, such as in the US.  Boase (1996) 
reaches a similar conclusion about the US in a comparative study of the US and 
Canada.  On the other hand, more corporatist policy networks developed from 
stronger states and civil societies, such as the Netherlands.  Kenis (1991) shows that 
informal domestic structures – such as the traditional political orientation of the 
economy, the management of industrial adaptation and the role of public agencies – 
have impacted the emergence of policy networks in the chemical fibre sector in 
Germany, Italy and the UK.  Kriesi, Adam and Jochem (2006) emphasise the 
importance of informal practices and procedures in their study of policy networks in 
seven European countries.  Knoke et al. (1996) underscore the role of both informal 
and formal institutional settings in explaining the nature of labour policy in 
Germany, Japan and the US.  Based on several case studies in agriculture, business, 
health and consumer policy, Smith (1993) concludes that relationships vary between 
sectors.  The Max-Planck Institute has also published widely on explaining 
policymaking through networks (which its scholars call constellations), using 
institutional theory and game theory (Mayntz 2003; Scharpf 1991; Scharpf 1997; 
Marin and Mayntz 1991).  Rhodes (1997: 45) claims that policy networks in Britain 
changed in the 1990s due to a fragmentation of state institutions; his research led 
him to describe policy networks as a meso-level concept, representing the structural 
relationship between political institutions at different levels.  John and Cole (2000), 
examining education finance policy networks in France and Britain, found that the 
type of policy sector actually mediates the impact of political institutions.  On the 
other hand, Greenaway et al. (2007) found that the several layers of government 
involved in policy implementation networks compromised the accountability of 
locally elected officials responsible for building a new hospital in Britain.  Using 
four different German labour policy networks, Konig and Brauninger (1998) 
examine why policy network actors pursue relationships with mutual contacts and 
test whether this is because of similar preferences or formal institutional settings.  
They indicate that actor preferences are more important than institutional settings in 
determining which relationships actors will choose for their network, although, 
institutional settings do limit the overall choice.   
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Most policy network research has been at the national level, but some studies 
have looked at the subnational level (Stohr 1992; Cole and John 1995; Conzelmann 
1995; Deeg 1996; Thielemann 1998; John and Cole 2000; Le Galès 2001).  The 
policy network approach has also been applied to intergovernmental relations within 
states, especially central-local or federal-state relations (Rhodes 1988; Rhodes 2006; 
Wright 1978; Galligan 1995).  Cowell (2013) and Toke et al. (2013) examined 
policy networks and intergovernmental relations in the devolved renewable energy 
sectors of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.  Toke et al. also created a 
Westminster-level policy network to analyse the impact of devolution on renewable 
energy policy.  They used primary data from 75 interviews with senior figures in 
government, industry and environmental groups as well as context analysis.  They 
found that devolved arrangements and close-knit policy communities helped 
Scotland23 by giving it greater freedom to promote its renewable energy efforts and 
expand these resources further with cross-party support.  Devolution also facilitated 
cross-governmental integration and fostered a national economic agenda around 
energy development.  Wales, Northern Ireland and England, all of which were less 
devolved at the time, displayed policy constellations more like issue networks than 
community network types.  Perhaps this is why the successes of Scotland were not 
reproduced in these areas.   
Because policy networks are generally studied across countries and sectors, 
there is very little research specifically on health policy in the empirical literature.  
Rather, most studies that include the health policy sector discuss it as one of 
multiple sectors examined in one or more countries.  Dohler (1991) studied policy 
networks and neo-conservative reform strategies in the health sectors of Britain, the 
US and Germany, looking at the relationship between established institutional 
configurations in the health sector and past neo-conservative reforms.  He (1991, 
238) hypothesised that “policy networks, as a result of previous political decisions, 
produce certain interactive routines, modes of interest intermediation and decision 
making.”  She looked for a “goodness of fit” between structure and strategy over 
about ten years of reform efforts in order to understand the resulting policy change 
or continuity.  He (1991, 241) defines health policy networks as containing the 
following characteristics:   
                                               
23 The results were less evident in Northern Ireland, Wales and England.   
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(i) Structure, or the organization of areas of the political system relevant to 
medical care administration and health policy.  It is composed of degree 
of centralization, sectoralization, homogeneity and system integration.   
(ii) A constellation of actors, which is the dynamic feature of all networks 
and for which the following need to be determined: number of actors, 
who participates, and how they are linked to each other and the network 
(e.g. coalitions).   
(iii) Governance, defined as the “mode of economic coordination in the 
health sector” (Dohler 1991, 247), including the incentive structure, 
prevailing mode of resource allocation, and the size and vitality (mix) 
of the public and private sectors. 
(iv) Patterns of interactions, which have been referred to in the literature as 
“policy style” (or the standard operating procedure) and include the 
sectoral “rules” of decision making, interest intermediation, and conflict 
regulation. 
(v) Selectivity, which is the summarizing category of the above-listed 
network dimensions and determines the “range of available strategic 
options” by analysing strategic opportunities, cognitive maps and policy 
legacies. 
Dohler (1991) concludes that there is no apparent fit between a network structure 
and a market-oriented strategy, further stipulating that the predisposition of 
networks towards strategic changes depends highly on network stability (Aldrich 
and Whetten 1981, 391) and the strength or structure of ties between actors in the 
policy network.   
Blom-Hansen (1999) presents an empirical example of the combination of 
rational choice institutionalism and policy network analysis for central-local 
policymaking in multiple public policy areas, including health, in three 
Scandinavian countries.  His policy network framework is based on his previous 
research (e.g. Blom-Hansen (1997)) and is particular to intergovernmental relations 
within a decentralized policymaking environment.  He uses an “iron triangle” model 
for actor behaviour, identifying three institutional actor groups and their likely self-
interests: expenditure advocates, expenditure guardians and topocrats.  The first two 
of these are prominently defined in the budget literature, and the third is defined 
previously in the policy network literature (Rhodes 1992).  Using this policy 
network framework and actor behaviour model, Blom-Hansen empirically tests his 
framework with Scandinavian countries, showing that the organisation of decision-
making process is an explanatory factor for both cross-country and cross-sectoral 
differences.  He also demonstrates that categorizing actors into a few generic types 
and using basic but plausible behavioural assumptions is useful in the analysis of 
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policymaking and policy priorities in a decentralized setting.  Furthermore, he 
emphasises the notion that relationships in central-local policymaking vary from 
sector to sector within the same country (Page and Goldsmith 1987).   
2.3.  A Combined Analytical Approach for the Thesis 
For the analysis of the research questions of this thesis, the integration of the rational 
choice institutionalist and policy network approaches is intended to cover each 
other’s weaknesses and maximise their strengths.  In particular, on the one hand, 
rational choice institutionalism lends itself to illuminating the political impact of 
institutions as well as policy stability and change, whereas policy network analysis 
is weaker in these areas.  On the other hand, policy networks paint a more realistic 
picture of the policymaking process, a function that rational choice institutionalism 
is often criticised for not doing well.  Moreover, while rational choice 
institutionalism and the policy network approach overlap in their emphasis on actors 
and their behaviour and interests—in that both take a similar rational choice theory 
perspective—rational choice institutionalism also stresses the importance of 
institutions and the policy network approach highlights the additional value of a 
relationship-based perspective when studying the policymaking process and its 
outcomes.  In addition, both approaches are adequate for studying collective action 
issues; however, rational choice institutionalism tends to focus on the individual, 
whereas the policy network approach concentrates mainly on actor groups.  Where 
the policy network approach lacks explanatory power or any sense of 
consequentialism and strategic calculus, the rational choice institutionalist approach 
nicely supports it.  In addition, while rational choice institutionalism and the policy 
network approach both may examine formal or informal institutions, the former 
tends to favour formal institutions while the latter favours more informal institutions 
(i.e., formal organisations operating under informal rules).  Moreover, the latter is a 
better representation of a differentiated polity and intergovernmental relations, as it 
clearly has a “many-to-many” policymaking structure.  Lastly, while rational choice 
institutionalism pays little attention to major community power theories, the policy 
network approach fills this gap with its pluralist interpretation of power and resource 
dependency.   
In addition to harnessing the powerful synchronicities between these two 
approaches, the present thesis will help fill in the literature gaps on policy networks 
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in the health sector, at the regional level, and in Spain.  Furthermore, it will present a 
policy network model for not only the national policymaking environment but also 
the subnational policymaking environment and which will be empirically evaluated 
with a comparative regional study in Spain.  To complete my analytical framework 
for studying policymaking in a devolved health system, I combine this joint 
approach to policymaking with the comparative definition of health system 
decentralization by Bossert (1998).  The following chapter gives a complete 
description of the analytical framework of the thesis.   
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3.  The Analytical Framework 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed and presented the literature on decentralization and 
devolution, and on interest-based approaches to policymaking, identifying some 
deficiencies in the current research as well as promising directions for it.  In terms of 
deficiencies, the review found only a few relevant general and health system-specific 
typologies and analytical frameworks for decentralization, some of which included 
devolution; the most salient of these was Bossert’s (1998a) decision-space approach for 
analysing health system decentralization.  The typologies and frameworks reviewed 
centred on administrative matters (J. M. Cohen and Peterson 1997; A. Mills et al. 1990; 
Rondinelli 1981; Rondinelli, McCullough, and Johnson 1989) or examined the effect of 
decentralization on performance (Bossert 1998; J. M. Cohen and Peterson 1997; 
Gershberg 1998; A. Mills et al. 1990; S. Peckham et al. 2005) and on other outcomes 
such as accountability (Gershberg 1998) and innovation (Bossert 1998), but did not 
focus particularly on the health policymaking process and how it affects the policy 
priorities in a politically decentralized or devolved setting.  In addition, the literature on 
interest-based policymaking approaches pointed to Blom-Hansen’s (1999) 
intergovernmental policy network approach as offering much insight into policymaking 
and policy priorities in a devolved government arrangement by categorizing the 
bewildering number of actors into a few generic groups and applying relatively simple 
but plausible assumptions of the rational choice institutionalist kind.24   
As a promising direction, then, the way forward for analysing health system 
devolution and its effects on health policymaking and policy priorities appears to 
involve a combination of two main analytical approaches derived from the literature: 
Bossert’s approach for defining and measuring decision space in a decentralized health 
system and Blom-Hansen’s policy network approach for analysing intergovernmental 
health policymaking and health policy priorities within the national policymaking 
environment.  These approaches, however, tell us nothing about what happens to health 
policy priorities after devolution within subnational policymaking environments—a 
key question of the thesis.  To fill this gap in the literature and with the goal of creating 
a coherent and tight analytical framework, as my own contribution to the literature, I 
build on Blom-Hansen’s approach to design an approach for analysing the 
                                               
24 Which he has applied successfully to the health sector.  
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intergovernmental health policymaking and health policy priorities within the 
subnational policymaking environment.   
Ideally, a comparative analytical framework for health system devolution 
should use concepts that can be defined, measured, and applied to all health systems or, 
at least, to the cases being compared.  Most importantly, it should represent the 
policymaking process as structured by the institutional rules of devolution and should 
include an actor behaviour model that indicates the relative influence of the actors 
(taking into account such factors as balance of power and resource dependencies) and 
their strategic interactions in both national and subnational policymaking environments.  
In terms of structure, the framework should identify the main actor groups in the 
process and their relationships to each other.  It should also include behavioural 
assumptions for the actors involved.  Finally, the framework should be evaluated to 
determine whether it is robust enough to anticipate policy priorities in a devolved 
health system.  I attempt to address all these issues in the analytical framework of the 
thesis as presented below.     
 This dissertation proposes a comparative analytical framework specific to the 
phenomenon being examined by drawing from mainstream policymaking models and 
theories in the literature and adapting them to the specific policymaking situation 
created by devolution in the health sector.  More precisely, the framework modifies 
Bossert’s approach to define and measure decentralization so that it is applicable to 
upper-middle- to high-income countries that have undergone devolution.  It combines 
this approach with the analysis of the national policy network articulated by Blom-
Hansen (1999), which incorporates concepts from rational choice institutionalism, and 
with my contribution to the literature that analyses the subnational intergovernmental 
policymaking network.  Taken in conjunction, these three analytical tools offer a 
unique look at the institutional relationships that constitute the policymaking process in 
a devolved health system and their effects on policy priorities and choices, not only at 
the national but also at the, often overlooked, subnational level.  Overall, the analytical 
framework (i) provides a thorough description of the policymaking process in a 
devolved health system; (ii) analyses this process more precisely and accurately in 
order to determine the effects of devolution on policymaking; and (iii) anticipates 
policy priorities in a devolved health system.  The benefit of this framework is that, for 
a devolved health system, it should identify a relatively close correspondence between 
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the positions of actors in the national and subnational policy networks and the priority 
areas for future health policy.   
I apply this three-part analytical framework for health system devolution to a 
case study to understand its ability to determine the effects of devolution on health 
policymaking and anticipate health policy priorities in a devolved system; and, then, I 
evaluate the anticipated results from the framework with a retrospective analysis of the 
actual policy choices at the subnational government level for the same case.  The 
framework was designed for use in upper-middle- and high-income countries and looks 
only at domestic policy issues specific to the health sector at the national and 
subnational levels of government.25  It is not applicable to lower-middle- and lower-
income countries, because it does not account for two main factors that are prominent 
in those nations: (i) the strong policymaking influence of international actor groups (the 
United Nations, the World Bank, NGOs, etc.) and (ii) the significantly different impact 
of decentralization on lower-income countries, e.g. due to their lack of capacity (see 
Bossert and Mitchell (2011)).  These considerations lie beyond the scope of the thesis.   
 The details of the analytical framework are presented in the following sections.  
The first section presents Bossert’s decision-space approach and map, including its 
adaptation to upper-middle- and high-income countries.  The second section describes 
Blom-Hansen’s integration of the intergovernmental policy networks, with concepts of 
                                               
25 Upper-middle-income countries, defined by the World Bank (2013) as having a GNI per capita 
between $4,126 and $12,735, include: Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Namibia, Palau, Panama, Peru, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Suriname, Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Tuvalu.  High-income 
countries, defined by the World Bank (2013) as having a GNI per capita greater than $12,736, include: 
Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Belgium, Bermuda, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Croatia, Curacao, Cyrus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Equatorial Guinea, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, French 
Polynesia, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Guam, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of 
Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Rep. Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao 
SAR, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, 
Oman, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, 
Singapore, Sint Maarten, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Martin, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and US Virgin Islands.  
While a review of all of these countries is beyond the scope of the thesis, I reviewed 33 high-income 
(OECD-member) countries to understand which of them could potentially be a case study for the thesis.  
Of these 33 countries, I calculated that 13 have primarily tax-financed health systems—an important 
factor for distinguishing and comparing health systems—(see these in bold type) and, of those, 9 were 
politically-decentralized unitary states (see italic type).  As such, the analytical framework of the thesis 
would be most applicable to these nine countries.  This review would need to be expanded to include the 
remaining upper-middle- to high-income countries listed in order to understand how many more 
countries would also qualify.   
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rational choice institutionalism, for understanding the intergovernmental policymaking 
process within the national policymaking environment.  Extending Blom-Hansen’s 
approach, this section also describes the dissertation’s original contribution to the 
literature of an analytical approach for understanding the intergovernmental 
policymaking process within the subnational policymaking environment.  The third 
section brings together these three approaches for analysing health system devolution 
and constructs a methodology that can be used to understand and better anticipate 
health policy priorities.  It also presents the methodology for empirically examining the 
framework with a case study.  Finally, this chapter ends with a detailed account of the 
research design and methods employed in the elaboration of the thesis.    
3.1.  Defining Decision Space for Health System Devolution 
As elaborated in the literature review, the study’s definition of health system devolution 
is the transfer of power and authority over specific health system functions from the 
central government to subnational government units, with all the administrative, 
political and economic attributes and relationships that these entail, including the 
discretion to engage effectively in decision-making regarding health policies within 
their legally delimited geographic and functional domain.  Although comprehensive, 
this definition (similar to other definitions found in the literature) does not provide a 
consistent means for measuring health system devolution or decentralization.  Instead, 
Bossert proposes using the concept of decision space, or “the range of effective choice 
that is allowed by central authorities (the principal) to be utilized by local authorities 
(the agents)” (1998, p.  1518).  With this definition, devolution and decentralization 
become measurable and operational, and we understand that the degree of discretion 
allowed to subnational authorities is more important than who gets more of it.26  
Decision space can be formally defined by the laws and regulations established by the 
relevant governing bodies (and national court decisions).27  Bossert uses it to define the 
specific rules of the game for devolved or decentralized governments.  He illustrates 
this concept with a “decision-space map”, locating the amount of latitude granted to 
subnational decision makers over a series of key health system functions.  This map 
                                               
26 As such, the form (i.e., administrative, political or fiscal) and type (delegation, de-concentration or 
devolution) of the decentralization is not useful at this point.   
27 Effective decision space can also be defined as what actually happens despite formal laws, allowing 
subnational governments more or less room for decision-making.  This is similar to Kenneth Shepsle’s 
(2006) conception of “institutions-as-equilibrium”.   
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represents the amount of choice for each function at the subnational level of 
government as narrow, moderate or wide on the horizontal axis of the map; and lists a 
series of key health system functions on the vertical axis of the same map.  See 
Bossert’s original decision-space map in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1.  Bossert's Original Health System Decision-Space Map 
 
Source: Bossert (1998, 1518). 
The value of this approach is that it allows decentralization—or, in the case of 
the present thesis, devolution—to be conceptualised not as a single transfer of a defined 
amount of power, authority, and responsibility to a subnational government, but rather 
as varying degrees of discretion over a series of key functions that may be transferred 
differently to a subnational government.  Following Bossert’s original decision-space 
map with a few modifications, eliminating functional areas and key functions that are 
not germane to upper-middle- to high-income countries (e.g., “access rules”),28 and 
using more recent literature (e.g. (2007)) to add new functions, the decision-space map 
for this thesis is illustrated in Table 3.2.   
 
                                               
28 Bossert’s original approach analyses developing (i.e., low- to lower-middle-income) countries, where 
access is a bigger problem than, e.g., targeting service delivery. 
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Table 3.2.  Health System Decision-Space Map for This Thesis 
 
 
Sources: Author’s modification of Bossert (1998), also drawing from Bossert, Bowser and Amenyah (2007); WHO (2000); and Management Sciences for Health (2000). 
NB:  To show how I adapted Bossert’s map, I use the following: M = Moved from another functional area; ∆ = Changed key function title slightly; + = New functional area or key 
function.
M 
M 
M 
∆
∆
+
+
+
+
∆
∆
∆
∆
+
+
+
+
+
+
M ∆
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In this table, the decision-space map of the thesis shows the key health system 
functions grouped in functional areas.  For example, the category of financing contains 
five key functions: insurance schemes, payment mechanisms, sources of revenue, 
resource allocation, and income from fees.  Following Bossert, I evaluate quantifiable 
indicators for each key function of the decision-space map to make this a tool for 
rigorous comparison, as shown in Table 3.3.  The amount of choice is described as 
“moderate range” when the subnational government has some but not complete 
discretion over decisions regarding the function, e.g. when the national government 
prescribes a basic or common health care benefit package for all subnational health 
services but allows the subnational government to make decisions on additional 
benefits within its territory and finance them with its own resources.  This part of the 
decision-space approach will be applied to the empirical case study before and after 
health system devolution to understand the degree of increased decision space for each 
health system function that is provided by the reform and its impact.   
Decisions in each functional area are likely to have significant influence on a 
given health system’s performance, particularly in the areas of efficiency, equity, 
financial soundness and quality.  For example, key decisions on planning will influence 
the system’s economic and political efficiency.  Indeed, one of the oft-stated objectives 
of decentralization is to “bring government closer to the people” for greater 
responsiveness and accountability.  Decisions made on the sources and allocation of 
revenue will affect the system’s financial soundness and equity.  Decisions concerning 
the service organisation may significantly influence the efficiency and quality of the 
services delivered.  Permitting management of human resources at a more local level 
may also increase the efficiency and quality of services.  Stewardship and governance 
rules outline the limits within which the different organisations can influence the health 
system.  Finally, all of these will have an influence on the health policy priorities and 
decisions made after devolution.  
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Table 3.3.  Key Health System Functions and Indicators for Comparative Mapping of Decision Space 
Functional Areas Indicators Range of Choice 
Key functions Narrow Moderate Wide 
Service Organisation 
Contracts with private 
health care services 
providers 
Choice of contracting with private health care service 
(institutional) providers 
Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Hospital autonomy Choice of range of autonomy for hospitals Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Targeting service 
delivery 
Choice in defining, monitoring and modifying equity of 
access to services by priority populations  
Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Regulation and Planning 
Policy formulation Choice of range of health policies formulated  No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Norms and standards  Choice of defining standards and norms (e.g. health 
care benefits)   
Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Prescription drugs 
planning 
Choice of defining essential drug lists, generic 
substitution or a drug formulary 
No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Drugs and supplies 
(rationing) 
Choice of developing protocols for prescriptions and 
utilisation of drugs and supplies 
No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Infrastructure planning Choice of planning health infrastructure  No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Health information 
systems design 
Choice of health information systems structure and 
design 
No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Financing 
Insurance schemes Choice of how to design and manage insurance 
schemes 
Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Payment mechanisms  Choice of how to pay public providers (incentives and 
non-salaried) 
Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Sources of revenue Choice of sources of revenue, including role of 
intergovernmental transfers in local health expenditure 
No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
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Functional Areas Indicators Range of Choice 
Key functions  Narrow Moderate Wide 
Financing (cont.) 
Revenue allocation 
(budgeting) 
Choice of budgeting and allocating revenue No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Income from fees Choice of range of prices allowed No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Human Resources 
Salaries and benefits 
(permanent staff) 
Ability to modify salary and benefit levels Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Moderate range for 
salary and benefit 
levels defined 
No limits 
Contracts (non-
permanent staff) 
Choice of contracting non-permanent staff None or defined 
by higher 
authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Civil service Choice of planning, hiring, evaluating and firing staff National civil 
service 
Local civil service No civil service 
Education and training 
(pre-service) 
Choice of planning pre-service education and training 
of health professionals by each organisation 
No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Education and training 
(continuing) 
Choice of planning continuing education of health 
professionals by each organisation 
No choice or 
narrow range 
Moderate range No limits 
Governance/Stewardship Rules 
Facility boards Choice of the size and composition of boards Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Territorial health offices Choice of the size and composition of local offices Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Public participation Choice of the size, number, composition and role of 
community participation 
Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Patient/user rights Choice of defining patient/user rights Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Complaint system Choice of establishing a patient/user feedback system Defined by law or 
higher authority 
Several models for 
local choice 
No limits 
Sources: Author’s modification of Bossert (1998) using Bossert, Bowser and Amenyah (2007); WHO (2000); and Management Sciences for Health (2000). 
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Bossert’s (1998) decision-space framework does not finish here with the 
definition and measurement of decentralization; but, it continues on to explore how 
greater decision space is used, i.e., whether the subnational health authorities given this 
wider discretion choose innovations or no change, and how the changes (if any) affect 
the performance of the subnational government in achieving health reform objectives.  
He compares this with directed change from the central government in a situation of 
narrow decision space at the subnational government level.29  Bossert’s framework uses 
the principal-agent approach to consider how the principal (i.e., the national-level entity 
that maintains oversight) uses various mechanisms of control to assure that the agents 
work toward achieving the desired objectives.  He focuses on analysing the ministry of 
health as principal and the local health authorities as agents; though, the principle-agent 
model does not preclude using multiple principles.  My analysis takes a somewhat 
different route from Bossert’s framework at this point.  I am interested primarily in how 
the concept of decision space might be utilised to describe and illustrate the degree of 
discretion that is allowed to subnational governments for each health system function 
through devolution reform and, subsequently, how it affects the health policymaking 
process and the health policy priorities made after devolution (and whether the latter 
can be anticipated through an analysis of the policymaking process).  This endeavour 
requires a more dynamic analysis, which I develop in the following section.    
3.2.  Intergovernmental Policy Networks for a Devolved Health System 
For the second part of the analytical framework of the thesis, I build on Blom-Hansen’s 
intergovernmental policy network approach with rational choice institutionalism to 
represent respectively the structure and agency of the policymaking process, and to 
examine policy priorities after devolution at both the national and subnational levels.  
This is an interest-based model offers a micro-level explanation of the policy processes 
and change, focusing on the role of actors, their relationships and interactions and their 
respective policy priorities and strategies.  It focuses on the strategic actions of elite 
actors, including politicians and high-level bureaucrats, who play a significant role in 
intergovernmental relations for health policy at the national and regional levels of 
government.  Thus, main groups of actors for this approach come from the health 
                                               
29 Bossert refers to “local” rather than “subnational” governments in his framework.  I use the latter for 
consistency of the term throughout the thesis.  
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sector, the top positions of each government at each level of government and those 
responsible for budgetary issues.  They interact with each other regularly in the 
policymaking process, forming policy networks.      
This study defines policy networks as institutions, which according to Ostrom 
(1986) can be conceptualised as the rules governing action.  However, as described 
more fully in the policy literature review, policy networks can vary along a cohesion 
continuum that ranges from tight-knit policy communities to more loosely coupled issue 
networks.  Using Blom-Hansen’s (1999, 239) modification of Ostrom’s (1986) 
institutional rules, intergovernmental policy networks are categorised into these two 
major categories (see Table 3.4).  This descriptive portion of the policy network 
approach identifies the structures, or main institutional rules, that enclose the 
intergovernmental policymaking process under devolution and limit the space for actors 
to manoeuvre.   
Table 3.4.  Intergovernmental Policy Networks as Institutions 
 Intergovernmental Policy Networks 
Institutional rules Policy Communities Issue Networks 
1.  Position of actors Negotiators Rulers and pressure 
groups 
2.  Boundary of the 
institution 
Includes only government 
and representatives of 
local governments 
Government and various 
types of interest 
organisations 
3.  Decision-making 
procedure 
Unanimity Consultation 
4.  Scope of decisions 
Policy formulation and 
implementation 
Policy formulation 
5.  Pay-off rules 
Influence and 
responsibility 
Influence 
Source: Blom-Hansen (1999, 239). 
To enhance the explanatory effectiveness of this interest-based approach, the 
intergovernmental policy network depends on an actor behaviour model, including 
behavioural assumptions based on rationality.  Blom-Hansen employs one such model 
designed for central-local relations based on the principles and assumptions of rational 
choice institutionalism.  Additionally, actor behaviour models in intergovernmental 
relations shift in emphasis from agency towards partnership as a lower-level 
government gains greater autonomy and financial independence from its central 
government, e.g. through the devolution of powers (Rhodes 1981).  The partnership 
principle of multilevel governance gives both formal and informal roles and powers to 
 The Analytical Framework 
   90 
 
a range of actors at each level of the policymaking process, creating an 
intergovernmental policy network.  In the health system literature, this type of 
partnership is often referred to as “stewardship” (see e.g. WHO (2000) and Travis et al. 
(2003)).  The following paragraphs elaborate the details of this model, starting with 
Blom-Hansen’s (1999) analysis of intergovernmental policy networks in the national 
policymaking environment (or “national-level intergovernmental policy network”) and 
then moving on to my own proposed model for analysing the policymaking process and 
priorities of the intergovernmental policy network in the subnational policymaking 
environment (or “subnational-level intergovernmental policy network”). 
Blom-Hansen identifies three essential types of actor groups involved in 
intergovernmental relations within the national policymaking environment and depicts 
the political process (or interactions between them) as a game.  In a devolved political 
situation, he attributes sectoral policy preferences and priorities, and ultimately the 
determination of policy choice, to the interactions between these three groups.  The 
political process, or ‘game’, is seen as an institutional conflict between the competing 
interests of the different actor groups to implement policies reflecting their own 
preferences.   
The first two types of intergovernmental actor groups, or ‘institutional actors’, 
have been grounded in the government budgeting literature since the mid-20th century; 
they are called expenditure advocates and expenditure guardians (Wildavsky and 
Caiden 1997, chap. 1).  Indeed, the interactions between budgetary spending and 
cutting groups make up the primary components of budgetary systems (Wildavsky 
1975).  These two types of actor groups have been widely used and accepted by 
governments, international organizations and the political science and economic 
literature.  The main argument for their use in the literature is that budgetary politics, 
outcomes and performance can be analysed and even explained by focusing on the 
interplay of these two actor groups (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974a; Wildavsky 1975; 
1986).   
An expenditure advocate is interested in working on new or existing public 
programmes, which usually entails promoting increased funding and new types of 
policy regulation for such programmes.  This specific, pre-determined motivation 
subjectively influences her judgements and decision-making.  Thus, as a group and to 
the best of their abilities, expenditure advocates are expected to work towards sector-
specific policy goals in the political system.  They garner respect and admiration 
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especially for new spending initiatives.  An expenditure guardian is a protector of the 
treasury, wishing to constrain public spending, most often, by limiting public sector 
activity.  Savoie (1999, 162) wrote expenditure guardians “are in the business of saving 
public money”.  They are expected to work towards the goal of macroeconomic control 
of the political system to the best of their abilities.  This goal influences their decision-
making and judgements subjectively.  Expenditure guardians often fear the political and 
other consequences of continually spending more money than the system can raise.  
Indeed, when advocates dominate guardians, two common issues arise: first, new 
policies rarely replace or eliminate existing programs; and, second, without the 
economic restraint of guardians, all of the line ministries (i.e., the expenditure 
advocates for each sector) would look to increase spending in their sectors and use all 
available resources to satisfy their constituents, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
situation.   
A variety of actors at the central level of government may take on these two 
roles; in general, however, sectoral (or line) ministries or secretaries and sectoral 
parliamentary committees (along with special-interest organisations) play the role of 
expenditure advocates, while finance ministries and parliamentary budget committees 
generally play the role of expenditure guardians.  In contrast to the line ministries, 
finance ministries do not affiliate with any particular programme priority, making them 
more autonomous from social pressures for a specific programme and able to maintain 
oversight of the budget process (Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen 2009).  
 The third type of intergovernmental actor group operating in the national-level 
policymaking environment consists of representatives from the subnational level of 
government.  These representatives interact regularly with the other two types of actor 
groups, promoting subnational interests for national policymaking.  Blom-Hansen calls 
this type topocrats—a term first coined by Beer (1978) in the federalism literature.30  
As a group, topocrats are increasingly important to the process of national 
policymaking in upper-middle- to high-income countries, which have potentially 
greater technical, human resource and financial capacity (Page 1991, 43–56).  Rhodes 
(1886, p.  1), for example, documents the everyday existence of topocrats in the 
national policymaking environment in the United Kingdom due to their routine 
lobbying “in the village that is Westminster and Whitehall”.  As a group, it would seem 
                                               
30 This word comes from the Greek topos, meaning place or locality, and kratos, meaning authority.  It is, 
however, newly invented and does not appear in the Modern Greek language.   
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logical that topocrats would act as the guardians and defenders of the territorial 
interests and associations of their constituents in the national political process 
(Cammisa 1995; Elazar 1991; V. A. Schmidt 1990).  According to Haider (1974, 214–
15), topocrats “are protective of the autonomy, fiscal viability, and integrity of the 
particular level of government they speak for.”  As a result, and according to Blom-
Hansen (1999), a topocrat’s ultimate goal is to defend their subnational autonomy.31  
Subnational government bureaucrats and politicians, especially those within the sector 
of analysis and the office of the presidency, generally play this role in 
intergovernmental relations with the other two main actor groups of the central 
government.   
 Together, these three actor groups and the structure of their relationships can be 
conceptualised as an “iron triangle” model of policy networks.  Using rational choice 
institutionalism, their interactions and strategies can also be conceptualised as a game 
in which they rationally pursue their own self-interested goals.  As noted, the three 
groups’ top priorities, respectively, tend to be sectoral policy goals, macroeconomic 
control, and subnational autonomy.  While they may agree that all three goals are 
important, each actor group has its own overriding priority.  As all three goals can 
seldom be realised at the same time,32 a policymaking situation of trade-offs emerges.  
In this way, the structure of the national policy network becomes paramount as it both 
constrains and facilitates the ability of the different actor groups to pursue their 
respective goals, which they do in a rational and self-interested (as opposed to 
altruistic) way.  Hence, the “rules governing the action” of the three actor groups must 
be better understood.  They can be determined by examining various measures 
regarding the relative power and influence (exerted power) of the three groups.  This 
allows the analyst to determine where the actual balance of the three goals lies (i.e., 
how the trade-offs function) and the relative level of participation of each actor group 
in intergovernmental policymaking.   
 Figure 3.1 illustrates the national-level intergovernmental policy network in 
terms of the positions of the various actor groups and the trade-offs between their often-
                                               
31 Blom-Hansen (1999) refers to “local” rather than “subnational” autonomy.  I use the latter for 
consistency of the term throughout the thesis. 
32 Sectoral policy goals, especially those in social sectors such as health and education, can be expensive 
to pursue and often conflict with macroeconomic control goals.  Meanwhile, macroeconomic control 
goals can conflict with local autonomy goals when local governments do not follow national economic 
policy guidelines.  Finally, local autonomy goals conflict with sectoral policy goals when national and 
local policy positions on an issue differ (Blom-Hansen 1999, 241). 
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competing goals.  For example, if one actor group is in a position to dictate 
intergovernmental policymaking, then the other two have little or no influence and 
policy will move towards the dictator’s goal (which is located at one of the three 
corners of the triangle in the figure).  However, if only one actor group is lacking 
political influence, then policy will be balanced between the goals of these remaining 
two actor groups (on one of the sides of the triangle).  Finally, if all three actor groups 
participate effectively in intergovernmental policymaking with roughly equal power 
and influence, then the overall policy outcome will likely reflect a balance between the 
goals of all three groups (somewhere inside the triangle, with point D representing a 
rare but perfect balance between their goals).    
Figure 3.1.  Trade-offs in Intergovernmental Policymaking at the National Level 
 
  Building on this notion of national-level intergovernmental policy networks, I 
define, as an original contribution to the literature, an intergovernmental policy network 
that operates within the subnational policymaking environment.  This subnational-level 
intergovernmental policy network is also modelled as an iron triangle, representing 
three actor groups and the structure of their relationships.  The policymaking ‘game’ 
that is played out between the actor groups of the subnational-level intergovernmental 
policy network operates in much the same way as the national-level one does.  The 
actor groups are also quite similar, considering that the subnational-level government 
structures and policymaking arrangements in Spain (and other countries) generally 
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correspond to those of their central government.  Indeed, the first two types of actor 
groups in this network play analogous roles to the expenditure advocates and 
expenditure guardians of the national-level intergovernmental policy network: they are 
the expenditure advocates and guardians at the subnational level of government.  I call 
them the subnational expenditure advocates and subnational expenditure guardians, 
respectively.  Based on the same conceptual foundation, the entities taking on these 
roles are kindred to those at the national level; they are, e.g., subnational sectoral 
ministries or secretaries, and sectoral committees in the subnational parliament, and 
subnational finance ministries and parliamentary budget committees respectively for 
the expenditure advocates and guardians. 
The third type of intergovernmental actor group plays the inverse role of the 
topocrat; as central government representatives working in the subnational 
policymaking environment, they interact regularly with the subnational expenditure 
advocates and guardians.  I call this type of actor group kentrocrats.33  Acting on behalf 
of the central government and, essentially, the citizens of a whole country, kentrocrats’ 
primary objective is to promote national interests.  As the intergovernmental relations 
shift toward a greater amount of decision space at the subnational government level 
(especially in the case of political devolution), kentrocrats take on a role of 
stewardship, seeking to advance the goals of national policy coherence and subnational 
policy coordination, especially with regard to strategic national objectives.  In general, 
kentrocrats are made up national-level bureaucrats, but in times of great need, national-
level politicians can also become involved.  Defined broadly like this, however, the 
kentrocrats, theoretically, could encompass many different central-level representatives 
and their goals could be just as different (and even sometimes competing).  Therefore, 
for each study, it is important to specify the sector from which kentrocrats hail.  Figure 
3.2 illustrates the subnational policy network, with each actor group, and their 
respective positions and trade-offs in intergovernmental policymaking.  Again, the 
same game situation assumptions specified for the national policy network also apply 
for the subnational policy network; the only difference that might be an additional 
factor in decision-making at the subnational level is some influence from the balance of 
priorities between the three actor groups of the national-level intergovernmental policy 
network.   
                                               
33 This word comes from the Greek kentro, meaning centre, and kratos, meaning authority.  I have 
invented it. It does not appear in the Modern Greek language.   
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Figure 3.2.  Trade-offs in Intergovernmental Policymaking at the Subnational Level  
 
For the thesis, and complying with sector-specificity, I call this group health-
sector kentrocrats and their specific goals are national health policy coherence and 
subnational health policy coordination.  Moreover, when referring to the 
intergovernmental policy networks for an analysis of the health sector, I call them the 
“national health policy network” and “subnational health policy network”, respectively.   
3.2.1.  Establishing the Position of Actor Groups in the National Health Policy 
Network 
Blom-Hansen (1999) hypothesises that the organisation of central and local 
policymaking matters because it offers the three institutional actor groups different 
opportunities to achieve their interests and goals.  He tests this hypothesis using a 
comparative analysis of three policy areas (economic, health and childcare policy) in 
the three Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) before the year 
2000.  At the time, these three countries had similar political systems, as unitary states 
with parliamentary systems and proportional elections at all three levels of government 
(national, county and municipality) and similar political parties (Blom-Hansen 1999, 
243).  They also had similar, formally organised local governments, participating in the 
decentralization of core welfare state responsibilities and handling the majority of 
public expenditures.  These similarities meant that many variables could be held 
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constant between countries.  By analysing the power and influence of each actor group, 
Blom-Hansen found a point of equilibrium for central-local policymaking (i.e., the 
informally organised, intergovernmental institutions involved in the national 
policymaking process) for each policy area in the three countries.  This point was the 
most likely compromise among the policy goals and priorities of the three actor groups 
for the specific sector and country (cf. Figure 3.1).   
To find the relative position of each actor group of the national policy network, 
Blom-Hansen employs two main methods.  For expenditure advocates and expenditure 
guardians, Blom-Hansen looks primarily at the national budget process to determine 
their relative influence and position.  Examining the national budget is ideal because it 
encapsulates a process of continuous bargaining and negotiation between these two 
types of institutional actors and their opposing goals.  The relative strength of each 
actor bloc can be measured first through the degree of openness of the national budget 
process.  If the process is mostly closed (or “tight”), then expenditure guardians have a 
stronger bargaining position than advocates do; conversely, advocates benefit from a 
“loose” and open process.  The national budget process has several phases: preparation, 
parliamentary enactment and (often) ad-hoc appropriations throughout the year.  At 
each phase, expenditure guardians and advocates bargain for their respective goals.  
Blom-Hansen uses von Hagen’s (1992) structural index of the national budget process 
in European Community countries to measure the tightness of all three phases of 
budgeting using a number of institutional indicators.  The index is scored on a 60-point 
scale, where 1-30 seems to indicate a “weak” budgetary process and 31-60 indicates a 
“strong” budgetary process.34  Because budget processes change over time and Blom-
Hansen’s study covers a relatively long period, he also verifies his results through 
content analysis of the major changes in each country’s budget process.   
For the topocrats, Blom-Hansen first verifies that local government associations 
exist in all three countries and that they routinely interact with the central government.  
To assess their level of influence in a particular sector and country, he looks primarily 
at their role in decision-making, asking:  How involved are they in policy formulation at 
the national level?  To what extent are formal agreements or other mechanisms 
between local government associations and the national government used as 
alternatives to parliamentary decision-making?  These formal intergovernmental 
                                               
34 While Blom-Hansen (1999) does not explicit these details of the index, I gathered them through a 
careful comparison of his work and that of von Hagen (1992).  
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agreements hold political rather than legal value.  They are corporatist decision-making 
tools, useful to the national government as an alternative to command-and-control 
methods (e.g. parliamentary regulation) that are inappropriate in a partnership model of 
governance.  Local government participation in such intergovernmental agreements 
suggests a privileged position and considerable influence on the national policymaking 
process.   
To determine the level of influence of the topocrats, Blom-Hansen does not use 
a quantitative scale but rather, he looks at the agreements negotiated between the 
central government and local government associations within the national   
policymaking environment.  In cases where the central government consults local 
government associations as a matter of standard operating procedure only, he 
designates them as “weak”.  Where the local government associations have exclusive 
and systematic access to the central government and agreements between them are used 
as an alternative to parliamentary decision-making, Blom-Hansen designates them as 
“strong”.  Finally, he labels a country with intergovernmental relations that lie between 
these two examples as an intermediate case, labelling the topocrats as having “medium” 
strength and acknowledging that this determination may vary across sectors (e.g. in his 
study, Sweden represented an intermediate case and, thus, Blom-Hansen labelled 
Swedish topocrats as “medium” for all policy areas, but “strong” for health sector 
policy).  For the analytical framework of this thesis, I apply slightly modified version 
of Blom-Hansen’s method to the health sector and establish the position of the different 
actor groups in the national health policy network.  For the national budget process 
analysis of the influence of expenditure advocates and guardians, I first look in the 
literature to see if von Hagen’s empirical approach has been applied to the country case 
study of the thesis.  If it has, but for a period that is distant from the dates of my 
analysis, then I will verify the budget tightness results by reviewing and assessing the 
major changes in the budget process since the period of the study and until the dates of 
my analysis, making any corresponding changes to values in the structural index.  If 
von Hagen’s approach has not been applied to the country case study of the thesis, then 
I will fully replicate it for the case.  The results of each phase of the national budget 
process for the study will be reported in a table (see Table 3.5 as a template).   
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Table 3.5.  The National Budget Process in Spain 
  Spain 
 Von Hagen (1992) Other 
Government’s preparation of the budget 
(maximum score: 16) 
  
Parliament’s enactment of the budget (maximum 
score: 20) 
  
Observance of the budget during the budget year 
(maximum score: 25) 
  
Total score   
Explanatory note: The lower the score on the 60-point scale, the more open the budget process. 
 
Finally, I modify Blom-Hansen’s 60-point scale: instead of using a binary 
designation, I believe there is room in the analysis to add a third category to indicate a 
“moderate” budgetary process.  Accordingly, for the thesis, a score between 1 and 20 
points suggests a “weak” budgetary process, between 21 and 40 points suggests a 
“moderate” budgetary process, and between 41 and 60 points suggests a “strong” 
budgetary process.  For the topocrats, I modify Blom-Hansen’s method by creating an 
index for determining their strength in the national policymaking process, improving its 
objectivity and reproducibility.  See Table 3.6 below.  To understand the strength of the 
topocrats within the national policymaking process, I tally up the points for all index 
items and map the total on a 9-point scale, with ‘9’ being the maximum overall value.  
Finally, I rank the topocrats as follows: “weak” for a score between 1 and 3, 
“moderate” for between 4 and 6, and “strong” for between 7 and 9.35   
  
                                               
35 NB: I prefer the term “moderate” as a substitute for what Blom-Hansen designates “medium” strength. 
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Table 3.6.  Index for Topocrat Strength in the National Policymaking Environment 
Items Possible 
Values 
1. Do the local government associations36 exist in the country and sector 
of investigation?  no [0]; yes, in the country only [1]; yes, in the country 
and sector [2]. 
2 
2. Do local government associations routinely interact with, and have 
exclusive and systematic access to, the central government?  no [0]; 
yes, for routine, exclusive access only [1]; yes, for routine, systematic 
access only [1]; yes, for routine, exclusive and systematic access [3]. 
3 
3. How involved are local government associations in policy formulation 
at the national level?  They are not involved at all [0]; they are 
consulted because of standard operating procedure only [1]; they 
provide some influence on policy formulation beyond standard 
operating procedures [3]; formal agreements and other mechanisms 
between them and the central government are used as an alternative to 
parliamentary decision-making [4]. 
4 
Total Score 9 
Explanatory note: The higher the score, the stronger the topocrat.   
3.2.2.  Establishing the Position of Actor Groups in the Subnational Health Policy 
Network 
Parallel to Blom-Hansen’s discussion of intergovernmental actor groups within the 
national policymaking environment, I contend that the organisation of 
intergovernmental policy network matters in a devolved health system because it 
structures the interactions between the three actor groups within the subnational 
policymaking environment, providing each with opportunities to pursue their interests 
and goals.  In the following paragraphs, I present the methods used to analyse the 
power and influence of each actor group and position them on the trade-offs figure for 
intergovernmental policymaking at the subnational level (as shown above). 
 To identify the relative position and influence of the subnational expenditure 
advocates and guardians in their policymaking process, I apply a similar procedure to 
what I outlined for their national-level counterparts.  First, I look for analyses of the 
tightness of the subnational budget process for the subnational government case 
studies.  If I find one, but for a period that is distant from the dates of my analysis, then 
I will verify the budget tightness results by reviewing and assessing the major changes 
in the budget process since the period of the study until the dates of my analysis, 
                                               
36 The use of the term ‘local government associations’ is not strictly limited to the definition used in 
Scandinavian countries.  It includes bodies existing in countries with different organizational structures 
to those studied by Blom-Hansen but that perform similar functions to the local government associations. 
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making any corresponding changes to values in the structural index.  If an adequate 
analysis of this kind cannot be found for the subnational case studies, then I will adapt 
von Hagen’s analysis to the subnational context and budget process and perform my 
own analysis of the subnational budget process.  In any case, some adaptation of von 
Hagen’s index and analysis to the subnational level is necessary and will inherently be 
influenced by the national context and budget process because the central government 
often establishes the rules for budget processes and procedures for all levels of 
government in a country.  The results for the subnational expenditure advocates and 
guardians for each subnational case study will be presented in tabular form similar to 
Table 3.5 above.  In addition, I designate each of these actor groups as having weak, 
moderate or strong power and influence for each subnational government case study, 
using the same methods as stated above for the national-level expenditure advocates 
and guardians. 
To locate the relative position of the health-sector kentrocrats—that usually 
consist of national-level bureaucrats from the highest-level health ministry in a 
country—, I use two main methods.  First, I look for evidence in the literature of these 
actors and their relatively routine interactions with their subnational governments, 
regarding the health sector (i.e., I look for any entities in the country case that perform 
similar roles and functions to Scandinavia’s local government associations).  Then, to 
assess their influence, I examine health-sector kentrocrats’ as stewards over health 
policy within the subnational policymaking environment and, ultimately, their ability to 
accomplish their overarching goals of national health policy coherence and the 
coordination of subnational health policy.37   
Drawing on Travis et al.’s (2003) framework on stewardship of the health 
system, I break down this assessment of the health-sector kentrocrats into four sub-
functions of stewardship (or responsibilities): (i) ensuring tools for implementation: 
powers, incentives and sanctions; (ii) ensuring accountability; (iii) generating 
intelligence; and (iv) building partnerships.  To assess these functions, I perform a 
content analysis of the literature and regulatory framework (including laws, decrees, 
standards, and procedures that exist to guide the health system) from the country 
studied to understand and assess the activities health-sector kentrocrats carry out for 
                                               
37 There is an abundance of scholarly literature on health system stewardship, especially for decentralized 
and multi-level governance systems.  See e.g. WHO (2000), Boffin (2002), Travis et al. (2003), Gilson 
(2007), and Alvarez-Rosete et al. (2013). 
 The Analytical Framework 
   101 
 
each responsibility.  For the first stewardship responsibility, I assess whether the 
health-sector kentrocrats are able to set and enforce fair rules, incentives and sanctions, 
taking a two-pronged approach: (a) I examine whether they have sufficient funding to 
use as a tool for setting incentives and ensuring the compliance of the subnational 
governments on nationally-established health policies; and (b) I look at whether they 
are able to identify, motivate and/or enforce subnational government to comply with 
nationally established laws and regulations.  Then, for the second responsibility, I 
assess health-sector kentrocrat’s efforts to ensure accountability within the health 
system, with a review of the mechanisms they have in place for accountability and 
public participation.  Next, for the third stewardship responsibility, I examine their 
competence to ensure subnational governments have timely access to the information 
they need to make their contribution to the health system, including receiving the 
necessary data and intelligence from the central and other subnational governments 
(e.g. information appearing in sources that the kentrocrats produce, such as annual 
national health system reports).  Finally, for the fourth responsibility, I examine 
whether they have built and been able to sustain partnerships with the subnational 
governments.  For example, I consider to what extent they have created opportunities to 
interact with politicians and bureaucrats from individual or multiple subnational 
governments through special events, regular tasks or continuous activities.   
Intending to standardize this analysis for replication and make it more objective, 
I construct an index to value these functions on an 18-point scale with ‘18’ being the 
maximum overall value health-sector kentrocrats can achieve.  See Table 3.7 below.  
The maximum possible value for each stewardship function is indicated in the table, 
along with their descriptions.  Finally, to understand the strength of the health-sector 
kentrocrats as stewards of the national health system, I tally up the points for all of their 
functions and rank them as follows: “weak” for a score between 1 and 6, “moderate” 
for between 7 and 12, and “strong” for between 13 and 18.    
Finally, I summarise the relative positions of power and influence of all the 
institutional actor groups in the two intergovernmental health policy networks.  I 
illustrate these positions together in a table (see Table 3.8 for the format; in this 
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instance, I have provided a hypothetical set of results for Subnational Government 1 for 
use as an example later in the chapter).38  . 
Table 3.7.  Index of Stewardship Functions for Health-Sector Kentrocrats 
Stewardship Functions 
 
Possible 
Values 
1.  Ensuring tools for implementation: financing and regulation 
a) Do health-sector kentrocrats have sufficient funding for setting 
incentives and ensuring the compliance of the subnational governments 
on nationally-established health policies?  no [0]; yes, for setting 
incentives only [1]; yes, for ensuring compliance only [2]; yes, for 
setting incentives and ensuring compliance [3].   
3 
b) Do health-sector kentrocrats identify, motivate and enforce subnational 
governments to comply with nationally-established laws and 
regulations?  no [0]; yes, for identifying and motivating only [1]; 
identifying and enforcing only [2]; identifying, motivating and 
enforcing [3]. 
3 
2.  Ensuring accountability 
a) Do health-sector kentrocrats have sufficient accountability and public 
participation mechanisms in place?  no [0]; some [1]; yes [2]. 
2 
b) Are health-sector kentrocrats able to ensure that subnational 
governments comply with the nationally-established mechanisms for 
accountability?  no [0]; yes, in part [1]; yes, fully [2].   
2 
3.  Generating intelligence 
a) Have health-sector kentrocrats been able to provide subnational 
governments with the data and intelligence necessary to carry out their 
responsibilities?  No [0]; yes, some necessary data and intelligence [1]; 
yes, all necessary data and intelligence [2]. 
2 
b) Have health-sector kentrocrats been able to do this in a timely manner?  
no [0]; yes, in part [1]; yes, for all necessary data and intelligence [2].  
2 
4.  Building partnerships 
a) Have health-sector kentrocrats built active and effective partnerships 
with subnational governments?  no [0]; yes, for activity only [1]; yes, 
for activity and effectiveness [2].  
2 
b) Have health-sector kentrocrats sustained their activities and 
effectiveness in these partnerships overtime?  no [0]; yes, in part[1]; 
yes, fully [2].  
2 
Total 18 
Explanatory note: The higher the score, the stronger the health-sector kentrocrat.  
  
                                               
38 I assume that all institutional actors will have at least a modicum of power and influence within their 
respective policymaking environments and, thus, none of them will dictate policy completely or be 
excluded entirely from the policymaking process. 
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Table 3.8.  Intergovernmental Health Policy Networks for Subnational Governments 
 Country Health Sector 
Subnational 
Government 1 
Subnational 
Government 2 
National Health Policy Network 
Expenditure Advocates Strong  
Expenditure Guardians Weak  
Topocrats Strong  
Subnational Health Policy Network 
Subnational Expenditure Advocates Weak  
Subnational Expenditure Guardians Strong  
Health-Sector Kentrocrats Moderate  
3.3.  Policy Directions in a Devolved Health System 
For the third and final part of the analytical framework of the thesis, I bring together the 
results of the analyses of decision space and intergovernmental policy networks for 
health system devolution to construct a methodology that can be used to understand and 
better anticipate health policy priorities.   
3.3.1.  Combining Decision Space with Intergovernmental Health Policy Networks 
Combining the results of these two analyses for any given policy, I first examine the 
amount of decision space devolved to the health system function most implicated in the 
policy (e.g. if the policy involves changing the revenue source, then I look at the 
“sources of revenue” function).  Depending on the range of choice for the implicated 
health system function, one of the two intergovernmental health policy networks will 
be dominant.  If the amount of decision space for a given function is narrow, then the 
national health policy network is dominant and the top triangle of the scenario would 
be represented in bold type.  If it is wide, then the subnational health policy network is 
dominant and the bottom triangle of the scenario would be bold.  If it is moderate, then 
the two intergovernmental health policy networks share power and will need to be 
examined more closely with respect to the affected policy to understand whether one 
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supersedes the other or if the two should be described as fully interrelated (which I 
believe is rather rare empirically).39  See Figure 3.3.   
Figure 3.3.  Decision Space and Intergovernmental Health Policy Network Possibilities 
 
 
So, turning back to our example in Table 3.8 with our hypothetical Subnational 
Government 1 and assuming wide decision space, we would expect that most, if not all, 
policy decisions for the particular health system function would be mostly taken at the 
subnational government level.  Thus, we would expect the subnational health policy 
network to be dominant, with policy priorities favouring its subnational expenditure 
guardians, with moderate influence from health-sector kentrocrats and little to no 
influence from the subnational expenditure advocates.  Thus, the subnational 
expenditure guardians’ goal of subnational economic control would be prioritised over 
the goals of the other two actor groups in most cases, and any given sectoral policy for 
the subnational government would tend toward the objectives of national sectoral 
policy coherence and coordination across subnational governments.  In addition, any 
policymaking power for the health system function that remains at the national 
government level of our hypothetical example is expected to produce policies that 
reflect a compromise between the goals of the expenditure advocates and the topocrats, 
                                               
39 I believe that it is rare empirically to have a shared competency over policymaking between 
governments in upper-middle- and high-income countries because they tend to have already undergone a 
process to clearly define and divide competencies between governments so that they are not overlapping, 
and the governments tend to have already built sufficient capacity to implement their respective 
competencies properly.   
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with little influence in terms of macroeconomic control from the expenditure guardians.  
This means that policies should tend toward sectoral goals and favour local autonomy.   
Furthermore, theoretically, in a politically devolved system, the power 
dynamics expressed in each of these intergovernmental policy networks may also have 
some influence on the other; though, it would be most likely for the national level 
policymaking process to influence the subnational level policymaking process than for 
the contrary to happen.40  As such, for example, we could assume that the influence of 
national policymaking decisions may have a push or pull effect on the expected policy 
priority at the subnational level; this influence could be toward either the national 
expenditure advocates or guardians, whichever is stronger.  As a result, turning again to 
our hypothetical Subnational Government 1 and considering the strong influence of 
expenditure advocates in the national health policy network, we would anticipate that 
health policy priorities and decisions for the health system functions with wide decision 
space may carry some additional influence from the national-level expenditure 
advocates.  Consequently, although health policy priorities still rest mostly with the 
subnational expenditure guardians and their goal of subnational economic control, it 
may be dampened by a heightened level of priority for increasing expenditure on health 
policy.  Therefore, considering the influence that the power and priorities of national 
health policymaking process have on the subnational health policy network may affect 
the originally-established balance between the priority goals of the three main actor 
groups at the subnational government level. 
3.3.2.  Examining Policy Priorities in a Devolved Health System 
In this subsection, I present the method for examining the degree of correspondence 
between the results (i.e., health policy priorities) anticipated by the analytical 
framework of the thesis and the actual results of health policy decisions for a country 
case study.  Following Blom-Hansen (1999), I retrospectively analyse the degree to 
                                               
40 Though, as abovementioned, at least some national-level influence is assumed to be built into the 
subnational adaptation of von Hagen’s structural index, especially when the central government dictates 
budget rules, processes and procedures for all levels of government in the country case study (which, 
e.g., may happen in a highly politically-decentralized system or in a central government’s attempt to 
contain expenditure levels for the whole system).  The balance of power and, ultimately, the priority for 
future policies in the national policymaking environment can also be influenced by the power dynamics 
of the subnational health policy network.  However, this is not likely to result from the actions of one or 
even a handful of subnational governments, but only from consensus among many of the country’s 
subnational governments, which is already adequately represented in the framework by the topocrats.  
For this reason, this thesis does not consider the possibility of influence from a subnational health policy 
network of an individual subnational government on the balance of power of the national health policy 
network.   
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which actual health policy favours those actors who have a privileged position in the 
policymaking process, their respective intergovernmental policy networks and resulting 
prioritisation of policy goals by subjecting a selection of health policies41 to three 
different measures of the effectiveness of intergovernmental policy.  First, I assess the 
level of policy efficiency in the system; i.e., the degree of correspondence between 
policy objectives and actual outcomes.  Often, however, policy efficiency is difficult to 
assess, as governments do not always explicitly stipulate their policy goals.  For this 
reason, I apply two additional measures.  As the second measure of intergovernmental 
policy, I examine the policy strategies employed by the diverse actors to attain their 
policy objectives.  The third measure addresses policy failures, or the evidence that the 
efforts being made are insufficient to reach the policy objectives.   
The results of my empirical analysis enable me to assess the degree to which the 
analytical framework successfully anticipates actual health policy priorities.  Based on 
this assessment, I offer some conclusions regarding whether the policies formulated and 
implemented under devolution align with the specific objectives of the country’s 
devolution policy and overall health system.42  I also identify some general lessons and 
policy implications that emerge from the exercise undertaken in the thesis and present 
ideas for future research. 
 In summary, the analytical framework of the thesis allows for an improved 
understanding of the effects health system devolution has on the policy choices at the 
national and subnational level by using an established and original constellation of 
institutional actors to analyse the health policymaking process following devolution.  
The analytical framework is applied and evaluated with one country- and two 
subnational-case studies, the parameters of which are outlined below.  Overall, the 
value of my analytical approach is threefold: (1) it analyses the level of decision space 
afforded by devolution and its corresponding effects on policymaking; (2) through an 
analysis of the structure and agency of the policymaking process, it estimates policy 
                                               
41 Criteria for selecting health policies: The selection should include (i) a balance of policies that fall 
within health system functions with wide and moderate range of choice; (ii) if possible, one policy from 
each of the five functional areas of the decision-space map.  In addition, the selection will prioritize 
policies falling under the health system functions for which data is more readily available data for the 
case study.  These criteria are not likely to introduce bias in terms of fitting with the model.  The 
selection should also include the economic relevance of both the policy and key function, which triggers 
the trade-off among the goals of the three actor groups. 
42 Historically, devolution (along with decentralization in general) has been advocated as a desirable 
process for improving health systems, under the implicit assumption that the objectives for devolution in 
any given country are aligned with that country’s overall health system objectives.   
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priorities in a devolved health system; and (3) it identifies the level of correspondence 
between the positions of the institutional actor groups in the intergovernmental health 
policy networks and the level of priority and content of future policies regarding the 
various functions of the health system.     
3.4.  Research Design and Methods  
In this subsection, I describe the research design and methods of the thesis.  First, I 
present the case study method, detailing the importance and selection procedure and 
parameters for the single-country case and the regional case studies of the thesis.  Then, 
I describe the methods for selecting and collecting primary, secondary, and tertiary 
data, with particular attention to the research design details for collecting and 
performing interviews with key informants and stakeholders to obtain primary data.  
Finally, I present the way that I organised, handled and analysed the data for the thesis 
using the method of content analysis in both the traditional way and with computer-
aided qualitative data analysis software.      
3.4.1.  The Case Study 
The present thesis evaluates the effectiveness of its analytical framework for health 
system devolution by means of a single-country case study, with two regional case 
studies.43  The case study method is the primary method of scholarly inquiry among 
researchers in the social sciences (Gerring 2004; Merriam 1992; Van Evera 1997; 
Exworthy, Peckham, and Powell 2012).  It offers a means to assess specific 
contemporary phenomena in depth within a real-life context (Easton 1992; Yin 2009).  
In essence, “it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, 
how they were implemented and with what result” (Schramm 1971, 6).  It is preferred 
over other methods (experimentation and large-n studies) “when a ‘how’ and a ‘why’ 
question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator 
has little or no control” (Exworthy, Peckham, and Powell 2012, 5).  Eckstein (2009, 
119) argues, “Case studies … are valuable at all stages of the theory-building process, 
but most valuable at that stage of theory building where the least value is generally 
attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories are ‘tested’”.  Furthermore, in 
                                               
43 I hope that the analytical framework of this dissertation will be applicable to more than one country, 
but cross-country comparisons are beyond the scope of the present work.  There is much debate on the 
viability of such an approach in the literature.   
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the field of health, case studies can be particularly useful in evaluating theories about 
policymaking and valuable in supporting theoretical generalisations (Ham 1981).   
The selection of the case study is of fundamental importance.  I selected Spain 
for my single-country case study because, as a high-income country, it clearly falls into 
the category of countries addressed by the framework and, most importantly, it has 
undergone health system devolution reform relatively recently and successfully.  In 
addition, Spain’s health system devolution reform (e.g. Urbanos-Garrido and Utrilla de 
la Hoz (2000), López-Casasnovas (2007), Simon-Cosano, Lago-Peñas and Vaquero 
(2012) and Costa-Font (2013)) and other aspects of its health system and services (e.g. 
Levaggi and Smith (2005), Borkan et al (2010), Carnicero and Rojas (2010) and 
McClellan et al. (2015)) have been used often as models for upper-middle- and high-
income countries (e.g. Rodríguez et al. (1999) and Saltman et al. (2007)), especially in 
the Americas (e.g. see Montero (2001) for Latin American countries, and Walter (2012) 
for the US), to inform policy-makers and academics about their experiences and lessons 
learnt, which may be relevant to their own health system, service and policy situations.  
The case study of this doctoral dissertation looks particularly at Spain’s 2001 
devolution of health service competencies from the central government to ten of its 
seventeen subnational governments.  While it takes a countrywide perspective44, it 
focuses on the ten subnational governments45 that participated in this reform and 
examines two of them in depth: the Autonomous Communities of Extremadura and 
Madrid.  For the thesis, I refer to these subnational governments or Autonomous 
Communities as ‘regions’ or by their simple names: Extremadura and Madrid.  The 
uniform background and contextual conditions of a single-country case study create a 
semi-controlled environment for the regional case studies, thereby limiting the impact 
of potentially confounding variables by holding them constant.  Extremadura and 
Madrid were selected from the ten regions that underwent the reform because they have 
the following features in common:  
                                               
44 I.e., data and information regarding the Spanish central government and the seven autonomous 
communities that did not participate in this reform will also be included in the analysis where relevant 
and available.   
45 See Table 3.9 for a list of all regions in Spain.  The ten implicated in the 2001 health devolution reform 
were Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile Leon, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, La 
Rioja, Madrid, and Murcia.  
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(i) No potential path-dependence drivers: both are among the ten autonomous 
communities on the “slow track” to receive devolution powers, having 
experienced health system devolution in 2001 (enacted with Act 21 of 2001 on 
regulation of the fiscal and administrative measures of the new financing system 
of the regions and Royal Decrees 1471-1480 of 2001 on transferral of health 
care management competencies, and implemented from January 2002). 
(ii) No drivers based on nationalism or regional identity: neither region had active 
nationalist or regionalist parties or separatist groups during the period of study, 
1996–2006.   
(iii)No potential drivers associated with changes in the political ruling party: one 
major political party consistently ruled each of these regions during the period 
of study.  The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party, PSOE) governed Extremadura and the Partido Popular (People’s Party, 
PP) governed Madrid continuously during this period.   
At the same time, these regions have some differences between them that make them 
particularly useful and ‘rich’ case-selections, per purposeful sampling (Cresswell 1994; 
Patton 2002).  Most notably, they represent opposite sides of the socio-economic 
spectrum in Spain (see Table 3.9).  Madrid contains the country’s capital and is one of 
the more industrial, urban and economically affluent regions of Spain.  Extremadura is 
a more rural, agricultural region with a relatively low socio-economic status.  In 
particular, in 2000, Madrid had a GDP per capita of 21,281 € and Extremadura had 
9,965 €.  In the same year, the average life expectancy at birth in Madrid (80.47 years) 
was higher than Extremadura’s (78.90 years).  Finally, in terms of educational level, a 
smaller proportion of Madrid’s population (9.36 per cent) was illiterate than 
Extremadura’s population (26.32 per cent), and a greater proportion had higher 
education (25.84 per cent in Madrid compared to 12.19 per cent in Extremadura).   
3.4.2.  Data Collection  
I collected original primary data through in-depth interviews with institutional actors 
involved in the intergovernmental health policymaking process, in addition to 
secondary data from newspapers, peer-reviewed articles and public documents, 
including parliamentary debates, regulations and legislation related to my investigation, 
and tertiary data, e.g. from the INEbase (a database for Spanish statistics), von Hagen’s 
(1992) Structural Index, and Blom-Hansen (1999).  
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3.4.2.1.  Primary Data – In-depth Interviews: The use of in-depth interviews of 
institutional actors constitutes a major contribution of the dissertation, complementing 
both the literature review and the secondary data retrieved from other sources.  In 
general, in-depth interviews provide first-hand information on events that took place 
during the period under examination.  They also facilitate the compilation of large 
amounts of data rather quickly, with the potential for subsequent follow-up and 
clarification.  Moreover, interviews are used frequently to examine the validity of 
assumptions made in theory development and in the specific context of a case study.  
Moreover, interviewing key stakeholders (or elite actors), in particular, can uncover 
unique and valuable information because of the privileged status of the interviewees, 
who usually hold high positions in society and/or the political system as well as an 
exclusive ability to report on past, present and future policies and agendas of their 
organisations.   
For the design of the semi-structured interview guide, I based my questions on a 
stakeholder analysis (Schmeer 1999; Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000; Varvasovszky 
and Brugha 2000), which identified the needs and concerns of the various stakeholders 
in the health sector.  Questions concerning Spain’s 2001 health devolution reform and 
the roles of each primary actor group were developed to determine the interviewees’ 
power, position, preferences, goals and interests, along with the alliances they made, 
the resources they had available and how they were used, and the stakeholders’ 
willingness to lead action for or against certain policies.  In addition, the interview 
guide included questions to validate the primary behavioural assumptions supporting 
the analytical framework of the thesis.  I adapted the general interview guide to each 
actor group, considering each key stakeholder’s experience (e.g. central or regional 
government) and expertise (e.g. health or economics) when and where possible.  See 
Appendix C for an example interview guide that was used with regional key 
stakeholders. 
I conducted 48 in-depth interviews for the Spanish case study.  Twenty of these 
were with key informants and twenty-eight of these interviews were with key 
stakeholders of the Spanish NHS.  Key informants included university professors and 
lecturers of health policy, public health and health economics, as well as a few 
representatives of non-governmental organisations and interest groups (e.g. one actor 
recounted his experience with Spain’s physicians association and another worked for a 
private health policy foundation.  Key stakeholders interviewed included a variety of 
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Table 3.9.  Characteristics of Spain’s Autonomous Communities 
Autonomous 
Community 
Year of 
Health 
System 
Devolution 
Nationalism/Regionalism Driversa Identity 
Driverb 
Political 
Party 
1995-2001 
Political 
Party 
2002-2006 
Income 
(GDP 
per 
Capita)c 
Health 
(Life 
Expect.  
at Birth)d 
Illiteracy 
(% of Pop.   
≥ age 16)e 
Higher 
Ed. (% of 
Pop.   
≥ age 16)f 
Andalusia 1984 NO Nationality PSOE PSOE 11,538 € 78.20 24.45 14.91 
Aragon 2001 
YES, Partido Aragonés (Centrism, Aragonese 
Regionalism, nationalism); Chunta 
Aragonesista (Democratic Socialism, 
Aragonese nationalism) 
Nationality PP PSOE 16,365 € 80.04 10.15 18.46 
Asturias 2001 YES, Asturian Forum (Asturian regionalism) Regiong PP-URAS PSOE 13,081 € 78.79 14.76 16.42 
Balearic 
Islands 
2001 
YES, Més per Mallorca (Catalan 
nationalism); Eivissa pel Canvi (Catalan 
nationalism) 
Nationality 
PP/ 1999 
PSIB-
PSOE 
PSIB-PSOE/ 
2003 PP 
19,282 € 78.55 14.43 13.94 
Basque 
Country 
1988 
YES, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque 
nationalism); Geroa Bai (Basque nationalism); 
EH Bildu (Socialism, Basque and left-wing 
nationalism) 
Nationality PNV PNV 19,182 € 79.64 7.86 26.18 
Canary 
Islands 
1994 YES, Coalición Canarian (Canarian nationalism) Nationality CC CC 14,845 € 77.82 19.80 14.97 
Cantabria 2001 
YES, Partido Regionalista de Cantabria 
(Regionalism) Region
g PP 
PP/ 2003 
PRC 
14,634 € 79.32 7.37 18.08 
Castile-Leon 2001 YES, Unión del Pueblo Leonés (Regionalism) Regionh PP PP 14,164 € 80.65 8.74 17.32 
Castile-La 
Mancha 
2001 NO Regioni PSOE PSOE 12,307 € 80.25 26.80 11.83 
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Autonomous 
Community 
Year of 
Health 
System 
Devolution 
Nationalism/Regionalism Driversa Identity 
Driverb 
Political 
Party 
1995-2001 
Political 
Party 
2002-2006 
Income 
(GDP 
per 
Capita)c 
Health 
(Life 
Expect.  
at Birth)d 
Illiteracy 
(% of Pop.   
≥ age 16)e 
Higher 
Ed. (% of 
Pop.   
≥ age 16)f 
Catalonia 1981 
YES, Convergéncia i Unió (Catalan 
nationalism); Esquerra Republicana de 
Cantalunya (Catalan separatism); Iniciativa per 
Catalunya Verds (Green Politics, Catalan 
nationalism); Ciutadans (Social liberalism, 
European federalism, post-nationalism); 
Candidatura D'Unitat Popular (Catalan 
Independence) 
Nationality CiU PSC 19,072 € 79.67 14.33 18.90 
Extremadura 2001 NOj Region PSOE PSOE 9,965 € 78.90 26.32 12.19 
Galicia 1991 
YES, Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician 
nationalism) Nationality PPdeG 
PPdeG/ 2005 
PSdeG-PSOE 
12,163 € 79.31 20.54 14.17 
La Rioja 2001 YES, Partido Riojano (Regionalist) Region PP PP 17,826 € 80.48 6.44 17.47 
Madrid 2001 NO Communityi PP PP 21,281 € 80.47 9.36 25.84 
Murcia 2001 NO Region PP PP 13,132 € 78.38 22.77 16.26 
Navarre 1991 
YES, Unión del Pueblo Navarra (Conservatism, 
Navarese Regionalism); Nafarroa Bai (Basque 
nationalism); Bildu (Socialism, Basque and 
left-wing nationalism) 
Chartered 
(Foral) 
Communityk 
UPN UPN 19,927 € 80.50 8.28 24.34 
Valencia 1988 YES, Coalició Compromís (Valencian nationalism) Nationality PP-UV PP 15,102 € 78.74 17.19 16.24 
a Nationalism/Regionalism Driver measure: political parties in Congress and additional political parties in regional parliament s (most information taken from 2011). 
b Identity Driver: how each region defines itself in its Statutes of Autonomy.  c Income: GDP per capita in euros, 2000.  d Health: Life expectancy at birth, 2000. 
e Education: proportion of the population 16 years or older that was illiterate in 2000.  f Education: proportion of the population 16 years or older with higher education as of 2000.  g 
Asturias and Cantabria are also identified as “historic communities” in their Statutes of Autonomy.  h Castile-Leon is also identified as a “historic and cultural community” in its 
Statute of Autonomy.  i Madrid was separated from Castile-La Mancha and made an autonomous community because it is Spain's capital and the seat of its national government 
institutions.  j Extremadura Unida has represented Extremadura in a united Spain, but did not get a seat in Parliament until it formed a coali tion with the Popular Party of 
Extremadura in 2007.  k Navarra secured self-government through reintegration and improvement of its medieval charters.  Source: INEbase (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2015) 
online for income, health and education indicators.  Abbreviations: CC = Coalición Canarian, CiU = Convergéncia i Unió, PNV = Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PP = Partido Popular, 
PPdeG = Partido Popular de Galicia, PRC = Partido Regionalista de Cantabria, PSC = Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, PSIB  = Partit Socialista Illes Balears, PSOE = Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, PSdeG = Partido Socialist de Galicia, URAS = Unión Renovadora Asturiana, and UV = Unión Valenciana.   
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Spanish national and regional politicians and bureaucrats, who held positions in the 
political system and NHS, and participated in the health policymaking process before 
and/or after the 2001 health devolution reform.  See Appendix D for a list of key 
stakeholders interviewed.  Most of them belonged to one of the main actor groups in 
the national and subnational policy networks, and more of a political, rather than a 
high-level technical, role.  A few particularly informative and accessible participants 
granted follow-up interviews so that I could ask additional questions that emerged 
during the data collection and analysis processes.   
Careful selection of the interviewees based on their professional background 
and experiences was essential to obtain a fair and accurate portrayal of the Spanish 
situation.  In particular, key stakeholders from the Ministry of Health and Consumer 
Affairs and parliamentary groups concentrating on the health sector represented the 
expenditure advocates, and health-sector kentrocrats.  Key stakeholders from the 
regions, especially persons who have held top positions in the regional parliament 
and/or the regional ministries of health, economy and finance as well as the regional 
presidents and regional ministers (consejeros/as) of health, represented the topocrats 
and subnational expenditure guardians and advocates.46  Most of the key stakeholders 
interviewed for this group hailed from Extremadura and Madrid, though I also 
interviewed key regional stakeholders from Asturias, Baleares, the Basque Country, 
Castile-La Mancha, Catalonia, and Galicia.   
I selected key stakeholders with the objective of being politically balanced.  To 
this end, my pool of key stakeholders interviewed included similar numbers of 
participants from both the Socialist Party (Partida Social de Obreros Españoles) and 
the People’s Party (Partida Popular) at each level of government.  Eleven of the 
interviewees identified themselves as having views aligned with the Socialist Party, 
eleven with the People’s Party, and one with the Catalan nationalist party, Convergence 
and Union (Convergència I Unió).47   
Initial interviews were obtained using the procedures of key informant and 
snowball sampling techniques, following the recommendations of Patton (2002).  I 
                                               
46 It is important to note that often there was overlap between the institutional actors in the two 
intergovernmental policy networks—e.g. an actor may have worked for more than one of the groups but 
at different times in the study or an actor’s experience qualified him to answer questions as a (national) 
expenditure advocate as well as a health-sector kentrocrat.  For this reason, I carefully designed and 
adapted each interview guide for each key stakeholder.    
47 The others did not explicitly define their political views or identify themselves as aligned with any one 
party. 
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actively pursued contact with key informants before beginning my fieldwork, mainly 
relying on sponsorship, recommendations and introductions for appointments gained 
through my association with LSE and its professors.  Some key informants were also 
identified through the literature.  I then sought to identify further interviewees through 
geographic and snowball sampling with help from the recommendations and contacts 
of the key informant pool.  As this approach to recruiting interviewees could not by 
itself ensure a balanced representation, I consulted with academics to crosscheck the 
backgrounds of the interviewees and thereby avoid introducing any unintended bias.  
This led to the identification of a small but impressive network of experts on the topic.  
To complement this approach, I expanded my search by scanning State Manuals 
(Manuales de Estado) from the years 1994 to 1999 for more potential interviewees and 
their positions.  In addition, I included some major actors who were still working in the 
field through 2007.  I personally requested interviews via email and followed them up 
when necessary, scheduled them and sent out thank you letters.   
I performed these interviews in three waves.  The first wave took place during 
the period December 2005–March 2006.  It consisted of preliminary interviews with 
mostly key informants but also some accessible key stakeholders.  I explored their 
advice on my thesis’s overall argument and its suitability for the Spanish case, the 
structure and questions of my interview guide, and my list of potential key stakeholders 
to interview.48  I introduced my consolidated, semi-structured interview guide during 
the second wave of interviews, which took place during the period March–July 2007.  
The second wave entailed the first complete round of key stakeholder interviews.  The 
third wave of interviews took place mostly during the month of October 2007, with an 
outlying interview in March 2008.  It consisted of the second round of key stakeholder 
interviews, in which I employed the interview guide and dove deeper into details that 
were not clarified in the first round and after an initial interim analysis of the previously 
collected data.   
                                               
48 The first few key stakeholders were asked to sign a consent form signifying that they were consenting 
to participate in the interview, that I had informed them of their right to interrupt the interview at any 
time, and that I would preserve their anonymity (see Appendix E for the information sheet and consent 
form used).  I later stopped using the consent form because it became an obstacle to conducting these 
interviews.  Researchers with experience in qualitative interviewing in Spain advised me not to use it, as 
it is a culturally awkward concept for Spaniards in general and because elites in Spain are accustomed to 
giving consent for the release—not preservation—of their anonymity.  Instead of using the consent form, 
I verbally advised each key stakeholder of his or her interviewing rights.   
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All interviews were performed one-on-one in a native language of the 
interviewees: Spanish.  They were largely conducted in Extremadura and Madrid, with 
some taking place in Barcelona, La Coruña, Toledo, Seville, and Santiago de 
Compostela in Spain as well as Paris (at the Spanish Embassy) and Brussels (at the 
European Parliament).  The average interview lasted 66 minutes, with a range from 17 
to 100 minutes.  I took handwritten notes during each interview and digitally recorded 
all but one of them (because one key stakeholder declined recording).  The interview 
data were made anonymous by means of an alphanumeric coding system based on the 
actors’ main organisation of expertise, political orientation and administrative position.  
I am the only person in possession of the list that matches the codes to the specific 
interviewees and their comments.  I had all of the digital recordings of the interviews 
transcribed by a native Spanish-speaking professional.     
Despite the many benefits of in-depth interviews, this method contains a few 
potential limitations, especially when interviewees are highly political, ‘elite’ actors.  
Data collection depends on participants’ honesty, cooperation, and accessibility 
(Marshall and Rossman 1995).  Moreover, an elite interviewee often has well-honed 
public speaking and interviewing skills, which may make the interviewer’s attempts to 
obtain necessary information quite difficult.  Additionally, an elite interviewee’s own 
value judgements may present another limitation.  After all, the raison d’être of 
coalitions or groups of political actors is to disseminate their ideas and values, and so 
they specialise in trying to bring others to share their viewpoints.  Such endeavours by 
the interviewee can distract from or even overwhelm the intended focus of the 
interview.  As human beings, interviewees tend to rewrite history, as “realities exist as 
mental constructs and are relative to those who hold them” (Becker 1963).  For these 
reasons, juxtaposing interview data with more objective sources of information 
becomes an important safeguard.  Furthermore, interviewing elite actors is also a 
particularly costly research method, both in time and money.  Contacting them can be 
difficult; the researcher may have to go through a number of gatekeepers in order to 
make initial contact.  In addition, the researcher must compete for a spot on the elite 
actor’s busy professional schedule.  When an interview is granted, it may often be 
cancelled or postponed at the last minute, especially during campaign season for 
government elections.   
I experienced some of these limitations in my research for this study.  For 
example, one of my key stakeholders declined to be digitally recorded during the 
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interview and was extremely (politically) guarded throughout it (e.g. refusing to answer 
certain questions without providing any good reason).  The pool of female “key 
stakeholder” candidates qualified for the case study was extremely small and their 
response rate to my interview request was very low.  Moreover, while I considered the 
timing of national elections when planning the different waves of interviews, I 
overlooked the timing of 2007 regional (parliamentary) elections, which were held on 
the 27th of May in thirteen of the seventeen autonomous communities: Aragon, 
Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, 
Castile-Leon, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, La Rioja and the Valencian 
Community.  As a result, I had to postpone a number of interviews with key 
stakeholders from Madrid and Extremadura that were originally slotted for the second 
wave of interviews to the third wave of interviews.  To minimise further potential 
obstacles to collecting primary data through ‘elite’ actor interviews, I was 
methodological with arranging my interviews and persistent in my contact methods.  
Moreover, in my correspondence, I emphasised the importance of my interviewing 
each potential key stakeholder.  My affiliation with the London School of Economics 
and Political Science also seemed to be appreciated and (to my surprise) the fact that I 
was an American counted in my favour.  To reduce travel costs, I resided in Madrid 
during my fieldwork, giving me convenient access to most key informants and 
stakeholders for my study.  My interviews in Extremadura and other regions were more 
difficult to plan, less secure and more costly; though, they were rarely cancelled at the 
last minute.  
3.4.2.2.  Secondary and Tertiary Data:  I conducted a review of the literature on 
public policy and decentralization, including literature specific to health policy.  This 
review helped me the three parts of the analytical framework for this thesis in an 
informed and educated manner.  The literature review and case study research was 
ongoing both prior to and during my fieldwork experience.  This proved particularly 
useful because it allowed me greater access to information on new laws and regulations 
and information not widely disseminated outside Spain (due to the means of 
distribution or the language barrier).  As a result, the focus of my thesis changed 
considerably over the years of study.  In addition, being immersed in Spain and its 
culture permitted me to track daily developments in its political system and general 
news about the country more fully.   
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Key literature and secondary data resources for this study were collected from 
the following institutions and their libraries:  
European Observatory of Health Systems and Policies, Spain 
Harvard School of Public Health, United States 
Harvard University, United States 
Institute Juan March Centre for Advanced Studies in Social Science, Spain 
Institute of Health Carlos III, Spain 
Inter-American Development Bank, United States 
London School of Economics, United Kingdom 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, United Kingdom 
Ministry of Health, Italy 
Ministry of Health, Spain 
National Council for Research, Italy 
National Institute of Health, Italy 
Pan-American Health Organisation, United States 
University of Barcelona, Spain 
University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain 
World Bank, United States 
I performed a literature search using keywords and phrases in the LSE library 
and several online search catalogues, databases and journals, as well as BIDS IBSS, 
Dialnet, (dialnet.unirioja.es), Google Scholar, INGENTA, ISI Web of Knowledge, 
PubMed, and WorldCAT.  I also consulted with experts and searched websites to 
collect additional bibliographic materials.  The general search terms or keywords and 
phrases that I systematically employed included the following: decentralization, 
political decentralization, health system decentralization, health care decentralization, 
health sector decentralization, devolution, political devolution, health system 
devolution, health care devolution, health sector decentralisation, centralisation, 
intergovernmental relations, central-local relations, public policy, social policy, health 
policy, public administration, and the policymaking process.  These data were collected 
in English, Spanish and, in a few cases, Italian.49  
3.4.3.  Data Handling and Analysis 
3.4.3.1.  Content Analysis:  I used the scientific method of content analysis to 
analyse systematically the text from the primary, secondary and tertiary data that I 
collected.  This method is commonly used in the social sciences, including political 
                                               
49 As such, language variants of the search terms in US and UK English, Spanish and Italian were also 
used, e.g. decentralization (US English) = decentralisation (UK English) = decentralización (Spanish) or 
las transferencias sanitarias = decentramento or decentralizzazione (Italian).  Despite my decision to use 
UK English as the main language of the thesis, I chose to use the US English spelling of decentralization 
because, in my experience, it is most widely used in the literature and I believe that doing so will make 
my work more easily accessible in literature searches. 
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science and public policy (Abrahamson 1983).  It is a reliable, discreet and context-
sensitive technique that allows researchers to process and analyse relatively 
unstructured data in order to recognise meanings, patterns, systems, indices, institutions 
and expressive contents and make valid inferences from it to the contexts of their use 
(Krippendorff 2012).   It is also constructive for answering policy questions regarding 
organisational phenomena, like decentralization.  More generally, it is an effective 
method for objectively processing information that must be condensed and made 
systematically comparable (Berg 2007, chap. 11).  Content analysis is better equipped 
to find inconsistencies and conflicts that are built into policies and policymaking 
processes than most quantitative methods (Patton 2002).  It is also useful in finding 
more practical solutions to problems (Cantarero Prieto and Pascual Saez 2007).  It can 
further cope with processing large volumes of data, especially but not necessarily when 
assisted by a computer (see Krippendorff (2012)).  
I used the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, Nvivo 9, to help 
me analyse the transcriptions and digital recordings, simultaneously, as well as some 
secondary and tertiary data.  I took a 10-week online qualitative analysis course to 
guide me in the use of Nvivo 9 with my research.  Because I could work with my own 
data during this course, I was able to prepare and check my research design ideas and 
their application within the software with an expert in qualitative research and other 
students in the course.  I followed di Gregorio and Davidson (2008) for designing and 
conducting my qualitative research in Nvivo 9 software environment and for 
implementing the research design.  Data not analysed with Nvivo 9 were processed and 
analysed in the traditional way without computer assistance.   
I examined the data keeping the research questions, analytical framework, and 
context of my research in mind.  For the interview data, I was interested in examining 
the actors’ accounts of the health devolution process and its effects on policymaking, 
especially at the subnational level.  My units of analysis were the institutional actor 
groups that I identified in Section 3.2.  The timeframe was longitudinal, spanning a 
decade (1996–2006) and retrospective.  I inductively identified codes in the data and 
affixed them to sets of notes, documents, and interview transcripts, in the traditional 
way and with Nvivo 9.  Next, I turned the codes into categorical labels and themes and 
sorted the materials by them in order to identify patterns, relationships, commonalities 
and/or differences among them.  The result of the content analysis was that I could 
draw inferences from it and validate them.  In particular, I juxtaposed and triangulated 
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inferences that stemmed from the primary interview data with the secondary data.  
Finally, I used these inferences to tell produce a narrative in the three empirical 
chapters of the thesis.  
 I followed di Gregorio and Davidson’s (2008) guide for representing my 
research in Nvivo 9.  Before actually getting to handle and analyse my data with the 
software, I prepared a design framework and outlined my research according to their 
core research design questions on the research topic/problem, research questions and 
data collection.  For the handling and analysis of my data within the software, I first 
organised the different kinds of data into document folders and created a back-up folder 
for these on my hard drive.  I then imported my interview transcripts and audio files as 
well as other secondary data into these folders.  Next, I prepared the text files in word, 
structuring them when possible with automatic codes (e.g. headings).  Since my 
interviews were only semi-structured, automatic coding of headings was not very 
useful.  With my primary interview data, I linked the corresponding audio and 
transcript files, setting them up for simultaneous coding, and created case nodes for 
each interview.  Then, I created node classification sheets for interviewee and place 
attributes and node classification profiles for the stakeholder interviews (people), key 
informants (people), and governments (places), mapping them to each interview case 
node.  See Appendix F for an excerpt from the codebook.  Because my research is 
longitudinal with two main timeframes, before and after the 2001, I created document 
folders for each period and mapped my primary interview data and other data to them.  
I created thematic nodes for broad topic areas that I expected to code.  Finally, I began 
coding the data using Saldaña’s (2012) coding manual as a guide.  Throughout my 
analysis, I periodically reviewed my codes, nodes and their content, which led to 
changes, adaptations and an overall evolution of how they were represented and 
mapped to each other.  While I coded and analysed the data, I took some traditional and 
electronic memos on key issues to record my research process (though, I was not 
rigorous in doing this, which may have hampered my process).  As I analysed the data, 
I tried to connect ideas and capture questions that emerged from it and, working with 
Nvivo 9, I used its various tools for visualizing and modelling data as well as the 
queries to interrogate and filter the data and extract different sets of codes from it.  
Finally, I cross-referenced the inferences that emerged from the data analysis as well as 
my interpretation of the data for validity purposes.  I present the results of the data 
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analysis in the three empirical chapters of the thesis, along with discussions and 
conclusions.   
Looking back on my experience utilizing Nvivo, as I dove deeper into the 
analysis, the code-structure also evolved and, in the end, I found that some codes went 
unused while others were more heavily used than I had originally expected.  I also 
found that, once I consolidated my research design within Nvivo, that data analysis was 
more efficient and productive—than the traditional coding and analysis methods I used.  
This made the time-intensive preparation and design phase worth it.            
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4.  Defining the Decision Space for Health System Devolution in Spain 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the comparative framework for analysing health 
system devolution.  In this chapter and the following, I apply the three different parts of 
this framework to the case of Spain, comparing the regions of Extremadura and 
Madrid.  Overall, the framework should point to the effects of health system devolution 
on the policymaking process and subsequent policy choices in Spain.   
This chapter applies the first part of the framework: the definition and 
measurement of health system devolution in Spain, using the modified decision-space 
approach as designed and described in the analytical chapter.  It examines the specific 
health system devolution reform enacted in 2001 (and implemented from 2002), which 
affected ten of the seventeen Autonomous Communities in Spain.50  Of these ten 
regions, this study focuses on the Autonomous Communities (or “regions”) of 
Extremadura and Madrid.   
I first outline Spain’s overarching health devolution reform, which stems from 
its 1978 Constitution, by presenting relevant background information to the 2001 
reform and explaining legislation on the broader structure of the Spanish government, 
territorial organisation and health system.  Then, I perform a decision-space analysis on 
the 2001 reform for the period 1996-2001, examining the five functional areas of the 
Spanish health system with a focus on the ten regions implicated in the reform and, in 
particular, Extremadura and Madrid (including relevant information regarding the other 
seven regions in Spain when it is contextually necessary).  As a result of the analysis, I 
provide a health decision-space map for Extremadura and Madrid for this period.  Next, 
I present the legislation on the 2001 health system devolution along with supporting 
regulations and financial agreements.  Following this, I analyse the decision-space 
allowed by the 2001 reform to the same five functional areas of the health system, 
looking particularly at the period 2002-2006 and focusing on the ten Spanish regions, 
and in particular Extremadura and Madrid.  As a result, I present a health decision-
space map for Extremadura and Madrid for this period.  Finally, in the discussion, I 
present a comparison of the two decision-space analyses, discussing their results and 
how they lead to a greater understanding of the 2001 reform and, finally, what they 
mean for the analytical framework of the thesis and the thesis as a whole.  
                                               
50 These ten regions accepted responsibility over health service policy and management for completing 
the overarching health system devolution reform that began with the 1978 Spanish Constitution more 
than for any desire to accentuate their cultural identity or economic independence.   
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In terms of expectations, I anticipate to find that the health system decision-
space maps of Extremadura and Madrid will be the same for each period, mostly 
because I perform a de jure analysis of the regulations and legislation, which should be 
similar, if not the same, for all ten regions implicated in the 2001 devolution reform.51  
Moreover, I expect them to show that the regions had relatively narrow decision space 
for most functions of the health system for the period 1996-2001, with a widening 
decision space for most functions of the health system after devolution (2002-2006).  It 
is difficult to state further expectations and a priori statements regarding the most 
desirable degree of decision space that should be devolved to subnational governments 
because research has yet to determine this and it is likely to be different for different 
countries.  In is known, however, that a balance must be struck between the degrees of 
authority over the various health system functions afforded to the subnational 
government and the subnational government’s level of resource capacity and available 
mechanisms for accountability.52 
4.1.  Background to the Health System Devolution in Spain 
Spain is regarded by health decentralization scholars as a highly significant case 
because of its extensive devolution of health service responsibilities to relatively young 
subnational governments.  The 2001 health devolution reform was the “second wave” 
and culmination of the devolution of health service competencies from the central 
government to subnational governments and part of a much larger state reform, 
devolving several different competencies to the subnational level of government, which 
began with the creation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution (Costa-Font and Greer, 2013).   
The Constitution was modelled after that of post-World War II Germany in 
form, function, and governmental powers.  It can be seen as an effort to democratise a 
previously totalitarian (centralised) state (Heywood, 1999).53  Among other changes, 
this effort towards democracy established a new territorial organisation of the state into 
municipalities, provinces, and autonomous communities (or “regions”), all with the 
ability to administer autonomously the responsibilities ascribed to them in Article 137 
                                               
51 If they were analysed with de facto information, I would have expected these regions to have exercised 
their decision-making powers differently, due to variations in their political party systems and their 
socio-economic status. 
52 These other factors (improvement in population health, level of resource capacity and mechanisms of 
accountability) are not evaluated here, as they are beyond the scope of the thesis. 
53 From 1939 to 1978, Spain was a totalitarian regime for almost 40 years under General Francisco 
Franco.  In 1978, it became a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy.   
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of the Constitution (Ministerio de la Presidencia 1978).  While the provincial and 
municipal governments54 were given authority over minor, mostly administrative 
matters, the seventeen newly created regions55 were given extensive decision-making 
powers over several public functions in collaboration with the central government 
(Newton and Donaghy 1997).56   
Part 1 of Article 147 of the Constitution established the fundamental terms 
under which each region should establish its legal framework, called the Statute of 
Autonomy (El Estatuto de Autonomía).  This and other statutes hold the same legal 
status as the Constitution (that is, they are organic law) and form a part of the 
Constitutional Body (Cuerpo Constitutional).57  Accordingly, these statutes have 
become the primary tool by which the regions can expand and modify their powers and 
authority over public functions, with the central government’s definitive approval.  Part 
2d of the same article of the Constitution stipulates that the Statutes of Autonomy 
should be modified to identify explicitly each public function before it is transferred to 
the regions and state the basis for its transfer, including specification of the level of 
government from which it comes—municipal, provincial or central.58  Article 148 
presents all the public functions that the Constitution allows the regions to assume 
authority over, including the, then, Social Assistance programme (Asistencia Social) 
through social security (Part 20).59  At the time of the Constitution’s adoption, the 
Social Assistance programme performed the state’s health service functions.60   
                                               
54 As well as the cities of Ceuta and Melilla.  Local governments in big cities are important in Spain, 
particularly in urban planning.   
55 A few of these were historical region-states.   
56 It should be noted, however, that municipal governments in large cities hold more power than the 
average municipal government and may be main stakeholders in policymaking.   
57 The hierarchy of Spanish laws contains (i) the constitution; (ii) international treaties; (iii) organic law 
(which requires an absolute majority of the General Court), ordinary law and regulatory laws; and (iv) 
executive laws, referred to as royal decrees, decrees, ministerial orders, etc. depending on the body 
enacting them. 
58 The 1986 General Health Care Law stipulated that most local municipal health care service areas (e.g. 
mental health) should be transferred (up) to the regions, even if they continued to own and finance their 
health care networks.   
59 The Social Assistance programme did not include public health and hygiene functions (e.g. activities 
for preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical and mental health, sanitation, personal 
hygiene and infection control).  The Regions were also allowed to assume public health and hygiene 
functions (Part 21), although these were devolved separately from the social assistance functions.    
60 The social assistance programme did not include public health and hygiene functions such as activities 
for preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical and mental health, sanitation, personal 
hygiene and infection control.  The 1986 General Health Law created a National Health System (NHS), 
bringing together the state-run health services and those of the autonomous communities with health care 
competencies, which were also to integrate the Social Security Health Centres into their regional health 
service.  The National Institute of Health (INSALUD) managed the health services of the autonomous 
communities without health care competencies.  After this law, the Royal Decrees regarding the transfer 
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The regions, however, were not slated to receive all public functions, including 
authority over health service functions, at the same time.  After a heated debate on the 
issue of autonomy within the negotiations that preceded adoption of the 1978 
Constitution, a compromise was reached between the desire for national unity from the 
centralist party, lobbying for minimal decentralization from the right-wing party and for 
federalism from the left-wing party, and a push for greater recognition through 
asymmetric (territorial) decentralization from the nationalist parties and territories 
(Newton and Donaghy 1997).  Moreover, this compromise integrated concern for 
achieving an effective devolution of powers to the regional level, and not just the 
appearance of devolution in the form of administrative decentralization.  Accordingly, 
the Constitution—while prohibiting the regions from ever forming a federation61—
mandated a political decentralization of public functions to the regions.  In doing so, it 
established an open process and laid out three tracks—“slow”, “intermediate” and 
“fast”  for regional accession of greater autonomy and power over the management and 
provision of the public function stipulated in Article 148.  In doing so, it triggered a de 
facto period of asymmetric devolution, which eventually transformed Spain into the 
highly devolved, unitary state it is today.   
The mechanics of this transformation are easy to reconstruct.  Article 143 of the 
Constitution established the “normal” track, which later became known as the “slow 
track” to full regional autonomy.  This route consisted of a five-year provisional period 
with limited powers, after which the regions could negotiate with the central 
government for additional authority until they assumed all the powers afforded by the 
Constitution.  Additionally, the Second Transitional Provision of the Constitution 
established the “special track”, later dubbed the “fast track,” in which regions with a 
historic nationality—specifically, those that had previously initiated a constitutional 
process during the Second Spanish Republic62—did not have to adhere to the five-year 
                                               
of functions and services to the autonomous communities without competencies stated that they would 
be transferred from INSALUD (not from the social assistance programme of Social Security). 
61 “En ningún caso se admitirá la federación de Comunidades Autónomas” (Ministerio de la Presidencia 
1978, pt. 1, Art. 145).  However, all regions were permitted to work together with the approval of the 
General Courts (Cortes Generales) (Part 2 of Article 145) and the Basque Country and Navarra generally 
enjoyed fewer restrictions on their autonomy and self-governance than the other regions.   
62 The Second Spanish Republic (1931-1939) was a republican regime that stripped the Spanish 
Monarchy of its legal status and installed a republic government with the Spanish Constitution of 1931, 
which among other things granted the Spanish regions the right to autonomy.  Catalonia gained 
autonomy in 1932 and the Basque Country and Galicia reached it in 1936, just before the Spanish Civil 
War started, eventually leading to the fall of the Republic in 1939 and General Franco’s Totalitarian 
regime.  
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provisional period prior to attaining full autonomy.  This was the case for the regions of 
the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia in 1979, 1979 and 1981, respectively.  
Next, Article 151 of the Constitution established exceptional conditions for non-historic 
nationality regions also to pursue a “fast track” to full autonomy63.  These conditions, 
however, were difficult to achieve; perhaps the most forbidding of them were the 
stipulations that the region would have to hold a referendum and win an absolute 
majority in every one of its provinces.  Indeed, only one region, Andalusia, succeeded 
in complying with these conditions and moving onto the “fast track” toward full 
autonomy.  Moreover, Article 144 gave Navarra special considerations and allowed it 
to skip the five-year provisional period because it was a Statutory Body (Órgano Foral) 
and consisted of only one province (Article 144).  Although the Canary Islands and 
Valencia followed the “slow track” to full autonomy (Article 148), they each managed 
to pass their Statutes of Autonomy (Jefatura del Estado 1982a; 1982b) and 
corresponding transfer-of-power laws for assuming the competencies in 1982, 
effectively putting them on an “intermediate track” between the two tracks established 
in the 1978 Constitution (Jefatura del Estado 1982c; 1982d).  The remaining regions 
proceeded on the “slow track” to full autonomy, completing it only decades later (in 
2002).   
Following these processes, the public function of the health system and services 
(e.g. the Social Assistance programme) were devolved de facto in two waves.64  The 
first wave of health system devolution began in 1981 with Catalonia.  This first 
transfer, along with the six separate ones that followed it, illustrates the varying speed 
with which the first seven regions assumed authority over health services in their 
territories (see Figure 4.1).  All seven “fast-track” and “intermediate-track” regions 
assumed health system responsibilities, ending with the Canary Islands possession of 
them in 1994.  Then, there was a pause of seven years before the “second wave” of 
health system devolution at the end of 2001, when the Spanish government decided to 
devolve health service competencies to the remaining ten regions at once.  Several 
objectives were stated for this move, most pointed to it being “a political decision, not a 
technical one” (Novinskey, Interview no. 16, 36 and 41).  Some specified the benefits 
of bringing decision-making closer to the people (Novinskey, Interview no. 08, 09, 18, 
                                               
63 Sometimes referred to also as the “exceptional track”. 
64 This is not to be confused with the public function of public health and hygiene, which was transferred 
to all regions in 1979.  
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23, 32, 33, 34, 37, and 39).  Alternatively, one MOH stakeholder noted, “José María 
Aznar wanted to complete the model [of the Autonomous State] to end that debate: the 
permanent wound that inequality produced in the transfers, ‘what I do not have and the 
other does’; the situation that created a social wound, a certain social unrest” 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 16).  Another said, “The MOF was in favour of the transfers 
because they realized that health expenditures were growing at a faster rate than the 
GDP and, therefore, they could remove this burden…passing it to the Autonomous 
Communities” (Novinskey, Interview no. 15).  
In the following section, I begin my analysis of the Spanish case before the 
“second wave” of health system devolution, with a focus on the ten “slow-track” 
regions and, particularly, Extremadura and Madrid.  I employ Bossert’s (1998) 
approach to define and measure the decision-space allocated to the subnational 
government level before the reform, for a baseline.  In accordance with this approach, I 
break up the analysis into five subsections, one for each functional area of the health 
system, and finally I present the findings in these sections in the form of a decision-
space map.  
 
 
Figure 4.1.  Chronology of Health System Devolution in Spain 
 
Source: Duran, A.  et al. (2006, 20), with modifications. 
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4.2.  National Health System Functions for the “Slow-Track” Regions, 1996-2001 
4.2.1.  Service Organisation 
With the enactment of the 1986 General Health Law (GHL)65 (Jefatura del Estado 
1986a), the Spanish health system moved from the Social Assistance programme 
through Social Security—a Bismarckian-style social health insurance system—to the 
Spanish National Health System (NHS)—a Beveridgean-style system based on 
Britain's National Health Service.  This meant two major shifts: first, from a system 
funded through employment contributions to one funded through general taxation; and 
second, a shift from a system whose criterion for entitlement benefits was based on 
employment to one based on citizenship.66   
During this period, the central government’s Ministry of Health and Consumer 
Affairs (MOH) was the primary authority over the NHS, particularly over health 
services in the ten “slow-track” regions.  It, however, shared responsibilities over health 
services with the seven “fast-track” and “intermediate-track” regions.  In this 
arrangement, the MOH spearheaded the NHS, carrying out almost all decision-making 
functions for the central government and the ten “slow-track” regions.  The power-
sharing arrangement created by the asymmetric devolution of the Spanish NHS is 
illustrated in its organisation (see Figure 4.2).  In particular, the MOH was responsible 
for strategic areas of the health system, including coordinating health services, 
formulating basic health legislation, health financing and defining the health care 
benefit package.  In addition, the MOH was required to agree on financial and benefit 
policy issues with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOF)67 and the Social 
Security system, and on human resource issues (e.g. recruitment and employment of 
health personnel, especially civil servants) with the Ministry of Public Administration  
                                               
65 The 1986 General Health Law created an NHS, integrating the state-run health services, the health 
services that had already been devolved to some regions, and the Social Security Health Centres into one 
health service for each region.  The National Institute of Health (INSALUD) managed the health services 
of the regions without authority over health care competencies (yet).  After this law, the royal decrees 
regarding the transfer of functions and services to the regions without authority over health care stated 
that they would be transferred from INSALUD not from the social assistance programme of Social 
Security. 
66 The Spanish NHS stipulated universal health care—health care for all free of access at the point of 
service—in Royal Decree 1088/1989 (Ministerio de Relaciones con las Cortes y de la Secretaría del 
Gobierno 1989).  A small number of high-income, non-salaried individuals, however, elect not to be 
covered by the NHS (as per Royal Decree 1088/89).  In 1997, this group was estimated as representing 
0.6 per cent of the population (Rico, Sabes, and Wisbaum 2000, 37).   
67  In April 2002, the Ministry of Economy and Finance was split into two different ministries: the 
Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Finance.  When I refer to the MOF after this date, I am 
referring to the Ministry of Finance.   
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Figure 4.2.  Organisation of the Spanish NHS, 1996–2001 
 
Source: European Observatory for Health Systems (2000, 22), modified by the author. 
(MOPA).  The MOF played a particularly important role in the NHS, tasked with 
preparing a draft national budget and designing and planning of the regional and NHS-
specific financial agreements (including resource allocation formulas).  See the 
Financing subsection below for more information.  The MOH also was required to 
coordinate with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOL) in areas of joint 
responsibility, including social and community care-related issues and the authorisation 
of payments made within the NHS, and with the Ministry of Education68 (MOEdu) on 
postgraduate training for medical professionals and human resources planning (see 
Table 4.1).  
                                               
68 In April 2000, the Ministry of Education and Culture changed its name to the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Sports.   
Defining the Decision Space for Health System Devolution in Spain 
   129 
 
Table 4.1.  Areas of the MOH’s Joint Responsibility with other Government Entities, 
1996–2006 
 Ministry of Health 
“Fast-track” and 
“Intermediate-track” 
Regions 
Health service responsibilities 
Ministry of Economy and 
Finance 
Financial and benefit policy issues, especially the 
national health budget and the health resource 
allocation system for the regions 
Social Security System Financial and benefit policy issues 
Ministry of Public 
Administration 
Human resource issues 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs 
Areas of joint responsibility, such as NHS payment 
authorisation and social and community care 
Ministry of Education  Postgraduate training for medical professionals and 
human resources planning 
In terms of health services, the MOH had direct authority over the National 
Institute of Health (Instituto Nacional de Salud, INSALUD), which was the NHS’s 
implementation body.  INSALUD was charged with purchasing, providing and 
managing health services for the ten “slow-track” regions.  It operated through 
territorially-based provincial delegations and the “slow-track” regions played only a 
limited role in the NHS, at this time.  In terms of decision-making, however, the “slow- 
track” regions had some power over the formulation of a few types of health policies 
for which they were partially responsible, including primary and psychiatric care 
policies.  In practice, all the decisions that INSALUD took were according to 
homogeneous criteria for all Autonomous Communities (Novinskey, Interview no. 31).  
A stakeholder from Extremadura recounts his experience, “but [this method] did not 
account for relevant aspects of the particular situations of each territory.  Therefore, 
INSALUD made decisions…for both Madrid and Extremadura [but] their starting 
points were never the same…And at some point…there were inequalities that were 
accentuated” (Novinskey, Interview no. 07).  Another regional stakeholder noted that 
party politics were also a part of INSALUD decision-making at times (Novinskey, 
Interview no. 09).   
During this period, although they had not yet assumed full autonomy over 
health services in their territories, seven of the “slow-track” regions already had laid out 
the legal framework for receiving them (as according to the process outlined in the 
Constitution).  Despite considerable latitude in drafting this legal framework, most of 
these regions designed their regional administration with a Regional Health Ministry 
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(Consejería de Sanidad, RHM) at its core, to which a regional health service (Servicio 
Regional de Salud, RHS) would be responsible.  The RHM was designed to be the 
counterpart of the central MOH, carrying out decision-making and public 
administration functions for regional health policies and health services, and the RHS 
would manage health delivery functions for the region.  In particular, the RHS was 
responsible for integrating the work of specialised hospitals and primary health centres 
and for ensuring the offer of planned health services within its territory.   
As envisioned in the 1986 GHL, for all regions, services were to be 
administratively decentralized into Health Areas (Áreas de Salud) and then further into 
smaller Basic Health Zones (Zonas Básicas de Salud), neither of which were aligned 
with local government boundaries, but were rather based on catchment areas.69  Each 
Health Area was to cover approximately 200,000 residents, and each Basic Health 
Zones between 5,000 and 25,000 residents; though, the latter also was strategically 
located according to population, epidemiology, and travel distance (maximum of 30 
minutes by vehicle between any community and their services).  The Health Areas were 
to be staffed with one area manager and its health professionals would provide primary 
care, specialised ambulatory care and hospital (outpatient and inpatient) care.  Each 
Basic Health Zone operated as a single primary care team (Equipo de Atención 
Primaria).   
Finally, all regions participated in two major intergovernmental bodies at the 
national level, namely, the Inter-territorial Council of the NHS (Consejo Interterritorial 
del Sistema Nacional de Salud, CISNS) and the Tax and Finance Policy Council 
(Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas, CPFF) 70.  
The CISNS was the intergovernmental coordinating body between the central and 
regional governments on NHS-related policies and issues.  It consisted of the regional 
health ministers (consejeros de sanidad) from each of the seventeen regions and an 
equal number of central government representatives including the national minister of 
health, who chaired its meetings.  Its agreements held advisory, not executive, power.  
Like the CISNS, the CPFF functioned as an intergovernmental coordinating body 
between the central government and the regions but its focus was on fiscal and financial 
issues.  In particular, it would negotiate and prepare the regional and NHS-specific 
                                               
69 Though, overtime and with their implementation, these administrative and organisational structures 
changed among the regions and between the RHS and their Health Areas, and Basic Health Zones within 
the regions. 
70 This Council was originally created in 1980 by Article 3 of the LOFCA (Jefatura del Estado 1980a).   
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financing agreements, which included the details of the resource allocation formulas.71  
It was composed of the national minister of finance and the regional finance ministers 
(consejeros de hacienda) from the seventeen regions.  Although, formally, the CPFF 
held advisory and not executive power, its financing agreements were incorporated into 
the national budget, which was approved by Congress and generally implemented as 
planned.   
4.2.2.  Regulation and Planning 
From 1996 to 2001, the central government and the seven regions with devolved health 
service powers mostly regulated the Spanish NHS together, with the ten “slow-track” 
regions having very limited regulatory powers.  The 1978 Constitution charged the 
MOH with developing basic legislation (e.g. norms and standards for the whole 
system) and the regions were permitted to pass subsidiary legislation.  In addition, the 
ten “slow-track” regions held some responsibilities over accreditation and planning, 
limited veto power over the purchase and provision of services and no authority over 
the determination of health care benefits.  In the following, I describe the regulations 
and processes for establishing health plans and the health care benefit packages during 
this period. 
4.2.2.1.  Health Plans: The central government and the regions also shared 
responsibilities for health planning during this period.  There were two mostly-parallel 
processes for planning health services: one for health financing, led by the MOF, and 
another for health services, led by the MOH.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, together 
with the regions holding health care competencies, the MOF worked on designing and 
implementing a priority-setting strategy and plan for containing health expenditures.  
This priority-setting strategy and plan was generally implemented as intended and fed 
into the annual national health budget.  
From 1986 and according to the GHL, the MOH was to produce multi-year 
health plans as the main planning instrument of the NHS and with the objective of 
allocating resources efficiently in order for the system to meet the population’s demand 
for health care.  The process for elaborating these health plans combined bottom-up and 
top-down actions.  For the regions with health system competencies, each Health Area 
was to create a health plan for its locality, which it would subsequently submit to its 
RHM.  Then, the RHM would aggregate all the health plans in its territory, creating a 
                                               
71 Prior to 1994, they used bilateral management committees to negotiate the terms on an on-going basis.   
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regional-level health plan.  Because the ten “slow-track” regions had still not received 
health system competencies during this period, their regulatory and planning functions 
were performed by INSALUD, working in conjunction with the existing RHMs (as 
they gained authority and responsibility over health system and service functions in 
their territories).  Parallel to this process, the MOH would create a national-level health 
plan containing stipulations from the general regulatory framework, the organisation of 
health system programs and a set of priority action areas, with the objective of 
promoting cohesive planning across all regions.  Once approved by the Spanish 
Parliament, the national health plan would be sent to the regions so that they could 
integrate its objectives into their regional health plans.  After this integration and prior 
to their implementation, the regional health plans would require the regional 
parliament’s approval.   
In practice, however, the implementation of this health-planning tool developed 
slowly.  Despite the 1986 mandate, the central government approved its first health 
plan only in 1995.72  As a result, the regional health planning process was slow going 
and it was not until 1999 that every region had at least one plan approved.  For 
example, the regions of Madrid and Extremadura each published a plan during this 
period.  Madrid’s plan spanned ten years, starting in 1995, and Extremadura’s plan 
covered four years, starting in 1997.  In their infancy, these regional health plans were 
used mostly as instruments for gathering information and developing intelligence on 
health needs across the region; this was perhaps a prerequisite for planning but 
certainly not a complete process.   
By 2000, the MOF and MOH had combined their planning strategies to 
formulate joint plans that linked health resource allocation and financing plans with 
health status priorities and health service plans.   
4.2.2.2.  Health Care Benefit Package:  Consistent with its regulatory role, the 
national parliament approved a common benefit package of health services covered by 
the NHS and to be offered in all regions with Royal Decree 63/1995 (Ministerio de 
Sanidad y Consumo 1995b).  While the MOH was the main central government actor 
defining the health benefit package, it shared this responsibility with the MOF (which 
has the responsibility for authorizing the financing of these benefits), the MOPA 
                                               
72 Prior to this, however, the central government did mandate the introduction of the World Health 
Organisation’s “Targets for Health for All” into the NHS (WHO 1985).  The Health for All initiative 
emphasized objectives of equity, clinical effectiveness and quality of care.   
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(responsible for issues related to health personnel), and the MOL (responsible for social 
and community care during this period).  The CISNS and the Health Institute Carlos 
III—the main public biomedical research entity in Spain73—also played important roles 
in the determination of the health care benefit package.  The CISNS was responsible for 
granting equity and access to services across all regions; the Health Institute Carlos III 
performed much of the research underlying the decision on what benefits to include in 
the package.  As the regions assumed health service responsibilities, their regulatory 
capacity and purview over the specific health care benefit package offered to their 
populations increased (Puig-Junoy, Planas-Miret, and Tur-Prats 2005).  Although 
obligated to cover all the health benefits in the common package, these regions could 
decide the amount of financing for each benefit in the package and what additional 
benefits to offer with their own financing to their population (Novinskey, Interview no. 
22).  The regions participating in the “second wave” of health system devolution were 
not given the same latitude because their services were financed primarily through the 
central government—though, some managed to add benefits that were not dependent on 
financing (see examples below).    
 In terms of entitlement, a few major laws and regulations together defined the 
rights and criteria for access to the health services contained in the core benefit 
package.  While Article 43.1 of the 1978 Constitution guaranteed health protection for 
all citizens, the health system continued to be managed mostly through the Social 
Assistance programme of Social Security, with entitlement based on employment 
contributions, until the 1986 GHL explicitly mandated a shift from a social health 
insurance-based system to an NHS-style system.  In addition, the GHL extended the 
government’s health protection guarantee to foreigners with a residence permit.74  
Shortly afterwards, Royal Decree 1088/1989 extended eligibility to low-income 
populations.  As a result, the remaining population without coverage from either NHS 
or Social Security health services consisted mainly of high-income individuals, who 
declined participation in the system (Novinskey, Interview no. 07 and 21).  Finally, on 
December 18, 1997, the Spanish Congress of Deputies approved a Parliamentary 
                                               
73 Health Institute Carlos III supports the development of scientific knowledge in the health sciences and 
contributes to innovation in health care and disease prevention (Ministerio de Economía y 
Competitividad 2015).  
74 This last provision did not apply to health centres of the social security system and foreigners who 
received care at social security health centres were obliged to pay out-of-pocket for services.   
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Agreement for the Consolidation and Modernisation of the NHS, which definitively 
extended health care as a universal right to the entire Spanish population.   
Also during this period, the regions each passed their own entitlement 
legislation, especially regarding the coverage of foreigners within their territories.75  
Andalusia,76 Aragon, Asturias, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, 
Galicia77 and La Rioja all passed legislation containing the same entitlement rules as 
those specified by the central government.  Valencia extended the benefits of long-term 
care services (atención socio-sanitaria) in addition to health services for all residents in 
Decree 88/1989 (Consell de la Generalitat Valenciana 1989), and subsequently in a 
1989 order, a 1999 resolution, and Decree 26/2000 (Comunidad Valenciana 2000).  In 
their regional health plans, the remaining regions (including Extremadura and Madrid) 
legislated that all health services would be free for all residents, independent of their 
legal or administrative status.  In addition, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country,78 
Castile Leon, and Madrid provide all health services without fee to non-resident 
travellers (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2003a).   
Royal Decree 63/1995 (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 1995b) defined a list 
of health services to be offered by the NHS (also known as the common health benefit 
package) and a list of excluded services.  The common health benefit package included 
primary health care, specialised health care, infant dental care, pharmaceutical benefits 
(including a list of included and excluded drugs), and complementary benefits such as 
prostheses, orthopaedic products, and transport to health care services.  It excluded 
psychoanalysis, hypnosis, sex change surgery, spa treatments, cosmetic plastic surgery, 
and any adult dental care beyond tooth extractions.   
As mentioned, the regions were permitted to expand the health benefits offered 
in the common package for their territory.  During this period, most additions to the 
common package were made by the seven regions in the “first wave” of health system 
devolution.  For example, despite its explicit exclusion by Royal Decree 63/1995, 
Andalusia covered sex change surgery beginning in February 1999 (Parlamento de 
Andalucía 1999).  In 1990, 1991, and 2001, respectively, the Basque Country, Navarra 
and Andalusia decided to offer full child dental care coverage (Puig-Junoy, Planas-
                                               
75 This legislation is located in a region’s health law or plan (Ordenación Sanitaria), or documents 
related to the creation of its RHS. 
76 Andalusian Decree 66/1990 (Consejería de Salud y Servicios Sociales 1990). 
77 Only residents receive additional region-specific benefits according to Galician Decree 63/1996 
(Consellería de Sanidad y Servicios Sociales 1996). 
78 Decree 26/1988 and Order 28.6.1982 (Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco 1988).   
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Miret, and Tur-Prats 2005).  Under Law 10/2001, Extremadura added passive 
euthanasia to its benefit package (Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2001a).  In its 
Health Planning Law 12/2001 (Ley de Ordenación Sanitaria), although it did not add 
any items to the common health benefit package, Madrid did approve some relevant 
provisions, such as recognizing the legally binding  nature of  “advance care directives” 
(“Instrucciones Previas”) by the patient regarding the final moments of life (Article 
28)79 (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 2001a).  
4.2.3.  Financing 
Before 2001, there were three principal movements of financial resources for the health 
system.  The first financial flow consisted of regional and NHS-earmarked 
intergovernmental transfers, which flowed from the central government to INSALUD 
and the regions with health care competencies.  The second flow then moved from 
these regions and INSALUD to hospitals.  At this stage, the regions with devolved 
power over health services had significant authority in determining payment methods 
but INSALUD primarily decided the payment methods for, and paid the hospitals in, 
the ten “slow-track” regions.  The third financial flow regarded human resources for the 
health sector.  Health employees have a similar status to national civil servants in 
Spain, and salaries and payment methods are regulated by the central government.  The 
regions with health service competencies had some responsibility in this area; they 
could set or adjust some additional payment methods to basic salaries (see the Human 
Resources section for further details).   
In this section, I discuss the flow of funds from the central government to 
INSALUD and the regions with health service competencies, which comprised two 
main systems of financing: the regional financing system and the NHS financing 
system.  The CPFF was responsible for reaching agreements on all matters regarding 
the allocation of financial resources to regions (whether or not they flowed through 
INSALUD), including those for the NHS.  The regional financing system reflects the 
evolution of the regions’ fiscal autonomy as well as some important overall contextual 
financing issues that indirectly affect the health system.  Because the funds for the NHS 
                                               
79 The “advance care directive” is a person’s wishes expressed in advance about the care and treatment of 
his health or the fate of his body so that they may be followed in the moment the person may reach 
certain clinical situations, which prevent him from expressing his will, at the end of his life.  This article 
was repealed and replaced by Law 3/2005, which regulated exercising the right to formulate “advance 
care directives” regarding health care and created a corresponding registry (Presidencia de la Comunidad 
de Madrid 2005).   
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financing system were earmarked for health, they served as the most significant method 
of direct financing for the NHS.   
4.2.3.1.  Regional financing system: In 1980, as stipulated by the 1978 
Constitution, the central government established a system of regional financing with 
the Autonomous Community Financing Law (LOFCA) (Jefatura del Estado, 1980).  
Under this law, the regions were effectively separated into two regimes: the “foral” 
financing regime, composed of the Basque Country and Navarra80; and the “ordinary” 
financing regime, consisting of the remaining fifteen regions.  In the following, I focus 
on the details of the “ordinary” financing regime, and its meaning for the ten “slow-
track” regions.  I structure these details according to four periods, beginning with the 
LOFCA and ending before the “second wave” of health system devolution.  The first 
period was, in effect, a ten-year transitory period (1978–1987).  It was then followed by 
three financing agreements covering five years each from 1987 through 2001 (Consejo 
de Política Fiscal y Financiera 1986; 1992; 1996).   
During the transitory period, the central and regional governments agreed on the 
amount of goods and services as well as personnel that would have to be transferred 
from the central government to the regions so that the regions could furnish an effective 
level of services for each competency they received.  The agreements were negotiated 
through the bilateral commissions of the CPFF, called Mixed Parity Commissions 
(Comisiones Mixtas Paritarias, MPCs), which were regulated by the LOFCA and the 
regional Statutes of Autonomy.  Essentially, these Commissions were responsible for 
defining the amount of revenue that the central government would need to transfer to 
the regional governments and INSALUD so they could carry out their different public 
service responsibilities, such as health care, social services and education (Ramallo 
Massanet and Zornoza Pérez 1995).  According to a mandate from the 1986 GHL, these 
Commissions calculated the cost of service delivery using historic annual budgeting 
practices.  As such, for the first year of the transfers, they were to base their 
calculations on the total amount expended on these services within the region during 
the previous year.  From then on, the amount of the transfers would be calculated based 
on each region’s prior-year share of the total national expenditure.   
                                               
80 This was stipulated respectively for these regions in the first and second Additional Provisions of the 
LOFCA.  Foral is a Spanish legal term and concept, drawn from the Latin forum and used to describe an 
open space for tribunals, councils or meetings.  Its approximate equivalent in English is a leasehold or 
charter.  In Spain, it has come to mean a compilation of laws for a region, often dating back to the times 
before kings.  Present-day Spain has two foral regions, the Basque Country and Navarra.   
Defining the Decision Space for Health System Devolution in Spain 
   137 
 
In practice, however, as a result of significant political pressure and other 
factors, many observers maintain that the transfers were not determined by formula 
through the proposed costing system, but rather continued to be based on negotiations 
(Corona, Alonso, and Puy 1998; García-Mila and McGuire 2002; García-Mila 2005).  
For example, in the MPCs, regional representatives would vie for as many resources as 
possible, usually raising the ante from the previous MPC negotiations (Corona, Alonso, 
and Puy 1998).  Moreover, concessions would be influenced often by political 
affiliations; for example, regional governments of the same party as the central 
government tended to have a stronger bargaining position than regional governments 
ruled by an opposing party (León-Alfonso 2007).  The multilateral function of the 
CPFF came into play only to formally ratify the regional financing agreement after 
MPC negotiations were finalised.   
In November 1986, the regional financing agreement for the period of 1987–
1991 was approved.  It changed the procedure for carrying out and approving regional 
financing agreements: instead of being adjusted annually, they would be modified 
every five years.81  Additionally, the financing agreement changed the resource 
allocation formula to reflect regional needs better.  For the regions still under 
INSALUD’s management, this meant that 59 per cent of regional financing would be 
calculated based on population, 24.3 per cent on the number of administrative units 
operating in the region, 16 per cent on area, and 0.7 per cent on insularity.  In addition, 
equalisation measures across regions were instituted.  According to an index of fiscal 
strength, approximately 5 per cent of funds would be reassigned, and according to an 
index of relative poverty, 4.2 per cent of funds would be redistributed.  There was a 
different financial resource allocation formula for the regions with health service 
competencies.82  The financing agreement also set a maximum increase each year equal 
to the nominal increase in GDP.   
According to León-Alfonso’s (2007, 161) analysis of “per capita unconditional 
financing”83 across the regions, the financing agreements made during this period for 
                                               
81 To the best of my knowledge, this provision did not appear in the LOFCA (Ramallo and Zornoza 
1995) or in any other piece of legislation except the Statue of Autonomy of Valencia. 
82 The regions in the “first wave” of health system devolution employed a similar formula to that used for 
the “ordinary” financing regime, except for the count of administrative units and an additional 
adjustment constant, and the weights for each measure were considerably different.   
83 Referring to “per capita unconditional financing”, León-Alfonso includes the unconditional funds 
transferred from the central government, which are composed of ceded taxes, service fees and revenue 
sharing between the central government and the regional government, as well as regional own resources, 
consisting of regional taxes and surcharges on national taxes.   
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the ordinary financing regime suggested that the regions of Aragon, the Canary Islands, 
Castile Leon, and La Rioja benefited the most (receiving higher-than-average capitation 
rates).  At the same time, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Madrid, Murcia and “fast-
tracked” Valencia received below-average capitation rates.   
For the 1992–1996 period, a five-year financing agreement was approved in 
January 1992 and updated in 1993 (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera 1993).  
Authority over higher education and social services was devolved in 1995 and 1996 to 
regions in the ordinary financing regime.  The main change in these financing 
agreements was the adjustment of the resource allocation formula.  For the regions still 
under INSALUD’s management, now 64 per cent of funds would be allocated by 
population (an increase from the previous formula), 17 per cent on the number of 
administrative units in each autonomous community (decrease), 16.6 per cent on area 
(slight increase), 0.4 per cent for insularity (slight decrease), and 2 per cent on an 
additional measure of population dispersion.  The equalisation funds were considerably 
reduced to 1.82 per cent based on the index of fiscal strength and 2.7 per cent from the 
index of relative poverty.  Table 4.2 presents a comparative view of the changing 
financing agreements over time.  Moreover, this agreement set a minimum funding 
guarantee for intergovernmental transfer to the regions, equal to the amount that each 
region received from the central government in 1990.  It, however, excluded any 
possibility of increased regional fiscal autonomy.  For this reason, a study group was 
formed and a new agreement was reached in 1993, which amplified regional tax 
powers, in addition to the earlier agreements on resource allocation for the system.  The 
1993 agreement gave the regions the right to 15 per cent of the individual income tax 
yield collected by the central government within their territory.  At the same time, 
however, this extra fiscal autonomy was limited by the central government, e.g., who 
also set a fixed maximum for the extra funding any one region could receive.84  In 
practise, this agreement was also limited because the regions lacked the necessary 
taxation tools for implementation, starting with the power to change income tax 
regulations.   
  
                                               
84 Extra funding could not be greater than the percentage calculated for intergovernmental transfers 
(revenue sharing) in the 1992 financing agreement.   
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Table 4.2.  Resource Allocation Formulas for the Ordinary Financing Regime 
Criteria 1987–1991 1992–1996 
(in effect 
until 2002) 
Population 59% 64% 
Number of central government administrative units 24.3% 17% 
Area 16% 16.6% 
Insularity 0.7% 0.4% 
Funds reassigned, fiscal strength index 5% 1.82% 
Funds redistributed, r  elative poverty index 4.2% 2.7% 
León-Alfonso’s (2007) per capita unconditional financing analysis further 
indicated that, the regions benefitting the most for the period 1992–1996 were 
Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile-Leon, and La Rioja as well as the “fast-tracked” 
Canary Islands and Galicia.  Madrid and Murcia again received below-average 
capitation rates.  Overall, in comparison with the previous period, regional differences 
actually increased over time.   
Approved in September 1996, the financial agreement for the period 1997–2001 
was created with the objectives of balancing the increasing differences in regional 
expenditure responsibilities and giving them greater taxation powers.  In particular, it 
increased regional control over individual income taxes, giving the regions, for 
example, the capacity to regulate tax brackets, tax rates, and some tax credits.  Initially, 
they were given power to raise and retain up to 15 per cent of these taxes; but once they 
assumed public education competencies (in 2000), they were allowed to raise and retain 
up to 30 per cent of these income taxes.   
The objectives of this financing agreement, however, were mostly unmet during 
implementation.  First, three regions – Andalusia, Castile-La Mancha, and Extremadura 
– declined to ratify this new agreement and instead remained under the 1992 
agreement.  Then, most of the remaining regions did not exercise their new authority to 
increase taxes; rather, they tended to introduce tax exemptions.  According to 
Monasterio (2002), this was an attempt by incumbent governments to gain electoral 
favour.  Next, as León-Alfonso (2007, 171) observed, average regional variations in per 
capita unconditional financing actually increased over time.  The study also 
demonstrated considerable variation in per capita unconditional financing among the 
regions under the ordinary financing regime, with Cantabria, Balearic Islands, and La 
Rioja continuing to benefit from the new agreement, along with “fast-tracked” 
Catalonia and Galicia.  At the same time, Murcia continued to receive a below-average 
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capitation rate.  However, Madrid moved up from its disadvantaged position to an 
almost average rate, and “fast-tracked” Valencia moved down to a below-average rate.  
Having rejected this new financing agreement, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura and 
“fast-tracked” Andalusia all fell well below the average capitation rate.  The remaining 
regions in the ordinary financing regime showed some increase in their rates over time.   
4.2.3.2. NHS Financing: During the period 1994–2001, just over 70 per cent of 
total health expenditure (THE) came from public sources, including the central 
government, regional and municipal governments, and social security funds.  The 
private sector provided the rest of total spending, mostly through private household out-
of-pocket payments (23.5 per cent of the total) (OECD 2005).85  
 The budgeting process for the NHS financing system was elaborated in several 
steps.  Once each of the “fast-track” regions had drafted its annual health budget, it 
would send the budget to the central government, which would determine the actual 
amount of financial resources to be allocated to health.  Incorporating the information 
from the proposed regional budgets as well as from the INSALUD field offices, the 
MOH would create an annual national health budget and bring it to the MOF for 
consultation and its integration into the larger national general budget.  The MOF 
would then draft a bill for the national general budget, which would subsequently 
undergo the legislative process within the national parliament.86  Once it was approved, 
the resulting financial resources would flow from the MOH to the regions with health 
service powers and to INSALUD for the regions without these powers, and then from 
these recipients to the various health services (e.g. primary, specialised and hospital 
care).  Resources transferred via INSALUD were earmarked for items such as 
investment, current expenditure and personnel costs, primary care, and specialised and 
hospital care.   
Per the 1986 GHL, most of the public financing for the NHS was mandated to 
come from individual taxes on the whole population.  This funding system was 
established on the principle of solidarity: contribution levels were based on personal 
income, and access to health care was based on need.  The GHL stipulated that 
revenues would initially be injected into the health system using a combination of 
intergovernmental transfers from the central government, fees for specific services not 
                                               
85 Small percentages were spent on private insurance enterprises and other private funds as well.   
86 From 1994 to 1999, social security also budgeted a small amount of funds for health.  This budget 
required approval from the Spanish parliament as well.   
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included in the common benefit package, and contributions from the regions and 
municipalities as well as from social security.  After this initial period, social security 
contributions would be phased out over time as they were supplanted by tax revenues, 
which would feedback into the regions via the intergovernmental transfers. 
Prior to the GHL, the health system was financed mainly through employment 
contributions to the social security system, which then funnelled some of the funds to 
Social Security’s health insurance system, Social Assistance.  A little health funding 
was allocated from the national general budget as well.  Financing for the health system 
changed radically with the 1986 GHL and the National Budget Law (NBL) for 1989 
(Jefatura del Estado 1988), which mandated a major shift from a social health 
insurance-based system to an NHS-style system based on tax revenues.  The transition 
in financing aspects would take ten years, ending in 1999; therefore, overlapping with 
the study period of this thesis.  Before 1989, 70 per cent of health system financing 
came from social security and 30 per cent from the national budget.  One of the 
functions of the 1989 NBL was first to turn this financing nominally on its head,87 then 
to reduce the rate of social security contributions to the system at the same gradual pace 
that funds from the national budget would increase and, by 1999 all financing would 
come from the national budget.  Indeed, this result took place and virtually the entire 
NHS (excluding civil servant pension funds) was financed by the national budget with 
general taxes in 1999.   
Moreover, the 1986 GHL envisioned four-year financing agreements for the 
health system starting in 1994.  It introduced a system of financial resource allocation 
to the regional level for health services, according to criteria based on capitation.  In the 
following paragraphs, I discuss this and other major elements of the NHS financing 
agreements for the periods 1994–1997 and 1998–2001 (Consejo de Política Fiscal y 
Financiera 1997).   
Similar to the regional financing agreements, the 1994–1997 NHS financing 
agreement was negotiated bilaterally by the MPCs and approved by the CPFF in 
November 1994 (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera 1995; 1997).  This agreement 
stipulated an increase of 3.5 billion pesetas to the health system by the end of 1997.  In 
part, this increase covered debt that the health system had accumulated in 1992 and 
1993 (Cabasés 1997; Echániz Salgado 1999; Elola Somoza 2001).   
                                               
87 The law did not stipulate a mathematical formula, but it envisioned the replacement of social security 
contributions with an equivalent amount in general revenues from the national budget. 
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This agreement also made a firmer commitment to allocating financial resources 
to the “fast-tracked” regions according to a single criterion: the size of the benefit 
population (a simple capitation figure, as stipulated by the GHL).  Prior to it, the 
financial resource allocation process for these regions was warped by the highly 
politicised, bilateral negotiations that took place on the MPCs during the negotiation 
process for health service devolution.  For the “slow-tracked” regions, however, 
capitation rates were used consistently, before and after this agreement, to calculate 
financing for the health services managed by INSALUD.  With the firmer commitment 
to this single criterion for all regions, the agreement mandated the use of a new base 
year for calculating the benefit population: the March 1991 census carried out by the 
National Statistics Institution (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE).  The complete 
implementation of this single-criterion allocation formula resolved the prior 
discrepancies in the distribution of financial resources among the regions.   
Moreover, this period’s financing agreement introduced a norm that linked the 
budgetary increase for the regions with devolved health services to the regional growth 
in GDP.  This effectively eliminated any financing overlaps between the “fast-tracked” 
regions and the direct management by INSALUD.  Finally, this agreement fixed a 
ceiling for the regions to spend on health, which was linked to 1993 spending levels of 
INSALUD with adjustment measures.   
In November 1997, the 1998–2001 financing agreement for the health system 
was negotiated and approved by the CPFF (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera 
1997).  During the year prior to this agreement, a parliamentary sub-commission had 
been formed to develop an appropriate reform of NHS financing to be implemented in 
this new period.  The sub-commission’s final reform proposal attempted to address 
several issues.  The primary issue concerned the level of financial resources dedicated 
to INSALUD and their sufficiency to meet the volume of health services it provided.  
The proposal also earmarked financial resources to the administrative units under 
INSALUD’s management for specific programme expenditures.  For the whole system, 
it put general cost-containment measures in place as well as mechanisms to achieve 
savings in the system and obtain an optimal level of service delivery.  Finally, it 
established an accountability system for health expenditures.  The sub-commission’s 
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proposal was approved by a 32-2 vote (with Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura the 
lone dissenters) and became the official financing agreement for this period.88   
While this financing agreement did not change the capitation criteria for 
formulating the amount of financial resources to be allocated to the regions, it did 
acknowledge a need to supplement the defined allocation to them.  As such, its formula 
began using part of the budgeted expenditures from the 1998 NBL to set an initial 
amount of financing to be transferred to the regions.  Then, it injected additional 
funds—some of which were obtained from health expenditure rationalisation measures 
(i.e., savings)—into the system for five purposes: (i) increasing the health coverage of 
the population, (ii) implementing control programs and disability benefits, (iii) 
compensating regions with decreased population size, (iv) teaching and research, and 
(v) assisting residents who move from one region to another (Cantarero Prieto 2000; 
Echániz Salgado 1999).  As a result, in 2000, INSALUD received 1.66 million pesetas 
to manage and provide health services for the remaining ten “slow-tracked” regions.89  
In the same year, the seven regions with health care competencies received 2.69 million 
pesetas.  Overall, this signified a massive increase in the funding for the NHS.  
Appendix G holds health expenditure and population coverage data for Spain, 
Extremadura and Madrid.   
4.2.4.  Human Resources 
Arguably, human resources are the most important resource of any health system; 
without quality staff, any system is practically useless.  Spain has a long history of 
regulating health professions and professionals, starting in 1848 with a government 
declaration that medical, pharmacy and veterinary professions would constitute the 
field of health (Reglamento para las Subdelegaciones de Sanidad Interior del Reino, 24 
July).  However, regulating human resources for health is complicated not least because 
one has to agree with the research and investigation, labour, and education sectors 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 02).  Thus, despite history, recent action has been sparse.  
The most recent legislation regarding health professions took place in 1986.  First, the 
                                               
88 These agreements needed a majority greater than two-thirds of the total votes.  A stakeholder from 
Extremadura said, “they did not agree because they thought [the agreement] was prejudiced against 
Extremadura in its financing terms. Because of the economic parameters, the region is already at a 
disadvantage compared to others…in fact, Extremadura took this agreement to the Constitutional Court” 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 07).   
89 The cities of Ceuta and Melilla were also covered by this allocation.  The population of the remaining 
regions totalled about 38 per cent of the total Spanish population.   
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GHL referred only to the free exercise of health professions and designated the 
homologation of postgraduate specialisation programs for health personnel as well as 
job posts in health services as a competency of the central government.  It, however, 
did not regulate health professions directly; it only stated, in Article 84, that a specific 
framework statute, separate from but similar to the civil service, should be created to 
regulate them.  In addition, Law 10/1986 regulated orthodontists and other 
professionals related to dental health (deferring regulation of other medical and health 
professions, as no legislation covering these other professions was passed at that time) 
(Jefatura del Estado 1986b).   
As a result, the vast majority of health professionals worked as civil servants 
during this period, regulated under the public administration Law 30/1984 (Jefatura del 
Estado 1984, 30).  This law maintained that statutory health personnel, including those 
within the civil service, would be the object of future special legislation.  However, 
when no special legislation regarding health personnel was legislated, it became the 
regulation for health personnel de facto.  Among other things, Law 30/1984 granted 
each region the authority to regulate its own civil service.90  It was complemented by 
Royal Decree 364/1995, which approved the General Regulation of the State and of the 
Provision of Employment Positions and Professional Promotion of the Civil Services of 
the General Administration of the State and also contained provisions for working in 
the regions (Ministerio para Las Administraciones Públicas 1995).  The basic 
information, entry requirements, terms of mobility and salaries for both the national 
and regional civil services were practically the same.  In general, the civil service was a 
gateway for entering into public administration.  A large portion of both the national 
and regional civil services (18 per cent and 6.7 per cent, respectively) was composed of 
personnel who worked for the administration of ministries and other autonomous 
government bodies (Ministerio para Las Administraciones Públicas 1996).  During this 
period before health service devolution, however, the majority of health personnel 
(including medical doctors and nurses), managers and administrators working in the 
NHS were national-level civil servants.  When the responsibility for most public 
services was to be devolved from the central government to the regional governments, 
administrative personnel working for these services would also be transferred but 
                                               
90 Royal Decree 28/1990 approved the Regulation of the Provision of Employment Positions and 
Professional Promotion.  This law was modified by Law 22/1993, which changed the methods of 
planning for employment in the public service.    
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health personnel would not.  In 1996, 132,234 out of almost 800,000 national civil 
servants were doctors and nurses (Parrado Díez 2000).   
Comprehensive Human Resource Plans (Planes Integrales de Recursos 
Humanos) are the basic instrument for global planning of human resources, defining 
the objectives of personnel, the strength and structure of human resources needed to 
adequately meet these objectives, and the necessary measures and actions (e.g. 
mobility, training and promotion) for adapting the current structure to meet the human 
resource needs.  If the needs are not met, then recruitment for the civil service occurs 
through a public call and selection process, which must be approved by MOAP and 
MOF.  Once approved, the regional ministry of the corresponding Body and Scale 
(Cuerpos y Escalas) of public servants proceeds with the selection and hiring process 
(Article 9, Royal Decree 364/1995).  Promotions for this period were carried out 
though a competitive system, subject to the principles of equality, merit, ability and 
publicity, and authorised by the government or the competent body of public 
administration (Articles 74 and 75, Royal Decree 364/1995).  Dismissal of civil 
servants who failed to fulfil their duties required a long disciplinary process (Article 31, 
Law 20/1984).   
 In addition to passing the selection process for entering into public service, 
health workers were required to have completed any technical training compulsory for 
the particular position (e.g. specialist training for medical doctors91).  In general, 
salaries for health personnel were set at the national level and differed by level of 
health care (primary vs. secondary and tertiary).  All health professionals in the NHS 
were salaried.  Public general practitioners on primary care teams were paid 85 per cent 
of their salary directly with the remaining 15 per cent depending on a capitation 
component, which considers the population characteristics, including density and 
percentage of persons over age 65.  Private General Practitioners were paid a fee for 
services provided.  Doctors and specialists in public hospitals are usually civil servants 
and completely salaried; those in private hospitals are paid according to market forces.  
With the devolution of health services,92 the regions were empowered to provide 
additional financial and non-financial benefits to their health personnel for achieving 
quality, performance, training and individual development objectives (Hidalgo and 
                                               
91 Public and private specialized care doctors and public primary care doctors were required to pass the 
civil service entry exam beginning in 1980 and 1995, respectively.   
92 Salaries were somewhat negotiable during agreements with the regions that had health service 
responsibilities.   
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Matas 2004).  For example, Catalonia adjusted salaries based on a socioeconomic index 
of the population served.  Health centre managers, however, had very limited capacity 
to negotiate salaries or incentives for their direct employees.  Furthermore, during this 
time, de facto, one’s professional profile seemed less important than their ideological 
link to a political party: “it used to happen that when the government changed parties, 
so did [most human resources] all the way down to the nurse supervisor of the night 
shift at the hospital of Cáceres” (Novinskey, Interview no. 09).   
All undergraduate education and training of health personnel was overseen by 
the central government’s MOEdu.  Basic undergraduate education for medical doctors 
lasted six years.  Since 1978, the postgraduate specialisation of medical doctors has 
been planned through an Internal Medical Doctor Residency (Medicos Internos 
Residentes, MIR) programme (‘MIR’ 2015).  Depending on the type of medical 
specialisation, doctors would practise their speciality in hospitals and primary care 
services for three to five years, with pay.  Hospitals and primary care centres that 
received these medical residents had to be accredited for this level of training.  
Accreditation was dependent on compliance with strict standards set jointly by the 
MOH and MOEdu along with the National Specialisation Councils (Comisiones 
Nacionales de Especialidad) and was authorised for up to three years.  A separate 
national commission oversaw each medical speciality.  Members of these commissions 
consisted of university professors, health professionals, residents and representatives 
from physician associations and medical societies.  They were in charge of defining the 
training programs for each specialisation, the number of annual vacancies and the 
programme’s duration.  In 1996, the number of new graduates from basic medical 
training was slightly lower than the number of vacancies for specialised medical 
training, with almost a third of those vacancies in family medicine.   
 For nurses, undergraduate-level education and training lasted between two and 
three years.  Only two nursing postgraduate specialisations were in effect by the end of 
2001, in mental health and midwifery (both beginning in 1996), with others in 
development.  The planning and operation of the nursing specialisation programs 
mimicked those of the MIR.   
Health care managers were not required to follow any type of management 
training.  The National Public Health School (Instituto de Salud Carlos III) and other 
regional-level public health schools offered them management training.   
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4.2.5.  Governance and Stewardship Rules 
Stewardship and governance rules for the health system include six main dimensions 
according to the WHO (2000) and Travis et al.’s (2003) comprehensive stewardship 
framework for health systems.  The six dimensions concern the steward’s ability to (i) 
formulate a strategic policy framework; (ii) ensure a fit between policy objectives and 
organisational structure and culture; (iii) ensure tools for implementation, i.e., powers, 
incentives and sanctions; (iv) build coalitions and partnerships; (v) generate 
intelligence; and (vi) ensure accountability.  Because these stewardship dimensions 
overlap considerably with the NHS functional areas of the decision-space approach, in 
this section I focus on the one stewardship dimension that has not received much 
attention thus far: ensuring accountability.  For the period 1996–2001, I will examine 
government organisational structures for ensuring accountability, such as the size and 
composition of health facility boards and territorial health offices, and consider 
mechanisms to ensure public participation as a means of accountability, such as the 
size, number, composition and role of community participants, legislation for patient 
and user rights, and the establishment of a user complaint system (Bossert 1998b; 
Travis et al. 2003).   
During this period, the 1986 GHL established integrated mechanisms to ensure 
accountability through several organisations at all levels of the NHS.  At the central 
level, it mandated that a Consultative Committee provide relevant health care 
information to the CISNS.  The Consultative Committee contained a range of 
representatives, including health experts, trade unions, employers and users.  At the 
regional level, the GHL regulated the structure of Health Areas and Basic Health Zones 
(as discussed in the section on Service Organisation above); while the regions with 
health service competencies and INSALUD designed “health maps” that defined the 
territorial borders of these Health Areas and Zones.  To ensure accountability and 
public participation in the NHS, the GHL stipulated creation of a Health Council for 
each Basic Health Zone.  These Councils were given an advisory role for the 
management of primary and community health care.  In addition, for secondary and 
tertiary specialised health care, Hospital Participation Committees were created at the 
Health Area-level.  These Committees had representation from municipalities, local 
professional organisations and user associations, and they provided advice on hospital 
management and the coordination and integration of primary and specialised hospital 
care.  However, in practice, ever since Franco’s prohibition of civic networks, public 
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participation by local professional organisation and user groups has been relatively 
weak (Durán, Lara, and van Waveren 2006).   
In terms of patient and user rights within the NHS, the GHL stipulated, among 
other things, respect for users’ personality, human dignity and intimacy; caution against 
the improper use of prognostic, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures and tests; 
assignment of a particular general practitioner to each user; public participation in 
health activities; and the establishment and implementation of user complaint and 
suggestion systems.  In particular, its Article 10.12 recognised the right of any citizen 
to communicate a complaint or suggestion regarding NHS processes, procedures or 
service delivery.  This right was designed both to protect patients and to serve as an 
opportunity for quality improvement (Durán, Lara, and van Waveren 2006).  Later, in 
the 1990s, patient rights were expanded with Royal Decrees 1575/1993 (Ministerio de 
Sanidad y Consumo 1993) and 8/1996 (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 1996) on the 
free choice of primary care physicians and specialists, respectively, within INSALUD.  
Prior to these decrees, residents were allocated a primary care physician, who would 
serve as the gatekeeper for referrals to specialists.   
Furthermore, the regions with health care powers were allowed to develop their 
own regulations on rights and duties.  For example, in its 1998 Health Law (Presidencia 
de la Junta 1998), Andalusia explicitly referenced users’ rights to file complaints and 
suggestions, and to receive answers within a specific time.  The regions under 
INSALUD were not given these specific powers during this period; mechanisms for 
public participation and accountability for these regions were implemented to some 
degree by the central government through INSALUD.  In preparation for assuming 
health service competencies, however, almost all the “slow-track” regions, with the 
exception of Murcia, passed laws regulating health care (leyes de salud) or health care 
planning (leyes de ordenación sanitaria), which included some level of mandate that 
users be permitted to file claims and complaints regarding the NHS, and would be 
implemented after devolution.  In particular, Extremadura legislated the right to 
complaint and suggestion procedures in Article 11.1n of its 10/2001 Health Care Law 
(Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2001b) and mandated the creation of an 
ombudsman for patients of its RHS in Article 16 of this same law.  At the same time, 
Madrid (in Title IV of Law 12/2001) stipulated the rights and duties of citizens with 
regard to the NHS, expanding the rights in their region to include, for example, the 
right to receive health care within defined waiting times, the right to give “advance care 
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directives”, the right to access information from their medical records, and the creation 
of an ombudsman for patients (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 2001b).   
 
4.2.6.  Health System Decision-Space Map as of 2001 
Table 4.3 shows the health system decision-space map for Extremadura and Madrid as 
of 2001.   
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Table 4.3.  Health System Decision-Space Map for Extremadura and Madrid, as of 2001 
Functional Areas Range of Choice 
Key Functions Narrow Moderate Wide 
Service Organisation 
Contracts with private 
providers 
No contracting with other organisations, defined by 
central government 
  
Hospital autonomy Hospitals managed by INSALUD, defined by central 
government 
  
Targeting service delivery Free access to public health services based on need, 1986 
GHL  
  
Regulation and Planning 
Policy formulation Defined by MOH, along with other central government 
ministries depending on the issue 
  
Norms and standards  The common health benefit package is defined by the 
MOH, along with the MOF (Royal Decree 63/1995)a  
  
Prescription drugs 
planning 
Defined by the central governmentb   
Drugs and supplies 
(rationing) 
Defined by the central government   
Infrastructure planning Defined by the central government   
Health information 
systems design 
Defined by the central government   
Financing 
Insurance schemes NHS-style public health system, 1986 GHLc   
Payment mechanisms  Public health care providers payment mechanisms 
managed by central government 
  
Sources of revenue 
 
Defined by the CPFF, which includes regional finance 
ministers; earmarked health financing is defined in 
consultation with the MOH; intergovernmental transfers fund 
almost all regional health expendituresd 
 
Revenue allocation 
(budgeting) 
 
Resource allocation defined by INSALUD/MOH, in 
collaboration with deconcentrated field offices 
 
Income from fees No fees for health services, as defined by the central 
government  
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Functional Areas Range of Choice 
Key Functions Narrow Moderate Wide 
Human Resources 
Salaries and benefits 
(permanent staff) 
Defined by the National Civil Service   
Contracts  
(non-permanent staff) 
Defined by the MOH’s INSALUD   
Civil Service Defined by the central government   
Education and training 
(pre-service) 
Defined by the MOH, along with the MOEdu    
Education and training 
(continuing) 
None 
  
Education and training 
(continuing) 
None 
  
Governance and Stewardship Rules 
Facility boards Defined by GHL and implemented by INSALUD   
Territorial health offices Defined by GHL and implemented by INSALUD   
Public participation Defined by GHL and implemented by INSALUD   
Patient/user rights Defined by central government and implemented by 
INSALUD 
  
Complaint system Defined by central government and implemented by 
INSALUD 
  
a The Fifth Additional Provision states that this Royal Decree does not affect the health activities and services provided by t he regions, thereby offering them more choice; however, 
this opportunity would not be utilised by the “slow-track” regions during this period.  b From 1998, Madrid implements central government pharmaceutical product legislation (Article 
28, section 1.10 of Law 3/1983 (Jefatura del Estado 1983); updated by Law 5/1998 (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 1998)).  c Mutual funds schemes exist for public sector 
employees; they analysis is beyond the scope of the thesis.  d The regions were allowed to use their own resources or to use fees, taxes or other income to provide health services and 
activities in their territory.  This opportunity offered the regions more choice, but none of the “slow-track” regions used these options during this period.   
Note: One main difference between Madrid and Extremadura had implications for their financing and tax powers: for most of this peri od, Madrid followed the 1997–2001 regional 
financing agreement but Extremadura refused to adopt it and, de facto, continued to follow the 1992–1996 regional financing agreement.   
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4.3.  The 2001 Health System Devolution to the “Slow-Track” Regions 
Between 1996 and 1999, the ten “slow-track” regions modified their Statutes of 
Autonomy, giving them the means to exercise the health service competencies 
permitted in Part 20 of Article 148 of the Spanish Constitution.93  To do so, they 
incorporated the following text: 
The executive function over the following matters corresponds to the 
Autonomous Community of ___________: …  Management of the health 
services of the social security system, in accordance with provision 17 of 
Article 149 of the Constitution, reserving for the State the role of high 
inspectorate over the performance of the function referred to in this 
provision.   
For the regions, assuming health service competencies enjoined the development of the 
following new capabilities: (i) services and functions corresponding to health, 
assistance, and administrative centres and establishments taken over from Social 
Security, managed by INSALUD; (ii) inspection of the health services and management 
under the Social Assistance programme; (iii) the elaboration and execution of 
investments; (iv) contracting and managing agreements with other entities; (v) the 
creation, transformation, amplification, classification and suppression of health centres 
run by the Social Assistance programme; and (vi) planning programs and means of 
health care (Múzquiz Vicente-Arche 2002).   
On 27 December 2001, as stipulated in Royal Decrees 1471-1480,94 the Spanish 
central government transferred the functions and services of INSALUD to the ten 
remaining “slow-track” regions.  A year prior to these Royal Decrees, the MOPA and 
the administrations of these regions formed joint working groups that negotiated the 
details of the transfer agreements, including the identification of which functions and 
services would be transferred, which would be reserved for the central government and 
which would be shared by both entities (Novinskey, Interview no. 05, 17, and 41).  
These decrees effectively devolved approximately 132,000 civil servants, 79 hospitals, 
                                               
93 Aragon modified its Statute of Autonomy in 1996 (Jefatura del Estado 1996), Castile-La Mancha in 
1997 (Jefatura del Estado 1997), Cantabria, Madrid and Murcia in 1998 (Jefatura del Estado 1998a; 
1998b; 1998c), and Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Castile Leon, Extremadura and La Rioja in 1999 
(Jefatura del Estado 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 1999d; 1999e).   
94 Royal Decree 1471/2001 regarding Asturias, 1472 Cantabria, 1473 La Rioja, 1474 Murcia, 1475 
Aragón, 1476 Castile-La Mancha, 1477 Extremadura, 1478 the Balearic Islands, 1479 Madrid, and 1480 
Castile Leon (Ministerio para Las Administraciones Públicas 2001a; 2001b; 2001c; 2001d; 2001e; 
2001f; 2001g; 2001h; 2001i; 2001j). 
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1,087 health centres, and 12 billion euros95 to these regions within six months 
(Múzquiz Vicente-Arche 2001).96  
  Parallel to the transfer agreement working groups, the CPFF worked on a new 
financing agreement for the regions, which was approved for the period after 2001 
(Law 21/2001) (Jefatura del Estado 2001b).  The new agreement, originally established 
for an indefinite period, integrated the general regional financing system and the NHS 
financing system into one system that aimed at attaining long-term financial stability, 
especially with regard to the NHS.  Overall, it meant that regional expenditures would 
compose 45 per cent of total public health expenditures.97  It also increased fiscal 
autonomy by granting new taxation powers to the regions (see the Financing section for 
2002-2006 below).   
Together, all of this legislation represented the “second wave” of health system 
devolution in Spain, and one of the most profound macro-organisational reforms it had 
ever experienced (Costa-Font and Rico 2006a).  Importantly, it signalled the end of the 
period of asymmetric decentralization that had continued since the beginning of the 
implementation of the Constitution.98  With regard to the NHS, Urbanos (2001) 
underscored that this reform effectively removed the earmarking of funds; from then 
on, allocating financial resources to health sector priorities would be the sole 
responsibility of the regions.99  Because of this, some with a stake in the NHS feared 
that the regions might divert funds previously earmarked for health to other policy 
areas (Novinskey, Interview no. 23 and 36).  In January 2002, the ten remaining “slow-
track” regions began assuming responsibility for the management of their own health 
services, marking the end of the twenty-year process to devolve health service and 
system competencies to the regional level governments.   
In the following section, I offer more information on the results of this reform 
and subsequent relevant legislation, giving an overall picture of the five functional 
areas of the NHS for the period 2002–2006.   
                                               
95 Before negotiations this figure was originally intended to be 10.217 million euros, but the final transfer 
agreements with the regions cost approximately 12.1 million euros altogether. 
96 Law 16/2001 established an extraordinary process for the consolidation and provision of places for 
statutory personnel in the health institutions of the Social Assistance programme (Jefatura del Estado 
2001d).   
97 The central government and the municipalities made up 40 and 15 per cent, respectively. 
98 Some asymmetry still exists with regard to the financing of the Basque Country and Navarra; e.g. 
because of their historic privileges, these regions retain full autonomy over their fiscal policy.   
99 The only exception was the minimum mandatory amount of regional health expenditures (European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 2002). 
Defining the Decision Space for Health System Devolution in Spain 
   154 
 
4.4.  National Health System Functions for the “Slow-Track” Regions, 2002–2006 
4.4.1.  Service Organisation 
In addition to the above-mentioned 2001 health system devolution legislation, in terms 
of service organisation, Royal Decree 840/2002 modified the organisational structure 
and roles of the central government’s health sector entities (Ministerio para Las 
Administraciones Públicas 2002).100  First, the MOH assumed the role of steering body 
and inspector of the NHS and the CISNS became the chief coordinating body of the 
whole system.  Then, INSALUD’s name was changed to the National Health 
Management Institute (Instituto Nacional de Gestión Sanitaria, INGESA) and it took 
on a reduced role as manager of health services for the autonomous cities of Ceuta and 
Melilla and of related administrative activities.   
A year later, the roles and organisation of directorates within the MOH and of 
the CISNS were later refined by what was arguably the most important health 
regulation affecting the NHS during this period of study: the 16/2003 Law on the 
Cohesion and Quality of the NHS (LCQ) (Jefatura del Estado 2003b).  Chapters IX 
through XI of the LCQ refined the mandates of three NHS bodies: the CISNS for 
coordination, the NHS High Inspectorate (Alta Inspección) role for quality, and the 
NHS Council for Social Participation (Consejo de Participación Social) for the public’s 
participation in the NHS.   
More specifically, with the LCQ, the CISNS assumed a new role as overseer of 
the NHS’s coordination, cooperation, communication and information activities 
(Article 69).  In its role as the principal organising instrument of the NHS, the CISNS 
was given the power to debate issues related to, and to adopt recommendations for, the 
organising, advising, planning, evaluating and coordinating functions of the NHS as 
well as facilitating cooperation between the central government and regions (Article 
71).  The CISNS’s status as a non-executive, advisory body, whose agreements are 
approved by consensus, remained unchanged (Article 73).  Its general aim was to 
address issues regarding the competencies of both the MOH and the regions.  However, 
as noted by Repullo Labrador et al. (2004), its lack of executive power has created 
some efficiency problems.  Finally, the CISNS was authorised to create commissions 
and working groups to study and develop recommendations on issues within its 
                                               
100 This Royal Decree was later modified by Royal Decree 1087/2003, which established the 
organisational structure of the MOH (Ministerio para Las Administraciones Públicas 2003).   
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purview (Article 74).  To carry out these new roles and tasks, the composition of the 
CISNS underwent a significant change to reflect the post-devolution (non-hierarchical) 
distribution of health service powers, reducing the number of voting members from 
thirty-four to eighteen by removing all central government representation except the 
Minister of Health, who remained the Council’s president.101  Article 70 stipulated that 
the seventeen regional health ministers would now elect one of their number as vice 
president.   
In practice, the character and functioning of the CISNS was mixed during this 
period.  An MOH interviewee mentioned that he thought, “The [CISNS] has always 
worked well on certain topics.  [For example,] it is working with the Basic Minimum 
Data Set [and] the hospital information system” (Novinskey, Interview no. 36).  At the 
same time, a regional stakeholder mentioned that “in reality, [the CISNS is] an 
instrument more at the service of the MOH for central policies of the ministry that have 
to do with the [health care] services and need to reach a consensus with the 
Autonomous Communities…it has not served as a coordination or cooperation 
instrument among the decentralized Communities” (Novinskey, Interview no. 27).  An 
academic interviewee in a similar statement agreed with this assessment (Novinskey, 
Interview no. 29).  An interviewee from a health association outside the government 
suggested that, “the CISNS does not work because they only try to stick it to each other 
politically…so, health problems are not raised” (Novinskey, Interview no. 34).  
Another regional interviewee went further, calling CISNS meetings “very violent” at 
times when the central government tries to establish obligations for the Autonomous 
Communities without offering additional financing  (Novinskey, Interview no. 38).  At 
the same time, an MOH official explains, “conflicts arise either because the MOH 
believes that there are rules that are not adhered to, or because a Community believes 
that some MOH norm invades their competencies” (Novinskey, Interview no. 04).      
In addition, the LCQ gave the MOH the role of High Inspectorate over NHS 
responsibilities at all levels of government as stipulated in the Constitution, Statutes of 
Autonomy and other laws (Article 76).  This role encompassed the following functions: 
(i) monitoring the integration of regional health plans and programs with the general 
                                               
101 As of February 1997, the representatives from the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla were 
invited to attend.  In April 1999, the representative from Ceuta became a member of the Council.  As of 
the 2003 LCQ, the Under Secretary of Health and Consumer Affairs and the Director-General of 
Cohesion of the NHS and High Inspection are allowed to attend the Council meetings with voice but 
without vote.   
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objectives of the central government; (ii) evaluating compliance with the NHS’s goals 
and objectives, including those defined in agreements made by the CISNS; (iii) 
monitoring the implementation and utilisation of central government funds and 
subsidies allocated to the regions; (iv) ensuring that funds for regional health services 
are utilised according to the general principles of this law, (v) ensuring proper operation 
of previously central government-owned health centres, services or establishments; (vi) 
verifying the absence of all types of discrimination in the NHS; and (vii) monitoring all 
health competencies and ensuring that their delivery incorporates the democratic 
participation of all stakeholders.  In the event that the NHS Inspectorate were to find a 
regional health service to be non-compliant with any of its health functions, it would 
first give a warning; and, then, if the non-compliance continued, it would formally 
require the region to take the necessary measures to become compliant.  Furthermore, 
the NHS Inspectorate seeks to prevent all forms of fraud, corruption and deviation in 
health benefits and services in the public sector (Article 79).   
Finally, the LCQ stipulated that the MOH would create and regulate the NHS 
Council for Social Participation (Consejo de Participación Social del Sistema Nacional 
de Salud) to ensure the participation of citizens and professionals in the NHS.  
Accordingly, this Council’s main role was to provide a permanent channel of 
communication between health sector authorities, professional and scientific societies, 
trade unions, businesses and users.  The LCQ also established that this Council would 
ensure public participation in the NHS through an Advisory Committee (Comité 
Consultivo), an Open Health Forum (Foro Abierto de Salud) and a Virtual Forum 
(Foro Virtual).  The Advisory Committee would be presided over by a representative 
of the General Administration of the State (Administración General del Estado), 
designated by the Minister of Health.  Its members would be appointed, consisting of 
six representatives from the General Public Administration, six from the regions, four 
from local administrations, eight from business organisations and eight from the main 
national trade unions.  The Open Health Forum would be an instrument that could be 
utilised by the Minister of Health to study, debate and formulate proposals on specific 
NHS issues.  Accordingly, representatives from organisations corresponding to the 
issues under discussion would participate in this forum.  The Virtual Forum would be a 
forum, accessible to the public through the MOH’s website.  Furthermore, Article 68 of 
the LCQ gave the MOH responsibility for creating networks for the exchange of 
experiences and knowledge in the areas of health information, promotion and 
Defining the Decision Space for Health System Devolution in Spain 
   157 
 
education, health technology evaluation, and public health and health care education 
and training, among other things.  Figure 4.3 illustrates the organisation of the Spanish 
NHS for 2002–2006.   
Figure 4.3.  Organisation of the Spanish NHS, 2002-2006 
 
Source: Durán et al. (2006, 20).  AC = autonomous community or region. 
The LCQ also altered the MOH’s organisational structure by eliminating a 
number of its general sub-directorates and creating the Agency for NHS Quality 
(Agencia de Calidad del Sistema Nacional de Salud), the Health Information Institute 
(Instituto de Información Sanitaria) and the NHS Observatory (Observatorio del 
Sistema Nacional de Salud).  The Agency for NHS Quality, created by Article 60, was 
established to elaborate and maintain the elements of the NHS’s health care quality 
infrastructure.  Its main activities include performing periodic external audits of health 
institutions and services and accrediting public and private health institutions.  More 
information about the NHS Observatory (Article 63 of Law 16/2003) and Health 
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Information Institute (Article 58 of Law 16/2003) can be found in the Regulation and 
Planning section below.   
A year later, the MOH underwent another significant internal restructuring as 
mandated by three Royal Decrees (Ministerio para Las Administraciones Públicas 
2004a; 2004b; Presidencia del Gobierno del Estado 2004).  In particular, Article 15 of 
Royal Decree 553/2004 integrated the Government Delegation for the National Plan for 
Pharmaceuticals (Delegación del Gobierno para el Plan Nacional de Drogas) into the 
organisational structure of the MOH.  Article 14 of Royal Decree 562/2004 restructured 
the MOH’s Under Secretariat of Health and Consumer Affairs (into a General 
Technical Secretariat and General Directorates of Pharmacy and Health Products, of 
Human Resources and Economic-Budgetary Services, and of Consumer Affairs and 
Customer Care) as well as its General Secretariat of Health (into the General 
Directorates of Public Health, of NHS Cohesion and Inspection and—at the same level 
of organisation—the Agency for NHS Quality and the Government Delegation for the 
National Plan for Pharmaceuticals).  See Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 for basic 
organograms.  Finally, Royal Decree 1555/2004 further developed the basic 
organisational structure of the MOH into sub-directorates, incorporating an adequate 
and coherent structure consistent with the 2001 health system devolution and following 
the efficiency and efficacy requirements established by Royal Decree 1449/2000 of the 
Ministry of Interior (Ministerio para Las Administraciones Públicas 2000).  
Meanwhile, the MOH’s joint management functions with the MOEdu, MOF and 
MOPA in defined areas of health remained the same.  The organisational structure of 
MOH outlined in these Royal Decrees remained in effect through 2006 and beyond.    
Once the “second wave” of health system devolution was completed, all regions 
enjoyed wide discretion over service organisation functions within their respective 
territories.102  In anticipation of this new discretion over health services, Madrid passed 
                                               
102 The role of the municipalities was not affected by the 2001 health system devolution, nor was it 
changed at any point between 2002 and 2006.  After the regional elections of 2003, twelve regions began 
to exercise their wide discretion by considerably modifying the organisational structure of their RHMs.  
All twelve added a planning office to the existing organisation of their RHM and RHS.  Four of them 
added top-level offices to address pharmaceutical issues and one has a similar office subordinate to its 
human resources office.  Moreover, in 2003, most regions transferred responsibilities for social and 
consumer affairs previously assigned to their RHMs to other regional ministries.  The regions also 
converted the general manager positions of hospitals and primary care centres into political 
appointments.  See the following laws: Andalusia, Law 2/1998 (Presidencia de la Junta 1998); Aragon, 
Law 2/1989, modified by Law 2/2004 (Departamento de Salud y Consumo 2005; Presidencia de la 
Diputación General de Aragón 1989) and Law 6/2002 (Presidencia del Gobierno de Aragón 2002); 
Asturias, Law 1/1992 (Junta General del Principado de Asturias 1992); the Balearic Islands, Law 5/2003 
(Presidencia del Gobierno de Las Illes Balears 2003); the Basque Country, Law 8/1997 (Presidencia del 
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Law 12/2001 (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 2001b) on the establishment of 
its health system (Sistema Sanitaria de la Comunidad de Madrid).  This law 
Figure 4.4.  Basic Organogram of the MOH, ca. 2006 
 
 Source: www.msc.es, accessed in 2006.  This chart is not exhaustive and includes only those units, 
agencies and directorates mentioned in the text. 
Figure 4.5.  Organogram of the Under Secretariat of Health and Consumer Affairs, ca. 
2006 
 
 Source: www.msc.es, accessed in 2006.  This chart is not exhaustive and includes only those units, 
agencies and directorates mentioned in the text. 
                                               
Gobierno Vasco 1997); Canary Islands, Law 11/1994 (Presidencia del Gobierno de Canarias 1994); 
Cantabria, Law 7/2002 (Parlamento de Cantabria 2002); Castile-La Mancha, Law 8/2000 (Presidencia de 
la Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-La Mancha 2000); Castile Leon, Law 1/1993 (Comunidad 
Autónoma de Castilla y León 1993); Catalonia, Law 15/1990 (Presidencia de la Generalidad de Cataluña 
1990); Extremadura, Law 12/2001 (Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2001b); Galicia, Law 7/2003 
(Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia 2003); Madrid, Law 12/2001 (Presidencia de la Comunidad de 
Madrid 2001b); Murcia, Law 4/1994 (Asamblea Regional de Murcia 1994); La Rioja, Law 4/1991 
(Diputación General de La Rioja 1991).   
Minister
Under Secretariat 
Health and 
Consumer Affairs
General Secretariat 
of Health
Public Health 
Institute Carlos III
Spainsh Agency 
for Food 
Security 
Technical Cabinet Health Advisory Council
Under Secretariat of Health and Consumer Affairs            
General Technical 
Secretariat
General Directorate of 
Human Resources and 
Economic-Budgetary 
Services
General Directorate of 
Pharmacy and Health 
Products
General Directorate of 
Consumer Affairs and  
Customer Care
Technical 
Cabinet 
Defining the Decision Space for Health System Devolution in Spain 
   160 
 
Figure 4.6.  Organogram of the General Secretariat of Health, ca. 2006 
 
 Source: www.msc.es, accessed in 2006.  This chart is not exhaustive and includes only those units, 
agencies and directorates mentioned in the text. 
set up the administrative and bureaucratic functions of the health system as well as its 
health services.  It envisioned an innovative separation of functions between health care 
assurance, purchasing and provision.103  Accordingly, it instituted the Madrid Ministry 
of Health (Consejería de Sanidad de la Comunidad de Madrid, Madrid RMH) as the 
main health authority (autoridad sanitaria) for the area.  Under this authority, it 
established the Network of Health Agencies of the Community of Madrid (la Red de 
Agencias Sanitarias de la Comunidad de Madrid) to carry out the function of health 
care assurance, with the tasks of guaranteeing the population’s right to health care, 
regulating the health system, and monitoring, inspecting, evaluating and accrediting 
health services, providers and institutions.  Also under the Regional Ministry of Health, 
the law created the Madrid Health Service (Servicio Madrileño de Salud, Madrid RHS) 
to carry out the purchasing functions of its health system and provide an adequate 
organisation and allocation of the budget to health services for the population.  Finally, 
this law created the Unique Health Network for Public Utilisation (Red Sanitaria Única 
de Utilización Pública), composed of all of the publicly-funded health care providers, 
including (i) those whose management was transferred from INSALUD to the newly 
                                               
103 According to law 12/2001, this separation was an important innovation relative to the health model of 
other regions.  It provided a much-needed connection between health care purchasing and planning based 
on health needs, as developed in the State of Population Health Report (Informe del Estado de Salud de 
la Población).  It also adopted a model of patient-centred care. 
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created Madrid Institute of Health (Instituto Madrileño de la Salud), (ii) the health 
centres contracted by the Madrid RHS, and (iii) other accredited public and private 
providers that may provide services to the public system.  It was envisioned that the 
Madrid RHS would purchase services from health care providers in this Unique Health 
Network.  See Figure 4.7 for a summary of Madrid’s health system organisational 
structure in 2002.   
The Community of Madrid further applied its newly found discretion 
established by Law 12/2001104, making several modifications to the organisational 
structure of its health system.  For example, the organisational structure of the Madrid 
RHM was established by Decree 1/2002, which was successively repealed and replaced 
by Decrees 10/2004, 120/2004 (later modified by Decree 15/2005) and 100/2005 of the 
Governing Council of Madrid (Consejo de Gobierno 2004a; 2004c; 2005c).105  At the 
same time, the organisational structure of the Madrid RHS was established by Decree 
121/2004  
Figure 4.7.  Madrid’s Health System Organisation, ca. 2002 
 
 Source: www.madrid.org, accessed in 2006.  This chart is not exhaustive and includes only those units, 
agencies and directorates mentioned in the text. 
 
                                               
104 Partially modified later by Law 7/2004 (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 2004). 
105 These provisions remained in effect until Decree 22/2008 (Consejo de Gobierno 2008a). 
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and later repealed and replaced by Decree 16/2005, following the integration of the 
Madrid Institute of Health into the Madrid RHS by Decree 14/2005 (Consejo de 
Gobierno 2004d; 2005a; 2005b).106  Accordingly, the organisational structure of the 
previously established Madrid Institute of Health was repealed and replaced by Decree 
197/2002 (which was modified by 48/2003) and later itself repealed and replaced by 
123/2004, until its dissolution as a single public entity and its integration into the 
Madrid RHS via the above-mentioned Decree 14/2005 (Consejo de Gobierno 2002; 
2003b; 2004e).  See Figures 4.8 and 4.9 for an illustration of the Madrid’s health 
system after these changes.   
 
Figure 4.8.  Madrid’s Health System Organisation, ca. 2006 
 
 Source: www.madrid.org, accessed in 2006.  This chart is not exhaustive and includes only those units, 
agencies and directorates mentioned in the text. 
                                               
106 These provisions remained in effect until Decree 23/2008 (Consejo de Gobierno 2008b). 
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Figure 4.9.  Basic Organogram of the Madrid RHM, ca. 2006 
 
 Source: www.madrid.org, accessed in 2006.  This chart is not exhaustive and includes only those units, 
agencies and directorates mentioned in the text. 
Turning to Extremadura, which in its Health Law 10/2001 established the 
constitution and foundation for the organisation of its public health system (Sistema 
Sanitario Público de Extremadura) prior to, and in preparation for, the actual transfer 
of health service competencies from INSALUD (Presidencia de la Junta de 
Extremadura 2001b).  This Law adjusted the previous Decree 4/1999, through which 
the President of the Government of Extremadura (Junta de Extremadura) ordered the 
creation of the Extremadura Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs (Consejería de 
Sanidad y Consumo de Extremadura, Extremadura RHM), to accommodate the new 
regulatory framework and competencies (Presidencia de la Junta 1999).  It also newly 
created the Extremadura Health Service (Servicio Extremeño de Salud, Extremadura 
RHS) and regulated its organisational structure so that it could receive the health 
resource transfers from INSALUD.  Importantly, Law 10/2001 mandated a separation 
of powers between the health authority’s control over the health system (to be carried 
out by the RHM) and service provision (to be carried out by the RHS).  The former is 
in charge of regulation and strategic planning of the regional health system, while the 
latter is in charge of operational planning, management of the services network and 
coordination of health care provisions across Extremadura.  This Law also established 
the Extremadura Council for Health (Consejo Extremeño de Salud) as the highest 
consultative board in the system.  Finally, it regulated the organisational structure of the 
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Extremadura RHS into Health Areas and Basic Health Zones, and stipulated the 
composition, powers and functions of the Health Area Councils (Consejos de Salud de 
Área).   
Extremadura continued to apply its wide discretion in deciding the 
organisational structure of its regional health system and services through several 
modifications of Law 10/2001.  For example, the organisational structure of the 
Extremadura RHM established by Law 10/2001 was repealed and replaced by Decree 
210/2001, to more adequately reflect the assumption of health service competencies 
(Consejería de Presidencia 2001b).  This decree was repealed and replaced by Decree 
80/2003, which was then modified by Decree 152/2005, ultimately increasing the 
number of actual jobs available to match those necessary for eventual staff in the 
Government of Extremadura (Consejería de Presidencia 2003a; 2005g).  These decrees 
remained in effect for the period under study.  On the same day as it received health 
service competencies, Extremadura passed Decree 209/2001, approving the Statutes of 
Autonomous Organisation (Estatutos del Organismo Autónomo) of Extremadura’s 
RHS and re-establishing it (from Law 10/2001) according to the statutes and as a public 
entity (Consejería de Presidencia 2001a).  The Statutes of the Extremadura RHS were 
modified by Decree 81/2003 and remained in effect during the period of study 
(Consejería de Presidencia 2003b).107  The organisational structure of the Extremadura 
RHS was modified with Decree 189/2004,  with changes to the organisational structure 
of its Health Areas and to the composition, powers and functions of the Health Area 
Councils (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004b).   The organisational structure of 
the Extremadura Council for Health was also repealed and replaced by Decree 88/2002 
(Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2002).108  See Figure 4.10 for the organogram of 
Extremadura’s RHM as of 2006.   
 
  
                                               
107 The organisational structure of the Extremadura RHS was repealed and replaced by Decree 221/2008 
so that it would be in accordance with the newly named RHM, Department of Health and Dependence, 
and its new functions and competencies (Consejería de Administración Pública y Hacienda 2008).   
108 This was later modified by Decree 216/2013 (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2013).   
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Figure 4.10.  Basic Organogram of the Extremadura RHM, ca. 2006 
 
 Source: www.saludextremadura.com, accessed in 2006.  This chart is not exhaustive and includes only 
those units, agencies and directorates mentioned in the text. 
4.4.2.  Regulation and Planning 
In this section, I review some additional regulatory aspects of the NHS as well as key 
aspects of health planning and the health care benefit package that have changed since 
devolution.  The 2001 health system devolution transferred regulatory and planning 
authority over health services from the central government to the “slow-tracked” 
regions.  The MOH remained the nation’s supreme health authority, but with a greater 
focus on guaranteeing the cohesion and quality of health services across the country.  
As one stakeholder stated, “the State establishes the requirements and the Autonomous 
Communities are to develop their respective norms latter” (Novinskey, Interview no. 
26).  In this capacity, the MOH and other central government authorities in charge of 
regulating the sector passed several regulations during this period (see Table 4.4).  
Although it no longer had exclusive control over regulation and planning of health 
services, through its National Constitutional Court the central government still accepted 
appeals regarding the unconstitutionality of regulations promulgated by either the 
central government or the regions.    
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Table 4.4.  Principal Health Regulation of the Spanish Central Government, 2002–2006 
Law 41/2002 Patient autonomy, rights and duties regarding medical 
information and records 
Law 16/2003 Cohesion and quality of the NHS 
Law 55/2003 Framework statute covering statutory professionals in the 
health services 
Law 44/2003 Regulation of health professionals 
Law 28/2005 Measures against tobacco consumption and regulating the 
sale, distribution, consumption and publicity of tobacco 
products 
Law 29/2006 Guarantees and rational use of pharmaceuticals and health 
products 
Sources: Jefatura del Estado (2002; 2003b; 2003a; 2003c; 2005; 2006c) 
While all of the laws passed by the central government during this period 
warrant attention, Law 16/2003 on the Cohesion and Quality of the NHS is probably 
the most important national-level regulation regarding the regulatory and planning 
functions of the NHS.  The main purpose of the LCQ was to update and complement 
the 1986 GHL framework and refine the NHS’s operations now that health system 
devolution had been completed.  The LCQ had three main objectives.  The first was to 
promote coordination and cooperation, and ultimately to guarantee cohesion, among the 
RHSs as well as between them and the central government.  The second was to 
facilitate the overall improvement of NHS’s quality.  The third was to integrate public 
participation in the NHS officially, respecting the autonomous decision-making of 
individuals over their own health, considering the overall population’s expectations of 
the NHS and facilitating the exchange of knowledge and experiences from the 
population.  To do this, the LCQ described the NHS within the context of the 2001 
devolution, refining, redefining and clarifying those NHS elements that were common 
across all regions.  For example, it redefined the health care benefit package that each 
region was obligated to offer its populations (further discussed later in this section).  
The LCQ also regulated the mobility of health professionals across regions.  In 
addition, it updated issues pertaining to research and development in the health sector 
and it addressed the development of health management information systems.  Finally, 
the LCQ introduced two main innovations for coordinating and facilitating cooperation 
between the MOH and the regions.  The first of these established Comprehensive 
Health Plans for the NHS to be carried out jointly by the central government and the 
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regions, as a function of the CISNS (further explained below).  The second innovation 
outlined different strategies for cooperation among public health authorities.   
Since 2001, the regions have approved several health care regulations, mainly 
addressing organisational structure, human resources and financing issues.  The most 
common policy issues included the role and accreditation of private health services, the 
working conditions of health personnel and mental health issues.109  Importantly, all 
regions have had the ability to regulate third-party payers (primarily their own RHSs, 
but also contracted private health care providers).  Madrid, for example, impressively 
exercised its new authority by enacting more than 50 pieces of legislation regarding the 
health sector.   
In the following, I present details on how health plans and the health care 
benefit package regulation and planning has changed from the “second wave” of health 
system devolution until 2006, focusing on legislation produced by Extremadura and 
Madrid.  
4.4.2.1. Health Plans:  As stipulated in previous laws (the 1986 GHL, Royal 
Decree 63/1995 and the 2003 LCQ), the MOH and the regions were mandated to 
develop Comprehensive Health Plans jointly as a principal instrument for priority 
setting according to the needs of the region’s population.  In addition, the 2003 LCQ 
established a framework for monitoring and improving the quality of health care 
nationwide, called the NHS Quality Plan (Plan Calidad Sistema Nacional de Salud).  
Since its publication in March 2006, this Plan has been the MOH’s main instrument for 
establishing and communicating norms and standards for the practice of quality health 
care in the regions.  The 2006 NHS Quality Plan, in particular, set six action areas with 
a total of twelve strategies for achieving the goals of those areas (see Table 4.5) as well 
as 41 objectives and 189 projects (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2006e).  It 
provided funding of 50 million euros for 2006.  The plan was updated in April 2007.110  
  
                                               
109 Mental health competencies lie in the hands of provincial and municipal authorities, but their 
integration into the organisational structures of the RHMs has often been discussed.   
110 The 2007 plan did not change the action areas or strategies, although the number of objectives and 
projects changed to 40 and 197, respectively, and the fiscal allocation rose to 50.5 million euros for 2007.  
This plan remained in effect until 2010, when the next version was released (Ministerio de Sanidad, 
Política Social e Igualdad 2010).   
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Table 4.5.  The 2006 NHS Quality Plan, Areas and Strategies for Action 
Areas for Action Strategies for Action 
Protection, health promotion, 
and prevention 
1.  Protect health 
2.  Health and life habits 
Foster equity 
3.  Boost health policies based on good practice 
4.  Analyse health policies and propose actions for 
reducing health inequities with an emphasis on 
gender inequalities 
Support the planning and 
development of human 
resources for health 
5.  Better match human resources to health service 
needs 
Foster clinical excellence 
6.  Evaluate clinical technologies and procedures 
as a pillar of clinical decisions and management  
7.  Accredit and audit health centres and services  
8.  Improve patient security in the NHS’s health 
centres 
9.  Improve patient health care with a determined 
pathology 
10.  Improve clinical practice 
Utilise information technology 
to improve health care 11.  On-line Health 
Greater transparency 
12.  Design a reliable, timely and accessible NHS 
information system 
Source: Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo (2006e), author’s translation. 
As of 2006, all regions had published at least one multi-year Comprehensive 
Health Plan, integrating items from epidemiological and demographic needs-based 
planning, infrastructure and capital investment planning, and human resource planning.  
In their second generation of plans, the regions refined the objectives in number and 
composition as well as the scope, indicators and evaluation systems, making them more 
realistic and attainable over time (SESPAS 2002).   
Extremadura published two plans during this period, lasting four years each: 
2001–2004 and 2005–2008 (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2001; 2005b; Europa 
Press 2009).  The 2005–2008 Extremadura Health Plan – the region’s third health plan, 
but the first one created after the 2001 devolution – was impacted particularly by 
Decree 96/2004, which established the basic norms for elaborating, monitoring and 
evaluating the plan to develop it in an efficient and effective way (Consejería de 
Sanidad y Consumo 2004j).  Accordingly, the Extremadura RHM began implementing 
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the plan by creating an information system to monitor the objectives and their 
achievement.  Overall, the 2005–2008 plan focuses on the most prevalent health needs 
and problems of Extremadura’s population, proposing 22 priority intervention areas, 66 
specific objectives and 365 strategic lines of action as well as their corresponding 
evaluation criteria and the bodies or units responsible for their development (Junta de 
Extremadura 2004).  For implementation of continuous improvement of health care 
quality, this plan outlined a strategic axis, including the incorporation of new 
technologies.  De facto, an Extremadura stakeholder highlights, “the most striking leap 
we have taken has everything to do with technology…diagnostic and therapeutic 
technology...hemodynamic units…in vetro fertilization units…lithotripsy…technology 
is suddenly here” (Novinskey, Interview no. 01).     
Complementary to the Extremadura Health Plan, Extremadura took several 
other planning actions.  For example, the Extremadura RHS created its own strategic 
plan for 2005–2008 (Servicio Extremeño de Salud 2006a).  In addition, the 
Extremadura RHM created the Framework Plan for Social-Health Services 2005-2010 
(Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo and Consejería de Bienestar Social 2005).  As 
actions towards the creation of a Comprehensive Plan on Cardiovascular Diseases in 
Extremadura (2007–2011), Extremadura also passed Decree 157/2005, establishing the 
Advisory Council on Cardiovascular Diseases in Extremadura (Consejo Asesor sobre 
Enfermedades Cardiovasculares de Extremadura), and appointed twenty-three 
members to this Council on 29 May 2006 (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2005k; 
2006i).  It also passed Order 18 July 2006, establishing quality standards for health 
centres, services and establishments and a standard model of health care quality 
accreditation for them (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2006l).  Furthermore, during 
2006, the Extremadura RHM began elaborating a Comprehensive Plan Against Cancer, 
an Education Framework Plan for Health, a Comprehensive Plan for Mental Health 
2007–2011 and a Plan for the Humanisation of Health Services in the Extremadura 
Public Health System, as well as developing several other plans on specific health care 
and disease prevention areas in 2006 (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2006b; 
Consejería de Sanidad y Dependencia 2007a; 2007b; 2007c).  See Table 4.6. 
At the same time, Madrid published only one plan spanning 10 years (1995–
2004) and then proceeded to make several specific plans for specific illnesses and 
diseases or areas of health and disease prevention.  Table 4.7 lists Madrid’s active plans 
for 2005–2006.    
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Table 4.6.  Development of Plans for Specific Health and Disease Prevention Areas in 
Extremadura, 2006 
Education plan for health sciences 
Comprehensive plan on drugs (e.g. detoxification programs) 
Programs for health promotion and disease prevention (e.g. school health programs, 
HIV/AIDS programs) 
Food security (e.g. health inspection and control of food retail establishments) 
Zoonosis’ (e.g. programme against brucellosis) 
Environmental health and sanitation (e.g. sanitation of the public water supply) 
Health inspection and control in camping grounds and hotels  
Source: Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo (2006 Anexo Junta de Extremadura). 
Table 4.7.  Active Health Plans for Madrid, 2001–2006 
Health Plan Year(s) 
Regional programme for the prevention and control of 
tuberculosis 
2000–2003a 
Comprehensive programme for detection of and advice on 
familiar breast cancer 
2001– 
Plan against social exclusion 2002–2006 
Plan of continued education for health professionals 2002–2006 
Plan for the elimination of measles 2002–2012 
Breast cancer screening programme 2003– 
Mental health plan  2003–2008 
Action programme for the prevention and improvement of 
Diabetes Mellitus 
2005– 
Comprehensive plan for cancer control 2005– 
II plan of action against HIV/AIDS 2005–2007 
Action plan for the disabled 2005–2008 
Support plan for families 2005–2008 
Comprehensive action plan against gender violence 2005–2008 
Plan for infant and adolescent health care 2005–2008 
Integration plan (of immigration) 2006–2008 
System of monitoring and control for nosocomial (hospital-
acquired) infection  
RHM Order 
1.087/2006  
Plan for the surveillance and control of Hepatitis C n/a 
a Since then, Madrid continues to maintain the activities established in the programme. 
Sources: Informes, Estudios e Investigación (2007 Anexo Comunidad de Madrid; 2008 Anexo 
Comunidad de Madrid); Observatorio SNS (2005 Anexo Comunidad de Madrid; 2006 Anexo 
Comunidad de Madrid), author’s translation. 
 
4.4.2.2.  Health Care Benefit Package: The common health benefit package for 
this period was based on the list of services defined by Law 16/2003 and Royal Decree 
1030/2006 in addition to the previously mentioned Royal Decree 63/1995 (Ministerio 
de Sanidad y Consumo 1995a; 2006d; Jefatura del Estado 2003b).  Law 16/2003 
established that the common health benefit package would be guaranteed to all Spanish 
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residents, independent of where they reside.  It newly added the areas (and 
corresponding interventions) of public health and geriatric care within the common 
package as well as pharmacy, orthoprosthesis, dietary products and medical transport.  
Within the area of specialised care, it included a new explicit reference to home health 
care services.  Law 16/2003 also established a general procedure for updating the list of 
services, involving the Agency for the Evaluation of Health Technologies (Agencia de 
Evaluación de Tecnologias Sanitarias) of the Health Institute Carlos III to evaluate 
new health care techniques, technologies and procedures, and the Health Cohesion 
Fund (Fondo de Cohesión Sanitaria) to finance research on health techniques, 
technologies and procedures before they are added to the health care benefit package.  
It stipulated that new benefits would be included in the package through a Royal 
Decree and, it stated in its Single Transitional Provision that until this Royal Decree 
was approved, Royal Decree 63/1995 would remain in effect.  In September of 2006, 
Royal Decree 1030/2006 established this new common health benefit package as well 
as the procedure for updating it.  Article 6 of this Royal Decree stipulates that, with 
previous approval from the CISNS, the MOH can draft in detail the content of the 
common package.  Articles 7 and 8 of the decree describe the procedure for updating 
the common package: the update is proposed by Ministerial Order of the NHS with 
previous approval from the CISNS, and then submitted to the Commission for Health 
Services, Assurance and Financing of the MOH.  The MOH gives final approval of the 
package, with previous approval from the CISNS.  Royal Decree 1030/2006 was 
updated by Order SCO/3422/2007 (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2007).  In 
addition, Law 29/2006 regulated the guarantee and rational use of pharmaceutical 
medicines and health products (Jefatura del Estado 2006c).   
Regarding entitlement to the common health benefit package, during this 
period, there were few additional changes to the criteria previously defined by either 
the central government or the regions.  A ruling by the European Court of Justice 
expanded the realm of application of the common benefit package.  On April 12, 2005, 
that court mandated that the National Institute of Social Security and INGESA to 
reimburse all medical expenses of a Spanish resident incurred in another country 
(outside the European Union) as long as the person was employed or self-employed in 
Spain and otherwise entitled to such benefits (European Court of Justice 2005).  At the 
regional level, Extremadura regulated its offer of health service provisions to foreigners 
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residing in its territory through Decree 31/2004 (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 
2004h).111 
After the 2001 devolution, all regions had the power to make certain decisions 
regarding the common health benefit package provided to their populations.  Although 
obligated to provide coverage for all benefits in the common package, they could 
decide how much financing to allocate for each benefit.  The regions could also 
incorporate additional health activities and benefits into the benefit package offered to 
their populations, including some that were explicitly excluded from the common 
package by Royal Decrees 63/1995 and 1030/2006, and by Law 16/2003.  However, 
the regions would have to use their own resources to fund these extra benefits. 
During the period 2002–2006, Extremadura added a number of health benefits 
to its package.  In an Order of 17 March 2004, it defined the organisation, procedures 
and criteria for developing, updating and evaluating the health care benefit package of 
the Extremadura Public Health System (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004g).  
Moreover, in Decree 80/2004,112 Extremadura legislated the establishment of a 
programme that would permit low-income senior citizens (over age 65) who are 
prescribed specific orthoprosthesis products to pay the amount set out in the decree’s 
Annex I113 in periodic payments without interest over a period of up to two years in 
duration, with Extremadura paying the interest on their behalf to the financial 
institutions administering the grants (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004i).  It later 
repealed and replaced this decree with Decree 55/2006, which expanded this benefit to 
all senior citizens (independent of their income level) and to persons entitled to a 
disability pension (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2006g).  In addition, in Decree 
16/2004, Extremadura legislated the right to a second medical opinion within the 
Extremadura Public Health System (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004e).  Also, 
in Decree 195/2004, Extremadura legislated free dental health care for children age 6 to 
14 (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004c), emulating the legislation in this health 
area passed previously by Andalusia, the Basque Country, and Navarra (Departamento 
de Sanidad y Consumo del Gobierno Vasco 1990; Departamento de Sanidad de la 
Comunidad Foral de Navarra 1991; Consejería de Salud 2001).  Following the mandate 
                                               
111 This decree regulates what Articles 2, 3 and 10 of Law 10/2001 stipulated.  It also created the health 
care card for the Extremadura Public Health System.   
112 A correction of errors in this decree was submitted on June 19, 2004.   
113 Among the products covered were digital or analogue hearing aids, dental extractions, and multifocal 
glasses.   
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in Article 25 of the 2003 LCQ, Extremadura passed Law 1/2005, regulating waiting 
times for specialised health care from the Extremadura Public Health System 
(Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2005a).  In accordance with its previous 
legislation on euthanasia, Extremadura passed Law 3/2005, which in Articles 17-22 
legislates recognition of advance care directives (expression anticipada de voluntades) 
regarding health care decisions when a person does not have the capacity to express 
them otherwise (Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2005b).114  Furthermore, in 
Decree 6/2006, Extremadura regulated the reimbursement of expenses related to 
pharmaceutical products, orthoprosthesis and health services from outside its public 
health system, including financial support for travel and subsistence (Consejería de 
Sanidad y Consumo 2006g).   
During this period, while it did not expand the common health benefit package, 
Madrid legislated several regulations facilitating access to the health services contained 
in the package.  For example, Instruction 1/2004 regulated the reimbursement of out-of-
pocket, health care-related travel expenses (Comunidad de Madrid, 2004).  Following 
the mandate in Article 25 of the 2003 LCQ, Madrid also passed Decree 62/2004, 
establishing and regulating a unified registry of patients on the waiting list for surgery 
in its public health system (Consejo de Gobierno 2004b).   
4.4.3.  Financing 
The period following the devolution of health service competencies saw one major 
primary financing agreement regarding the NHS.  As noted above in the section on the 
2001 Health System Devolution, the CPFF approved the regional financing agreement, 
which became Law 21/2001 and would take effect from January 1, 2002 for an 
indefinite period (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera 2001; Jefatura del Estado 
2001b).115  The 2001 financing agreement integrated the regional financing system and 
the NHS financing system—both of which would expire that same year—into a single 
system aimed at attaining long-term financial sustainability, especially regarding NHS 
expenditures.  Overall, this agreement meant that regional expenditures, including those 
                                               
114 Extremadura Decree 311/2007 regulates the content, organisation and functioning of the Registry for 
Early Expression of Wills (Consejería de Sanidad y Dependencia 2007d).   
115 This new regional financial agreement was applied only to the ordinary financing regime.  The CPFF 
also made agreements on 6 March 2003 regarding borrowing and indebtedness of the regions after the 
budgetary stability legislation of 1 January 2003 (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera 2003a), and 
subsequently on 10 April 2003 regarding the request and submission of information to the MOF and the 
CPFF for the development of the functions concerning budgetary stability (Consejo de Política Fiscal y 
Financiera 2003b). 
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for health care, would represent 45 per cent of total public expenditures.  It also meant 
the consolidation of financial flows for the NHS, where regional health financing was 
obtained through a combination of regional and national taxes and an 
intergovernmental block grant from the central government.   
Prior to this period, the regions experienced incremental annual budgeting for 
health services and there was no specified ceiling on expenditures.  Regions could, and 
often did, incur deficits, shifting them to later budget periods (historical debt) until they 
were assumed after tough negotiations by the central government.116  Now, with Law 
21/2001, the regions would be completely responsible for funding its health budget; 
health funding lost its previous earmarking by becoming integrated within the general 
intergovernmental grant allocated to the regional government, which had the final 
decision-making power over the allocation of funds to the health sector and other 
sectors.  Each region had its own budgeting process.  The only condition established in 
the new agreement was a minimum allocation for expenditures on health services for 
each region, based on 1999 expenditures adjusted for health needs.117   
Additionally, the 2001 financing agreement also established a new resource 
allocation formula for calculating the intergovernmental block grant for the regions in 
the “ordinary” financing regime (called the Sufficiency Fund): 75 per cent based on the 
size of the population, 24.5 per cent on the size of the population over 65 years old, and 
0.5 per cent for insularity.  Notably, by considering the higher cost for the elderly, the 
allocation formula for regional financing began to be based on the population’s health 
needs.   
Moreover, the 2001 financing agreement increased fiscal autonomy by granting 
new taxing powers to the regions.  It substantially redesigned the taxation system, 
giving the regions authority over the following taxes originating in their territories: (i) 
100 per cent of gifts and inheritance tax, estates and estate transfer tax,118 gaming tax, 
electricity tax and special taxes on specific means of transport as well as alcoholic 
beverages; (ii) 35 per cent of personal income tax;119 (iii) 35 per cent of Value-Added 
Tax (VAT);120 and (iv) 40 per cent of beer tax, intermediate product tax, alcohol and 
                                               
116 The regions usually relied on the argument that the financial resource allocation mechanism was 
flawed.   
117 The regions easily met this amount because the minimum was so low and because levels of health 
spending were increasing each year.   
118 These taxes are based on the location of the particular property. 
119 This tax is based on the residence of the taxpayer. 
120 This tax is based on the place of consumption. 
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alcoholic beverage tax, hydrocarbon taxes and tobacco tax.  In some cases, the regions 
were also given the authority to modify the taxes.  Madrid, for example, was the first 
region in Spain to implement the “Penny for Health” (Céntimo Sanitario) policy, which 
established a 1.7 euro cent per litre tax on petrol and diesel from August 2002 (Cosme 
2014).121 
In practice, as shown by Blanco (2008) for the period 2003–2005, this new 
financing agreement meant either a loss or an increase in the proportion of financing 
budgeted for health as a share of the general regional budget.  On one hand, for 
example, Extremadura experienced a moderate and steady increase in its health budget 
as a percentage of its general budget, growing from 27.92 per cent in 2003 to 28.70 per 
cent in 2004 and 29.82 per cent in 2005.  On the other hand, Madrid experienced a 
sharp decrease in this percentage, falling from 36.51 per cent in 2003 to 33.13 per cent 
in 2004 and then again to 31.62 per cent in 2005.  Still, by the end of 2005, Madrid was 
allocating a higher proportion of its general budget to health than Extremadura was.  
Appendix G holds health expenditure and population coverage data for Spain, 
Extremadura and Madrid.   
4.4.4.  Human Resources 
Adequate planning for human resources is fundamental to ensure quality health care, 
but there was virtually a regulatory vacuum regarding specific legislation on health 
professions in Spain until this period.  Finally, starting in 2003, the central government 
passed three major laws concerning health professions and personnel.  The first, Law 
44/2003 on the Regulation of Health Professions (Ordenación de las Profesiones 
Sanitarias), covered training in both undergraduate and graduate education programs 
with regard to health care knowledge, skills and attitudes, as well as professional 
associations (Jefatura del Estado 2003c).  This law aimed to equip the health system 
with a legal framework that would enable the greater integration of professionals into 
the health service, guarantee that all health professionals meet the skill and knowledge 
levels required to perform their health care functions, and facilitate their collaboration 
to improve the quality of care.  To achieve this, it sought to refine the general norms, 
rights and duties of health professionals as well as the principles of education and 
training systems and the linkages between training and employment in the public NHS.  
                                               
121 By 2014, thirteen regions eventually exercised their power to establish this same policy in their 
regions, but at varying rates (which eventually were capped at 4.8 euro-cents/liter by the central 
government).  Extremadura did not implement this tax until January 2011 (Soriano 2015).   
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In particular, Law 44/2003 regulated the registration and licensing of health 
professionals in Spain, accrediting university degree programs through a corporate 
professional organisation recognised by the Spanish General Public Administration 
(Administración General del Estado).  This law also created two levels of university 
degrees: a high-level degree, called licenciado, for medical doctors, and a mid-level 
degree, or diplomado, for technical graduates such as nurses.  Not only did health 
professionals have to graduate from an accredited, health care-related university degree 
programme, but per Law 44/2003 they also had to pursue continuing education and 
training to maintain their professional competencies and remain up to date with 
constantly advancing medical research.  This type of professional re-accreditation 
would be overseen by the health centre and hospital managers122 in each region.  To 
ensure public accountability, Law 44/2003 also stipulated that public registries of 
accredited health professionals would be maintained continuously.  Furthermore, in its 
Second Transitory Provision, it gave the regions four years to implement a system of 
professional development.   
Building on this measure, Law 55/2003 established the long-awaited 
Framework Statute for Statutory Health Personnel (Estatuto marco del personal 
estatutario de los servicios de salud) and the rights of these workers (Jefatura del 
Estado 2003a).  It identified three categories of staff: physicians, non-physician health 
care personnel, and non-health care personnel in the centres and institutions of the 
NHS.  Moreover, it established special regulations for these three personnel categories 
and sought to enhance employee motivation through an incentive system, to 
decentralize the employment selection process and career development responsibilities, 
and to link other employment issues such as salaries, and staffing needs to the 
development of statutory health personnel education and training programs (Jefatura 
del Estado 2003a).  Law 55/2003 created the Commission of Human Resources 
(Comisión de Recursos Humanos) of the NHS, charged with carrying out planning 
activities, designing training programs and modernizing human resources (Article 10).  
It stipulated that the selection of permanent (fixed) statutory personnel will take place 
periodically within each health service, and defined a process for public competition 
and procedures that would ensure fair selection based on merit and ability (Article 30).  
It also established similar principles for internal promotion to be implemented by the 
                                               
122 Hospital managers were in a political position in the sense that they were often changed with non-
incumbent, incoming governments (Novinskey, Interview no. 9). 
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corresponding public administration (Art.  34).  Furthermore, Law 55/2003 stipulates 
disciplinary measures (Chapter XII) for statutory personnel, distinguishing very 
serious, serious, and minor offenses, on which the regions could elaborate further 
(Article 72.5), and their corresponding sanctions, as well as disciplinary procedures and 
provisional measures (Articles 74 and 75).   
The third piece of important national legislation during this period was Royal 
Decree 450/2005, which regulated the development of nursing specialties (Ministerio 
de la Presidencia 2005).  This decree added five new specialties to the previously 
defined specialties of mental health and midwifery: geriatrics, occupational health, 
medical-surgical care, paediatrics, and family and community care (Article 2, c-g).  It 
also established a residency programme for nursing specialties modelled on the MIR, 
including the formation of national councils for each speciality.  This decree and related 
legislation received an abundance of support from stakeholders, including the Nursing 
Specialties Board, the Board for Official Nursing Associations, the NHS’s Commission 
for Human Resources, and trade unions (including Sindicato de Enfermería, Sindicato 
Unión General de Trabajadores and Comisiones Obreras).    
In addition, in June 2004, the Council for NHS Human Resources (Comisión de 
Recursos Humanos del Sistema Nacional de Salud) was established under the 
leadership of the Minister of Health and Consumer Affairs.  This is an advisory body 
composed of representatives from the RHMs as well as from different ministries of the 
Spanish General Public Administration.  In 2006, the central government also 
promulgated the 2006 Quality Health Plan, within which one of twelve strategies was 
to take measures to match human resources to health service needs.  Finally, the 
Council for NHS Human Resources established on general guidelines for the 
professional career systems of the regional RHSs through an agreement on 19 April 
2006 (Dirección General de Recursos Humanos y Servicios Económico-
Presupuestarios 2007; Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2006a).   
The regions greatly exercised their new decision-making authority over human 
resources in the health sector during this period.  While, payment mechanisms for 
human resource professionals in Spain did not change much at the national level after 
the “second wave” of health system devolution during the period of study, the regions 
began experimenting with different methods of remuneration and financial incentives.  
This included pay-for-performance mechanisms to motivate doctors and other health 
professionals to improve their quality of care (Eirea Eiras and Ortún Rubio 2012); 
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however, it appears that these mechanisms were not particularly effective (García-
Armesto et al. 2010).   
One of the most important uses of new regional powers over human resources 
for health involved compliance with the Second Transitory Provision of Law 44/2003, 
which required the regions to implement a career and professional development system 
for their health personnel.  Extremadura negotiated an agreement between its RHS and 
trade unions in October 2005 regarding professional career and development (Dirección 
General de Trabajo 2005).  This agreement, among other things, established an 
incentive framework of four consecutive levels of professional development, based on a 
minimum number of years of experience for each level (5, 14, 22, and 28, respectively) 
and an evaluation.  Madrid also complied with the Second Transitory Provision of Law 
44/2003, passing several agreements on the career development of health personnel.  
Moreover, in October 2004, Madrid negotiated an incentives programme to reduce its 
surgery waiting list (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo and Organizaciones Sindicales 
2004) and partially fulfil its April 2004 agreement to reduce waiting times to no more 
than 30 days (Consejo de Gobierno 2004b).   
Since the 2001 health system devolution, Extremadura has made great efforts to 
improve staff quality and quantity at its health care institutions.  By 2005, it managed to 
employ an additional 1,700 health and non-health professionals in these institutions 
(Informes, Estudios e Investigación 2007, 30).  For primary care services, this staffing 
increase and the introduction of new technologies (such as electronic prescriptions) 
have enabled doctors to reduce their patient quotas and dedicate more time to each 
patient.  For speciality care, the Extremadura RHM managed an increase in medical 
specialists by opening up more places in the Faculty of Medicine and increasing the 
number of hospitals and health centres with accreditation for training medical 
specialists via the MIR.  It also began enlisting specialists from other EU countries and 
Latin America into its organisation.  Furthermore, Extremadura made great advances in 
continuous education for health professionals.  With survey input from its employees as 
well as from scientific societies, professional associations and trade unions, 
Extremadura’s School for the Study of Health Sciences (Escuela de Estudios de 
Ciencias de la Salud) developed and implemented 178 continuous education activities 
in 2005 (Informes, Estudios e Investigación 2007).123  These included review programs 
                                               
123 These activities served 4,315 students and delivered 4,414 lecture hours.   
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for specific skills in primary care as well as scholarships for training visits to other 
health centres.   
Madrid legislated several pieces of minor regulation regarding human resources 
for health care.  Continuing education and training for health personnel in Madrid were 
carried out by the Laín Entralgo Agency (Agencia Laín Entralgo), according to the 
guidelines set out in Law 44/2003 and following Madrid’s 2005 Education Plan for 
Health Professionals.  Among other things, this plan determined education and training 
needs based on the strategic objectives of each general directorate and management 
unit, developed criteria on the distribution of funding between health centres and 
achieved synergies through collaborative agreements between stakeholders.  One 
innovative aspect of the plan was the coverage of gender violence in its training 
programs.  Appendix H details Extremadura and Madrid’s human resource regulations 
during this period. 
4.4.5.  Governance and Stewardship Rules 
After the 2001 health system devolution, in the areas of governance and stewardship 
rules, the central government continued to set broad accountability mechanisms for the 
entire NHS, which the regions could then enhance if they wished.124  After devolution, 
the central government passed two major laws that improved accountability 
mechanisms in the NHS: Law 41/2002 on Patient Freedom, Rights and Duties on 
Medical Information and Records (la autonomía del paciente y de derechos y 
obligaciones en materia de información y documentación clínica), and 2003 LCQ 
(Jefatura del Estado 2002; 2003b).  Building on the GHL, Law 41/2002 refined 
regulation on the rights and duties of patients, users and professionals, as well as public 
and private health centres and services in the area of patient autonomy and clinical 
information and documentation.  In particular, it regulated the right to health 
information, privacy, respect for patient freedom (including the right to deny 
treatment), the integration of, use of and access to information from clinical history 
documents, the patient’s right to be discharged and the procedure for reporting 
discharges.  In terms of accountability, this new law laid out more precisely the rights 
                                               
124 Bankauskaite and Novinskey (2010) evaluated the MOH’s role as a steward of the Spanish NHS, 
following the framework of Travis et al. (2003).  They found that, overall, the MOH fulfils its role as a 
steward of the health system in the areas of generating intelligence and formulating a strategic policy 
framework; however, it lacks appropriate authority to efficiently coordinate the health system and ensure 
the regions implement policies that are aligned with national NHS objectives (Novinskey, Interview no. 
20).      
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of patients and users of the NHS and the criteria to which the system would be required 
to conform.  As for coherence of medical records across the NHS, the law established 
the basic and minimum content of all medical records in the country and a method of 
coordinating them across all regions (Observatorio del SNS 2005 Anexo II: Normativa; 
Durán, Lara, and van Waveren 2006).  In addition, the 2003 LCQ fostered user and 
citizen participation in the NHS, especially by creating the NHS Council for Social 
Participation (Consejo de Participación Social del Sistema Nacional de Salud), 
regulated by the MOH.  This Council’s main role was to provide a permanent channel 
of communication between health sector authorities, professional and scientific 
societies, trade unions, businesses and users.  As explained in more detail above in the 
section on Service Organisation, the LCQ established three new means of public 
participation in the NHS: an Advisory Committee, an Open Health Forum and a Virtual 
Forum.  Furthermore, since 2004, the MOH has used a Barometer of Users’ 
Satisfaction (Barómetro Sanitario) to gauge patients’ satisfaction with various aspects 
of the health system (Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad 2012).   
The 2001 devolution gave the regions the right to expand the central 
government’s legislation on accountability within the NHS.  The regions took such 
action at different times and in different ways.  For example, all regions, except Murcia, 
mandate patient rights to make claims and complaints in their regional health planning 
laws (Ordinación Sanitaria).  Moreover, Article 12.3 of Law 41/2002 obliged all RHSs 
to display guides on complaints in health centres and services as well as establish an 
adequate system for exercising patient freedom and rights.  Some RHSs have created 
specific units for protecting and providing information on patient rights, called Patient 
Support Services (Servicios de Atención al Paciente) or User Complaint Units 
(Unidades de Atención al Usuario).  At the same time, some regions have also created 
an ombudsman position.   
In particular, Extremadura legislated the right to use complaint and suggestion 
procedures in Article 11.1n of its 10/2001 Health Care Law and created a patient 
ombudsman position in Article 16 of the same law (Presidencia de la Junta de 
Extremadura 2001b).125  Subsequently, Extremadura passed Decree 4/2003, which 
developed the ombudsman’s legal status, structure and (independent and autonomous) 
                                               
125 For more information about the Ombudsman for Patients in Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Castile-La 
Mancha, Galicia and La Rioja, see Table 4 of Annex II of the Annual NHS Report (Observatorio del 
SNS 2005).  Section 2.5 of this same report includes information on the effective guarantee of citizen 
rights regarding the NHS for the remaining regions.   
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functions, including publishing an annual record of the office’s activities (Consejería de 
Sanidad y Consumo 2003a).126   
In Title IV of its Health Planning Law 12/2001, Madrid stipulated the rights and 
duties of citizens with regard to the NHS, expanding those regulated by the GHL to 
include, for example, the right to receive health care benefits within certain known 
waiting times, the right for patients to give “advance care directives” regarding their 
treatment, the right to access information from their medical records, and the creation 
of a patient ombudsman (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 2001b).  In addition, 
Madrid’s Decree 10/2004 guaranteed the ombudsman’s independence and autonomy 
(Consejo de Gobierno 2004a).  Following Decree 21/2002, which regulated all 
customer services for its citizens, Madrid legislated Order 605/2003, which developed 
the customer service platform for the health sector.  This order contained regulations 
for the System for Handling Suggestions, Complaints and Claims for the Unique Health 
Network for Public Utilisation and created the Commission for the Monitoring and 
Evaluation of Suggestions, Complaints and Claims under the RHM (Consejería de 
Presidencia 2002; Consejería de Presidencia and Consejería de Sanidad 2003).  
Regulations on accountability and public participation in Extremadura and Madrid are 
presented in Appendix I.   
4.4.6.  Health System Decision-Space Map, as of 2006 
Table 4.8 below presents the health system decision-space map for Madrid and 
Extremadura as of 2006.   
 
                                               
126 The Order of 26 November 2003 also regulates the handling of complaints and suggestions regarding 
health care activities (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2003c).   
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Table 4.8.  Health System Decision-Space Map for Madrid and Extremadura, as of 2006 
Functional Areas Range of Choice 
Key Functions Narrow Moderate Wide 
Service Organisation 
Contracts with private 
health care services 
  
Regions may decide to contract with private 
services to provide care for public system 
Hospital autonomy   Defined by regions 
Targeting service 
delivery 
Free access to public health 
services based on need, 1986 GHL  
  
Regulation and Planning 
Policy formulation 
 
Defined by the MOH; regions can expand the definition of 
policies defined by the MOH and can make new policies in 
areas not covered by it 
 
Norms and standards 
 
Defined by the MOH; regions can expand health care 
benefits with their own financing 
 
Prescription drug 
planning 
Defined by the central 
governmenta 
  
Drugs and supplies 
(rationing) 
  No limits by the central government 
Infrastructure planning   No limits by the central government 
Health information 
systems design  
Defined by the MOH in collaboration with the CISNS, 
which includes regional health ministers (Law 14/1986 GHL 
and Law 16/2003 LCQ) 
 
Financing 
Insurance schemes NHS-style public health system, 
1986 GHLb 
  
Payment mechanisms  
 
Public health care provider payment mechanisms managed 
by central government; regions can add financial and non-
financial incentives 
 
Sources of revenue 
 
Negotiated by each region and the CPFF; no earmarking for 
health; intergovernmental transfers fund majority of regional 
health expenditures, but regions have ability to use own 
resources.   
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Functional Areas Range of Choice 
Key Functions Narrow Moderate Wide 
Financing (cont.) 
Revenue allocation 
(budgeting)   
Regions have autonomy on allocating resources 
to and within health (central government set a 
minimum expenditure on health) 
Income from fees No fees for health services, as 
defined by the central government 
  
Human Resources 
Salaries and benefits 
(permanent staff) 
Defined by the National Civil 
Service 
  
Contracts  
(non-permanent staff) 
  
Regions have the liberty to contract non-
permanent staff  
Civil Service 
 
General guidelines defined by central government with Law 
55/2003, with more specific legislation allowed in limited 
areas by the regions 
 
Education and training 
(pre-service) 
Defined by the MOH, along with 
the MOEdu  
  
Education and training 
(continuing) 
Defined by the MOH, along with 
the MOEdu 
  
Governance and Stewardship Rules 
Facility boards   Appointed by regional governments 
Territorial health 
offices 
  
Regions have autonomy over their Health 
Areas and Basic Health Zones 
Patient and user rights 
 
Defined broadly by the central government (Laws 41/2002 
and 16/2003); regions can expand and refine (but not limit) 
its definition  
 
Complaint system 
 
Defined broadly by the central government (Law 16/2003); 
regions can expand and refine (but not limit) its definition  
 
Public participation 
 
Defined broadly by the central government (Law 16/2003); 
regions can expand and refine (but not limit) its definition 
 
a From 2003, Extremadura implements central government pharmaceutical product legislation (Royal Decree 430/2003 (Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas, 2003)).  b Mutual 
funds schemes exist for public sector employees; they analysis is beyond the scope of the thesis.   
Note:  The fifteen “ordinary” financing regime (or “non-foral”) regions have the same amount of de jure decision space for each health system function; thus, the common health 
system decision-space map for Extremadura and Madrid.   
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4.5.  Discussion 
Determining the degree of discretion allowed at the regional level of government is the 
first step towards understanding the effects of health system devolution on the health 
policymaking process and subsequent health policy actions in Spain.  Following the 
modified decision-space approach and corresponding methods described in the first part 
of the analytical framework of the thesis, in this chapter, I analysed the decision space 
allowed to the regions before and after the 2001 health devolution reform.  In doing so, 
I paid attention to the ten “slow-track” regions and, in particular, Extremadura and 
Madrid.  Using mostly de jure government and documentary information along with 
secondary and tertiary data, I constructed two health system decision-space maps for 
the Extremadura and Madrid.127   
In terms of the research findings, Sections 4.2.6 and 4.4.6 present the resulting 
health system decision-space maps for Extremadura and Madrid, respectively for the 
periods before and after the 2001 health devolution reform.  The first major finding is 
that the decision-space allowed to the regions for the periods before and after the 
devolution reform varied by health system function.  Indeed, even before the 2001 
health system reform, the regions had a moderate degree of decision space for some 
health system functions; to wit, in the determination of the revenue sources and 
allocation of funds for the NHS, through their participation on the CPFF and, in 
particular, the negotiations of the multi-annual, regional and NHS financing 
agreements.  This is further evident from the health system decision-space map after the 
devolution reform, which showed that the regions had a varying amount of choice—
from narrow to wide—depending on the health system function.  In effect, they had a 
narrow degree of discretion over seven functions (including education and training of 
human resources), a moderate degree of discretion over nine functions (including 
formulating policy, and norms and standards) and a wide degree over eight functions 
(including revenue allocation).  See Table 4.9 for a health system decision-space map 
that, using arrows, shows the shift in decision space at the regional level of government 
                                               
127 Here I present the results of the systematic, de jure analysis of health system devolution with the case 
study.  However, I discuss the de facto results below for a more robust analysis.  A systematic analysis 
and decision-space mapping of the de facto results is not within the scope of this thesis.  Chapter 5 
reveals additional de facto information, primarily with information from in-depth stakeholder interviews 
and other sources. 
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from before to after the “second wave” of health system devolution for Extremadura 
and Madrid.   
Table 4.9.  Decision-Space Map Illustrating the Effects of the 2001 Health System 
Devolution Reform for Extremadura and Madrid 
Functional Areas Range of Choice  
Key Functions Narrow Moderate Wide 
Service Organisation 
Contracts with private health care 
service organizations 
*   
Hospital autonomy *   
Targeting service delivery *   
Regulation and Planning 
Policy formulation *   
Norms and standards *   
Prescription drug planning *   
Drugs and supplies (rationing) *   
Infrastructure planning *   
Health information systems design *   
Financing 
Insurance schemes *   
Payment mechanisms  *   
Sources of revenue  *  
Revenue allocation (budgeting)  *  
Income from fees *   
Human Resources 
Salaries and benefits (permanent staff) *   
Contracts (with individual, non-
permanent staff) 
*   
Civil service *   
Education and training (pre-service) *   
Education and training (continuing) *   
Governance and Stewardship Rules 
Facility boards *   
Territorial health offices *   
Public participation *   
Patient and user rights *   
Complaint system *   
 
In particular, after the reform, the central government maintained power over 
policymaking for the health system functions of (i) targeting service delivery, (ii) 
prescription drug planning, (iii) insurance schemes, (iv) income from fees and (v) most 
human resource functions (with the exceptions of contracting with non-permanent staff 
and civil service).  On the other hand, the regions gained the most discretion over 
policymaking for the functions of (i) contracting with private health service providers, 
(ii) hospital autonomy, (iii) rationing drugs and supplies, (iv) infrastructure planning, 
(v) revenue allocation, (vi) contracting with non-permanent staff, (vii) governing 
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facility boards and (viii) governing territorial health offices.  For the remaining health 
system functions, the regions gained or maintained a moderate amount of discretion.   
Comparing these results for regional decision space after the 2001 devolution 
reform in Spain with the “decision-space options” for optimal local discretion in 
Bossert and Mitchell (2010) demonstrates that the Spanish devolution reform emanated 
the optimal level of local decision space for most of the health system functions 
reviewed.  For example, for regulating and planning, they recommend that norms (and 
standards) have a moderate level of local discretion128, which is the case for Spain.  
Under financing, they suggest that both sources of revenue and revenue allocation 
should have moderate to wide local discretion, which is also true for the Spanish 
regions.  Under this same area, they recommend insurance plans be allocated low to 
moderate local discretion129, which is again the case of Spain.  Additionally, under 
human resources, they suggest that optimal discretion over civil service terms of 
employment and performance are moderate or wide at the local level.  This is the case 
for the Spanish regions, which were given moderate decision space after devolution.  
Under service organization, for hospital autonomy, they suggest an optimal level would 
be between low and moderate decision space, with greater levels of autonomy requiring 
mechanisms to balance responsiveness to local preferences with national-level goals.  
Finally, while the Spanish regions do not reflect this recommended level of local 
discretion after devolution (i.e., theirs is wide), they do have mechanisms to balance 
local and national goals (e.g. CISNS).           
Using the degree of discretion allowed for different health system functions to 
analyse devolution reform revealed several otherwise hidden and important differences 
in it; therefore, validating the analytical framework’s use of the decision-space 
approach for a more adequate and precise definition and measurement of devolution 
than an approach that analyses devolution as a single block-transfer of decision-making 
power from the central government to the regions.  Thus, this analysis provides a 
relatively strong foundation for the rest of the framework and its examination of the 
health policymaking process in Spain and determination of policy priorities at the 
regional government level.   
                                               
128 They recommend avoiding extremes, too much or too little local discretion, because they lead to 
central-level mismanagement and a lack of effective national stewardship, respectively.   
129 They suggest that most aspects of insurance plans (except maybe enrollment of beneficiaries) will 
benefit from economies of scale.  
 Defining the Decision Space for Health System Devolution in Spain 
   187 
 
Moreover, my findings confirm my two expectations for the Spanish and 
regional case studies.  First, the regions had overall narrow decision space for the 
majority of health system functions before the “second wave” of health devolution 
reform, which widened considerably for most functions during the period after the 
reform.  Second, my analysis identified only one health system decision-space map for 
both Extremadura and Madrid for each period because the analysis was mostly based 
on de jure legislation and regulations. 
From these similar de jure changes in decision space, my research also revealed 
some real effects that differed de facto for Extremadura and Madrid.  Most outstanding, 
I found that the two regions exercised their new health policymaking powers and 
responsibilities to different extents.  Overall, Extremadura produced more legislation on 
health issues and policies than Madrid did.  For example, Extremadura tended to 
expand the health care benefit package using its own financial resources and to develop 
definitions of health care rights more than Madrid did.  Additionally, when it seemed 
not to have the necessary own-source financial resources available to support its policy 
on orthoprosthesis products for senior citizens, Extremadura innovatively created a 
public-private partnership for a supplemental fund.  Alternatively, Madrid was 
conservative in its health policymaking, using its new power mostly to make 
organisational and structural reforms, perhaps, in the interest of improving the 
administrative efficiency.  Moreover, it did not expand the common health care benefit 
package or pass any health policies using its own funds.  At the same time, Madrid 
more innovatively used its tax raising abilities, for example, with the “Penny for 
Health” policy.  The de facto impact of the accountability mechanisms in place or of 
each region’s level of health care capacity on the effectiveness of the health system, 
however, could not be determined.   
These real effects are particularly interesting given Extremadura’s and Madrid’s 
social, economic and geographic differences (cf. Table 3.9).  Socially, Extremadura has 
always served less than a quarter of the population than Madrid has served (both in 
total population and population covered by the NHS); a percentage that decreased 
during the period of study, due in part to an influx of immigrants to Madrid.  For 
example, in 2001, Extremadura’s NHS covered 1,004,837 individuals and Madrid’s 
NHS covered 4,709,391 individuals, and, in 2003, they covered 1,002,666 individuals 
and 5,295,677 individuals, respectively (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and 
Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2005, 155).  Consequentially, Extremadura’s smaller 
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population means that its individuals have a greater potential of political weight than 
Madrid’s population does; which could be a motivating factor for Extremadura’s 
government to move more quickly on policy.130  Additionally, correcting for the age 
structure of their populations, in 2003, Extremadura’s dependent population (aged 65 
years and older, and under 4 years) was 5 percentage points higher than that of Madrid 
(23.9 and 18.68 per cent of their total respective populations); which usually results in 
higher expenditures on health care (ibid. 179-180).  Moreover, Extremadura’s 
population has always had a lower average socio-economic status and higher 
unemployment rate than Madrid’s population.  Correspondingly, Madrid’s income, 
productivity and tax revenues were higher than Extremadura’s were during the study 
period.  In 2003, Madrid’s public health expenditure as a percentage of its regional 
GDP, for example, was 3.56 percent, while Extremadura’s was 7.91 per cent (ibid. 49).  
At the same time, Madrid’s per capita cost for health care (870€ in 2003) was lower 
than Extremadura’s was (1,026€ in 2003)(ibid., 158); perhaps, due to its greater ability 
for economies of scale (Alesina 2003).  In terms of geography, the Community of 
Madrid is mostly a highly dense urban area, whereas Extremadura’s population is more 
rural and dispersed in comparison; the latter, which usually results greater spending on 
health services to either bring the person to the services (e.g. transport) or the services 
to the people (e.g. infrastructure).  Lastly, I would like to highlight the fact that Madrid 
is the capital of Spain, which meant that the headquarters for the activities of 
INSALUD, which managed the health care services pre-devolution, was also located in 
Madrid, giving the Madrid a proximity advantage in the design and functioning of their 
health system prior to devolution that Extremadura did not have.  As such, it would be 
hard for INSALUD decision makers not to see the conditions of, and plan for the needs 
of, heath care in Madrid when they were faced with them every day.   
These characteristic differences between Extremadura and Madrid—besides 
being a major factor for advocating devolution in the first place—might also help to 
explain the overall differences in Extremadura and Madrid’s exercise of their newly 
granted decision space de facto.  One could hypothesise that Madrid’s health service 
needs were more attended to by INSALUD prior to devolution than Extremadura’s 
were; thereby, upon receiving responsibility over these competencies, Extremadura 
needed to adapt its health service more than Madrid did to fit its local reality.  On the 
                                               
130 By bringing health care closer to the people in the territory, there is a certain political dependence at 
the regional level (Novinskey, Interview no. 01).  
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one hand, one Extremadura stakeholder suggested that health care devolution meant 
that they could use local businesses and vendors to support improvements in their 
health services (instead of those coming from Madrid), which also had the indirect 
benefits of increasing the region’s public economy and social capital (and pride) 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 01).  Madrid, on the other hand, assumingly still had the 
same pool of local business and vendors to pull from.  Additionally, it is well-known 
that many former-INSALUD and MOH employees working on health services before 
devolution found jobs with Madrid’s new administration after it (Novinskey, Interview 
no. 02, 05, 18, 24 and 39).  One could suggest, then, that Madrid had less potential need 
for improving its situation and, in particular, for looking for innovative, new solutions 
(i.e., the solutions they had were already satisfactorily addressing their health care 
problems).  This could have also been a contributing factor to Madrid’s de facto lack of 
exercising its discretion as well as for the few innovative policies they produced during 
the study period (e.g. fewer fresh faces and ideas).   
Political values may also play a part with Extremadura focusing their efforts on 
social programs, including health care, and Madrid acting more conservatively with 
expenditures, including those on health care.  Indeed, during the study period, 
Extremadura was governed by the PSOE, which values a free, egalitarian society, with 
solidarity and peace for the progress of people, especially those of the working class 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español 2017).  At the same time, Madrid was governed by 
the PP, which supports a platform of freedom for all and bringing Spain and the 
Spanish to ever higher heights of prosperity (Partido Popular 2017).  These hypotheses, 
however, are for future research. 
Looking forward, the de jure health system decision-space maps from this 
chapter will become even more useful in the following chapters as they provide a 
foundation for further analysis of our regional case studies.  More specifically, together 
with the intergovernmental policy network approach for analysing health policymaking 
process in politically decentralized countries, the health system decision-space 
approach should help to anticipate health policy priorities after devolution at the 
regional level of government.  Furthermore, just the application of the decision-space 
approach as a means of defining and measuring health system devolution (and, more 
generally, decentralization) will also be useful for future comparative analyses at the 
national and/or regional level in Spain, although such work lies well beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
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5.  Intergovernmental Policy Networks for a Devolved Health System 
In the previous chapter, I applied the first part of the analytical framework of the 
thesis—the decision-space approach—to the “second wave” of health devolution 
reform in Spain, focusing on the regional cases of Extremadura and Madrid.  In this 
chapter, I apply the second part of the framework—namely, the intergovernmental 
policy network approach (combined with rational choice institutionalism)—to the same 
case studies to examine the structure and agency of the health policymaking process 
before and after the reform.  I first describe the structure of the intergovernmental 
policy networks, according to the theory of intergovernmental policy networks as 
institutions.  Next, I pair this structural approach with the rational choice institutionalist 
model of actor behaviour, validating the appropriateness of my classification of the 
actor groups involved in health sector policymaking in Spain through a stakeholder 
analysis, using primary qualitative interview data.  Then, I examine various measures to 
establish the positions of the main actor groups within each of the intergovernmental 
policy networks in Spain.  To do this, I adapt and apply Blom-Hansen’s (1999) 
methodology for establishing the positions of these institutional actors on the national 
and subnational levels, as discussed in the analytical framework.  Finally, I discuss the 
resulting power-sharing situation on the trade-off triangles for intergovernmental health 
policymaking at both the national and subnational levels of government before and 
after devolution.   
In terms of expectations, for the period before the health devolution reform and 
with respect to the regional case studies, I anticipate this analysis to find all the power 
for health services and policies concentrated in the hands of the national-level 
expenditure advocates and guardians, with little influence from the topocrats.  
However, for the period after the health devolution reform, I expect this power to have 
shifted considerably to the subnational health policymaking environment, producing a 
relationship of shared responsibility between the central and regional governments 
within their respective health policymaking environments.  In this regard, I expect to 
find that the national-level expenditure advocates have lost much of their power to both 
the national-level expenditure guardians and the topocrats within the national health 
policymaking environment, and in equal amounts to the subnational expenditure 
advocates and guardians within the subnational health policymaking environments for 
both Extremadura and Madrid.  Similarly, I expect that the health-sector kentrocrats 
will have difficulty exercising influence over the subnational health policymaking 
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environment and that they (and the national expenditure advocates) might find 
themselves nearly organised out of politics. 
5.1.  Intergovernmental Health Policy Networks in Spain 
To understand intergovernmental policymaking, it is imperative to define its structure 
and agency.  For this reason, in this section, I first describe the structure of 
policymaking in the Spanish case study.  Next, I define the structure of 
intergovernmental policy networks as institutions, in order to determine the space 
within which the actors have to manoeuvre.  Then, I look at actors and their behaviour 
as represented by the rational choice institutionalist model and its application to the 
case study, for which I validate the use of the particular actor groups.  For additional 
information on the intergovernmental policy network approach and rational choice 
institutionalist model for actor behaviour, please see Chapter 3.  Finally, I present a 
matrix of the institutional architecture of intergovernmental health policymaking in 
Spain, which delimits the measures for establishing the positions of the different actor 
groups in both the national and subnational health policy networks.  
5.1.1.  Structure: Intergovernmental Policy Networks as Institutions  
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 describes its state model, called the Autonomous 
State (Estado Autonómico or Estado de las Autonomías), as having characteristics of 
both a federal and a unitary state.  The Autonomous State resembles a federal state in 
that the autonomous communities have legislative capacity over the policy areas within 
their competencies; however, it is similar to a unitary state in that it is composed of 
only one sovereign people.  Ultimately, the autonomous communities do not hold 
sovereignty over the people in their territories; in fact, all three levels of subnational 
government in Spain—autonomous communities, provinces and municipalities—can 
be created or abolished unilaterally by the central government without formal 
agreement by the affected bodies.  In reality, however, such an event is highly unlikely 
because the central government depends on its subnational governments—particularly, 
the autonomous communities (or “regions”)—for political support, information, 
expertise, and policy implementation.  Indeed, when the financial viability of the 
regions came into question in 2004, to assure them that the central government would 
take care of them, the President of the Generalitat of the Catalan Parliament, Pasqual 
Maragall, said “it has become clear that the Autonomous Communities are a part of the 
State from a legal and political point of view” (El País 2004) More recently, the regions 
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in Spain have expanded their competencies considerably and some have tried to expand 
their sovereignty.131  In any case, it is technically appropriate to categorise the Spanish 
case as being a politically decentralized or devolved unitary state.   
As described above, the intergovernmental relations in the Spanish case 
demonstrate the need to look at the underpinnings of formal institutions, using the 
concept of informal policy networks to understand how central and regional 
government actors interact with each other in order to formulate and implement 
policies.  This thesis defines policy networks as “institutions”, conceptualises them as 
rules governing actions, and further describes them according to their level of cohesion 
(from tight-knit policy communities to more loosely-coupled issue networks).  In this 
sense, rules are defined as “prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of 
participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships”(Ostrom 1986, 5).  Thus, 
the rules shed light on the boundaries that surround actors in an intergovernmental 
policy network and that place limits on their actions (though not necessarily on their 
behaviour132).  These rules are not automatically formal laws, because they are not 
necessarily backed by enforcement power; rather, they are behaviours that are 
commonly accepted and practiced by all actors.  Ostrom (1986, 17) presented a “set of 
necessary variables for the construction of formal decision models where outcomes are 
dependent on the acts of more than a single individual”133, which were later refined by 
Blom-Hansen (1999, p.  239), as illustrated in Table 5.1.     
  
                                               
131 For example, in June 2008, the Basque Parliament called a consultative referendum on independence 
(“the right to decide about the Basque people”).  It was blocked by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 
September 2008.  The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) filed an appeal on this ruling with the European 
Court of Human Rights, which ruled against the appeal in February 2010.  In January 2013, the Catalan 
Parliament adopted a Declaration for Catalan Sovereignty (Declaració de sobirania), which was 
provisionally suspended in May 2013 and declared null and unconstitutional in March 2014 by the 
Spanish Constitutional Court.  In April 2014, the Spanish Congress also dismissed the Catalan 
Parliament’s request to hold a referendum for independence (self-determination).  The Catalan 
Government re-branded the vote as a “process of citizen participation” in October 2014, which was also 
provisionally suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court.  However, the Catalan Government defied 
the suspension and held the referendum in November 2014, in which some 80 per cent of the nearly 2.3 
million (only 40 per cent of eligible voters) who voted also backed secession.  Nota Bene: These actions 
took place after the period of study of the thesis. 
132 “Viewing rules as directly affecting the structure of a situation, rather than as directly producing 
behavior, is a subtle but extremely important distinction” (Ostrom 1986, 7).   
133 Indeed, it is not possible to generate any prediction about actor behaviour in an interdependent 
situation without these rules and their relation together in a coherent structure; thus creating what Ostrom 
(1986) refers to as an action situation. 
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Table 5.1.  Intergovernmental Policy Networks as Institutions 
 Intergovernmental Policy Networks 
Institutional rules Policy Communities Issue Networks 
1.  Position of actors Negotiators 
Rulers and pressure 
groups 
2.  Boundary of the 
institution 
Includes only government 
and representatives of 
local governments 
Government and various 
types of interest 
organisations 
3.  Decision-making 
procedure 
Unanimity Consultation 
4.  Scope of decisions 
Policy formulation and 
implementation 
Policy formulation 
5.  Pay-off rules 
Influence and 
responsibility 
Influence 
Source: Blom-Hansen (1999, 239) 
Both before and after the 2001 health system devolution, the intergovernmental 
policy network in the national policymaking environment in Spain performed more like 
a policy community than an issue network.  For example, one very distinguished, key 
stakeholder described the agreement to devolve health care competencies to the 10 
slow-tracked regions as negotiations134, which the MOF carried out with a political 
game strategy.  Being of the Popular Party Administration, the MOF decided,  
First, to agree with the Socialist [Autonomous Communities], instead of 
with [its] own party… and [of those] first with the Communities who did 
not agree on the previous financing agreement, namely, Castile-La 
Mancha and Extremadura.135  Then, the rest came one by one, little by 
little.  [Finally, it] extended agreements to [the administration] party’s 
Autonomous Communities…Madrid did not have a problem 
negotiating136…[but] some of the smaller Autonomous Communities137, 
like Asturias, were not happy, and they made their declarations against 
the negotiations… but after two days, it was over because the new system 
really was convenient for them (Novinskey, Interview no. 41).138  
In addition, this stakeholder also revealed that part of the MOF’s strategy was to 
“complement budget differences with additional specific concessions for the first 
Socialist Autonomous Communities that agreed (e.g. a special plan for developing 
                                               
134 This negotiation was particularly complicated because it was two pronged, having to do with both 
negotiating a new regional financing agreement and negotiating the transfer of health care competencies 
to the 10 slow-tracked regions.   
135 See page 149 for more detail.  
136 Madrid understood that there had to be a redistribution of funds in the system (Novinskey, Interview 
no. 41). 
137 Those with little room to maneuver and small budgets.  
138 Asturias was the only region to hold strikes after the health system devolution in July 2002.  It did so 
to obtain what they called their “White Book”, which diagnosed the health service and identified its 
needs (Novinskey, Interview no. 36).  
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Castile-La Mancha’s central hospital of Ciudad Real)139” (Novinskey, Interview no. 
41).  Once most of the agreements were negotiated, it was easy for the Senate to go 
ahead and pass this legislation with an absolute majority.   
5.1.2.  Actors and Their Behaviour: A Model of Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Policy networks, however, have been largely considered a descriptive concept (see 
Chapter 2).  To make the analysis more explanatory, as described in Chapter 3, I 
complement this policy network model with an actor behaviour model based on the 
principles and assumptions of rational choice institutionalism.  For the 
intergovernmental health policy network within the national policymaking environment 
(or in the “national health policy network”), I apply a modified version of Blom-
Hansen’s (1999) actor behaviour model (which he applied in Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark) to Spanish case study, during the periods before and after 2001.  This model 
conceptualises three actor groups—expenditure advocates, expenditure guardians and 
topocrats—and their relationships within a triangle-shaped policy network, wherein 
their interactions and strategies regarding health policy form a game situation in which 
each player rationally pursues its own self-interest.  When making national health 
policies, expenditure advocates promote and defend national health system objectives, 
expenditure guardians promote and defend macroeconomic control and topocrats 
promote and defend subnational autonomy.140  Figure 5.1 illustrates intergovernmental 
health policymaking at the national level, in terms of the positions and goals of the 
three actor groups, their example membership in Spain, and the trade-offs between their 
often-competing goals.   
                                               
139 Extremadura also received concessions regarding its Zafra Hospital (Novinskey, Interview no. 41).  
140 As a whole, one stakeholder said he thought that “the government, in spite of having little sector 
competencies, has to guarantee the principle of constitutional equality” (Novinskey, Interview no.37). 
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Figure 5.1.  Trade-offs in Intergovernmental Health Policymaking at the National Level 
  
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Blom-Hansen (1999) 
Building on Blom-Hansen’s idea of intergovernmental policy networks at the 
national level, I apply my own model for analysing intergovernmental health 
policymaking at the subnational level (or in the “subnational health policy network”) to 
the Spanish case study for the period following the “second wave” of health system 
devolution.  Figure 5.2 illustrates intergovernmental health policymaking at the 
subnational level, with the respective actor positions and goals, example membership in 
Spain, and the trade-offs between their often-competing goals.  The same rational 
choice institutionalism assumptions specified for the intergovernmental health policy 
network within the national policymaking environment also apply to the subnational 
health policy network.   
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Figure 5.2.  Trade-offs in Intergovernmental Health Policymaking at the Subnational 
Level  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
5.1.2.1. Validation of Actors for the Case Study: To validate the appropriateness 
of the main actor groups in my analytical framework for the case of Spain, I asked key 
stakeholders to identify the main actors before and after the 2001 devolution of health 
services.141  For the period before the 2001 devolution, 94 per cent of stakeholders 
identified the MOH and 22 per cent identified INSALUD as a main actor group.  In 
addition, 72 per cent of those interviewed identified the regions and 44 per cent named 
the RMHs as a main actor group, while 61 per cent considered the MOF a main actor.  
No more than 22 per cent of respondents identified the MOPA, the regional ministries 
of finance, or the regional presidents as main actor groups; other actor groups identified 
by one or two respondents each were the President of Spain, the MOL, and citizens.  
                                               
141 For the period prior to the 2001 reform, I asked 18 of 27 key stakeholder interviewees (those qualified 
to answer for this period), “Who are the main actor groups involved in the decision-making process for 
health policy?”  Four of the interviewees represented the views of Extremadura, three represented 
Madrid, four represented the Ministry of Economy and Treasury, and seven represented the Ministry of 
Health.  For the post-reform period, I asked 11 interviewees, “Are these actor groups different from those 
involved in the decision-making process for health policy before decentralization?  Two of these 
interviewees represented Extremadura, four represented Madrid, two represented the Ministry of 
Economy and Treasury, and three represented the Ministry of Health.  Nota Bene: One (out of 28) key 
stakeholder declined to answer some of my interview questions.  
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Responses were generally comparable across all types of stakeholders interviewed.  
Figure 5.3 is a pie chart representing the total responses for the top actor groups within 
the national policymaking environment for the health sector before 2001 (e.g. the 
MOH—including responses for INSALUD—represents 36 per cent of the total 
responses).  As a result, we can see that, overall, the top three institutional actors in 
health policy in Spain were the MOH, regional actors and the MOF (in that order).    
Figure 5.3.  The Main Health Policy Actor Groups in the National Policymaking 
Environment in Spain, Before 2001 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from stakeholders interviewed.  
For the period after the 2001 devolution, 91 per cent of all stakeholders 
regarded the regions (in general) as a main actor group, with the RMHs were cited 
specifically by 36 per cent of respondents.  In addition, the MOH was cited by 64 per 
cent and the MOF by 36 per cent of respondents.  Other actor groups identified by one 
respondent each were the president of Spain, the MOL and citizens.  Again, all types of 
stakeholders had comparable views.  Figure 5.4 illustrates the percentages of total 
responses for the top actor groups within the national policymaking environment for 
the health sector after 2001 (e.g., the MOH represents 32 per cent of the total 
responses).  As a result, the top three institutional actors in health policy in Spain are 
the same after the devolution reform as they were before it; though, their order has 
changed to regional actor first and then the MOH and MOF.     
Regional 
actors 
32%
MOH 36%
MOF
23%
MOPA
9%
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Figure 5.4.  The Main Health Policy Actor Groups in the National Policymaking 
Environment in Spain, After 2001  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from stakeholders interviewed.  
Overall, the responses received from these stakeholders are consistent with the 
descriptions of the main actor groups for health policy proposed for the national 
policymaking environment in the analytical framework.  Responding to a question 
regarding changes in main protagonists from before to after the 2001 health system 
devolution, a regional health minister (from a different region than Extremadura or 
Madrid) stated,  
The fundamental element of negotiation on the health system before 
devolution was in Madrid, it was INSALUD…and, after the 2000 
elections, when they took the decision to transfer [health care 
competencies to the Autonomous Communities], it changed immediately 
and the different actors [of the system] began to look more toward the 
Autonomous Communities as the main interlocutor” (Novinskey, 
Interview no. 36). 
Speaking specifically to the negotiations of the 2001 health system devolution, another 
key stakeholder responded, “The actors were the giants: the political leaders of the 
MOH, MOF, MOPA as well as those from the Autonomous Communities” 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 26).  In addition, a regional stakeholder from Extremadura 
confirmed that at the regional level, those who negotiated the health transfers directly 
with the central government were not from the regional health ministry, stating, “the 
negotiators of the autonomous community were skilled enough to manage a deal with 
adequate funding for health within a global financing framework” (Novinskey, 
Interview no. 07).  The MOH (and INSALUD) can be considered expenditure 
advocates, the regions fulfil the function of topocrats, and the MOF (along with, but to 
Regions
50%
MOH
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MOF 
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a lesser extent, the MOPA and the president of Spain) are expenditure guardians.  
Interestingly, all of these actor groups were inherent in the following excerpt from a top 
MOF official involved negotiating the 2001 health system devolution reform, “because 
there was a big negotiation problem between the State and the Regions to receive the 
health care competencies [and] it was a political discussion with economic content.  
[The Minister of Finance] worked in parallel with the MOH to make this transfer 
happen” (Novinskey, Interview no. 41).  In addition, he added,  
Because the regional and health-specific financing agreements were due 
to be merged to create one financing regime… with a system that was no 
longer unbalanced…without any ear-marked or conditional financing for 
the Autonomous Communities…This was the big step and this is the 
reason that MOF was such a key protagonist in this devolution.  This 
would have been very difficult for the MOPA and the MOH to do 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 41).   
Of his relationship with the regions, a top MOH official involved in the 2001 
devolution negotiations noted,  
My relationship with the Regional Ministers of Health was terrible 
because they told me what they wanted to do in their Autonomous 
Communities and I had to say that I was responsible for the whole country 
and, therefore, when deciding on investments…the redistribution of 
resources is required…this generated a conflict of interests… [and] a 
tremendous pressure on the system, regardless of the political party 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 31).    
Another top MOH stakeholder described the MOH’s role with the other two 
actor groups as curious, “we are a part of the general administration of the State and we 
work in solidarity with what [the MOF] decides…but, at the same time, we are partners 
with the regional ministers of health…that is on spending we are with the regional 
ministers of health and with financing we are with the MOF” (Novinskey, Interview no. 
02).  After 2001, for the subnational policymaking environment, a few stakeholders 
identified the regional ministries of health and finance and the regional presidents as 
main actor groups.  Additionally, eight of the eleven respondents (73 per cent) said that 
the regions had become more powerful while the MOH had become weaker due to the 
2001 devolution reform.  However, the stakeholder interviews produced limited 
information to validate the identification of main actors at this level.  In support of 
these limited data, I further discussed my hypothesis that these actor groups play key 
roles in the subnational policymaking environment with seven key informants—mostly 
health policy and economics academics—, all of whom verified that it seemed 
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reasonable.142  In general, these informants and the literature underscored the fact that 
the organisational structure and processes of Spain’s regional governments were 
generally based on those of the central government.  Thus, it is likely that the regional 
ministries of health and finance (subnational expenditure advocates and guardians) are 
main actor groups in the health sector at the regional level.  Based on the prolific 
literature on health system stewardship, it also seems likely that the MOH—the primary 
member of the health-sector kentrocrats—plays a main role in the health policymaking 
process at the regional level, promoting the goals of national health policy coherence 
and coordination across regions.     
Chapter 4 described the organisation of the Spanish NHS both before and after 
the 2001 health system devolution.  In that chapter, the Spanish MOH, MOF, MOPA 
and regional health and finance ministries were salient institutional actors at the 
national level.  This was mostly evident from their executive and administrative 
assignments on the two main high-level councils concerning the NHS: the CPFF and 
the CISNS.  The interactions and roles of these main actor groups stood out during my 
stakeholder interviews.  In particular, when asked about the relationships between 
them143 , in addition to describing their formally organised interactions through the 
CISNS and the CPFF, interviewees described more-informal interactions.  For 
example, an interviewee who worked for INSALUD before the 2001 health system 
devolution reform reported that securing financing for the all health services in the 
country was a fundamental task that the MOH performed each year.  To do so, central 
INSALUD authorities would hold informal, “rather peripheral negotiations”, with the 
regional INSALUD authorities to understand the needs of each “slow-track” region.  At 
the same time, the regions already managing their own health services would 
participate and make informal requests for more financing.  They knew that the more 
financing INSALUD received, the more they would receive, because they were given a 
certain per cent of what INSALUD secured each year.  Then, formally, the MOH 
would meet with the MOF and the MOL to negotiate all health financing terms for the 
year (Novinskey, Interview no. 04).  
Moreover, a stakeholder clarified that, after devolution the central government 
and the regions worked through two different channels depending on the topic.  On 
                                               
142 One also suggested that I include a second type of kentrocrat of the finance variety, thus, having four 
main actor groups for the subnational policymaking environment (Novinskey, Interview no. 25). 
143 “How was your administration’s relationship with these main actors since the 2001 health service 
devolution?” and “Was it different from before the 2001 health service devolution?” 
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health policies, the RHMs worked with the MOH; on health care financing, the regional 
finance ministries worked with the MOF and often through the CPFF, but there was 
little interaction between RHMs and the MOF (Novinskey, Interview no. 39).  This 
interpretation does not necessarily contrast with the subnational health policy network 
model presented in the analytical framework, as it conceives the kentrocrat actor group 
as having both representatives from the MOF and MOH that interact with the regional 
health and finance ministries.  Furthermore, another stakeholder emphasised his dual 
role since 2001 as a representative of his RHM as well as a representative of the NHS, 
interacting regularly with the other sixteen regional health ministers and the Minister of 
Health:  “I form a part of the Inter-territorial Council for the National Health System, 
which is composed of the 17 regional ministers of health and the Minister [of Health].  
I have always clearly thought that I was there representing not only my community but 
my community and a part of the whole [NHS]” (Novinskey, Interview no. 01).   
In summary, the stakeholder interviewees confirmed that the main actor groups 
proposed in my analytical framework for the national policymaking environment were 
indeed active in health policy both before and after the 2001 health system devolution 
reform in Spain and are appropriate to use in analysing the Spanish case.  As noted, 
they did not provide, however, enough information to validate the selection of main 
actors at the subnational level.  In hindsight, the interview question was not sufficiently 
specific in asking for information about the subnational policymaking environment.  As 
a result, only a few stakeholders mentioned subnational-level actors, such as the 
regional health and finance ministries and the presidents of the regions, as playing a 
role in health policymaking.  In any case, no information was provided to suggest that 
my model overlooks any essential subnational government actors.   
5.1.3.  Matrix of Institutional Architecture of Intergovernmental Health Policymaking 
in Spain  
In the next two sections, I use different measures to establish the positions of the actors 
within each of the intergovernmental health policy networks in Spain after 2003 and to 
establish the institutional architecture of the case study for the following chapter.  The 
main laws that changed the institutional architecture and the power of the actor groups 
were introduced between 2001 and 2003.  These are included in my analyses of 
national and subnational expenditure advocates and expenditure guardians, using von 
Hagen’s structural index.  For the analysis of the topocrats, after defining the main laws 
concerning changes in their institutional architecture during the period 2001-2003, I 
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examine their intergovernmental associations and activities to assess their relative 
power in the national health policy network (Nota bene: I look at what they do not how 
they do it, for the period after 2001 with a focus on 2004–2006).  For the analysis of the 
health-sector kentrocrats, after defining the main laws concerning changes in their 
institutional architecture during the period 2001–2003, I examine their mandate as a 
steward of the NHS, assessing in particular their activities under four stewardship 
responsibilities in order to discern their relative power in the subnational health policy 
network for the period 2004–2006.  Table 5.2 presents the institutional architecture of 
intergovernmental health policymaking in Spain and the measures used to determine 
the relative power of the topocrats and health-sector kentrocrats. 
Table 5.2.  Matrix of Institutional Architecture of Intergovernmental Health 
Policymaking in Spain for 2001–2003, and Measures to Assess the Power of the 
Topocrats and Kentrocrats for 2004–2006  
Policy Network 
Actor Groups 
Institutional Architecture 
2001 2002 2003 2004–2006 
National 
Expenditure 
Advocates and 
Guardians 
Budget 
Stability Law 
 National 
Budget Law 
 
Topocrats 2001 
devolution of 
health service 
competencies 
and  
Regional 
financing 
agreement 
 Law for 
Cohesion and 
Quality of the 
NHS 
Assessment of 
intergovernment
al activities to 
define their 
relative power in 
the national 
health policy 
network  
Subnational 
Expenditure 
Advocates and 
Guardians  
Budget 
Stability Law 
 National 
Budget Lawa 
 
Health-Sector 
Kentrocrats 
 
2001 
devolution of 
health service 
competencies 
Patient 
Autonomy 
Law for 
Cohesion and 
Quality of the 
NHS and 
Statutory 
Framework 
for Health 
Professionals 
Assessment of 
responsibilities 
and activities as 
a steward to 
define their 
relative power in 
the subnational 
health policy 
network 
a Extremadura reformed the regulation of its parliament in 2003, 2004 and 2005, but these changes did not 
alter its institutional architecture in any way that would affect this study.   
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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5.2.  Establishing the Position of the Actor Groups in the National Health Policy 
Network 
In this section, I analyse the power and influence of each main actor group in Spain’s 
national health policy network: topocrats, expenditure advocates and expenditure 
guardians.  To determine their relative positions, I utilize von Hagen’s index for 
expenditure advocates and guardians as well as the index I created for topocrat strength 
(see Section 3.2.1).  After determining their relative positions, I discuss the general 
picture of the national health policy network in Spain and the corresponding trade-offs 
and priorities in policymaking at this level for the period before 2001 and then between 
2004 and 2006.    
5.2.1.  Expenditure Advocates and Expenditure Guardians in Spain 
The relative position of expenditure advocates and expenditure guardians of the 
national health policy network can be established by examining the national budget 
process.  The idea is that the institutional structure, i.e., the arrangements that assign 
roles to participants and the scope and sequence of decisions, has important effects on 
the outcomes of the budgeting process and can tell us the relative strength of these two 
actor groups with respect to each other.  The institutional structure is normally 
established by the general budget law of a country, parliamentary regulations and, 
sometimes, public sector administrative regulations.   
The three main phases of the budget process where bargaining takes place— 
preparing, enacting and executing the budget—are generally managed by expenditure 
guardians, led by the MOF.  In the preparation phase, the draft budget is usually 
prepared by the Minister of Finance, the Prime Minister, and/or the Cabinet and 
negotiated within the government.  In particular, expenditure guardians negotiate the 
draft budget with the different spending ministries—in the present case, the MOH—
who are key actors within the expenditure advocate group.  During negotiations on 
health spending, the expenditure guardians try to limit health sector growth and the 
expenditure advocates aim to maximise health sector funding (Blom-Hansen 1999).  
The expenditure guardians depend less on particular interest groups for their support 
than expenditure advocates do and their decisions are more strongly guided by general 
economic considerations.  The expenditure advocates are more exposed to political 
pressure from interest groups than expenditure guardians are and their decisions are 
biased in favour of larger expenditures and deficits.  Thus, greater constraints in budget 
preparation and a stronger role for the Minister of Finance in constructing the draft 
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budget help the government to achieve greater fiscal discipline and stay committed to 
overall budget goals and strategies.    
In the budget adoption (enacting) phase, the parliament’s amendment and 
voting procedures are important factors affecting the institutional structure of the 
budget process.  These factors differ across countries and may serve to limit or expand 
the parliament’s role.  Like the expenditure advocates, the parliament is more 
susceptible to political pressures from interest groups than is the Minister of Finance or 
the Prime Minister.  Thus, the more limited the parliament’s voting procedures and 
scope of action are, the more likely it is that the government will commit to fiscal 
strategies limiting expenditures and deficits, and successfully defend these strategies 
against political pressures.   
In the final (execution) phase of the budget, the flexibility of the budget—i.e., 
whether the MOF can block expenditures, how changes are authorised and by whom, 
whether transfers and carry-overs are allowed—becomes important.  These specific 
budget procedures limit the extent and depth to which the expenditure advocates (the 
spending ministries and their advocates in the parliament) can modify their budgetary 
allocations throughout the year and beyond (through carry-over authority).  Thus, the 
strength of the role of the Minister of Finance and, more generally, expenditure 
guardians can be assessed, as well as the extent of the limitations placed on expenditure 
advocates during this phase of the budget process.   
The organisation of the budget process and procedures tells us much about the 
relative strength of the expenditure guardians and advocates.  It is assumed that the 
more inflexible the budget procedures are, the more likely the government is to commit 
to and pursue fiscal discipline and overall budget control strategies.  As such, the 
budget process may be referred to as open (loose) or closed (tight).  The looser it is, the 
greater the bargaining position of the expenditure advocates, whereas a tighter process 
benefits the expenditure guardians.   
In one of the most comprehensive comparative analyses of national budget 
processes, von Hagen (1992) measured the tightness of the budget process in European 
Communities through a structural index that examined all three aforementioned phases 
of the budget process.  This index described each phase in terms of four or more 
indicators (see Table J.1 for the index and complete description of its indicators).  Von 
Hagen (1992) performed nonparametric tests and regression analyses on this structural 
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index, finding that the institutional framework in which budgeting takes place can have 
significant consequences for the level of fiscal discipline in a country.  He commented: 
A budgeting process that gives the prime or finance (or treasury) minister 
a position of strategic dominance over the spending ministers, that limits 
the amendment power of parliament, and that leaves little room for 
changes in the budget during the execution process is strongly conducive 
to fiscal discipline  (J. von Hagen 1992, 53). 
By way of reminder, this paragraph summarizes the budget processes for health 
care in Spain prior to 2001.  The central government sourced funds for its health system 
and services mostly from general tax revenues.  Overall, it had the power to decide 
which policy sectors (e.g. health, energy, judicial)144 to allocate (or budget) these and 
other revenues to.  For the regions without health care competencies at this time, the 
central government’s MOF would agree on health financing, including a resource 
allocation formula, with the regional governments on the CPFF, in consultation with 
the MOH (cf. Section 4.2.3).  As a function of its overall responsibilities, in making 
this health-specific agreement, the MOF had also to consider and decide how much 
total financing it could give to the health care sector, as opposed to other sectors, within 
each regional territory.  This ‘macroeconomic’ or ‘inter-sectoral expenditure’ flexibility 
that the MOF has in its preparation of the budget is captured well by the government 
constraint and negotiation parameters for the first phase of von Hagen’s budget 
tightness index for Spain.  See Appendix J.  Their final agreement on health financing 
with the regions would then be passed to the Senate for approval (phase two of von 
Hagen’s index).  Once approved, these nationally earmarked funds were allocated to 
INSALUD for each region’s health service, according to the agreed upon resource 
allocation formula.  INSALUD, then, had the ability to decide, within the parameters of 
the allocation for each region’s health services, where to budget, allocate and spend 
these health care funds (e.g., secondary vs. primary care vs. pharmacy and/or, within 
these categories, infrastructure vs. equipment vs. human resources).  Finally, 
INSALUD would execute the budget under the limitations set by the MOF, for which 
are measured by indicators in phase three of von Hagen’s index (i.e., how much space 
or flexibility the MOF allows INSALUD in executing; e.g., allowance of transfers 
between chapters or carry-overs to the next year, with or without approval by the 
MOF).  See Figure 5.5.       
                                               
144 As long as they were not devolved to the regions. 
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Figure 5.5.  Budget Flexibility for Health Expenditures, Pre-2001 in Spain 
 
Table 5.3 reports von Hagen’s (1992) results for Spain in the 1990s.  For 
purposes of comparison, it also includes von Hagen’s (1992) results for Denmark, as 
well as values for Sweden and Norway from similar analyses based on von Hagen 
(1992) and as reported by Blom-Hansen (1999 248).145  Regarding their situation in the 
1990s, Blom-Hansen described Denmark as an example country having a tight budget 
process, and Sweden and Norway as having relatively loose budget processes.  Spain 
scores even lower than Sweden and Norway, indicating a looser budget process than 
those of all three Scandinavian countries.  This implies that it was easier to be an 
expenditure advocate in Spain than in Sweden, Norway and especially Denmark during 
the 1990s.  
  
                                               
145 The Scandinavian countries’ political systems, party politics and local governments differ from 
Spain’s in many ways, so the comparisons must be regarded with some caution.   
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Table 5.3.  The National Budget Process in Spain, with Comparisons to Scandinavia, 
during the 1990s 
 Spain Denmark Sweden Norway 
 von Hagen 
(1992) 
von Hagen 
(1992) 
Molander 
(1992) 
Borg 
(1997) 
Helland and 
Rasch (1997) 
Government’s 
preparation of the 
budget (maximum 
score: 16) 
6 12.33 4.0 8.33 8.0 
Parliament’s 
enactment of the 
budget (maximum 
score: 20) 
8 12.0 6.0 8.0 8.66 
Observance of the 
budget during the 
budget year 
(maximum score: 
24) 
5.8 10.4 6.7 6.73 8.53 
Total score (max.  
score 60) 
19.8 34.73 16.7 23.06 25.19 
Explanatory note: The lower the score, the more open the budget process.   
Sources:  The scores for the studies on Denmark, Sweden and Norway were taken verbatim from Blom-
Hansen (1999, 248).  The scores for the study on Spain were taken from von Hagen (1992) with one 
modification from the author.  See Appendix J. 
Budget processes and procedures, however, change over time, and the thesis is 
interested in these for the period 2001–2006, starting ten years after von Hagen’s 
snapshot situation (1991–1992).  Therefore, I must consider whether any major changes 
to the budget process and procedures have taken place in Spain from the early 1990s 
through the mid-2000s.   
From 1988 to 2001, the principal framework for national budget processes of 
the Spanish central government was generated by the Consolidated Text of the General 
Budgetary Law, approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1091/1988, which updated the 
1977 General Budget Law (Jefatura del Estado 1977; Ministerio de Economía y 
Hacienda 1988).  However, between 2001 and 2003, the central government passed a 
number of budget reform laws, which included major changes to the budget processes 
and procedures of the government.  These reforms mostly resulted from Spain’s 
integration into the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Iglesias 
Quintana and Morano Larragueta 2008), but they also arose from the high level of 
fiscal decentralization that transpired in Spain after the “second wave” of health system 
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devolution, with over 50 per cent of total public spending managed by the regional and 
local governments (Ballart and Zapico Goñi 2010a).  Thus, in addition to Spain’s 
central government budget policy itself, I cover the supranational EMU treaties and 
pacts that influenced budget policy in Spain in the following discussion.   
In 1992, Spain signed the Maastricht Treaty, which outlined the path for 
creating a common currency for the EU, the euro.  This Treaty created political 
pressure on the central government to undertake fiscal consolidation and restraint, 
known as the “Maastricht” effect (Ballart and Zapico Goñi 2010b; von Hagen, Hughes 
Hallett, and Strauch 2001).  Immediately, Spain launched its first Convergence 
Programme, which among other things shifted the budget process from a fragmented to 
a contract-based approach in order to achieve a higher degree of centralization and to 
control spending (von Hagen, Hughes Hallett, and Strauch 2001).146  This new 
approach gave additional political power to coalition agreements and boosted the 
finance minister’s role in the budget preparation phase.  The Convergence Programme 
also gave the finance minister responsibility for deriving annual budget deficit targets 
from macroeconomic forecasts147 and proposing them to the Cabinet of Ministers for 
approval, and for inspecting “the consistency of the spending ministries’ bids with their 
numerical spending targets” (von Hagen, Hughes Hallett, and Strauch 2001, 49).  As a 
follow-up to the Maastricht Treaty, in 1997, Spain signed the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), agreeing to strengthen the monitoring and coordination of its fiscal and 
economic policies in order to enforce deficit and debt limits and achieve non-
inflationary growth and a high level of employment (as established by the Maastricht 
Treaty).   
The SGP and the impending “second wave” of health system devolution, the 
latter which represents one of the largest public-sector expenditure areas, influenced the 
                                               
146 Fragmentation is a problem for budgetary decision-making because the different actors may make 
decisions that do not consider overall spending levels.  A centralized approach in general means shifting 
more power for budget preparation and execution to the executive and the Minister of Finance, while 
limiting the parliament’s amendment powers (Hallerberg 2004; von Hagen 2006).  A contracts-based 
approach, among other things, is more adequate for states with electoral systems of proportional 
representation (which are most likely to produce coalition governments) and multi-party coalition 
governments (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1998; 1999).  “In a nutshell, it is difficult for a coalition 
government to work under a strong finance minister, since the latter necessarily comes from one of the 
coalition parties.  Vesting him with special authorities raises concerns among the other parties about a 
fair treatment of their spending interests in the budgeting process.  …  [T]he threat to break up a coalition 
is a very effective one for enforcing negotiated budget targets in multi-party governments” (von Hagen, 
Hughes Hallett, and Strauch 2001, 46).   
147 The ministerial budgets are derived with the cooperation of the financial office within each ministry 
(Oficina Presupuestaria).  The head of this office is appointed by, and hails from, the Ministry of 
Finance.   
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Spanish central government to pass the 2001 Budget Stability Laws,148 which aimed 
among other things to formalise the culture of fiscal discipline in Spanish legislation 
(Jefatura del Estado 2001a; 2001c).  These laws, which were meant not least to 
facilitate coordination between the regions and the central government (Novinskey, 
Interview no. 41), identified specific macroeconomic fiscal rules, including the 
definition of budget stability as a “surplus or balanced budget”,149 mid-term (triennial) 
budget stability objectives, a non-financial expenditure limit150, and a contingency fund 
for budget execution (Iglesias Quintana and Morano Larragueta 2008).  This last 
provision was intended to permit introduction into the budget of new non-discretionary 
expenditures due to unforeseen issues (e.g. natural disaster relief) by creating an 
exception to the procedure for approving modifications to the budget, which otherwise 
requires a new budget law (Zapico Goñi 2004).  The 2001 budget laws also established 
budgetary procedure rules, including the production of cyclical situation reports, the 
processing of budget stability objectives in parliament, the determination of growth 
thresholds, and the establishment of consequences for budget deficit or surplus 
situations.   
Moreover, with the 2003 National Budget Law (effective in 2005), the central 
government reformed the country’s general budget legislation for the first time in more 
than 25 years.  This law emphasised rules and principles for micro-management, 
performance management (output-outcome measures) and budgeting by objective 
(Jefatura del Estado 2003d).  It also introduced an evaluation procedure for all public 
policies, with the Ministry of Finance initially coordinating the evaluation of spending 
programs until an independent supervisory agency took over.  Spain passed further 
budget legislation, including a reform of the 2001 Budget Stability Laws, in 2006, but it 
was not implemented until 2007 and thus does not affect the present study (Jefatura del 
Estado 2006a; 2006b).151   
In terms of the mechanics of the budget processes for health care after 2001, by 
way of reminder, this paragraph provides a summary.  As they were prior to 2001, 
                                               
148 Consisting of the 2001 Budget Stability Law (18/2001) and its Complement Law (5/2001), which 
both apply to all levels of public administration in Spain.  These laws became effective in 2003 and were 
amended in 2006 (Jefatura del Estado 2006a; 2006b).   
149 A deficit is considered an exceptional situation requiring a correction plan to regain stability. 
150 The non-financial expenditure limit is based on accurate information related to the balance, budgetary 
deficit or surplus with the balance, and deficit or surplus calculated in accordance with the rules of the 
European System of National and Regional Accounts (Art.  13, Law 18/2001).   
151 In 2005, Spain also signed an amendment to the SGP that introduced additional economic 
considerations to the Pact and allowed greater flexibility considering individual national circumstances.  
The 2006 reform of the Budget Stability Laws included these aspects of the amendment.   
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general tax revenues were the main source of funding the health care system.  These 
revenues were sourced from the central government, the Autonomous Communities 
and taxes, according to the tax revenue parameters in the 2001 financing agreement 
(see Section 4.4.3).  Those from the central government were transferred directly from 
the coffers of the MOF to those of the RFMs, using the allocation formula of the 2001 
regional financing agreement.  It is important to remember that earmarked financing for 
health care was lost with this agreement.  At this point, any changes to this financing 
agreement or the input of additional funds to the regional health services would 
represent informal intergovernmental policymaking within the national health policy 
network and among its main actors.  As such, an assessment of the national-level 
macroeconomic or inter-sectoral expenditure flexibility can be measured here, using 
von Hagen’s budget tightness index (using indicators from the first phase of the 
budgeting process).  Each year the budget is then approved by the Senate (second phase 
of the budgeting process).  Upon approval, the regional financing funds are transferred 
to the RFM, who is responsible for budgeting and allocating them, for example, to the 
different policy sectors like health; however, particular to Spain, the RFM’s have to 
comply with a nationally set minimum allocation for health care.  As another step of the 
budgeting process, the RFM confers and negotiates with the RHM on the specific 
budget line items and final total funds for health care in the region.  In our subnational 
health policy network, this is a reflection of informal intergovernmental policymaking.  
It is also the point where a regional-level macroeconomic or inter-sectoral expenditure 
flexibility analysis has value, using my adapted version of von Hagen’s budget 
tightness index (see Section 5.3.1 below).  Once having negotiated with the RFM, the 
RHM is responsible for executing the budget within the limitations set by the RFM, 
which are measured by indicators in phase three of our adapted version of von Hagen’s 
budget tightness index.  See Figure 5.6. 
 Intergovernmental Health Policy Networks for a Devolved Health System 
 
   211 
Figure 5.6.  Budget Flexibility for Health Expenditures, Post-2001 in Spain 
 
Overall, for the period 2004–2006, the budget preparation and execution 
processes were affected mostly by the 1997 SGP and the 2001 Budget Stability Laws, 
and less so by the 2003 general budget law (because the latter only began 
implementation in 2005).  The differences these changes made on Spanish national 
budget processes and procedures since the early 1990s can be seen in Table 5.4, which 
compares von Hagen’s (1992) results for national budget tightness in Spain for 1990 
with the results of my analysis of the national budget tightness in Spain for 2004 to 
2006.  In particular, the 2001 Budget Stability Laws affected the first phase of the 
budget by changing the general constraint of budget preparation: intending to become a 
European exemplar in fiscal policy, Spain introduced a “zero deficit” rule that goes 
beyond the “golden rule” of public finance (Ballart and Zapico Goñi 2010a; 
Domínguez Martínez and López Jiménez 2012).  These laws also modified this phase 
through reshaping the negotiation procedure within government (i.e., the initial budget 
guidelines and agenda-setting procedure), as the Finance Minister now prepares the 
draft budget with spending recommendations according to general budget guidelines 
plus specific “budget stability objectives” before proposing it to the Council of 
Ministers.   
These major changes increased Spain’s score on the first phase of budgeting 
from 6 to 13.66 points.  In addition, with the reforms during this period, budget 
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execution in Spain became less flexible: the Finance Minister was given the ability to 
block expenditures during this phase of the budget process and more power concerning 
transfers between chapters, albeit still with considerable limitation.  These major 
changes also increased the score on observance of the budget during the budget year 
(i.e., the third phase) from 5.8 to 10.6 points.  The score for the second phase of the 
national budget process did not change during the period of study.  Therefore, the total 
score for all three phases of the budget increased from 19.8 to 32.26 points, showing a 
clear tightening of the national budget process in Spain across the two periods of study.  
Table 5.4.  The National Budget Process in Spaina 
 1991-1992 2004-2006 
 von Hagen 
(1992) 
Author 
Government’s preparation of the budget 
(maximum score: 16) 
6 13.66 
Parliament’s enactment of the budget (max.  
score: 20) 
8 8 
Observance of the budget during the budget 
year (max.  score: 24) 
5.8 10.6 
Total score (max.  score 60) 19.8 32.26 
Explanatory note: The lower the score, the more open the budget process.   
a The institutional architecture for this period was established at the end of 2003 and remained 
effective until 2007, when the 2006 budget stability reforms were implemented. 
     
5.2.2.  Topocrats in Spain 
From the moment when it launched its Autonomous State model, the Government of 
Spain foresaw a practical need to underpin formal policymaking processes of its central 
and regional governments by creating an informal channel for their exchange and 
coordination of information as well as cooperation.  This informal policymaking 
channel, first and foremost, manifested itself in the Sectoral Conferences (Conferencias 
Sectoriales) (Secretaría de Estado de Cooperación Territorial 2006).  The Sectoral 
Conferences were first included in the 1981 Draft Bill for the Harmonisation of the 
Autonomic Process (Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico) (Article 
9) and then appeared in Article 4 of the Law 12/1983 of Autonomic Process (Ley de 
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Proceso Autonómico) (Jefatura del Estado 1983).152  They were ostensively sector-
specific.  Several interviewees mentioned the importance of the Sectoral Conferences in 
harmonising sector politics (Novinskey, Interview no. 37, 39, 41).  The first Sectoral 
Conference developed was the Tax and Finance Policy Council (CPFF), established 
and regulated by Law 8/1980 on financing the autonomous communities (Ley Orgánica 
de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas) (Jefatura del Estado 1980b).  
Afterwards, they were established according to need, generally following the calendar 
of the devolution of public services from the central government to the regions; for 
example, the Agriculture and Rural Development Sectoral Conference was established 
in 1983, the Education Sectoral Conference in 1986 and the CISNS in 1987 (Secretaría 
de Estado de Administraciones Públicas 2012, 6, Table 1).  By the end of 2006, there 
existed 30 Sectoral Conferences, most of which based their regulatory framework on 
that of the CPFF.  Although some, like the CISNS, created their own specific 
regulatory framework.   
 Through their participation in Sectoral Conferences, the Spanish regional 
topocrats153 play an important informal policymaking role within the national 
policymaking environment.  Spain’s Sectoral Conferences are the closest equivalent to 
Scandinavia’s Local Government Associations, which Blom-Hansen (1999) described 
in his original analysis of this type of actor.  The main function of these Conferences is 
to coordinate central-regional government relations and promote their cooperation.  
They serve as intergovernmental forums for making formal agreements, as a more agile 
alternative to parliamentary decision-making.  The two Sectoral Conferences that 
influence the health sector are the CISNS and the CPFF.    
By way of reminder, the CISNS is a permanent body of health system 
coordination, cooperation, communication and information between the regional and 
the central governments.  Its main objective is to promote the cohesion of the NHS by 
guaranteeing citizen rights throughout the country.  It is the only Sectoral Conference 
specific to the health sector, and all regions and the central government form its 
membership.  Shortly after the 2001 health system devolution reform, in 2003, the LCQ 
                                               
152 The content of this Article was transferred eventually to Law 30/1992, and its current wording is 
given in Law 4/1999.    
153 I address all of the ten “slow-track” Spanish regional topocrats together here without distinguishing 
among them, although there is some evidence of differences in levels of de facto influence between 
them.  Madrid seemed to be the most powerful of the group and was a major player in convincing the 
others to move forward at the same time with the 2001 health system devolution reform (Novinskey, 
Interview no. 39).   
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changed the composition of the CISNS to reflect the post-devolution (non-hierarchical) 
distribution of health service powers, reducing its number of voting members from 
thirty-four (a one-to-one ratio of central government to regional government 
representation) to eighteen, including the Minister of Health (as the only central 
government representative) and the seventeen regional health ministers.  This 
effectively reduced the power of the central government (expenditure advocates) and 
increased the power and influence of the regions in the health sector.  Agreements 
reached by the CISNS are non-binding recommendations and are normally adopted by 
consensus, but they carry considerable political influence (El Globalnet 2004).    
Since 1996, the CISNS has held plenary sessions two to five times a year,154 in 
addition to “second-level” working group and executive and technical committee 
meetings.  The number of agreements made each year in plenary sessions varied 
(Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2015).  Before 2001, the CISNS held an average of 
2.2 plenary sessions per year and made an average of 11.1 agreements per session (see 
Table 5.5).  After health system devolution and during the period 2004–2006, the 
CISNS held an average of 3.7 plenary sessions per year and made an average of 37.7 
agreements per session.  .  Its use of agreements in central-regional government 
relations indicates a privileged position for the topocrats in the decision-making process 
at the national policymaking level.  However, it should be noted that prior to 2001, the 
topocrats from the Extremadura and Madrid were at a more disadvantaged position than 
the regions that had already received decision-making powers over health care 
competencies.   
Table 5.5.  Plenary Sessions and Agreements of the CISNS, 1996–2006 
Year (1996-2006) 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
Plenary sessions 2 4 4 2 2 4 3 5 3 4 4 
Agreements 18 56 34 30 18 21 19 37 29 41 43 
Agreements per plenary 
session 
9 14 8.5 15 9 5.3 6.3 7.4 9.7 10.3 10.8 
                                               
154 Despite a formal regulatory requirement that the CISNS meet four times a year (Consejo 
Interterritorial del Sistema Nacional de Salud 2003). 
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Regarding the scope of agreements, Table 5.6 shows CISNS agreements by 
thematic areas for the period 2002–2006.155  It shows that the Council made 169 
agreements, 43 of which were “interior system” topics (Régimen Interior) (e.g. 
adoption of minutes, appointments, modifications of its regulatory framework, and 
creation, modification or  dissolution of technical and technical committees and 
working groups).  The remaining 126 agreements were mostly in the areas of public 
health, health policy and evaluation, pharmaceuticals and planning.  Some agreements 
covered the areas of professional organisation and human resources,156 the European 
Union, health plans, service delivery organisation, specialised care, health care benefits 
and mental health.  Since 2001, the Council has also been charged with assigning 
resources from the Health Cohesion Fund (Fondo de Cohesión Sanitaria).157   
These thematic areas address competencies of the central government (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals and the EU) and some health issues devolved to the regions (e.g. 
health service management, health care benefits).  Therefore, to an extent, the CISNS is 
a two-way channel that provides each level of government with exclusive access to 
each other’s policymaking environment.  On the one hand, it gives the central 
government a means of overseeing decision-making across the regions, to make it more 
coherent.  Additionally, because the agreements are advisory and not executive, the 
central government can even encourage coordination with each region to achieve 
specific, mutually identified goals while not overstepping the boundaries of its own 
devolution mandate.  On the other hand, the regions can take part in national-level 
policy decisions that have a potential impact on the activities of the central government 
as well as across all regions.   
Overall, the increased proportional weight of the topocrats in the CISNS, its 
sustained activity over time, and the nature of the issues addressed (covering both 
national- and regional-level policies and coordination) show a greater and ongoing 
influence of the topocrats in the national policymaking processes over time. 
 
                                               
155 Comparable data for before 2002 were not available.  
156 Since the 2003 LCQ, professional organisation and human resource topics are addressed in the 
Human Resource Commission of the NHS and not the CISNS   
157 The Health Cohesion Fund was created by Law 21/2001 (article 4.B.c), with the objective of 
guaranteeing equal access to public health care services throughout the country and for displaced citizens 
in the EU.  At first, its management and distribution were competencies of the MOH, but with Law 
16/2003 (LCQ), the CISNS was charged with allocating its resources.  Royal Decree 1207/2006 
regulates the management of the Health Cohesion Fund and, in particular, the eligible activities and 
distribution criteria for compensation.   
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Table 5.6.  CISNS Agreements by Thematic Area, 2002-2006 
Thematic Area Total 
Per 
Cent 
Public health 36 21.3% 
Pharmaceutical 17 10.1% 
Professional organisation and HR 8 4.7% 
Health policy and evaluation 21 12.4% 
Planning 17 10.1% 
European Union 7 4.1% 
Health plans 3 1.8% 
Health service management/organisation 5 3.0% 
Specialised health care 2 1.2% 
Health services/benefits 5 3.0% 
Mental health 2 1.2% 
Other 3 1.8% 
Internal system 43 25.4% 
Total 169 100.0% 
The CPFF was created to coordinate tax and financing activities between the 
MOF, the MOPA and the regions.  Its membership, throughout the period of study 
comprised the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Public Administration and the 
seventeen regional finance ministers (a two-to-seventeen ratio of central government to 
regional government representation).158  The CPFF is required to hold meetings at least 
twice a year to establish agreements on various tax and finance matters, including “a) 
coordinating the budgetary policy of the regions with the central government.  b) The 
production of reports and the adoption of agreements defined in Law 18/2001 [sic], 
Complementary to the General Budget Stability Law.  c) The study and evaluation of 
criteria for the distribution of resources from the Compensation Fund” (Jefatura del 
Estado 1980, vol.  236, n.  Article 3, section 2, a–c, own translation).  CPFF agreements 
take the form of recommendations.  As described in the financing sections of Chapter 4, 
most of the CPFF’s agreements concerned the regional financing system and the NHS 
financing system, and they took place every five and four years, respectively, between 
1987 and 2001.  The 2001 regional financing agreement—the only one reached during 
2001–2006—absorbed NHS-earmarked financing within the regional financing system.  
As such, the CPFF did not separately discuss health financing from that point on.  
Overall, the CPFF has proven an effective mechanism for negotiating central-regional 
                                               
158 Since the merger of these two ministries, just the (one) Minister of Finance and Public Administration 
participates on the CPFF. 
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finance and tax policy before presenting agreements to parliament for approval.  The 
agreements reached involve major initiatives in finance and tax policy in which the 
regions participate.   
Overall, the influence of the ten “slow-track” Spanish regional topocrats 
differed before and after the 2001 health system devolution, especially with regard to 
their level of exclusive access to the central government and the average number of 
plenary sessions and agreements made by the CISNS, as well as the membership ratios 
of both the CISNS and the CPFF.  In summation, the regions had a slightly moderate 
position in the decision-making processes of their national health policy network before 
2001; after it, they gained considerable influence and became relatively strong 
topocrats.  See Table 5.7 on topocrat strength below. 
Table 5.7.  Topocrat Strength in Spain for before 2001 and 2004–2006 
 Spain 
 Before 2001 2004–2006 
1. Do the local government associations exist in the 
country and sector of investigation?  (maximum 
score: 2) 
2 2 
2. Do local government associations routinely interact 
with, and have exclusive and systematic access to, the 
central government?  (maximum score: 3) 
1 3 
3. How involved are local government associations in 
policy formulation at the national level?  (maximum 
score: 4) 
1 3 
Total Score 4 8 
Explanatory Note: The higher the score, the stronger the influence of the topocrat in the national 
health policy network.  See Appendix K for index values. 
5.2.3.  The General Picture of the National Health Policy Network in Spain 
In this section, I summarise the position of the three actor groups within the national 
health policy network in Spain during the period before the “second wave” of health 
system devolution (1991–2001), and after it, once the new institutional architecture for 
the health and finance sectors is re-established (2004–2006).   
For the period 1991–1992, the national health policy network in Spain was 
close to the policy community end of the network continuum (cf.  Table 5.1).  This 
cross-sectoral network gave expenditure advocates a structurally favoured position in 
the formulation of national health policy.  The institutional architecture of the health 
and finance (budget) sectors remained the same from this period until 2001, when it 
began to change, namely, with the “second wave” of health system devolution and the 
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2001 and 2003 budget reforms.  With these reforms, the national health policy network 
loosened and shifted slightly towards the issue network end of the continuum (although 
still closer to the policy community end than to the issue network end).  Moreover, as 
the budget process tightened and the topocrats gained strength, they also achieved a 
more structurally favoured position in the formulation of national health policy.  The 
institutional architecture of the health and finance sectors stabilised after 2003 and 
stayed the same throughout 2006.   
Table 5.8 presents the strength designations for the actor groups within the 
national health policy networks during each period in Spain, with a comparison to those 
in Scandinavian countries during the 1990s, which stem from Blom-Hansen’s (1999) 
data.  From the pre-2001 to the post-2003 period in Spain, the national budget process 
tightened considerably and the expenditure advocates and guardians exchanged 
positions, the former losing and the latter gaining power.  At the same time, the 
topocrats become considerably stronger after the 2001 devolution of health system and 
services.  Interview data from the study corroborate these results, with the exception 
that some expenditure guardians and topocrats have perceived expenditure advocates as 
always having been weak. 
 
Table 5.8.  National Health Policy Networks in Spain, with Comparison to Scandinavia 
Actor 
Groups 
Health Sector 
Denmark 
1991–1992 
Norway 
1991–1992 
Sweden 
1991–1992 
Spain  
1991–1992 
Spain  
2004–2006 
Topocrats Strong Weak Strong Moderate Strong 
Expenditure 
Advocates 
Moderate Moderate Strong Strong Moderate 
Expenditure 
Guardians 
Moderate Moderate Weak Weak Moderate 
Explanatory Note: I use different thresholds from Blom-Hansen (1999) to determine the 
strength of power of expenditure advocates and guardians, and of topocrats (See Chapter 3).  
Therefore, for expenditure advocates and guardians, I have revised Blom-Hansen’s 
designations according to my methods.  For topocrats, I created an index and labelled the two 
periods in Spain accordingly.  I was not able to revise Blom-Hansen’s designations for this 
actor group as he used a more subjective (non-quantitative) method that was not clearly 
defined enough for assigning labels to topocrats.  This should be taken into consideration 
when comparing topocrats across countries. 
  
 Intergovernmental Health Policy Networks for a Devolved Health System 
 
   219 
In terms of Figure 3.1 on the trade-offs in intergovernmental health 
policymaking at the national government level for the period 1991–2001, the Spanish 
health policy is somewhat close to the A–C line and further down that line more toward 
A.  Thus, the balance of power favoured the expenditure advocates and their national 
health policy goals, with a slightly moderate influence by topocrats.  For the period 
2004–2006, the structural organization of the Spanish system has shifted from the 
realm of the expenditure advocates toward the expenditure guardians and topocrats, 
landing slightly to the right of and below point D (the point where all three goals are in 
equilibrium).  Thus, the balance of power in the Spanish health sector after the 2001 
health system is within the realm of the topocrats with moderate influence from the 
expenditure advocates and guardians.  Interestingly, when comparing Spain’s results 
with the national health policy networks in 1991–1992 Scandinavia, we find three 
variants out of the five studies:  Sweden’s structural set-up for intergovernmental health 
policymaking at the national level is similar to Spain’s in 1991-2001, falling close to 
line A–C however in a more balanced position between A and C; and Denmark’s is 
remarkably similar to Spain’s in 2004–2006, lying slightly to the right of and below 
point D.  Norway’s structural set-up represents a third variant: the exact opposite of the 
Danish system, lying almost on the A–B line.   
5.3.  Establishing the Position of the Actor Groups in the Subnational Health 
Policy Network 
I now analyse the power and influence of the three actor groups in the subnational 
health policy network—subnational expenditure advocates and subnational expenditure 
guardians, and health-sector kentrocrats—in Spain between 2004 and 2006.  Then, I 
discuss their relative positions and trade-offs in intergovernmental health policymaking 
at the subnational government level to give an overall picture of the subnational health 
policy networks and where their priorities lie for the regions of Extremadura and 
Madrid. 
5.3.1.  Subnational Expenditure Advocates and Expenditure Guardians in Extremadura 
and Madrid 
Similar to the analysis carried out for the expenditure advocates and guardians of the 
national health policy network, the relative position of subnational expenditure 
advocates and guardians can be established by examining the budget processes at the 
regional level of government.  The institutional architecture of the regional budget 
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processes in Spain is established by regional public finance law, regulations of the 
regional parliament, national legislation and, sometimes, additional public 
administrative actions.  Here, I examine this institutional architecture for Extremadura 
and Madrid during the period 2001–2003, after which this architecture remains stable 
for the period 2004–2006.159  To do so, I implement the same methodology used in the 
prior analysis of national-level expenditure advocates and guardians in Spain; keeping 
in mind, though, that the regions are also subject to the financing constraints defined in 
the national budget laws and national constitution in addition to their own legislation 
(von Hagen, Hughes Hallett, and Strauch 2001).  Since this empirical approach has not 
previously been applied to the regional level of Spain’s health sector160, I replicate von 
Hagen’s (1992) structural index for measuring the tightness of the budget process for 
both Extremadura and Madrid (following the same procedure I used to update the index 
for Spain during 2004-2006).  
The budget process in Extremadura is based on three main regional laws and 
their reforms.  All legal and political processes in Extremadura are founded on the 
Statute of Autonomy, which was established in Organic Law 1/1983 and successively 
reformed in 1991, 1994 and 1999 (remaining in effect until 2011).  It defines the 
character and functions of the main government institutions in Extremadura.  The 
unicameral Parliament of Extremadura (Asamblea de Extremadura) is the legislative 
branch, while the Government of Extremadura (Junta de Extremadura) is the executive 
branch, containing a Governing Council composed of the president, vice presidents and 
the sectoral ministers.  Following this statute, during the same year, specific regulations 
for the parliament’s functioning were established and subsequently reformed in 2003, 
2004 and 2005 (Asamblea de Extremadura 1983).  These reforms, however, did not 
change the institutional architecture of the parliament for the purpose of this study.161  
In addition, Law 2/1985, on Public Finance of the Extremadura, constituted the legal 
reference document for regulating the financial functions of the regional public sector, 
                                               
159 From 2007, the 2006 updates to the Budget Stability Laws were implemented, modifying this 
institutional architecture.  See discussion in Section 5.2.1.  
160 I performed a wide search of the budget literature and contacted Drs. von Hagen and Hallerberg as 
well as two public finance experts in Spain via email to understand if they knew of any such analyses.  
Unfortunately, neither turned up any regional application of von Hagen’s structural index in Spain.    
161 The 2003 reform changed article 44.1, fixing the number, denomination and content of the permanent 
legislative commissions to the distinct competencies of the regional government ministries.  The 2004 
reform modified article 44.2 to create a parliamentary commission to control the newly created public 
enterprise “Extremadura Audio-Video Corporation” (stemming from Law 4/2000 and Law 4/2004).  The 
2005 reform modified article 44.1 according to the new designations of the ministries as well as the 
newly created Extremadura Housing Agency.    
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establishing all of its economic and financial bodies and procedures.  From 1990 until 
2003, several articles of this law were modified by annual budget laws until it was fully 
reformed in 2007 to better reflect Extremadura’s extensive assumption of new 
functions and services from the central government (Presidencia de la Junta 2007), as 
well as aspects of the central government’s 2001 Budget Stability Laws and the 2003 
General Budget Law that had already begun to affect Extremadura.   
Using information from the above legislation, I adapted von Hagen’s (1992) 
structural index parameters to the regional context, and applied it to the cases of 
Extremadura and Madrid.  See Section 5.2.1 for information on budget mechanisms, 
including regional macroeconomic or inter-sectoral expenditure flexibility.  See also 
Table 5.9 for the general scores for each phase and total of the budget process, and 
Appendix J for the complete indices with indicators and their definition.  For the first 
phase, on the government’s preparation of the budget, Extremadura scored a total of 
13.66 points.  The Spanish national budget process received this score as well during 
this period; the similarity is mostly because of the influence of the EU Maastricht 
Treaty and the SGP, and of subsequent national budget legislation affecting the 
regional budget process.  For example, the national budget law defined the general 
budgetary constraint—a 4-point indicator of the budget preparation phase of the 
index—for all levels of Spanish public administration.  For the second phase of the 
budget process—the parliament’s enactment of the budget—, while some indicators 
were affected by supranational budgetary agreements and national budget legislation, 
much of the information could be obtained from the regional parliament’s regulation.  
For example, following the guidelines established by the national budget laws, Article 
125.3 of the Extremadura Parliamentary Regulation set specific terms for offsetting 
additional expenditures with cuts in other areas of the budget; and Article 126 of the 
same regulation described the voting procedures for the assembly, which are original 
and specific to Extremadura.  Extremadura scored a total of 14 points for this phase 
during the study period.  Finally, for the third phase—observance of the budget during 
the budget year—, the indicators were mostly specific to the regulations regarding 
public finance in Extremadura.  Extremadura received a score of 11.6 points.  
Extremadura’s overall score for the budget process was 39.26 points; that is, seven 
points greater than the central government’s total score of 32.26 on this index during 
the same period.           
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Table 5.9.  The Regional Budget Process in Extremadura and Madrid, with Comparison 
to Spain, 2004-2006a 
 Spain Extremadura Madrid 
Government’s preparation of the 
budget (maximum score: 16) 
13.66 13.66 13.66 
Parliament’s enactment of the budget 
(max.  score: 20) 
8 14 10 
Observance of the budget during the 
budget year (max.  score: 24) 
10.6 11.6 7.6 
Total score (max.  score 60) 32.26 39.26 31.26 
Explanatory note: The lower the score, the more open the budget process.  a The institutional architecture 
for this period was set by the end of 2003 and remained effective until January 2007, when the 2006 budget 
stability reforms were implemented at the national level, and the 2007 reform of Law 2/1985 on Public 
Finance of the Extremadura and the 2009 modification of the regulation regarding the Parliament of 
Madrid’s functioning were implemented in Extremadura and Madrid, respectively.   
Source: Author’s analysis. 
The regional budget process in Madrid is based on three main regional laws and 
their modifications, but also influenced by the EU Maastricht Treaty and the SGP as 
well as subsequent national budget legislation (e.g. 2001 Budget Stability Laws and 
2003 General Budget Law).  All legal and political processes in Madrid are founded on 
its Statute of Autonomy, which was established with Organic Law 3/1983 and 
successively reformed in 1994 and 1998 (remaining in effect until 2010).  Madrid’s 
Statute of Autonomy defines the character and functions of its main government 
institutions.  The Parliament of Madrid (Asamblea de Madrid) is the legislative branch 
of the community, approving and controlling its budget (Comunidad Autónoma de 
Madrid 1997, vol. 36, n. Article 9).  The Regional Government of Madrid is the 
executive and administrative branch and has a Governing Council composed of the 
president, vice presidents (if any) and the ministers (Presidencia de la Comunidad de 
Madrid 1983, vol. 161, n. Article 19).  Law 9/1990, regulating the Treasury of the 
Community of Madrid, constituted the legal reference document for regulating the 
financial functioning of the regional public sector.  This law was modified almost every 
year by either the annual regional budget laws or the (annual) tax and administrative 
measures laws (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 1990).  Finally, in 1997, 
Madrid passed a specific regulation on the functioning of its parliament, which 
remained active without modification until 2009 (Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid 
1997).   
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I applied von Hagen’s (1992) structural index parameters to the case of Madrid.  
For the first phase of the budget process, the government’s preparation of the budget, 
Madrid scored 13.66 points.  It is not surprising that Madrid received the same scoring 
for this phase as Extremadura and the central government because it is under the same 
influences, namely the EU Maastricht Treaty, the SGP and subsequent national budget 
legislation.  For the second phase of the budget process, the parliament’s enactment of 
the budget, information was obtained from regional parliamentary regulations; for 
example, Article 162.2 sets specific terms for the offsetting of the budget (following 
national budget law guidelines) and Article 164 describes the voting procedures of the 
parliament (which are specific to Madrid).  I awarded Madrid 10 points on this phase.  
For the third phase of the budget process, observance of the budget during the budget 
year, indicators were mostly specific to the budget regulations within the Treasury Law 
of Madrid.  After careful analysis, Madrid scored 7.6 points, which was by far the 
lowest score across the board for any of the budget phases and case studies in this 
thesis.  Overall, Madrid scored 31.26 points, which was one point lower than the 
central government’s total score and eight points lower than Extremadura’s total score.   
Overall, from this analysis of subnational expenditure advocates and guardians, 
Extremadura almost ranked in the strong category, whereas Madrid was more 
moderate.  Indeed, Extremadura can be said to have had stronger subnational 
expenditure guardians than subnational expenditure advocates; however, Madrid’s 
expenditure advocates and guardians were both moderate.  Moreover, in comparison 
with the central government, Madrid had a slightly looser budget process, while 
Extremadura’s was considerably tighter. 
5.3.2.  Health-Sector Kentrocrats 
By way of reminder, health-sector kentrocrats are representatives who promote central 
government interests in the health policymaking process at the subnational level of 
government.  They can be thought of as the inverse of the topocrats, only sector 
specific.  Health-sector kentrocrats are typically national-level bureaucrats from the 
health sector but can also include national-level politicians with an interest in the health 
sector.  As the intergovernmental relations shift toward a greater amount of decision 
space at the subnational government level, especially in the case of health system 
devolution, health-sector kentrocrats “steward” subnational governments by guiding 
them in the policymaking and implementation of health policies and seeking to advance 
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their primary goals of national health policy coherence and coordination across the 
subnational governments.   
In most governments, including Spain, health-sector kentrocrats consist 
primarily of representatives from the MOH, because the MOH is the ultimate 
governing entity responsible for the health system’s performance and the welfare of the 
population (Roberts et al. 2004).  In Spain in particular, the 1978 Spanish Constitution 
(Article 149.16) gave the central government exclusive responsibility over basic 
legislation and general coordination of health care, as well as health financing, health 
care coverage and benefits, pharmaceutical policy and training and research.  The 
Spanish MOH is the public body responsible for proposing and implementing 
government policy on health planning and health care, and for guaranteeing the right to 
health care for all citizens.  The 1986 GHL charged the MOH with ensuring the 
coordination and cooperation of the NHS and its various stakeholders, including health 
services at the regional level.  With the completion of health system devolution in 
2001, the government passed Royal Decree 840/2002, which modified and developed 
the MOH’s organisational structure, giving it the role of steering body and high 
inspector of the NHS, and making the CISNS, the chief coordinating body of the NHS 
(Ministerio para Las Administraciones Públicas 2002, 840).  The 2003 LCQ further 
regulated the MOH’s oversight role vis-à-vis the NHS with a better systematisation of 
the MOH’s functions, as follows (Jefatura del Estado 2003b):  
i) to monitor the integration of the regional health plans and programs and 
the general objectives of the central government; 
ii) to evaluate compliance with the common goals and objectives of the NHS, 
including those defined in agreements made by the CISNS;  
iii) to monitor the implementation and utilisation of central government funds 
and subsidies allocated to the regions;  
iv) to make sure that funds for health services at the regional level are utilised 
according to the general principles of this law; 
v) to ensure that previously central government-owned health centres, 
services or establishments are being used appropriately,  
vi) to verify the absence of all types of discrimination in the NHS, and  
vii) to monitor all health competencies and ensure that they are carried out in 
agreement with criteria for the democratic participation of all 
stakeholders.   
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Furthermore, the 2003 LCQ gave the MOH joint responsibility (with the regions) over 
the development of quality assurance strategies for the NHS, which would be 
implemented through its Agency for NHS Quality (Article 60).162   
To find the relative position of the health-sector kentrocrats in Spain from 2004 
to 2006, I assess their influence on health policy priorities within the subnational health 
policymaking environment (see Chapter 3 for more details).  To do this, using health 
system stewardship concepts from Travis et al.’s (2003), I analyse the MOH as a 
steward of the health system and its progress in advancing its primary goals as a health-
sector kentrocrat (i.e., national health policy coherence and coordination across the 
regional governments). In particular, I examine the MOH and its ability to carry out the 
following four responsibilities: (i) to ensure tools for implementation: powers, 
incentives and sanctions; (ii) to ensure accountability; (iii) to generate intelligence; and 
(iv) to build partnerships. 
To begin, for the MOH’s first area of responsibility (Ensuring Tools for 
Implementation), I assess whether the MOH has sufficient funds to disperse to the 
regions in order to ensure regional compliance with national health priorities and 
policies.  I also examine the most significant health legislation and regulations 
established by the central government and the MOH during the early 2000s.  I take a 
close look at regional compliance with these provisions, especially in the cases of 
Extremadura and Madrid.163  Next, for its second responsibility (Ensuring 
Accountability), I review the MOH’s efforts to ensure accountability in the NHS (see 
more detail in Chapter 4).  In addition, for its third responsibility (Generating 
Intelligence), I assess the MOH’s ability to ensure access to health information 
throughout the NHS, for example, by looking at annual national health system reports 
and procedures.  Finally, for the MOH’s fourth responsibility (Building Partnerships), I 
examine its ability to build and sustain partnerships with the regions.  The elements that 
I analyse under each one of these responsibilities are directly carried out by the health-
sector kentrocrats within the subnational policymaking environment and/or provide 
them with a greater advantage to influence the subnational health policymaking 
process. 
5.3.2.1. Ensuring Tools for Implementation: Financing: As described in detail in 
Chapter 4, after the 2001 health system devolution all earmarking of financial resources 
                                               
162 See the Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 for more information. 
163 Reviewing the legislation of all Spanish regions is not within the scope of this thesis.   
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for health was removed.  Instead, Law 21/2001 legislated the 2001 regional financing 
agreement, which for the first time integrated NHS financing into the regional 
financing system (Jefatura del Estado 2001b).  The regional financing system consisted 
of intergovernmental block grants from the General Fund (Fondo General) channelled 
yearly from the central government to the regional government coffers.  The regions 
would receive these funds and would conduct their own processes for budgeting and 
spending them, complying with the central government’s stipulation of a minimum 
expenditure level (floor) for the financial resources that each region was obligated to 
spend on health.164  Although this expenditure floor was a precautionary measure, it 
was relatively easy to reach.  In general, the regions surpassed it and had difficulty, 
rather, containing the increasing costs of the health sector.  For 2003, the expenditure 
floor was €27,814 million for the country, €840 million for Extremadura and €3,025 
million for Madrid.165  In comparison, for the same year, actual consolidated spending 
on health by all regions exceeded €38,648 million, with Extremadura spending just 
over €1,028 million and Madrid spending just over €4,606 million (Ministerio de 
Economía y Hacienda and Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2005, 46).   
Law 21/2001 also redesigned the taxation system, increasing the regions’ direct 
control over taxes and their collection abilities.  As a result, regional taxes could also be 
used as a source for health financing.  In the regional financing agreement, a 
Sufficiency Fund (Fondo de Suficiencia) was established to supplement regional tax 
revenues and provide the funds that regional governments needed.  In 2006, this fund 
received €364.7 million together from the Balearic Isles (€206.67 million) and Madrid 
(€158.03 million).  At the same time, its budget for the same year totalled €29,248.61 
million, of which Extremadura was allocated 5.83 per cent (€1,705.75 million) 
(Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 2007a).  Finally, the regional financing agreement 
included the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación 
Interterritorial), for which regions could submit proposals to finance investment 
projects intended to remedy any economic imbalances between them.  In 2006, this 
fund totalled €1,159.89 million, of which it budgeted 7.7 percent (€87.79 million) for 
                                               
164 “This threshold is worked out by applying demographic and geographic indicators to calculate the 
expenditure in the reference year (1999) adjusted by health needs; this minimum amount has to be 
updated on an annual basis in line with the increase in the total state tax revenue” (García-Armesto et al. 
2010, 97).   
165 These figures exclude funds from the Temporary Disability Savings Programme (described below). 
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Extremadura (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 2007a).  In addition, it allocated 
funds to another nine regions, not including Madrid, and the two Autonomous Cities.     
In addition to these forms of non-sector-specific regional financing, the central 
government also created two health-specific funds: the Temporary Disability Savings 
Programme Fund (Fondo Programa de Ahorro en Incapacidad Temporal) and the 
Health Cohesion Fund (Fondo de Cohesión Sanitaria).  These funds were meant to 
cover particular expenses and foster the implementation of policies, ultimately 
increasing efficiency and reducing inequalities across the different regional health 
services.  Initially, the Temporary Disability Savings Programme Fund was allocated 
€240.4 million for distribution to the regions in proportion to their number of people 
with temporary disabilities.   
More interesting for this assessment, the Health Cohesion Fund, created under 
Article 4.B.c) of Law 21/2001, became the primary financing source managed directly 
by the MOH (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2002) and was “intended as a tool for 
the Ministry of Health to implement policies guaranteeing cohesion and equity in the 
[NHS]” (García-Armesto et al. 2010, 129).  These monies were to be allocated to the 
regions based on two main objectives: (i) to compensate them for care provided to 
residents of other regions or countries, and (ii) to guarantee equal access to public 
health care services for all citizens (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera 2001; 
Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2002, 5th Additional Provision).166  The Health 
Cohesion Fund’s initial allocation was just €55 million annually for both the regions 
and other nations.  In practice, however, the it was not an optimal instrument to reach 
these objectives because of its limited financial resources and scope (Urbanos 2004).167  
Thus, an annual increase of €45 million to this fund was recommended and approved 
by the Second Conference of the Presidents in 2005.  
Also stemming from a recommendation by this Conference, the President 
announced the implementation of the 2006 NHS Quality Plan (Plan de Calidad del 
                                               
166 The eligible services for compensation and the level of compensation for each service are included in 
Annex I and II of Royal Decree 1247/2002.   
167 An MOH stakeholder went further to say, in general, “I think that [the MOH] should have a larger 
budget to perform our tasks of coordination and cohesion” (Novinskey, Interview no. 4).  An MOF 
stakeholder disagreed with this, saying that “for a devolved country, the funds—including the Health 
Cohesion Fund—that the MOH had to carry out its main responsibilities, including “setting guidelines 
for the sector”, were sufficient; it is not necessary to increase spending on the regions but rather [the 
MOH] can obligate them to reprioritise or reassign expenditures to comply with new guidelines” 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 41).  He further stated that “any additional financial allocation to the regions 
in the name of ‘health care’ breaks with the logic of the financing system since 2001, which explicitly 
did away with conditional financing” (ibid.).   
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SNS) and a corresponding new allocation of €50 million to support it.  This new 
allocation, also managed by the MOH, first appeared in the 2006 budget.  It was 
intended primarily to strengthen the cohesion policy and strategy to improve the quality 
of NHS services (Urbanos-Garrido 2006).   
Having reviewed all of these financing mechanisms for the NHS, during the 
period from 2004 to 2006, did the MOH have sufficient funds to disperse to the regions 
to enable them to implement national health policy goals?  The short answer is no.  The 
regions received close to 98 per cent of their funding for the health sector from the 
central government’s General Fund, which was managed by the MOF.  The additional 
2 per cent managed by the MOH did not provide enough incentive for some regions 
even to process requests for compensation for the services they performed on residents 
of other regions or countries.  An Interviewee from the MOH provided the best account 
of the nature of the Health Cohesion Fund and the bargaining power of the MOH in 
general after 2001 (Novinskey, Interview no. 15):  
The problem is that this fund is endowed with very little money.  And 
with the little money that this fund had, they could not do anything.  If it 
were well endowed, this fund would probably be conditional.  …  The 
only way to do health policy is to have a conditional cohesion fund for 
which you need to ask for money to do something.  In the political game 
[around the consolidation of Law 21/2001], it was the Ministry of Finance 
that led negotiations because it was more important than the Ministry of 
Health.  What the Ministry of Finance wanted was to achieve a unanimous 
agreement from the autonomous communities.  I think they achieved that 
and to do so they had to put a lot of money on the table.  All the money 
that they used [in this negotiation] was what we could not use, then, for 
cohesion policy.  So [the central government] managed to make an 
agreement today but not in the future. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether the additional funding that the MOH was 
set to manage in 2006 would be an effective incentive for the regions to carry out 
national health cohesion and quality policy goals.  In reference to the new financial 
allocations to the regions resulting from the recommendations of the Second 
Conference of Presidents, an interviewee from the Ministry of Finance called them 
“Little gifts.  Nothing.  Peanuts” (Novinskey, Interview no. 38).  Another interviewee 
said, “In 2005, the Conference of Presidents ended unfavourably, distributing 
insufficient funds” (Novinskey, Interview no. 39).  In his analysis, Ferrandiz 
Manjavacas (2004, 700) calculated that in 2003 the financing for the Health Cohesion 
Fund would have needed to be at least €401 million—more than seven times the 
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original endowment and four times what it held in 2006—in order to satisfy the needs 
of the regions and fulfil the objectives of this Fund.   
5.3.2.2. Ensuring Tools for Implementation: Regulation and Compliance: The 
foundation of the regulatory framework for the Spanish health sector is the 1986 GHL, 
from which a number of requirements were established for the regions.  As one 
stakeholder stated, “the State establishes the requirements and the Autonomous 
Communities are to develop their respective norms latter” (Novinskey, Interview no. 
26).  Foremost among them was the requirement to elaborate health plans, which was 
discussed in the sections on Regulation and Planning both before and after 2001 in 
Chapter 4.  Most importantly, the MOH published its first “global” plan in 1995 and, 
by 1999, all regions had at least one health plan approved (e.g. Madrid in 1995 and 
Extremadura in 1997).  Nevertheless, the actual development of these plans at both the 
central government and regional levels was slow, taking up to 13 years in some cases.   
From the completion of health system devolution in 2001 until 2006, the central 
government and the MOH enacted several regulations regarding health services.  Of 
these, in this section, I examine the laws that have the greatest effect on the institutional 
architecture of the health sector and require specific actions from the regions.  See 
Appendix L.  They are Law 41/2002 on patient autonomy, rights and duties related to 
clinical information and documentation; Law 16/2003 LCQ; and Law 55/2003 on the 
framework statute of statutory health professionals.168  To do so, I present the relevant 
portions of these laws and their requirements for the regions in the areas of medical 
records, individual health cards, waiting time guarantees, NHS quality plans and the 
professional career path.  Furthermore, I assess Extremadura and Madrid’s compliance 
with requirements in these areas, in order to evaluate the influence health-sector 
kentrocrats had on steering policymaking processes and priorities at regional level.    
5.3.2.2.1. Medical Record Protection and Access.  Law 41/2002 sought to 
regulate the rights and obligations of patients, users and professionals, as well as public 
and private health centres and services, related to patient autonomy and medical 
information records.  This law stipulated two main actions from the regions; I review 
these required actions and Extremadura and Madrid’s compliance with them.  First, 
Article 14.4 requires the regions to ensure that health centres adopt adequate technical 
and organisational measures for archiving and protecting medical records and avoiding 
                                               
168 The Second Transitory Provision of Law 44/2003 allows the administrations four years from the time 
it takes effect to implement a professional development system, putting it outside our period of study.   
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their damage or loss; second, Article 16.7 requires them to regulate procedures for 
access to and use of medical records.  Both Extremadura and Madrid comply with these 
articles.169  Prior to this central government requirement, in its 2001 Health Care 
Planning Law, Madrid included general provisions for patient rights and access to 
medical records (Article 27.7); however, these provisions were rather broad and not 
defined as required by the central government (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 
2001b).  In 2004, Madrid’s Agency for the Protection of Data (La Agencia de 
Protección de Datos de la Comunidad de Madrid) approved a resolution regulating 
patient autonomy and guaranteeing protection of personal health information 
(Dirección de la Agencia de Protección de Datos de la Comunidad de Madrid 2004).  
Meanwhile, with Law 3/2005, Extremadura passed legislation governing health 
information and patient autonomy (Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2005b).  In 
particular, Chapter 1 of this law defines the content of and outlines the treatment, 
utilisation and conservation of medical records as well as patient rights to access them.  
In its title VII,170 the law also establishes the foundation for sanctioning administrative 
violations of rights and obligations related to medical records and patient autonomy.   
5.3.2.2.2. Individual Health Care Card.  Law 16/2003 regulates the cohesion 
and quality of the NHS.  Its Article 57 stipulates one individual health care card 
(Tarjeta Sanitaria Individual) for the nation, which should be regulated and utilised by 
the regions in their respective territories.  The primary means for collecting and holding 
the necessary data on this card is through a health information system.  Thus, Chapter 5 
of this law is dedicated to regulating the NHS’s health information system.   
Prior to Law 16/2003, beginning in the 1990s, there were seven different co-
existing regional health information systems and corresponding health cards within the 
NHS: one for the ten “slow-track” regions managed by INSALUD plus the Canary 
Islands, and one for each of the remaining six regions that had devolved health service 
competencies before 2001 (García-Armesto et al. 2010, 131).  “Each Autonomous 
Community has some embryo, some sketch of [data and information] but this is a task 
that we have to face collectively”, said one stakeholder (Novinskey, Interview no. 04).  
These health information systems and cards, however, were not interoperable—a 
necessary condition for a coherent and cohesive NHS (Novinskey, Interview no. 12).  
                                               
169 See http://susananajera.com/index.php/historia-clinica-legislacion-autonomica-en-espana/ for 
information on other regions.   
170 This title was supported by Article 52 of Law 10/2001, on Extremadura Health and Article 44 of the 
Organic Law 15/1999, on the Protection of Personal Data and Information.   
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As one stakeholder, who worked previously in the MOH and a regional health ministry, 
affirmed, “prior to the transfers, we were not able to put a system of health information 
together because the Ministry of health had a very big fight with the Autonomous 
Communities to obtain information, so it would be viable and prevail over time” 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 36).  Article 57 would remedy these problems through its 
mandate.  It also created a National Health Information Institute under its Agency for 
NHS Quality, which became the secretariat for the CISNS’s Sub-commission on 
Information Systems.  This sub-commission was ground zero for consolidating the co-
existing health information systems and health cards.  In developing Article 57, and in 
accordance with Royal Decree 1479/2001171 (Ministerio para Las Administraciones 
Públicas 2001i), the central government also passed Royal Decree 183/2004, which 
specifically regulated the emission and validity of the individual health care card with 
basic common data and a personal identification code for the entire NHS.   
Importantly, the regions were to regulate the introduction and use of this card in 
their respective territories.  Madrid complied with this measure through Order 
1285/2006, the objective of which was to regulate the legal system and the procedure 
for obtaining and issuing the individual health care card within its territory (Consejería 
de Sanidad y Consumo 2006k).  Extremadura established the requisite guarantees 
regarding the use of a health card as an instrument for accessing NHS benefits in the 
Second Additional Provision of the Extremadura Health Law (10/2001).  It further 
developed this provision and complied with the central government’s requirements 
through Order 29 September 2004, which regulated the procedure for its citizens to 
obtain this card (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004l).  Moreover, Extremadura 
regulated the procedures for foreigners to obtain a card for receiving health assistance 
within the Extremadura public health system (Tarjeta para Atención Sanitaria en el 
Sistema Sanitario Público de Extremadura); this is a separate card pursuant to 
Extremadura’s Decree 31/2004,172 granting health care protection to foreigners and 
authorizing the creation of this card as an additional benefit to the common health 
benefit package (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004h). 
                                               
171 Royal Decree 1479/2001 required specific regulation of the health care card as well as the system of 
managing and processing it.   
172 This Decree was later modified with Order 25 April 2007, and the content and characteristics of the 
individual health care card and design of the corresponding new information system were later regulated 
with Decree 9/2008 (25 January).   
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5.3.2.2.3. Waiting Time Guarantees.  Article 25 of Law 16/2003 also requires 
the regions to define the maximum waiting times for accessing health services in their 
benefit package.  Following this, Article 2 of Royal Decree 605/2003 obliges the 
regions to establish an information system on waiting lists for external consultations, 
diagnostic and therapeutic tests and surgical interventions (Ministerio de Sanidad y 
Consumo 2003b).   
Extremadura performed research on this topic, finding that, at times, its tertiary 
care173 patients had to wait longer for care than was “socially or medically desirable” 
(Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2005a).  In accordance with this region-
specific result and the above-mentioned central government laws, the Extremadura 
passed Law 1/2005, committing to guarantee all citizens an acceptable response time 
for specialised care (Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2005a).  As established in 
Article 11 of this law, Extremadura subsequently adopted Decree 228/2005, which 
regulates the content, organisation and functioning of the registry for the Extremadura 
Public Health System’s patient waiting list and creates a file of personal characteristics 
for it (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2005m).   
Within the central government’s framework for guaranteeing waiting times, the 
Community of Madrid prioritised a reduction in waiting times for surgical interventions 
and passed corresponding legislation in 2004.  First, with Resolution 12 February 2004 
of the Regional Parliament of Madrid, it charged the RHM with elaborating an 
integrated plan for the management and monitoring of waiting lists (Pleno de la 
Asamblea de Madrid 2004).  Then, the Governing Council of Madrid approved the 
Integral Plan for Reducing Waiting Times for Surgical Interventions (Plan Integral de 
Reducción de la Espera Quirúrgica), and set its implementation for 2006.  Finally, it 
legislated Decree 62/2004, creating a Central Unit for the Management of the Surgical 
Wait List and a Central Commission for Monitoring and Evaluating the Integral Plan.  
This decree also created and regulated the Unified Registry for Patients (Registro 
Unificado de Pacientes) on the surgical wait list of the Public Health Network for the 
Community of Madrid, in addition to establishing its content, management and 
procedures (Consejo de Gobierno 2004b).  In agreement with the First Final Provision 
of this decree, Madrid legislated Order 602/2004, approving the Instructions for 
Managing the Unified Registry for Patients on the surgical wait list.  It also legislated 
Order 676/2004, creating a file for the personal characteristics of the patients on the 
                                               
173 There were no waiting time issues for primary care services.   
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surgical waiting list.  Note well that by the end of this period, Madrid had not complied 
with the national laws regarding information systems and waiting time definitions for 
diagnostic and therapeutic tests nor external consultations. 
5.3.2.2.4. NHS Quality Plans.  In Article 61, Law 16/2003 stipulates that the 
MOH and the RHMs will periodically elaborate plans for NHS quality, containing 
quality objectives for a determined period.  As discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, 
the MOH published its first NHS Quality Plan in 2006 (Plan Calidad Sistema Nacional 
de Salud), including 41 quality objectives for the year (see Table 4.5).   
Prior to this, in 2002, Madrid passed its Comprehensive Quality Plan for Health 
Services (Plan de Calidad Integral de los Servicios Sanitarios), a multi-year plan 
through 2007.  This plan was generated with Madrid’s own initiative, created before the 
2003 LCQ with the objective of promoting the continued improvement of health care as 
perceived by citizens and the satisfaction of all health service professionals.   
In compliance with Article 53 of Law 16/2003 and the Extremadura Health Plan 
for 2005-2008, the Extremadura created the ‘I Framework Plan for Quality in 2006’ as 
an instrument for the continued improvement of health care quality in the region.  This 
Framework Plan contains eight Strategic Pillars regarding all aspects of health care 
quality improvement and user satisfaction, including (i) health care quality, (ii) 
relational quality, (iii) authorisation and accreditation of health centres, services and 
establishments, (iv) health care evaluation, (v) research and education, (vi) information 
systems, (vii) professional development, and (viii) management and financing.  
Because they were created prior to the NHS Quality Plan, Extremadura and Madrid’s 
health care quality plans were not wholly consistent nor coordinated with it or each 
other. 
5.3.2.2.5. General Criteria for a Professional Career and Remuneration in 
Health Care.  Law 55/2003 creates the statutory framework for health care 
professionals, stipulating the general criteria for a professional career and remuneration 
in health care in Articles 40 and 41, respectively.  The regions must establish career 
mechanisms for their health care professionals as well as the necessary mechanisms for 
ensuring payment for the activities they perform.  In compliance with these articles, 
Madrid’s Governing Council passed the Agreement of 24 January 2007, approving the 
agreement made by the Madrid RHM and trade unions on 5 December 2006 
(Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo and Las Organizaciones Sindicales 2006), 
regarding the professional career paths of health care graduates and masters 
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(diplomados y licenciados).  Furthermore, within its objectives, the 2002 
Comprehensive Quality Plan for the Health Services of the Community of Madrid 
included the design of a new uniform compensation system for personnel providing 
services at its health centres and institutions.   
Meanwhile, Extremadura passed Resolution 23 January 2006, which published 
the agreement reached on 24 October 2005 between the Extremadura RHS and five 
trade unions on the career paths and development of health professionals within the 
RHS.  In addition, it passed Decree 37/2006 regulating the personnel management tools 
for the Extremadura RHS and the structure of the statutory workforce, followed by 
Resolution 24 May 2006 on optional procedures for health workers with a master’s 
degree (licenciados) from the statutory regime.   
5.3.2.2.6. Summary.  According to my parameters, Extremadura and Madrid 
complied with these five areas of regional responsibility stipulated in the three laws 
under investigation by the end of 2006, with the exception of certain waiting time 
criteria for Madrid.  However, interestingly, in all these areas (with the exception of 
waiting time guarantees), Extremadura and/or Madrid had adopted their own legislation 
before the central government did.  For example, Extremadura regulated individual 
health care cards for its citizens in its 10/2001 Health Law and more specifically in its 
Order 29 September 2004; the central government did not mandate specific regulations 
for the cards until 2006.  Therefore, the question of whether or not these regions were 
complying with central government law becomes moot due to the level of initiative 
from these two regions, showing that they are stronger actors within their own health 
sector than the MOH is (because the  MOH is hardly leading the regions’ regulatory 
efforts).  Indeed, when talking about the MOH after the second wave of devolution, one 
stakeholder said that the MOH was lacking instruments to incentivise and sanction 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 36).  
Compliance does occur, however, in cases where Extremadura or Madrid 
adjusted its legislation to make it consistent with subsequent regulations from the 
central government.  For example, in its 2002 health care quality plan, Madrid included 
objectives and actions for addressing aspects of health care professional career paths 
and compensation, prior to the central government’s Law 55/2003 that mandated 
further actions, with which Madrid complied in 2006 with a more specific agreement.  
Moreover, Madrid had already begun adopting regulation on medical records with its 
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2001 health care planning law before the central government passed Law 41/2002, 
following up with additional detailed regulation in 2004.   
What I have described so far suggests good compliance by the regions with 
MOH regulations.  However, whereas this pattern might normally be seen as evidence 
that the health-sector kentrocrats retain strong advantage or influence, in fact the 
regions are leading and partially pre-empting national regulations by enacting their own 
requirements autonomously, even before such national regulations are formulated or 
put into effect.  This suggests that the role of health-sector kentrocrats is one of 
relatively little importance. 
5.3.2.3. Accountability:  As described in the section on Governance and 
Stewardship Rules after the 2001 health system devolution in Chapter 4, the central 
government and, more specifically, the MOH set broad accountability mechanisms for 
the whole NHS.  Here we look in particular at actions that make the system accountable 
to the people, regarding patient and user rights, complaint systems and public 
participation.  Laws 21/2002 and the 2003 LCQ were key legislation that updated 
accountability rules already established by the 1986 GHL.   
The regions were able to expand on the central government’s legislation in this 
aspect of the NHS.  For example, all the regional laws regarding health planning, 
except that of Murcia, mandate claims and complaints as users’ rights.  Moreover, 
Article 12.3 of Law 41/2002 obliged all RHSs to display guides on how-to file 
complaints at health care facilities and to establish an adequate system for exercising 
patient freedom and rights.  To this effect, some RHSs have created specific units for 
defending and guaranteeing, as well as providing information on patient rights, called 
Patient Support Services (Servicios de Atención al Paciente) or User Support Units 
(Unidades de Atención al Usuario).  Moreover, some regions have appointed an 
ombudsman to assist patients with their concerns.174   
In its 2001 Health Care Law, Extremadura legislated the right to use complaint 
and suggestion procedures (Article 11.1n) and mandated availability of an ombudsman 
for RHS patients175 (Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2001b).  Subsequently, 
Decree 4/2003 further defined and developed the role of the ombudsman.  In its 2001 
                                               
174 For more information on the Ombudsman for Patients in Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Castile-La 
Mancha, Galicia and La Rioja, see Table 4 of Annex II of the Annual NHS Report (Observatorio del 
SNS 2005).  Section 2.5 of this same report includes information on the effective guarantee of citizen 
rights regarding the NHS for the remaining regions.   
175 Article 16 on the Defensor de los Usuarios del Sistema Sanitario Público de Extremadura. 
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Health Planning Law, Madrid also mandated the rights and duties of users, including 
the right to receive health care within certain waiting times, to advance care directives 
and to access medical record information.  In this same law, it also created an 
ombudsman for patients (Chapter 3 of Title IV).  Following this, it guaranteed the 
independent and autonomous status of the ombudsman (Decree 10/2004), regulated 
customer service (Decree 21/2002 and Order 605/2003) and established a system for 
handling suggestions, complaints and claims for the RHS (Order 605/2003).   
Overall, Extremadura and Madrid have both fulfilled their obligations to define 
health care planning specifically for their respective RHSs and to establish a system for 
patient freedoms and rights.  They initiated legislation in these areas prior to central 
government mandates and then added regulations as needed to conform to mandates 
imposed subsequently.  As a result, the accountability mechanisms established by the 
central government and, more specifically, the MOH (through the 1986 GHL, Law 
21/2002, the 2003 LCQ) were implemented and complied with by the regions, 
demonstrating the MOH’s respectable ability to ensure accountability within the 
system.176  
5.3.2.4. Generating Intelligence:  As part of their stewardship of the NHS, 
health sector kentrocrats must be able to generate intelligence and coordinate an 
evidence base for decision-making.  Intelligence is defined as reliable, up-to-date 
information on important health system performance trends and possible policy 
options, among other things (Travis et al. 2001; 2003).  In Spain, according to the 2003 
LCQ, the MOH is responsible for developing the NHS’s Health Information System 
(Sistema de Información Sanitaria del SNS), creating the Institute for Health 
Information (Instituto de Información Sanitaria) under the auspices of the MOH 
(Alfarro Latorre 2006; Bankauskaite and Novinskey 2010)177, and ensuring the 
availability and dissemination of health information.  Along with this law, two others 
have created the legal framework for generating intelligence: the 1986 GHL mandates 
the fundamental exchange of information within the NHS and Law 41/2002 stipulates 
patients’ freedom of information, provides for the rights and obligations of the medical 
                                               
176 A more robust analysis would analyse the MOH’s ability to monitor and enforce dissenters of the 
central government mandates.  Unfortunately, this information is very difficult to obtain and, thus, 
beyond the scope of the thesis. 
177 In November 2000, the CISNS Sub-commission for Information Systems was charged with 
constructing a comprehensive and integrated system.  However, it was not until after the enactment of 
Law 16/2003 that the Sub-commission began to address this task (Subdirección General de Información 
Sanitaria e Innovación 2014).   
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records and information system, and sets the foundation of the national information 
technology strategy for the health sector.  The Health Information System must respond 
to the needs of health authorities, professionals, citizens and health care organisations 
and associations.  As such, respectively, it must include information for developing and 
making policy decisions, improving medical knowledge and aptitude, improving self-
care and health service use and promoting civil society’s participation in the NHS.  
Overall, the Health Information System is an essential element for meeting the current 
and future challenges facing the NHS.   
While information and data generally flowed effectively between the different 
administrations after devolution (Esteban Gonzalo 2007), the Health Information 
System was a repertoire of mostly descriptive, somewhat independent statistical 
operations, with some remaining thematic gaps and without common criteria for its 
integration and analysis.  Thus, the large amount of data reported had limited utility, 
and standardizing and harmonizing data and information systems presented a key 
challenge for the MOH.  For example, during this period, the MOH published its 
annual report on the NHS (Informe Anual del SNS) with at least a two-year lag and the 
information it included from the regions was incomparable and presented in separate 
annexes because the regions often used different indicators and measures for the same 
objectives (Novinskey, Interview no. 12).  The same problem characterised nearly all 
data reports coordinated by the MOH during this period (e.g. the National Health 
Survey and the Public Health Spending Statistics).  This situation had developed 
largely because of the history of the regional health information systems, which were 
created at different times and developed at different rates, corresponding to some extent 
with each region’s assumption of health service responsibilities.   
Although the MOH improved its role in developing the Health Information 
System and generating the necessary intelligence for the NHS over this period, it was 
not until the promulgation of the 2006 NHS Quality Plan that it made great strides in 
this area (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2006b).  At that point, through the 
CISNS’s Sub-commission for the Information Systems, the MOH began to redefine 
and standardise data and data flows, the selection of indicators, and the technical 
requirements necessary for the nationwide integration of health information (Antón 
Beltrán 2006; Esteban Gonzalo 2007).  This, however, is beyond of the period under 
investigation.    
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5.3.2.5.  Building Partnerships: A steward should be able to build and sustain 
effective partnerships in order to promote changes within a decentralized health system 
(Travis et al. 2003).  Here I assess the intergovernmental partnerships that the Spanish 
MOH has sustained from 2004 to 2006.  I have already discussed the CPFF and the 
CISNS, which are undoubtedly the MOH’s most important intergovernmental 
partnerships (Bankauskaite and Novinskey 2010).  The CPFF has proved to be a 
successful partnership; together with the Minister of Finance and the regional ministers 
of finance, this Council established and enforced periodic agreements regarding the 
NHS and regional financing before the 2001 devolution, and implemented the 2001 
regional financing agreement (set for an indefinite period) after the devolution reform 
and throughout the study period.  Technically, however, the MOH did not build this 
partnership nor play a major role in its agreements.   
The CISNS is the most sweeping partnership directed by the MOH, as a forum 
for the Minister of Health and its regional counterparts to discuss all matters of health 
policy.  At a more technical level, some of its commissions, sub-commissions and 
working groups have proven successful.  For example, its Sub-commission for the 
Information System was eventually effective in developing a coherent and 
interoperable system for the NHS, aided by the passage of legislation regarding the 
individual health care cards (García-Armesto et al. 2010).  In addition, its Commission 
for NHS Human Resources was quite active.  Moreover, the members of the Council 
participate on various professional bodies, including the Rector Council of the Institute 
of Health Carlos III, the Board of the National Foundation for Cancer Research, and the 
Board of the Foundation for the Institute of Cardiovascular Research (Ministerio de 
Sanidad y Consumo 2015).   
However, at a more political level, this body lacked real executive strength and 
was the source of great inefficiencies for the NHS (Elola 2004; Repullo Labrador, 
Ochoa, and et al. 2004).  Importantly, during the period of study, it had difficulties 
coordinating and integrating the 17 RHSs (Bankauskaite and Novinskey 2010).  
Moreover, stakeholder interviewees from the regions referred to the lack of direction 
from the MOH and the CISNS.  Indeed, because of this, Extremadura and Madrid, 
along with Castile-La Mancha and Castile-Leon (in total, two regions were governed 
by the PP and the other two by the PSOE), formed their own partnership (under the 
precepts of a Collaboration Agreement, which lasted approximately during 2002-2004) 
to navigate together the waters of their newfound health service responsibilities for the 
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first few years after devolution (Novinskey, Interview no. 01, 07 and 39).  This 
partnership was small but effective, agreeing on many things (Novinskey, Interview no. 
07).  Overall, the MOH built one main intergovernmental partnership that had the 
potential to promote change in the NHS (CISNS) and participated tangentially in 
another (CPFF).  By the end of the study period (2006), the CISNS still required 
strengthening to have a significant impact.  Finally, these two partnership were 
sustained through the period of study.  
In conclusion, this analysis on the influence of health-sector kentrocrats 
demonstrates that the MOH had insufficient funds to disperse to the regions to ensure 
their compliance with national health policies (part of its first responsibility).  In 
addition, while the MOH and central government established important health laws and 
regulations during the period of study and the regions seemed to comply with them, 
most often the regions actually were leading the policy environment with their own 
legislation and anticipating national legislation.  For its second responsibility, the MOH 
was successful in ensuring accountability in the NHS through its establishment of 
accountability mechanisms and the regions’ compliance and implementation of them.  
For its third responsibility, the MOH was increasingly able to generate intelligence and 
ensure access to health information throughout the NHS; however, it was not truly 
successful in doing so until just after the period of study.  Finally, for its fourth 
responsibility, the MOH’s ability to build partnerships with the regions had little 
success when examining its activities, effectiveness, and role and potential to promote 
change in the NHS through the CISNS.  Table 5.10 provides the index for health-sector 
kentrocrats in Spain and their scores for carrying out their stewardship functions of the 
system.  Overall, considering the results for these four areas of responsibility, the MOH 
performed weakly as a health-sector kentrocrat because it was only able to carry out its 
stewardship role fully under one of these four areas (accountability) and somewhat but 
not fully improve its influence in another area (generating intelligence) during the 
period 2004–2006. 
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Table 5.10.  Index for Stewardship Functions of Health-Sector Kentrocrats in Spain, 
2004–2006 
Stewardship Functions 2004–2006 
1.  Ensuring tools for implementation: financing and regulation 
a) Do health-sector kentrocrats have sufficient funding for setting 
incentives and ensuring the compliance of the subnational 
governments on nationally-established health policies?   
0 
b) Do health-sector kentrocrats identify, motivate and enforce 
subnational governments to comply with nationally-established 
laws and regulations?   
0 
2.  Ensuring accountability 
a) Do health-sector kentrocrats have sufficient accountability and 
public participation mechanisms in place?   
2 
b) Are health-sector kentrocrats able to ensure that subnational 
governments comply with the nationally-established mechanisms 
for accountability?   
2 
3.  Generating intelligence 
a) Have health-sector kentrocrats been able to provide subnational 
governments with the data and intelligence necessary to carry 
out their responsibilities?   
0 
b) Have health-sector kentrocrats been able to do this in a timely 
manner?   
0 
4.  Building partnerships 
a) Have health-sector kentrocrats built active and effective 
partnerships with subnational governments?   
1 
b) Have health-sector kentrocrats sustained their activities and 
effectiveness in these partnerships overtime?   
1 
Total Score 6 
Explanatory note: The higher the score, the stronger the health-sector kentrocrat. 
See Appendix K for index values 
 
 
5.3.3.  The General Picture of the Subnational Health Policy Network in Extremadura 
and Madrid 
In this section, I summarise the position of the three actor groups within the subnational 
health policy network in Extremadura and Madrid for the period 2004–2006, after 
health system devolution.  In general, from 2004 throughout 2006, the subnational 
health policymaking networks in Extremadura and Madrid resembled policy 
communities on the policy network continuum (cf.  Table 5.1).  The health-sector 
kentrocrats held a weak position in both regions, to a point that some would say that 
they were “organised” out of politics.  In addition, the subnational expenditure 
guardians held a structurally privileged position in the formulation of subnational 
health policy in both regions.  However, this analysis demonstrates that the subnational 
expenditure guardians were much stronger, and the expenditure advocates much 
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weaker, in Extremadura than they were in Madrid.  Table 5.11 outlines these positions.  
While the power designations appear to be the same for Extremadura and Madrid178, 
Extremadura’s actual scores for subnational expenditure advocates and guardians were 
only one point away from being labelled “weak” and “strong”.179   
Table 5.11.  Subnational Health Policy Networks for Extremadura and Madrid, 2004–
2006 
 Extremadura Madrid    
Health-Sector Kentrocrats Weak Weak 
Subnational Expenditure 
Advocates 
Moderate  
(almost weak)a 
Moderate 
Subnational Expenditure 
Guardians 
Moderate  
(almost strong)a 
Moderate 
a NB: The subnational expenditure advocates and guardians of Extremadura placed less than a point 
away from being categorized as “weak” and “strong” players, respectively.  This is an important 
distinction from Madrid’s average “moderate” score for the same actor groups. 
In terms of Figure 3.2 on the trade-offs in intergovernmental health 
policymaking at the subnational government level for the period 2004–2006, the 
Extremadura policy network functions close to the B–C line and further down that line 
toward the subnational expenditure guardians.  Thus, the balance of power in 
Extremadura intergovernmental health policymaking at this level favoured the 
subnational expenditure advocates and guardians, and a compromise of their respective 
policy priorities, more than the health-sector kentrocrats and their policy goals.  
Moreover, the subnational expenditure guardians appear in a considerably stronger 
position than the subnational expenditure advocates in Extremadura.  The Madrid 
policy network also lies close to the B–C line, however, midline.  Thus, the balance of 
power in Madrid intergovernmental health policymaking is likely a compromise 
between the policy priorities of subnational expenditure advocates and guardians, with 
little influence from the health-sector kentrocrats.  Compared with the three previously 
identified variants of the national health policy networks, the health policy networks of 
both Extremadura and Madrid, resemble the structural organization of 
intergovernmental health policymaking in Norway (1991–1992) with their respective 
                                               
178 This is the case for the health-sector kentrocrats’ influence in both regions. 
179, Used to determine the power of subnational expenditure advocates and guardians, my adaptation of 
von Hagen’s index builds in influence from the national policymaking environment by including some 
indicators that are determined by the national budget law and applied to all levels of government in the 
Spanish case.   
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expenditure advocates and guardians having moderate strength and the third actor being 
effectively organized out of politics and policymaking.  Furthermore, if accounting for 
any possible influences from the power dynamics of the national policymaking 
environment on our model of the subnational intergovernmental health policymaking, 
then we may see a slight pull from of the balance of power in Extremadura back 
towards the subnational expenditure advocates but still within the realm of the 
subnational expenditure guardians; whereas, there is unlikely to be any such influence 
on the balance of power in Madrid intergovernmental health policymaking. 
5.4.  Discussion 
Since none of our actor groups can be expected to be altruistic, it is important to 
understand who holds power in our intergovernmental policy networks at both levels of 
government in a devolved system.  My structural analysis answers this question by 
paying particular attention to what constrains or facilitates the actors’ pursuit of their 
interests (Blom-Hansen 1999).  The overall results are presented in Figure 5.7, which 
illustrates the balancing act between main actor groups in both the national and 
subnational health policymaking networks for my case studies, during the two periods 
of study.  The “iron triangles” in bold represent the dominant health policy network for 
each period of study.  The dots estimate the location of the balance of power among the 
three actor groups within each policy network.  The shaded areas around the dots in the 
subnational health policy networks represent the influence, if any, from the politics and 
policymaking of the national level.  In both policymaking environments, there are clear 
trade-offs.   
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Figure 5.7.  Overall Trade-offs in Intergovernmental Health Policymaking for the 
Regions of Extremadura and Madrid, before 2001 and 2004–2006 
 
NB: These are illustrations to give the reader a visual idea of the estimated location of the power 
dynamics of intergovernmental health policymaking during the two study periods and how such 
dynamics shifted overtime with the health care devolution reform in Spain.  They are not mathematically 
located, for example, using a ternary plot or any other graph or scale.  EA = Expenditure Advocate; EG = 
Expenditure Guardian; T = Topocrat; K = Kentrocrat; SEA = Subnational Expenditure Advocate; SEG = 
Subnational Expenditure Guardian.    
As expected, before the completion of health system devolution in 2001 and for 
the 10 slow-track regions (including Extremadura and Madrid), the main 
intergovernmental policy network involved in formulating health services and policy 
existed within the national health policymaking environment in Spain.  Within this 
environment, I expected that the expenditure advocates and guardians would share 
power; however, the results of the analysis demonstrate dominance by the expenditure 
advocates, with some influence from the topocrats via intergovernmental councils 
(namely, the CISNS and CPFF).   
After the 2001 health system devolution and the establishment of the health and 
financial institutional architecture by the end of 2003, I expected the power over the 
system to shift considerably toward the subnational health policymaking environment 
and it did.  I also expected that, within the national health policymaking environment, 
the MOH—the main expenditure advocate—would lose almost all its power to the 
expenditure guardians and topocrats.  This prediction was confirmed mostly by the 
analysis, as competencies for health care were devolved to the regional governments, 
policy influence still held by the MOH and other health expenditure advocates at the 
national level shifted to the topocrats and control over health financing moved to the 
MOF (the main expenditure guardian).  The latter change was compounded by the 
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overall tightening of the national budget processes, initiated by supranational 
requirements for Spain’s entrance into the EMU that also took place during this time as 
well.180   
With more health system power in regional hands after 2001, an 
intergovernmental health policy network arose within the subnational policymaking 
environment in both regions.  Within the subnational health policy networks of 
Extremadura and Madrid, I expected that the power transferred from the national 
expenditure advocates to this environment would be about equally balanced between 
the subnational expenditure advocates and guardians, and that the health-sector 
kentrocrats would be quite weak.  For Madrid, the health policy network analysis did 
indeed result as predicted.  For Extremadura, while the balance between subnational 
expenditure advocates and guardians lay closer to the latter, the health-sector 
kentrocrats in this network were also quite weak.  Indeed, after 2001, despite having 
passed the 2003 Law for the Cohesion and Quality of the NHS, the MOH had few tools 
available to steward the health system and attain their goal of subnational health policy 
cohesion and coordination.  The regions, rather, increased their level of influence over 
the CISNS, which directs NHS policy, and they often passed regional-level legislation 
for health care before the MOH did for the NHS as a whole.  As it seems, then, the 
health-sector kentrocrats were effectively organised out of health politics and 
policymaking for the period of study.  Furthermore, the influence of national-level 
health politics and policymaking demonstrate a pull on the original position of 
subnational health politics and policymaking in Extremadura toward the subnational 
expenditure advocates.  The model analysis does not show any particular influence 
from the national level on the balance of power at the subnational level.  
In terms of methodology, my main difficulty was the replication of von Hagen’s 
structural index on the tightness of budget processes for Spain and the two regional 
cases for the period 2004–2006.  In order to complete the index, I had to learn the 
terminology for public sector finance in English and Spanish, and to interpret the 
relevant legislation.  To assist me in this, I consulted with von Hagen via email to 
understand better how to interpret some of the indicators in his index.  I further 
consulted with a Spanish public finance specialist and former bureaucrat to confirm my 
interpretation of the budget and public-sector legislation as well as my results for each 
indicator in the index.  For future study, it would be more efficient to have a team of 
                                               
180 Because of its being non-sectoral, this part of the analysis applies to other sectors too.  
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researchers—at least one specializing in health policy and the other in public finance—
work together to replicate this index.    
I modified  Blom-Hansen’s (1999) translation of the level of budget tightness in 
a country to the level of strength of expenditure advocates and guardians from “strong 
or weak” to “strong, moderate or weak”, clearly defining a threshold for each a 
priori.181 I also created indices for the assessing the level of strength of the topocrats 
and health-sector kentrocrats.  While both of these changes helped to operationalize the 
analysis, making it more objective with stronger, more reliable results, further work is 
needed to improve the thresholds and designations for each actor group.  Such work 
should be done in conjunction with a public finance specialist and look at several cases 
to, perhaps, understand better where thresholds for the different designations should be 
located.  This should help make the designations matter more and represent differences 
between cases more appropriate (e.g., for the case of scoring the subnational 
expenditure advocates and guardians in Extremadura and Madrid).    
                                               
181 Blom-Hansen does not use the designation of “medium”, with the exception of situations in which 
topocrats have different levels of strength across policy areas (e.g. when comparing economic policy, 
health policy and child care policy in Sweden).  If he were to use this designation more generally, it is 
unclear as to where thresholds would be placed on the 60-point scale for budget tightness.   
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6.  Examining Health Policy Priorities in a Devolved Health System 
 
This chapter examines the results of the analytical framework of the thesis for the case 
of Spain, with regional cases of Extremadura and Madrid, during the period 2004–
2006, as presented in the previous two empirical chapters.  Its objective is to 
understand how effective the framework is in anticipating health policy priorities in a 
devolved system, focusing on the degree to which health policy in these two regions 
reflects the privileged position and priority goals of key actor groups in the decision-
making process.   
The results of the analytical framework of the thesis are presented separately in 
Chapters 4 and 5; I summarise them here.  In Chapter 4, I defined the degree of 
discretion, or decision space, for the various functions of the Spanish NHS before and 
after the 2001 devolution reform.  Results for Extremadura and Madrid showed that the 
same amount of de jure decision space was allocated to the two regions during both 
periods.  Through health system devolution, the regions gained a moderate to wide 
range of choice with regard to many health system functions, while the central 
government retained control over a smaller set of functions, mostly in human resources.   
In Chapter 5, I established the position of actors in the national and subnational 
health policy networks for the period before 2001 and for 2004–2006.  The institutional 
architecture of the health and finance sectors changed considerably between 2001 and 
2003, due to health system devolution and national health laws, as well as substantial 
national budget reforms.  These changes greatly affected the power dynamics between 
actors and the balance between their primary goals.  Before 2001, power was 
concentrated primarily in the hands of the expenditure advocates within the national 
health policymaking environment, with some pull towards the topocrats.  After 2003, 
this power was rebalanced and distributed between the actors in two ways.  First, 
within the national health policymaking environment it shifted away from the 
expenditure advocates and towards the expenditure guardians and topocrats; second, 
power moved downward to the subnational health policymaking environment, where it 
leaned away from the health-sector kentrocrats and more toward the subnational 
expenditure guardians for Extremadura and midline between expenditure advocates 
guardians for Madrid.   
These results characterise an intergovernmental dilemma for national health 
policies in Spain: the central government has relatively clear policy goals but the 
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regional governments have a certain degree of autonomy; meaning that if central 
guidelines are to be implemented in Spain, then the regional governments must be 
persuaded to comply.  A similar intergovernmental dilemma also appears with regard to 
subnational health policies in Spain: the regional governments have the discretion to 
make policies and to allocate expenditures to them as they like, but they rely on the 
central government for financing and some health-sector specific intelligence regarding 
these policies.   
In this chapter, I integrate the results of the decision-space approach and 
intergovernmental health policy networks components of the analytical framework of 
the thesis.  This is necessary to better understand, anticipate and examine health policy 
priorities for each health system function in a devolved health system.  To do so, we 
use the amount of the decision-space at the subnational government level to tell us 
where decision-making for a particular health policy takes place, which is where we 
should focus the analysis.  If the range of choice for a policy’s health system function is 
narrow, then the national health policy network prevails; if it is wide, then the 
subnational health policy network is dominant.  See, e.g., Figure 3.3.  If it is moderate, 
then the two intergovernmental health policy networks share power over the health 
system function and the affected policy requires further examination to determine 
which level of government has decision-making power over it and, thus, supersedes the 
other, or if the two should be described as fully interrelated, which I believe is rather 
rare empirically.   
I examine the case of Spain, with regional cases in Extremadura and Madrid, 
after the 2001 health care devolution reform for the period 2004–2006.182  This timing 
ensures that the regions are fully in the implementation phase of their health service 
competencies and responsibilities.  Through a stable institutional architecture for both 
the health and finance sectors, it also guarantees that the balances of power within the 
intergovernmental health policymaking environments in Spain are unchanging during 
the period of study.  The focus of this analysis is on the degree to which health policy 
during this period reflects the privileged position and goals of key actor groups in the 
decision-making process.  As described in Section 3.3, I do this by assessing three 
                                               
182 This period begins after the enactment of the second wave of health system devolution in Spain and 
after significant reforms to the institutional architecture of the public finance sector.  It ends at the 
beginning of 2007, when the latter is modified most importantly with the implementation of the 2006 
reforms of budget stability laws.   
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different measures for the effectiveness of intergovernmental policy: policy efficiency, 
policy strategies and policy failures.   
From this analysis, I expect to demonstrate a relatively close correspondence 
between the ex-ante derived positions and priority goals of actors in the national and 
subnational health policy networks and the ex-post health policies at the national and 
subnational government level, respectively.  I also expect that the degree of this 
correspondence will grow where greater discretion is granted to the subnational 
level.183  Moreover, I expect to substantiate the proposition that to understand 
intergovernmental health policymaking in a devolved health system, we must focus on 
the interactions among three types of actor groups within each policymaking 
environment: expenditure advocates, expenditure guardians and topocrats in the 
national one and subnational expenditure advocates, subnational expenditure guardians, 
and health-sector kentrocrats in the subnational one.  Finally, I expect to find that the 
ability of these actors to pursue their self-interests and goals is constrained and 
facilitated by the structure of the each of these intergovernmental policy networks, with 
the subnational one having some influence from the balance of power at the national 
level.   
In summary, the following sections examine whether health policy priorities as 
anticipated by the framework of the thesis hold true in Spain and the regions of 
Extremadura and Madrid during 2004–2006.  More specifically, at the subnational 
level, they analyse three health policies—waiting time guarantees, common health 
benefit package expansions, and paying medical specialists in hospital ambulatory 
settings—, each of which belong to a different functional area of the health system.  
The fourth section analyses increasing financing for regional health care within the 
national policymaking environment, under the functional area of financing.  Although 
the analysis may be applied to health system functions with different amounts of 
decision space, this analysis is limited to some of the policies belonging to health 
system functions with a moderate amount of decision space after 2001.  Moreover, for 
the first three health policies, only the regional government responsibilities for these 
functions and their corresponding subnational health policy network are examined.  For 
the fourth health policy, the national government responsibilities for financing and its 
corresponding national health policy network is examined.  Finally, I provide a 
discussion of these results.   
                                               
183 However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to examine and prove this expectation.   
Examining the Direction of Health Policies 
249 
6.1.  Governance and Stewardship Rules: Waiting Time Guarantees 
Here, I examine health policies regarding waiting time guarantees in Extremadura and 
Madrid during the period 2004–2006 and using measures of policy efficiency, policy 
strategies and policy failures.  Moreover, I evaluate whether the actual health policies 
for waiting time guarantees correspond with the policy priorities anticipated by the 
analytical framework of the thesis.  The health policies of waiting time guarantees fall 
under the functional area of Governance and Stewardship Rules and, more specifically, 
the health system function of patient and user rights.   
While health care is theoretically free at the point of service in Spain, the 
demand for health care exceeds supply, as in many health systems.  When this happens, 
waiting lists for health services are common and they are difficult to reduce.  One 
Extremadura stakeholder said,  
The hospital of Mérida was open and it had an index of urgent care 
frequency.  Then, we opened another hospital in Almendralejo, fifteen 
minutes away by car […] and we thought that frequency would decrease 
in Mérida.  [But,] it stayed the same and even increased because we offer 
a free service and, if you know that there is no or little waiting time for 
the doctor… [and] you have some discomfort, then that is enough to get 
you to go” (Novinskey, Interview no. 09).   
Indeed, since the mid-1990s, waiting lists for health care have been endemic to the 
Spanish NHS (Durán, Lara and van Waveren 2006).  Moreover, in 2000, they were the 
leading cause of complaints about the NHS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 
2000).  In such a situation, individuals suffer an additional health risk due to the time 
they must wait to receive their necessary treatment.  Furthermore, when people have to 
wait for appointments, surgeries or diagnostic tests, their degree of dissatisfaction 
grows along with their health risk, together creating a considerable social and political 
problem for the system.   
The Spanish Constitution ensures citizens the right to health protection and 
Royal Decree 63/1995 regulates the minimum services that the NHS should provide to 
them within this right.  From 1996, INSALUD and the regions with health service 
responsibilities deployed various strategies to reduce them, including additional 
working hours, agreements with private providers, specific funding agreements and 
waiting time guarantees (Observatorio del SNS 2004).  All of these were supply-side, 
not demand-side, mechanisms184 and therefore required an increase in expenditures to 
                                               
184 Up until 2006, Spain had a history of using only supply-side mechanisms (Observatorio del SNS 
2004). 
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fund them before the desired reduction in waiting times could be attempted and 
achieved.  This funding, in turn, required negotiation between subnational expenditure 
guardians and advocates.   
With Law 97/1996 (21 May), the region of Valencia was the first to introduce 
legislation on measures for reducing and eliminating waiting times (Cañizares Ruiz and 
Santos Gómez 2011).  Then, in 2000, the CISNS created a working group to analyse 
the problems with waiting lists in the NHS and to elaborate proposals with methods to 
reduce them.  As stipulated in Article 25 of the 2003 LCQ, it agreed on framework 
criteria guaranteeing a maximum waiting time to access NHS services, which would be 
approved by royal decree.185  The LCQ also gave the regions decision-making power to 
define the specific maximum waiting times for the health services within their 
territories.186  In addition, Royal Decree 605/2003 established methods for the 
homogeneous treatment of waiting list information for use in the NHS health 
information system, which defined and established the minimum, basic and common 
criteria, indicators, and requirements of waiting lists for surgical interventions, first 
outpatient visits, and diagnostic and therapeutic tests.  Before 2004, in Spain, the 
waiting time guarantee policy had been legislated and implemented in eight regions187 
and was under consideration in three additional ones; however, it had not yet been 
adopted by Extremadura or Madrid (Observatorio del SNS 2004; Cañizares Ruiz and 
Santos Gómez 2011).  
Extremadura regulated waiting times for specialised health care with Law 
1/2005 in June 2005 (Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2005a).  Article 4 of this 
law stipulated the maximum waiting times as follows:  
 180 natural days for surgical interventions, 
 60 natural days for accessing first outpatient visits, and 
 30 natural days for performing diagnostic and therapeutic tests.    
If it is anticipated that a patient may not receive care within these time limits at his or 
her original health centre, then the RHS will offer alternative assistance at another 
health centre within the Extremadura Public Health System.  If the maximum wait time 
                                               
185 These criteria, however, were not approved until 2011 with Royal Decree 1039/2011. 
186 Waiting lists for organ or tissue transplant surgeries are excluded from the waiting time guarantee 
because they depend on the availability of the organs.   
187 Andalusia Decree 207/2001 (18 September), Aragon Decree 83/2003 (29 April), Canaria Islands 
Order 15 May 2003, Castile Leon Law 8/2003 (8 April), Castile-La Mancha Law 24/2002 (5 December), 
Decree 9/2003 (28 January) and Decree 1/2004 (13 January), Catalonia Decree 354/2002 and Order 
203/2004, Galicia Law 7/2003, and Valencia Law 97/1996 (21 May). 
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is surpassed, then the patient may request care at a private health centre of her choice, 
through the ombudsman for health system users.  This law took effect in October 2005, 
shortly after Extremadura passed Decree 228/2005, creating the patient registry for the 
waiting list (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2005m).  Finally, with its experience in 
implementing Law 1/2005 and considering the available technical and human 
resources, the Governing Council of Extremadura reduced waiting times for specific 
(prioritised) types of specialised care.  Effective October 2006, Decree 132/2006 
stipulated that patients who need:  
 specific elective surgical interventions (non-urgent aneurisms, acute ischemic 
peripheral arterial disease, arteriovenous fistulas for dialysis, heart valve 
surgery and coronary surgery) would be attended within 90 natural days (Article 
2.1);  
 retinal detachment and vitrectomy within 60 natural days (Article 2.2); and  
 surgical removal of malignant tumours within 30 natural days (Article 2.3).   
In addition, it stipulated that patients suspected of having cancer would receive their 
first outpatient visit within 30 natural days, and any diagnostic and therapeutic tests 
within 15 natural days (Articles 3 and 4, respectively).  See Appendix Table M.1 for 
Extremadura’s legislation and regulations regarding waiting times during the period of 
study. 
In Article 27 of its 2001 Health Planning Law, Madrid gave its citizens the right 
to receive health services within pre-defined and known waiting times (Presidencia de 
la Comunidad de Madrid 2001b).  At the end of December 2003, the average waiting 
time for surgery was 57 days and 99 patients had been waiting more than six months 
for surgery (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004f).  But it was not until 2004 that it 
firmly committed to reducing the maximum waiting time for elective surgical 
interventions to 30 business days by the end of 2005 (Consejería de Sanidad y 
Consumo 2004a; Salvador 2004).  To carry out this commitment, through a Resolution 
of 12 February 2004, the Regional Parliament of Madrid charged the RHM with 
developing a comprehensive plan to address waiting times, including steps to increase 
surgical activities, improve the management of the waiting list, and facilitate 
reorganisation and improvement plans for both primary and specialised care.  For this, 
the RHM agreed with trade unions on a programme of incentives for health 
professionals; e.g., to agree on increasing their surgical activities.  It also determined 
the unmet need for surgeries (demand minus current supply) and, based on this 
calculation, established special agreements with public hospitals in the Unique Health 
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Network for Public Utilisation of the Madrid RHM to carry out additional surgical 
interventions.  In cases where demand still exceeded supply, the RHM would offer the 
patient a choice of receiving care at a private hospital or a public one from another 
government administration.  Madrid financed this comprehensive plan with a total of 
113,089,558 euros through three two-year programs within Madrid’s General Budget 
for 2004 and 2005.  The plan was approved by Madrid’s Governing Council in March 
2004 and its implementation was regulated by with Decree 62/2004, which created a 
Central Management Unit, a Central Commission for Monitoring and Evaluation, a 
Unified Patient Registry (RULEQ), and ethics committees.  Instructions for managing 
the RULEQ were further regulated by Order 602/2004, although this provision did not 
fully comply with national Decree 605/2003 on the homogenous treatment of the NHS 
waiting time data and information in two main ways.  First, Madrid accounted for the 
results of waiting time guarantees in a different way from the central government and 
all other regional governments (Elmundo.es 2006) (Novinskey, Interview no. 12).  
Second, Madrid refused to share its waiting time data with the MOH or others from 
2005.188  According to one MOH stakeholder, despite legislation requiring the regions 
to inform the MOH of its waiting list data, it was common practice for the regions to 
hold back data in general (Novinskey, Interview no. 15).    
In October 2005, speaking before the regional parliament, the President of 
Madrid, Esperanza Aguirre, promised to reduce waiting times for first outpatient visits 
and diagnostic tests as well.  In particular, she committed to reducing the wait for 
mammograms to 40 business days by January 2, 2006 by investing another 16 million 
euros in the programme (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2005a).  At the same time, 
the RHM raised the maximum age at which women would be eligible for preventive 
mammograms from 64 to 69.  Then, in May 2006, Madrid began to implement its plan 
to reduce waiting times for 31 outpatient medical specialties and 5 diagnostic tests to a 
maximum of 40 business days by the end of 2006 (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 
2006a).  Madrid took measures to increase the number of tests offered, partly by 
opening its health centres for business during afternoons.  Patients who could not 
obtain care within the waiting time guarantees at their health centre of origin were 
offered the choice of going to a public health centre within the Unique Health Network 
for Public Utilisation, a private health centre or public hospital pertaining to another 
                                               
188  At least until the end of this study. 
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government administration.  See Appendix Table M.2 for Madrid’s legislation and 
regulation regarding waiting times.   
In comparison, the waiting time guarantees in Extremadura granted patients 
legal rights, whereas in Madrid they were not legally binding and rested mainly on 
political statements and regulations for their implementation.  In both regions, there 
was a certain level of political and financial commitment to the policy.  However, in 
part due to the legal status of each policy, the processes of monitoring and 
accountability were more straightforward and transparent in Extremadura than in 
Madrid (despite the apparent efforts and financial investments in Madrid).  The waiting 
time data for Extremadura and Madrid are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, respectively.  
These data are not comparable between the two regions for several reasons, e.g. they 
calculate the number of days differently (natural days vs. business days) and define 
‘waiting time’ differently.  Extremadura counts days from referral for service to the 
date of service, including the date of scheduling the service.  Madrid counts only the 
period between scheduling the date of service and the date of service.  Additionally, in 
Extremadura, the data were presented clearly and consistently throughout the period of 
study, especially after Decree 228/2005.  All data were published by the Public 
Defender of Extremadura Public Health System Users.  Data for Madrid had a different 
trend: albeit largely lacking, they were clearest from the beginning of the period until 
2005, when the Government stopped sharing its data with the MOH (Cañizares Ruiz 
and Santos Gómez 2011), effectively cutting off its relationship with the health-sector 
kentrocrats.  For this reason, most of the relevant data after 2005 are unknown; making 
it impossible to evaluate objectively the efficiency of Madrid’s waiting time policy.  
This is, despite regional government declarations that it had met and surpassed its 
waiting time targets during this period (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2005a; 
2006a; Elmundo.es 2005).  Consequently, I am only able to examine data regarding the 
efficiency of Extremadura’s policy on waiting times in the following.   
The data in Table 6.1 demonstrate that the waiting time guarantees in the 
Extremadura were largely successful during 2003–2006 (taking 2003 as a baseline for 
the period 2004–2006).  Over the whole period, Extremadura managed to reduce the 
number of patients on the waiting list for surgical interventions and diagnostic and 
therapeutic tests (despite a slight rise in this last category from 2005 to 2006).  At the 
same time, its figures for the number of patients on its waiting list for first outpatient 
visits do not show a clear trend; first increasing between 2004–2005 and then 
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decreasing between 2005–2006.  Extremadura made particularly great strides during 
2005–2006, reducing the number of patients waiting more than a) 180 days for surgical 
interventions by 88 per cent, b) 60 days for their first outpatient visit by 84 per cent, 
and c) 30 days for their diagnostic and therapeutic tests by 34 per cent.  This was 
concurred although by some stakeholders (Novinskey, Interview no. 07, 35 and 37). 
Table 6.1.  Extremadura Waiting Time Guarantees, 2003–2006 
Measurement 2003 2004 2005 2006 % 
change, 
12/05 to 
12/06 
Waiting Time Guarantee for Surgical Interventions (Goal: < 180 natural days) 
Number of patients on 
waiting list 
16,021 15,971 14,155 12,757 -10 
Number of patients waiting 
more than 180 natural days 
899 2,720 1,517 179 -88 
Average waiting time 
(natural days) 
76 105 84 67 -20 
Waiting Time Guarantee for First Outpatient Visits (Goal: < 60 natural days) 
Number of patients on 
waiting list 
n/a 33,567 35,908 34,050 -5 
Number of patients waiting 
more than 60 natural days 
n/a n/a 13,741 2,178 -84 
Average waiting time 
(natural days) 
n/a 30 34 28 -17 
Waiting Time Guarantee for Diagnostic and Therapeutic Tests (Goal: < 30 
natural days) 
Number of patients on 
waiting list 
n/a 16,945 9,591 10,367 +8 
Number of patients waiting 
more than 30 natural days 
n/a n/a 6,973 4,571 -34 
Average waiting time 
(natural days) 
n/a 197a 34b 29c -15 
a No global figure available; estimate is for mammograms, which had the longest average waiting time 
among all diagnostic and therapeutic tests in 2004.  b This number masks the large variation of average 
wait times among the different tests; e.g. mammograms had an average of 47 days, still the longest of 
all tests, in 2005.  c This number masks the variation of average wait times among the different tests; 
e.g. mammograms had an average of 33 days, still the longest of all tests, in 2006.   
Sources:  Extremadura Defensor de Usuarios (2004; 2005; 2006; 2007).  Comparable data were not 
available for the additional waiting time guarantees for specific interventions in 2006.   
Importantly, Extremadura appears to have met the guaranteed average waiting 
times for all three service-areas.  With 2006 average waiting times of 67 natural days 
for surgical interventions and 28 natural days for first outpatient visits, Extremadura is 
well within its respective goals for these.  However, it is less clear if Extremadura was 
meeting its goal of a 30-day average waiting time for diagnostic and therapeutic tests in 
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2006 because the global data may mask specific waiting times for each test (e.g. 
mammograms had an average waiting time of 33 days in 2006, which fails to fulfil the 
guarantee).  Nevertheless, Extremadura increasingly made progress towards achieving 
its target guarantee for diagnostic and therapeutic tests (e.g. reducing the waiting times 
for mammograms from 197 days in 2004 to 47 days in 2005 and 33 days in 2006).  
Indeed, it was sufficiently confident in its progress that, with Decree 132/2006, 
Extremadura reduced the maximum waiting times even further for priority 
interventions, visits, and tests.  Data related to the monitoring and evaluation of these 
waiting time guarantees, however, was not available for this analysis.   
Table 6.2 demonstrates the data for waiting time guarantees in the Madrid 
during 2003–2006 (taking 2003 as a baseline).  Because of a lack of availability, little 
can be said.  Madrid managed to reduce the number of patients on its waiting list for 
surgical interventions from just over 54,000 patients in 2003 to 9,588 in 2005, which is 
impressive.  It also managed to attain its average waiting time guarantee for these 
services of 30 business days by 2005.  Comparative data for the number of patients on 
this waiting list for more than six months were not available.  What this data does not 
show, however, are waiting times for diagnostic testing, which is intricately linked to 
surgical interventions.  One key informant from Madrid explains,  
[Madrid] has done very well with the target for the surgical waiting list, 
an intermediate indicator…but it has done much worse with other 
indicators for the diagnostic test waiting list…so now what is much 
greater is the number of people who do not know if they are sick or not.  
So, over here [referring to people on the surgical waiting list], we know 
these people are sick, that some can wait but that the seriously sick ones 
are operated on.  But over here [referring to the people on the diagnostic 
test waiting list], we do not know if these people have cancer or not… and 
there are many more of them (Novinskey, Interview no. 24).    
In terms of user satisfaction, both regions achieved similar results, above the 
national average.  According to the Health Barometer (Barómetro Sanitario) for 2006, 
26.7 per cent of those surveyed from Extremadura and 28.4 per cent of those surveyed 
from Madrid believed that the waiting lists had improved in the last year (compared 
with 24.4 per cent of the national population) (Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios 
Sociales e Igualdad 2012).189   
  
                                               
189 Figures are for resident populations, ages 18 and older.   
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Table 6.2.  Madrid Waiting Time Guarantees, 2003–2006a 
Measurement 2003 2004 2005a 2006 % 
change, 
12/05 to 
12/06 
Waiting Time Guarantee for Surgical Interventions (Goal: < 30 business days) 
Number of patients on 
waiting list 
54,032 40,433 9,588 n/a n/a 
Number of patients on 
waiting list more than 6 
months 
99 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Average waiting time 
(business days) 
57 55 30b n/a n/a 
a Madrid stopped submitting data and information regarding waiting times to the NHS in 2005 
(Cañizares Ruiz and Santos Gómez, 2011).  b On June 30, 2005, Madrid reached its target waiting time 
guarantee.  No data are available for first outpatient visits, mammograms or other diagnostic tests. 
Sources: Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo (2004, 2005a, 2006); Instituto Madrileño de la Salud 
(2003).   
In terms of their policy strategy for waiting time guarantees, Extremadura 
complies with central government mandates, thus implying a collaborative interaction 
with health-sector kentrocrats.  My interview data from Extremadura generally 
corroborate this presumption of a cooperative attitude towards all health system 
stakeholders, including the MOH.  This policy was also supported by the regional 
president and parliament, having been approved and legislated by them.  Finally, 
although I did not delve into specific details of the implementation strategies used, the 
fact alone that Extremadura was able to meet and even surpass all of its waiting time 
guarantees by 2006 strongly suggests that it took sufficient actions in their regard.   
 Madrid’s RHM (expenditure advocates) elaborated its policy strategy for 
reducing wait times thorough plans, created an organisational structure to implement 
those plans and took specific actions towards reaching this goal.  Its president, 
parliament and ministry of finance (expenditure guardians) also seemed to back the 
plan, according to their political statements and the additional financial investments for 
it in annual budgets.  Their plan, however, defined and elaborated its own criteria, 
indicators and requirements for waiting times and was hence largely non-compliant 
with the central government’s Royal Decree 506/2003.  This fact and Madrid’s refusal 
to share its waiting time data after 2005 with the MOH demonstrate a strong push for 
regional autonomy.    
In conclusion, with regard to the policy trade-offs in Extremadura and Madrid, 
from the evidence, subnational expenditure advocates and guardians seem to carry 
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greater weight than the health-sector kentrocrats in this area of policy.  Given the 
privileged position of these two actor groups in both regions, this was to be expected.  
While Extremadura demonstrated respect for directives from health-sector kentrocrats, 
Madrid largely ignored them and was openly uncooperative after 2005, which—
perhaps, coincidentally—occurred after the change in political party control over the 
national government from the People’s Party to the Socialist Party in 2004.  Indeed, 
one stakeholder suggested this phenomenon was mainly due to party politics,  
Because, in Spain, the Autonomous Communities are never all governed 
by the same party…they are divided.  When the [central government] was 
governed by the PP, those from the PSOE gave opposition from the 
Autonomous Community level; now that the PSOE is governing, the PP 
makes their opposition from the Autonomous Community level.  
Therefore, when a PSOE government is arriving, a PP-governed 
Community has no interest in sharing information (Novinskey, Interview 
no. 15).        
Another stakeholder commented, “Before [the 2001 devolution] health care was 
somewhat less political” (Novinskey, Interview no. 34).  While Extremadura’s outcome 
was unexpected from our framework, Madrid’s was expected as it showed that the 
health-sector kentrocrats would be virtually shut out of politics within the subnational 
health policymaking environment (and their goals would not be a priority for the 
subnational policy network).  What the framework did not capture here is policy 
changes based purely on party politics.   
The power dynamics between the expenditure advocates and guardians are less 
easily ascertained.  Given their degree of success in passing legislation on waiting time 
guarantees (twice in two years) that required additional funds, subnational expenditure 
advocates seem to have held a significant and persuasive position in Extremadura’s 
subnational health policy network, and one greater than the subnational expenditure 
guardians did.  From the framework analysis of the thesis, however, the opposite result 
was expected: the policy priorities in the subnational policy network in Extremadura 
were expected to have favoured more economic restraint.  Yet, if we consider the 
influence of the national health policymaking environment190 on the subnational health 
policymaking environment and incorporate it into the analysis, then the actual policy 
developments for waiting time guarantees in Extremadura would be slightly more —
although not fully—aligned with the expectations of the framework.  Turning to 
Madrid, given the intensity of the politics surrounding the waiting time guarantee 
                                               
190 Because the national-level expenditure advocates have a slightly more power within their 
policymaking environment than the subnational expenditure advocates do in theirs.  
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policy and its financial backing, from the limited data available, Madrid’s expenditure 
guardians seemed slightly stronger than its expenditure advocates were, and that 
policymaking favoured regional economic control more than regional health policy.  
This actual development was anticipated from the framework’s analysis of health 
policy priorities in Madrid.   
6.2.  Regulation and Planning: Common Health Benefit Package Expansions 
In this subsection, I examine Extremadura and Madrid’s efforts to expand the benefits 
of the common health care package during the period 2004–2006, using measures of 
policy efficiency, policy strategies and policy failures.  Moreover, I evaluate whether 
the actual health policies correspond with the policy priorities anticipated by the 
analytical framework of the thesis.  The policies for the health care benefit package fall 
under the functional area of Regulation and Planning and, more specifically, the health 
system function of norms and standard, for which the regions have been allocated a 
moderate amount of decision space during the period of study.   
By way of reminder, the central government defines and guarantees a common 
health care benefit package for all Spanish residents (through Royal Decree 63/1995 
and Law 16/2003).191  In exchange for central government financing, the regions are 
responsible for providing this benefit package to their populations (as explained in 
detail in the sections of Regulation and Planning in Chapter 4).  They were also given 
certain liberties in this area (hence, the moderate decision space).  In addition to being 
able to decide how much financing to allocate for each health care benefit in the 
common package within their own territories, the regions are allowed to increase its 
breadth (e.g. broader coverage) and depth (e.g. number of benefits) for their respective 
populations, provided they finance those expansions themselves (Novinskey, Interview 
no. 20 and 22).   
In the following analysis, I focus on the regions’ share of responsibility for the 
norms and standards function of the NHS.  In particular, in terms of policy efficiency, I 
look at how each region actually uses its newly obtained decision-making power for 
this key function of planning and regulation.  I assume that an expansion of benefits—
either by enlarging the population entitled to the package or particular benefits within it 
                                               
191 Royal Decree 63/1995 remained in effect until the new benefit package was passed with Royal Decree 
1030/2006 in September 2006, which is at the end of our study period.  Please note that these are general 
frameworks of benefits, not properly minimum benefit packages of health services (Puig-Junoy, Planas-
Miret, and Tur-Prats 2005). 
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or by including new health services—would require an increase in expenditures to fund 
them and, ultimately, a negotiation between subnational expenditure guardians and 
advocates.  The greater use a region makes of this decision-making power, the greater 
the influence of the subnational expenditure advocates.  The lesser the use, the greater 
the influence of the subnational expenditure guardians.   
Next, I look at the level of correspondence between the content of the policies 
produced by Extremadura and Madrid in this policy area and the national 
recommendations for them to show the level of influence of health-sector kentrocrats in 
these decisions (and their priority goal for national health policy coherence).  For 
example, Annex III of Royal Decree 63/1995 explicitly excludes specific services from 
the common benefit package, e.g. sex-change surgery or cosmetic surgery.  If a region 
were to include one of these as an additional benefit to the common package in their 
territory (e.g. Andalusia’s addition of sex-change surgery as a benefit in 1999), this 
could be seen as an exhibit of great autonomy on behalf of the region but also a sign of 
disjointed national policy.  This would demonstrate the weak influence of health-sector 
kentrocrats on subnational health policymaking.      
While taking over responsibility for health services and competencies in 2001, 
both Extremadura and Madrid passed legislation that expanded the breadth and depth of 
the common health care benefit package to their respective populations.  Under its 
Regional Health Law 10/2001, Extremadura added passive euthanasia to its benefit 
package (Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2001a).  In its Health Planning Law 
12/2001, Madrid recognised the binding legal nature of advance care directives for 
patients in their final moments of life, and expanded access to its benefit package to 
non-resident travellers (Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid 2001a).   
During the period study (2004–2006), Extremadura passed several more pieces 
of legislation and regulation that expanded the benefit package available to its 
population or segments thereof (see Appendix N).  In particular, it regulated patient 
rights to a second medical opinion, waiting time guarantees, and advance care 
directives.  It also granted foreign residents in their territory the right to health 
protection and access to health benefits through a special Health Care Card.  Moreover, 
Extremadura passed legislation to assist seniors and persons with a disability pension to 
purchase relatively high-cost orthoprosthesis products with an interest-free, third-party 
loan (Extremadura paid the interest).  With its own financing, it further reimbursed and 
provided financial aid for some expenses not included in the common benefit package, 
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including pharmaceutical products and necessary travel for health care services in 
institutions outside the region.  Finally, also with its own funds, Extremadura legislated 
offering full child dental health care to its population aged 6 to 14 years old.   
During the study period, Madrid did not expand the common health care benefit 
package at all, but it adopted several “Instructions” regarding aspects of the application 
of health services contained in the package.  For example, Instruction 1/2004 regulated 
the reimbursement of out-of-pocket, health care-related travel expenses (Comunidad de 
Madrid, 2004).  It also regulated systems and procedures for carrying out items on their 
political agenda; e.g. Decree 62/2004, which established the RULEQ as well as 
procedures for monitoring and evaluating it.   
In summary, regarding policy efficiency, Extremadura clearly used its 
discretion to expand the common health care benefit package to its population more 
than Madrid did.  This extensive activity demonstrates that Extremadura’s subnational 
expenditure advocates in the health sector were quite accomplished and wielded 
considerable influence and power.  This was the opposite result of what my framework 
anticipated.  Again, if we consider the influence from the national health policymaking 
environment, then the actual policy developments for the expansion of the common 
benefit package in Extremadura would be slightly more in line (though, not fully) with 
the expected policy priorities gathered from  the framework.   
Turning to Madrid, it did not exercise its discretion to expand health benefits 
further.192  Indeed, just looking at the study period, it would seem as if the policy 
permitting the regions to expand health benefits within their territory was a failure.  
However, in the period prior to this investigation, Madrid enacted two pieces of 
legislation that expanded on the common health benefit package: recognition of 
advance care directives193 and free access to benefits for non-resident travelers (the 
latter of which could be a significant expense for the region, especially considering the 
Community of Madrid holds the country’s capital city).  As a result, this policy in 
Madrid cannot be deemed a failure.  Indeed, compared to the actions taken by 
                                               
192 One stakeholder expressed the Community of Madrid’s process objectives following its assumption of 
health care competences in 2002: “My fundamental objective from January to June was that no citizens 
would not notice any loss in quality [of health care]…Then, from June, we began to change some 
services and introduce new concepts and ways to do and see things that were more adapted to our reality.  
But important change happened after 2003, because between 2002 and 2003 basically we just received 
what [the central government] gave us.  The structural changes that we have now began from 2003” 
(Novinskey, Interview no. 24).    
193 NB: advance care directives are ‘cost neutral’. 
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Extremadura regarding only these two policies194, Madrid could be considered more 
policy efficient because of its earlier adoption of them.  Overall, it would seem that 
Madrid’s subnational expenditure guardians and advocates held comparable influence 
over policy decisions on expanding health benefits within their territory.  This result 
was anticipated by and corresponds with the resulting trade-offs for subnational health 
policymaking in Madrid from my framework.   
Regarding the role and goals of health-sector kentrocrats with respect to this 
policy area, there was one additional health benefit regulation that seemed to create a 
stir: that on the post-coitus, emergency contraceptive pill.195  Beginning in 2001, the 
MOH legalised and regulated the availability of this pill in pharmacies with a 
prescription and at the full cost (approximately 20 euros) to the user.  In doing so, it 
also explained that the regions could do what they considered appropriate with this 
policy using their right to exercise their health care competencies in their territories but 
that the NHS would not finance it (MedicinaTV 2000).  Indeed, in October 2004, 
backed by the MOH and broader Zapatero (PSOE) Administration, the Health 
Commission of the National Parliament approved and put forward to the whole 
parliament a proposition to offer this emergency contraceptive free-of-charge at health 
centres and hospitals nationwide with a prescription (Zanza 2004). The proposition 
failed; thus, showing the weak level of influence of the national-level expenditure 
advocates (which was expected from the results of the framework).  To this day, the 
NHS does not finance the post-coitus pill.  By 2004, considering its urgent character196, 
Extremadura (and at least four other Spanish regions) upped the ante on this policy by 
making the pill accessible at its health and family planning centres, free of charge to 
users (Ministerio de Sanidad, Política Social e Igualdad 2011).  The government of 
Madrid—along with the regional governments of Catalonia, Navarra, Murcia and 
Galicia—strongly opposed this practice, warning that “easy acquisition of the pill can 
spoil all the work done on sex prevention and education” (El Imparcial 2009, 1).  At 
the same time, the Municipality of Madrid approved the use of this emergency 
contraceptive in its own health centres with the municipality covering the full cost.  
Considering that the Municipality of Madrid operates health centres within the confines 
                                               
194Extremadura made similar health care benefit policy expansions regarding these two policies later than 
Madrid did.   
195 The World Health Organisation considers the morning after pill to be an “essential medicine” (El 
Imparcial 2009). 
196 To be effective, treatment with this pill needs to be administered within 72 hours of sexual relations. 
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of the Community of Madrid, this pair of contradictory positions begs the questions of 
what Madrid’s population actually supported and with which government it was more 
aligned.     
Overall, this is obviously a very controversial and politically motivating policy.  
However, to continue this aspect of the debate risks losing sight of its main points for 
the thesis: first, this is an instance in which one of our case-study regions passed 
legislation regarding a health benefit expansion that was not aligned completely with 
the national policy and, second, it demonstrates the incoherence and public confusion 
that happens when there is no common NHS protocol on a policy (e.g. there are 
differences in access, in the place of dispensing, and in the conditions for purchasing 
the post-coitus pill across regions in Spain).  Considering this, it seems that the health-
sector kentrocrats have little influence on regional health policies for this health system 
function and have not made sufficient efforts in this area to attain their policy priorities 
of national policy coherence and subnational policy coordination.  This was an 
expected result from the analytical framework of the thesis for both regional cases.   
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6.3.  Financing: Paying Medical Specialists in Hospital Ambulatory Settings 
In this subsection, I examine Extremadura and Madrid’s policy for paying medical 
specialists in hospital ambulatory settings during the period 2004–2006, using measures 
of policy efficiency, policy strategies and policy failures.  Moreover, I evaluate whether 
the actual health policies corresponds with the policy priorities anticipated by the 
analytical framework of the thesis.  The health policies for the health care benefit 
package fall under the functional area of financing and, more specifically, the health 
system function of payment mechanisms, for which the regions have been allocated a 
moderate amount of decision space during the period of study.   
Since 2001 and throughout the period under investigation, the choice of how to 
pay public health providers in Spain has been shared between the central government 
and the regions.  As we saw in Chapter 4, the central government regulates all statutory 
health personnel (a special civil servant status) through Law 55/2003.  This law 
stipulates that health personnel be remunerated with a basic salary as well as 
supplementary (or “top-up”) payments.  The basic salary amount for each cadre is 
established for a three-year period and standardised by the central government for all 
statutory health personnel (Hidalgo and Matas 2004).  Top-up payments for personnel 
within their territory are at the discretion of each region; thereby, constituting a 
moderate decision space for this policy at the subnational government level.  The 
regions have varied considerably in their application of this decision space and in the 
amount of supplemental payments authorised (García-Armesto et al. 2010).  In the 
following, I examine the situation of salary “top-ups” for medical specialists in hospital 
ambulatory settings.  In doing so, I assume that any supplemental payment would 
require an increase in expenditures to fund it and, therefore, a negotiation between 
subnational expenditure guardians and advocates.  In terms of policy efficiency, I 
establish the degree to which these regions use their discretion for supplementing 
medical professionals’ salaries.  The greater the amount of supplement payments 
allowed, the greater the influence of expenditure advocates within the subnational 
health policy network.  With respect to the health-sector kentrocrats, I look at how the 
regions use their decision-making authority over these payment mechanisms and how 
this compares to the kentrocrats’ priority for achieving national health policy cohesion 
and coordination.  I also consider the possible influence of national health 
policymaking dynamics on the decisions made within the subnational health policy 
networks for each region, as I have done for the prior two policy analyses.   
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 The various remuneration models across the Spanish regions display 
substantial complexity and variability.  Each region can apply its own types of 
supplementary payments; e.g. Extremadura pays a supplement for “working 
conditions” and Madrid pays a supplement “linked to the specific position”.  Moreover, 
when they apply the same supplement, such as a fixed performance supplement, the 
amount allocated can vary.  Additionally, the specific characteristics (e.g. civil servant 
status or not) and situation (e.g. number of years in service) of each medical specialist 
can differ.  Moreover, the relevant contract terms can vary within and across regions 
(e.g. allowing compensation from private practice or defining the number of 
permissible hours on call).  Consequently, comparing the “top-up” remuneration for 
medical specialists (or any health cadre) across regions is next to impossible.  In their 
Comparative Study of Physician Salaries in Spain, Hidalgo and Matas (2004) reduced 
this complexity by defining three types of medical specialists working in hospital 
ambulatory settings, ceteris paribus, with identical conditions and only one variable: 
the remuneration model in each region.  They presented data for December 2004.197  
Table 6.3 shows the gross monthly salaries for public medical specialists by level of 
dedication to the public service (measured in exclusivity and years of service)198 and 
type of contract (measured as civil servant or stand-in medical specialist contract) for 
Extremadura, Madrid and the national average for 2004.  It also presents the differences 
in gross monthly salaries for each region in comparison to the national average.  
Finally, we must remember that the cost of living in Extremadura and Madrid differs 
widely, and this variable is not controlled for in Hidalgo and Matas’ study.  So, for a 
more accurate comparison between the regions, I have included a column presenting a 
proxy for the cost of living in each region: the regional gross monthly salary for 2004 
as an index, where the national average equals 100 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
2005).  From the gross monthly salary data (in euros), I calculate and introduce into the 
table the corresponding index for each physician type. 
.
                                               
197 The process of standardizing remunerations across Europe (according to Directive 93/104/CE)was 
still being implemented and was anticipated to last until 2006, depending on the region.   
198 Medical specialists who do not exclusively work for the NHS can earn extra pay by working in the 
private sector, and this potential additional pay may be viewed as an incentive that the regional 
government offers the medical specialist without incurring any public costs.  There are no data on the 
impact of this incentive, so it has not been factored into the analysis.   
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Table 6.3.  Gross Monthly Salaries (in Euros) of Medical Specialists in Hospital Ambulatory Settings by Level of Dedication and Type of Contract, 
and Regional Gross Monthly Salary by Region for 2004 
 Medical Specialist Type 1: “Civil 
servant” with no exclusive 
dedication and no on-call hoursa 
Medical Specialist Type 2: “Civil 
servant” with exclusive dedication 
and 50 on-call hours per monthb 
Medical Specialist Type 3: Stand-
in medical specialists with exclusive 
dedication and 50 on-call hours per 
monthc 
Regional 
Gross 
Monthly 
Salary 
Index, 
adjusted (100 
is national 
average) 
Gross 
Monthly 
Salary 
(Euros) 
Difference 
from 
National 
Average 
Gross 
Monthly 
Salary 
(index) 
Gross 
Monthly 
Salary 
(Euros) 
Difference 
from 
National 
Average 
Gross 
Monthly 
Salary 
(index) 
Gross 
Monthly 
Salary 
(Euros) 
Difference 
from 
National 
Average 
Gross 
Monthly 
Salary 
(index) 
Extremadura 2,539.03 -332.85 88.4 4,347.70 -51.37 98.8 4,065.67 48.54 101.2 84.1 
Madrid  3,322.50 450.62 115.7 4,373.75 -25.32 99.4 4,091.72 74.59 101.9 115.0 
National 
Average 
2,871.88   4,399.07   4,017.13    
Minimum 2,481.17   3,907.62   3,238.58    
Maximum 3,680.94   5,408.21    4,813.88    
a Physician type 1: “Civil servant” with 21 years of service, without exclusive dedication to the RHS and with no on -call medical emergency service.   
b Physician type 2: “Civil servant” with 21 years of service, exclusive dedication to the RHS plus 50 on-call hours per month, 12 of which are on weekends or holidays.        
c Physician type 3: Stand-in medical specialists with exclusive dedication and 50 on-call hours per month, 12 of which are weekends or holidays.   
Note: Specialists are not formally civil servants but most have an analogous status.  Exclusive dedication means that the medical specialist’s terms of reference do not allow 
compensation from private practice outside public sector working hours.  Stand-in medical specialists have temporary contracts until a civil servant occupies that position.  
Yearly work hours are 1,533 hours in Madrid and 1,582 hours in Extremadura.  On-call hours are usually at night or on weekends or holidays; both Extremadura and Madrid  
pay 12.27 euros per hour for nights and 17.38 euros per hour for weekends or holidays.  The annual base salary established by the national government is 14,680.96 euros for 
all physician types.  The national average, minimum and maximum include the 17 regions, and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla (whose supplementary payments 
are set by INGESA).  
Sources: Medical specialist payment data: Hidalgo and Matas (2004), see also for further details.  See Instituto Nacional de Estadís ticas (2005) for data on general gross 
monthly salary by region.   
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As described in the table, the results for Extremadura demonstrate that medical 
specialist type 1 and type 2 are paid substantially and slightly below the national 
average, respectively, and type 3 is paid slightly above the national average.  For 
Madrid, medical specialist type 2 is paid just below the national average, while types 1 
and 3 are substantially and slightly above the national average, respectively.  While the 
difference from the national average is relatively similar in the two regions for medical 
specialist types 2 and 3, there is a very large difference for type 1: –332.85 euros for 
Extremadura and 450.62 euros for Madrid relative to the national average.   
Overall, from these figures, it would seem that Madrid has been more generous 
than Extremadura with its supplementary payments to medical specialists in (public) 
hospital ambulatory settings.  However, when we consider the “cost of living” proxy, 
there is a shift in the results.  The regional gross monthly salary for Extremadura (for 
all job types) is 16 points lower than the average gross monthly salary in Spain, 
whereas the gross monthly salary for medical specialist type 1 is 12 points lower, type 
2 is only 1 point lower and type 3 is 1 point higher than the national average.  
Therefore, medical specialists in Extremadura are paid more on average than the cost of 
living for the region would require.  This finding suggests that the subnational 
expenditure advocates for health have considerable influence in Extremadura, again the 
opposite of what was expected from the results of the analytical framework.  
Considering the influence of the balance of power from the national health policy 
network does not help us much to interpret this unexpected outcome either. 
For Madrid, the regional gross monthly salary and the gross monthly salary for 
medical specialist type 1 are both 15 points higher than the average gross monthly 
salary in Spain.  In contrast, the gross monthly salary for type 2 is a half a point less 
than the gross national average in Spain; for medical specialist type 3, this figure is 
only 2 points higher than the gross national average.  Overall, when factoring in the 
cost of living, Madrid’s medical specialists are paid equal to or less than the regional 
gross monthly salary for all jobs in the region.  This result suggests that the subnational 
expenditure guardians have influence over health policy in Madrid that is equal to or 
slightly greater than that of expenditure advocates, as expected from the results of the 
analytical framework of the thesis.  Compared with Extremadura and considering the 
cost of living, medical specialists of all three types are paid more in Extremadura than 
in Madrid 
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Turning to the health-sector kentrocrats, one might expect them to support 
standardisation of payments within Spain because it is consistent with their policy 
priorities for achieving national policy cohesion and coordination.  Moreover, it is 
aligned with the European Community’s Directive 93/104/CE to do this across its 
member countries, which includes Spain.  As such, it would seem that a value close to 
100 for the gross monthly salary of a medical specialist would represent an attempt by a 
region to standardise its payments with the national average.  This is the case for 
supplementary payments of medical specialist types 2 and 3 in both regions.  In 
contrast, payments for medical specialist type 1, “civil servants with no exclusive 
dedication and no on-call hours”, are well below the gross national average monthly 
salary in Extremadura and well above it in Madrid.  Overall, with two out of three types 
closely mirroring the national average, it seems that the health-sector kentrocrats may 
have at least a moderate amount of influence on both regions; this, however, is not 
aligned with the health policy priorities anticipated by the framework of the thesis.   
6.4.  Financing: Sources of Revenue 
In this subsection, I examine the national health policy network and policies for 
increasing funds to the regional health services for the period 2004–2006, using 
measures of policy efficiency, strategies and failures.  Moreover, I assess whether the 
ex-post policies adopted during this period correspond with the policy priorities laid out 
ex-ante from the analytical framework of the thesis.  The policies for increasing funds 
to regional health care fall under the functional area of financing and the health system 
function ‘sources of revenues’, for which the central government and the regions share 
a moderate amount of decision space for 2004–2006.  Additionally, informal 
intergovernmental policymaking within the national health policy network in Spain 
demonstrated moderate expenditure advocates and guardians, and strong topocrats for 
2004–2006.   
Throughout the study period, the discretion for determining revenue sources for 
the health system is held by the regions and central government, including actors from 
the MOF and RFMs, on the CPFF.  The 2001 financing agreement determined the 
parameters for transferring general funds to the regions, including those for health 
care.199  It also ceded tax-raising capabilities to the regions so that they could collect 
                                               
199 Funds for the health care sector lost their earmarking from the central government with this 
agreement. 
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and use their own resources (see Section 4.4.3).  This agreement was established for an 
indefinite period.  Thus, any attempts to introduce new funds to the system for health 
financing would be played on this field for informal intergovernmental policymaking.   
As the regions began to exercise their new authority over health care, it became 
apparent that the 2001 financing agreement was not financially sustainable.  
Expenditures for health care were rising and the regions with newly devolved health 
care competencies began to take out loans in order to pay for them.  Indeed, both 
Extremadura and Madrid began to borrow funds for health care at the end of 2002.200  
By the end of 2003, Extremadura had €40,311 thousand in accumulated pending debt 
for health care, and Madrid had €223,579 thousand, comprising 3.9 and 4.9 per cent of 
their total health expenditures, respectively.  These were, however, rather low 
percentages, considering the average percentage of accumulated pending debt over total 
health expenditures for all regions was 15.6 per cent.  In addition, by 2003, 13 of the 17 
regions had taken out at least one loan to cover their health expenditures and most took 
loans out yearly from that year on.   
Around this time, the regions began to make calls for a new regional financing 
agreement, in particular to help them cover the rising costs of health care.  The central 
government responded to these calls by making this topic the focus of the newly 
organized Conference of Presidents (Conferencias de Presidentes), or the “Regional 
Summit”.  This conference was the highest political-level meeting between the 
presidents of the national and regional governments in Spain201 and, therefore, also its 
highest political body of multilateral cooperation.  It is presided over by the Prime 
Minister.  Its purpose is to debate and adopt agreements on issues of special relevance 
for the autonomous system; however, decisions of the conference are not legally 
binding. 
In 2004 and 2005, the first two Conferences of Presidents were devoted 
primarily to the inquiry of how health expenditures had evolved over recent years, their 
unsustainability under the current financing agreement and what the possible 
government solutions for it were (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Ministerio 
de Sanidad y Consumo 2005; Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 2007).  In addition to 
institutionalizing the conference in 2004, the Conference identified the need for further 
investigation into health expenditures.  To do this, it created a working group headed 
                                               
200 The regions that already had devolved health care competencies had long been taking out loans to 
cover their spending on health care.  
201 As well as the presidents of the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla.  
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by the Comptroller of the State Administration (Intervención General de la 
Administración del Estado), with the objective of performing a study on the origin, 
composition, efficacy and efficiency of health spending during the period 1999–2003.  
The results of such research were supposed to inform a new model of health financing, 
which Zapatero, the President of Spain, announced would be agreed on in 2006.  
According to Zapatero, the new model would guarantee the sustainability of health care 
and improve “the quality and benefits” offered to all citizens” (El País 2004).   
In June 2005, this working group reported on the analysis of health expenditures 
to the CPFF (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Ministerio de Sanidad y 
Consumo 2005).  Among its main findings, the report indicated that public health care 
spending in Spain had increased at an average rate of 9.01 per cent for the period 
studied (1.9 percentage points above the average annual increase in GDP).  Public 
health spending on services beyond the common health care benefit package increased 
by 1.4 per cent annually.  Importantly, included in these figures were the above-
mentioned pending debts for health care that, at the end of 2003, totalled over €6 
billion.  Moreover, almost all regions showed an average annual increase in public 
health care spending above the average for all spending, but Extremadura’s increase 
was aligned with, and Madrid’s was below, this.  The largest component of health care 
spending, according to economic classifications, was human resource salaries; by a 
functional classification, it was specialised and hospital care, followed by pharmacy 
and primary care.  In addition, the total population of beneficiaries in Spain increased 
by an average of 1.62 per cent per year.  The beneficiary population of Extremadura 
decreased annually from 1999 to 2003, while Madrid’s beneficiary population 
increased at a higher annual rate than the national average.  In 2003, health care 
spending per beneficiary was €954 nationally, €1,026 in Extremadura and €870 in 
Madrid (the lowest of the seventeen regions).  For the same year, per equivalent person 
(por persona equivalente, calculated from a weighted scenario using seven age groups) 
it averaged €953 nationally, €988 in Extremadura and €920 in Madrid.   
These results were further discussed at the Second Conference of Presidents, 
held in September 2005.  Despite the Zapatero’s announcement for a new financing 
agreement at the first Conference, no such mention was made at this one.  Apparently, 
the President and the central government did not have the political conditions to 
negotiate a new financing agreement (Novinskey, Interview no. 38 and 41).  However, 
the Presidents of the Second Conference did decide to increase funds and quality 
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measures to the health sector in other ways: (i) the central government agreed to make 
an additional financial contribution to the NHS (the total contribution was established 
at €3,042.4 million for 2006 and €3,142.4 million for 2007), (ii) the regions agreed to 
adopt measures for rationalizing health spending as proposed in the report, and (iii) the 
working group agreed to continue developing and specifying the measures for assessing 
health spending growth for a report in early 2007 (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 
2007b).   
In terms of financing, the Health Cohesion Fund was one MOH instrument that 
would receive some of these agreed upon funds.  Prior to this, the endowment of this 
fund was just €54 million annually and it performed rather poorly (see Section 5.3.2.1).  
In an attempt to rectify this and make it more attractive to the regions and effective, the 
central government approved an increase of €45 million in its annual allocation, 
starting in 2006.  In addition, another part of the agreed upon funds (€50 million) when 
to the implementation of the 2006 NHS Quality Plan (Plan de Calidad del SNS).  This 
new allocation, also managed by the MOH, first appeared in the 2006 budget.  It was 
intended primarily to strengthen the cohesion policy and strategy to improve the quality 
of NHS services (Urbanos-Garrido 2006).  
In sum, this episode demonstrated the informal intergovernmental policymaking 
within the national environment in post-health system devolution in Spain.  
Importantly, when the trade-offs in informal policymaking for increasing central 
government financing of the regions in the name of health care became clear, efforts 
mostly a failed.  While this issue certainly received a lot of pressure from the Presidents 
of the regions (topocrats), who unquestionably pushed their weight around on it and, 
even, political attention from the President of the central government, by the end of 
2006, a new financing agreement was not in sight and a modicum of additional 
financing conceded to the health sector via the weak health sector expenditure 
advocates.  The regions had made at least two high-level attempts at gaining financing 
through the Conference of the Presidents but their only concessions were that they 
could ‘apply’ for some of the additional funds from the Health Cohesion Fund or that 
they had to make specific, centrally-dictated improvements in the quality of health care 
in their region, under the NHS Quality Plan, to receive some of them.  In addition, the 
amounts of these concessions were not close to fulfilling the needed financing for 
health care that the regions requested.  Indeed, one regional stakeholder said, “in 2005, 
the Conference of Presidents ended unfavourably, distributing insufficient funds” 
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(Novinskey, Interview no. 39).  Moreover, in comparison to what would have been the 
cost of a new financing agreement, an interviewee from the Ministry of Finance called 
this additional financing, “Little gifts.  Nothing.  Peanuts” (Novinskey, Interview no. 
38).  Clearly, from these interactions and despite concessions, the expenditure 
guardians were in a privileged position, with greater macroeconomic control on the 
health sector (and country) during this period.   
These results were not completely predictable given our analysis.  As expected 
from the results of our framework, while the health sector advocates were organized out 
of political discussions on health financing, especially those in the Conference of the 
Presidents, they did participate in the working group for the analysis of health 
expenditures.  It was also expected that that the topocrats would come together as a 
strong group, supporting the health sector; and they indubitably did this by bringing the 
request of increased financing for their health sectors to the centre of the agenda of, not 
one, but two meetings of the highest political body in Spain.  The topocrats efforts were 
not, however, strong enough to overcome the priorities of the national-level 
expenditure guardians for macroeconomic control.  This was not expected from our 
model, which showed the topocrats having relatively greater strength in informal 
intergovernmental policymaking than the expenditure guardians.            
6.5.  Discussion  
Overall, the results of the analyses of the above health policies in Spain and the regions 
of Extremadura and Madrid are mixed for the period 2004–2006.  In the case of 
Madrid, the outcomes of the ex-post analysis for all three subnational policies were 
aligned with the ex-ante results from the framework of the thesis, with the exception of 
the position of the health-sector kentrocrats in the policy on paying medical specialists 
in hospital ambulatory settings.  Conversely, in Extremadura, the ex-post results of 
these same policies did not reflect the ex-ante balance of power described by 
framework of the thesis for subnational expenditure guardians and advocates; although 
as anticipated, they did demonstrate the little influence that health-sector kentrocrats 
had for the policies concerning waiting time guarantees and health care benefit package 
expansions.  Finally, for our last health policy examination, results from the ex-post 
analysis of increasing health financing were also mixed, with those concerning the 
health expenditure advocates matching but a bit questionable for the topocrats and 
mostly wrong for expenditure guardians.    
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The discrepancies between the ex-ante results from the analytical framework 
and the ex-post findings in Extremadura as well as for the national-level expenditure 
guardians are likely due to a confounding factor not controlled for in the study.  The 
most probable factor for both is party politics.  One regional-level interviewee stated, 
“health care is not a subject in which the temptation to take political party sides is 
minor” (Novinskey, Interview no. 37).  Along these lines, another key informant said, 
“by bringing management closer to the territory, a certain political dependence is 
created” (Novinskey, Interview no. 34).  
In his cross-country comparison, Blom-Hansen (1999) controlled for party 
politics by selecting countries with political environments dominated by a mix of the 
same three types of parties, roughly represented to the same degree at all levels of 
government.  For my study, I took a different approach by intentionally selecting 
regions ruled by two different political parties (the Socialist Party in Extremadura and 
the People’s Party in Madrid).  My intent was to achieve a more realistic representation 
of regional-level political dynamics, since it is unlikely that all regions in a country will 
be dominated by the same political party, even in a two party system.202   
While Extremadura and Madrid have been ruled by a single party over the 
period analysed, their opposite political orientation most likely contributed to the 
determination of health policy priorities in each region.  The Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party, which governed Extremadura during the study period, aimed to 
produce policies that protect and extend worker and citizen rights, especially in health 
and social sectors.  This ideology is likely to be a confounding factor responsible for 
the discordance between the ex-ante balance of power and policy priorities among 
policymaking actors and the ex-post results of policies produced in Extremadura.  It is 
also most likely a reason the government actually gave greater priority to health-sector 
kentrocrats and subnational expenditure advocates, as well as to health policy issues in 
general.  Considering this factor in the framework analysis, potentially would have 
given these actor groups and their goals a higher level of priority in Extremadura and 
the ex-post results would have been more aligned with them.203   
                                               
202 Indeed, it is even less likely that party politics would be the same across countries.  A main objective 
of my analytical framework is for it to be used as widely as possible within upper-middle- and high-
income countries. 
203 The People’s Party ideology is founded on values of capitalism, defends private property, and 
promotes prosperity for Spain and its people, among other things.   
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Moreover, the difference between regional and national ruling political 
parties204 and their resulting intergovernmental relations could have also been 
confounding factors.  The change in ruling party of the Spanish government from the 
People’s Party to the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party with the 2004 general election 
would have likely produced a change in policy due to ideology and/or 
intergovernmental relations.  For national-level intergovernmental policymaking in the 
last policy addressed in this chapter, impending general economic problems205 during 
this time may have provided more support to the PP and their conservative economic 
and financing agenda.   
In addition to the potential importance of differences in political party 
alignment between the two Spanish regions, there also might be important differences 
in regional financing capacity and priorities, which have confounded the ex-ante 
results.  Assessing the regional governments’ ability to manage local resources 
efficiently and to make financial decisions to respond to citizen needs promptly could 
be a third determinant that helps to explain the discrepancy between the ex-ante and ex-
post results for the policies in Extremadura.206  There is evidence in the literature that 
points to the significance of decentralized governments’ financing capacity (Brindusa 
Tudose 2013).  Anecdotal data for Extremadura and Madrid also point to this potential 
influence.  For example, according to the 2001 financing agreement, the total financing 
for Extremadura in 2003 was nearly €2.409 million, comprised of €2.208 million from 
the central government (91.66 per cent)207, €179,476 thousand (7.45 per cent) from the 
region itself208, and €21,543 thousand from taxes209 (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 
2006c).  For Madrid, during the same year, total financing was approximately €10.799 
million, comprised of €7.717 million (71.46 per cent) from the central government, 
€2.956 million (27.38 per cent) from the region, and €744,646 thousand from taxes 
(ibid.).  This suggests that Extremadura has a lower fiscal capacity than its needs and 
that Madrid’s may be greater than its needs.  The Sufficiency Fund enters into the 
                                               
204 Before the 2004 general election, the central government and the region of Madrid were both ruled by 
the People’s Party.  After it, the central government and the region of Extremadura were both ruled by 
the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party.  This change could have potentially provoked differences in the 
intergovernmental relations of our policy networks.   
205 Indeed, this study (2004–2006) took place just before the 2007–2008 world financial crisis and the 
Great Recession in Spain in 2008.  Thus, as time progressed, signs of economic decline would have 
increasingly revealed themselves to the policymaking world, especially the expenditure guardians but 
also to the President—both of which are privy to this type of intelligence.   
206 Financing may also be a factor at the national level.   
207 Resources from the financing system managed by the General Administration of the State in 2003. 
208 Actual collection of transferred traditional taxes.  
209 Collection of (normative criterion) taxes.  
Examining the Direction of Health Policies 
274 
discussion here (See Section 4.4.3).  It was managed by the MOH and created to 
redistribute funds and maintain the status quo in each region.  Considering its lower 
fiscal capacity, Extremadura is likely to receive financial transfers from this fund, 
whereas Madrid is likely to be a contributor of financing to this fund.  Moreover, by the 
end of 2003, Extremadura had €40,311 thousand in accumulated pending debt for 
health care, and Madrid had €223,579 thousand.  These comprise 3.9 and 4.9 per cent 
of the total health expenditures in 2003, respectively; which was rather low considering 
the average for all regions was 15.6 per cent.  However, one would need to explore the 
tendencies for health care debt over time to understand this relationship with debt 
better.  Indeed, both Extremadura and Madrid began to borrow funds for health care in 
2002, whereas the regions with health care responsibilities before 2001 started well 
before 1998 and represented the regions with the largest accumulated health care debt 
in 2003.  It would be interesting to see how and to what extent our case-study regions 
use their borrowing capabilities for health care.  Anecdotal evidence for later years, 
show that both regions accumulated much greater debt, Madrid in particular (El 
Confidencial 2016)   
There are additional, perhaps more appropriate, financial and budget indicators 
for examining the financial capacity of regional governments, and determining their 
ability to manage regional health resources efficiently and make financial decisions that 
respond to citizen health needs promptly, within the context of budget constraints.210  
Tudose (2013), for example, puts forward an index of performance indicators on the 
general financial performance of local governments in decentralized systems.  Her 
index includes revenue-based indicators (which, e.g., give an idea of the level of 
dependence of the regional budget on the national budget), expenditure indicators 
(which measure the flexibility of regional government spending), and results indicators 
(which measure the extent and quality of the regional government’s involvement in 
boosting economic activity).  Perhaps, aspects of this index or a similar one specific to 
the health sector could be integrated into the framework in future work.  In that case, 
the set of indicators would have to be coherent and consistent, and data for them 
relevant and available for the Spanish case (as well as other middle-to-higher income 
countries).  To have a full assessment of the financial capacity of the region here, 
however, is not within the scope of the thesis.          
                                               
210 (the latter is addressed by the modified version of von Hagen’s budget tightness index in the thesis 
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The analytical framework of the thesis does not incorporate party politics and 
ideology nor financing capacity between the regions into the analysis; however, some 
of my results from the examination of health policies in Spain in this chapter do not 
point to these issues either.  For example, when the health-sector kentrocrats exhibited 
strong and weak influence on a policy for paying medical specialists, and waiting time 
guarantees and benefit package expansions, respectively), they did so in both regions, 
irrespective of their political and ideological differences.  Perhaps, then, it is necessary 
to consider the relationship between policy networks and processes, political party 
alignment and financing capacities at both the national and regional level and how they 
affect policy actions and outcomes.  As one example from the Spanish case herein, the 
story of negotiating the 2001 financial agreement comes to mind.  In this informal 
policymaking negotiation, it seemed that the regions (topocrats) of opposing political 
colours to the central administration (both expenditure advocates and guardians) and 
that also had seemingly less financial capacity were the toughest negotiators and 
obtained the greatest concessions for health care.  The regions of the same political 
party as the central government but that had seemingly less financial capacity than 
others has a second place advantage in the negotiations.  As such, these three factors 
may be causally related to policy actions and outcomes.  
In summary, the results from this chapter confirm that the organisation of 
informal policymaking plays an important part but is not the only factor determining 
health policy priorities.  They also suggest that the political orientation of the ruling 
party or coalition at the national and subnational government levels may also play a 
role in addition to regional financing capacity.   
 Regarding the methodology used, it is important to notice that the analytical 
framework permits analysing only those policies that have an effect on the level of 
expenditures, which limits the scope of the analysis considerably.  This limitation is 
inherited from Blom-Hansen’s decision to categorise actors into expenditure advocates 
and guardians, making the desire to increase or decrease expenditures the sole 
distinguishing factor between the two.  Consequently, the framework is not applicable 
to health policies that may influence the sector in other ways, such as by increasing 
efficiencies without affecting the level of public expenditures.   
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7.  Conclusion 
The objective of this doctoral dissertation has been to understand how health system 
devolution changes the structure and agency of health policymaking process and, 
subsequently, its impact on health policy priorities.  After reviewing the literature and 
determining that no one-piece adequately supported this objective, I created a 
comparative analytical framework for analysing health system devolution and the 
policymaking process and policy priorities that follow it.  I hypothesised that, in a 
devolved health system, policy priorities are the result of the relative influence of key 
actor groups in intergovernmental health policymaking.  Then, I applied the framework 
to the 2001 health system devolution reform in Spain with regional case studies of 
Extremadura and Madrid over the period 1996–2006.  Finally, I examined and 
evaluated the framework’s ability to achieve the dissertation’s objective.   
As suggested in the literature, the analytical framework used a comparable 
definition and measurement of devolution (and decentralization) that could be applied 
to upper-middle- and high-income countries, employing a modified version of 
Bossert’s (1998) decision-space approach.  It represented the policymaking process as 
structured by the institutional rules and intergovernmental aspects of devolution in 
Blom-Hansen’s (1999) intergovernmental policy networks, fine-tuning and applying 
these to the national and subnational policymaking environments.  In addition, it 
identified the main actor groups in the informal policymaking process within each 
environment, characterising the relationships between them and modelling their 
behaviour with assumptions, using a rational choice institutionalist approach.  Finally, 
besides the framework as a whole, the thesis’s primary original contribution to the 
literature was the elaboration of an intergovernmental policy network specific to the 
subnational health policymaking environment, using a newly termed actor group—
health-sector kentrocrats—and method for indexing and analysing their relative power 
within it.  
In terms of research design and methods, I chose Spain for the country case-
study because it underwent a significant devolution reform of health service 
competencies to a regional government level and because it is a high-income country, 
whose health system and its devolution reform have been used as a model example for 
other countries—especially “newly industrialised” ones.  I chose Extremadura and 
Madrid as regional case studies because of three common features: (i) both underwent 
the 2001 health devolution reform, (ii) neither had active nationalist or separatist 
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groups during the period of study, and (iii) one major political party controlled the 
regional government throughout the study period.  I collected primary data though in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and key informants that were 
involved in the policymaking processes surrounding the 2001 health system devolution 
reform in Spain.  These interviews were complemented and supported by secondary 
and tertiary data.  All data were analysed using the scientific method of content 
analysis, which was carried out employing the assistance of the qualitative data analysis 
software program NVivo 9, in addition to traditional data processing methods.  I 
collated, coded, categorised, interpreted and drew inferences from the data and 
validated them in order to tell a story in the three empirical chapters of the thesis.       
In terms of improving the employment of the methods used in the thesis, one 
lesson I learnt concerns a better way to collect primary data by way of interviews.  In 
future research, I would improve my methods by consulting with a handful of key 
informants throughout the development of the thesis and writing of the dissertation 
(rather than only to consult with them to inform the background of the analysis and to 
identify the elite actors for the stakeholder interviews).  Moreover, once the 
stakeholders are validated for the case study, performing the stakeholder interviews 
with elite actors after running the de jure analysis of the entire framework could better 
inform the thesis.  Furthermore, doing this could be used to explore the de facto side of 
the analysis, potentially deepening and enriching the study further.   
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4), I analysed the first of three 
components of the framework of the thesis.  To do so, I defined and measured health 
system devolution in Spain before and after the 2001 reform, using a modified version 
of Bossert’s decision-space approach for upper-middle- and high-income countries.  
Bossert’s approach defines devolution, and more generally decentralization, as the 
degree of discretion allowed by the central government to subnational authorities for a 
series of key health system functions.  Viewing devolution as a transfer of varying 
levels of discretion that can differ among the different functions of the health system 
captured nuances in the level of devolution that more-traditional approaches would not 
otherwise have detected.  The analysis produced health system decision-space maps for 
Extremadura and Madrid for both study periods.  When compared, these maps showed 
a significant change in de jure discretion granted to Spain’s regional governments from 
before to after the reform.  The decision-space map for the period before the reform 
illustrated mostly narrow decision-space for health system functions at the regional 
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level, while the decision-space map for the period after the reform displayed a varying 
amount of choice for them, ranging from narrow to wide.  De facto, the two regions 
both exercised their new health policymaking powers and responsibilities to different 
extents.  Overall, Extremadura produced more legislation on health issues and policies 
than Madrid did, but Madrid used its tax raising capacities more innovatively.  The 
results of this first part of the framework provided a rigorous foundation for the rest of 
the analysis by identifying the functions for which moderate and substantial discretion 
was allocated to the regions.    
In the second empirical chapter (Chapter 5), I analysed the second and third 
components of the framework for the thesis.  I employed the intergovernmental policy 
network approach in the national and subnational policymaking environments and 
applied it to the Spanish and regional cases for a period before 2001 and after it (2004-
2006).  Following the methods of the analytical framework, I identified and established 
the positions of the main actor groups within the national and subnational health policy 
networks and their trade-offs in intergovernmental health policymaking for both 
periods.  Overall, there were clear trade-offs for health policymaking in both 
environments.  Before 2001, ex-ante results show the national health policy network 
was the main network functioning in Spain.  The main actor group implicated in this 
network was the expenditure advocate group, with the topocrats exhibiting some 
influence via their positions on intergovernmental councils; namely, the CISNS and 
CPFF.  After the 2001 devolution, ex-ante results showed that the power and influence 
of the national-level expenditure advocates was redistributed to the expenditure 
guardians and topocrats within the national policymaking environment (forming a 
tightly knit policy network) and the subnational expenditure advocates and guardians 
within the policymaking environments of Extremadura and Madrid.  In the subnational 
health policy network for both regions, ex-ante results demonstrated subnational 
expenditure advocates and guardians to be more influential than health-sector 
kentrocrats.  Indeed, health-sector kentrocrats were expected to be virtually organised 
out of health politics and policy in both regions for this period.  At the same time, 
Madrid’s subnational expenditure advocates and guardians were expected to show 
proportional influence on health policy within their territory; while Extremadura’s 
subnational expenditure guardians were expected to have more influence than 
subnational expenditure advocates did on health policy within their territories.  The 
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latter expectation could have a slightly reduced effect when considering the impact 
from policy interests and priorities from the national health policy network      
Overall, Blom-Hansen’s method for analysing the intergovernmental health 
policymaking processes was straightforward, with the exception of clear indicators for 
assessing the relative power and position of the topocrats and health-sector kentrocrats 
which I ameliorated by creating indices for each of them.  These indices were intended 
to make the definition of the relative amount of power for the topocrats and health-
sector kentrocrats more objective (similar to the objectivity of von Hagen’s index 
measuring the strengths of the expenditure advocates and guardians).  Moreover, by 
further defining and expanding Blom-Hansen’s categories (e.g. “moderate” strength) 
and their thresholds, the analysis for the expenditure advocates and guardians became 
more robust.  In sum, this modified intergovernmental policy network approach 
provided important qualitative evidence and insight into the main actor groups involved 
in the health system, and how devolution affected their relative power positions and 
policymaking processes, and ex-ante health policy priorities.  
In the third empirical chapter (Chapter 6), I integrated the results from Chapters 
4 and 5 to examine whether the health policy priorities anticipated by the framework as 
a whole were aligned with the actual health policies produced in Spain and the Spanish 
regions of Extremadura and Madrid for the period 2004–2006.  Within the subnational 
health policymaking environment, I analysed the health policies for guaranteeing 
waiting times, expanding the common health care benefit package and paying medical 
specialists in hospital ambulatory settings.  These health policies all belonged to a 
different functional area of the health system and, for the period of study, were 
determined to have a moderate degree of discretion at the regional level.  For the 
national health policymaking environment, I assessed the policy for increasing health 
financing, which belonged to the functional area of health system financing.  For these 
analyses, I utilised three different measures of the effectiveness of intergovernmental 
policy—policy efficiency, policy strategies, and policy failures—to determine the 
actual output and priorities of these health policies.   
The overall results of these analyses were more mixed than not.  Madrid 
demonstrated a close correspondence between the expected positions and health policy 
priorities of their intergovernmental policy networks and the actual policy 
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developments within a devolved health system.211  Alternatively, for Extremadura, the 
ex-post policy developments did not completely reflect the ex-ante balance of power 
and policy priorities resulting from its intergovernmental policy network.  Rather, they 
favoured the subnational expenditure advocates’ priority for regional health policy over 
the subnational expenditure guardians’ priority for regional economic control.  
Moreover, the actual influence of the health-sector kentrocrats was underestimated by 
the framework analysis for the policy regarding payments for medical specialists in 
both regions.  Finally, the ex-post results for increasing health financing in Spain 
showed weakly corresponded to the ex-ante balance of power and policy priorities from 
the study period’s national health policy network.   
The discrepancies between ex-ante health policy priorities and ex-post ones in 
our case studies are likely due to confounding factors not controlled for in the study; 
most likely party politics or, in the case of the regions, financing capacity.  Party 
politics were held constant by Blom-Hansen (1999), a factor that I openly did not 
control in the thesis.  I intentionally selected the regional case studies because they 
were ruled by two different political parties.  My objective was to achieve a more 
realistic representation of regional-level political dynamics, since it is unlikely that all 
regions in a country will be dominated by the same party.  Moreover, political ideology 
may have had an effect on regional government decision-making.  From 1983 until the 
end of this study, Extremadura was led by the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party, which 
favours pro-labour social policies, including those governing the health sector.  
Meanwhile, from 1991 until the end of this study, Madrid was governed by the 
People’s Party, which holds more conservative values and views, favouring greater 
constraints on spending in all sectors.  In light of the prevailing party politics and 
ideologies in these two regions, I would have expected the subnational expenditure 
advocates to have had the greatest power among the three actor groups in Extremadura, 
and the subnational expenditure guardians to have had the greatest power in Madrid; 
and, thus, their health policy priorities to be followed.  Incorporating the influence of 
party politics and ideology into the analysis would explain the empirical results for 
Extremadura without compromising the explanation of the results obtained for Madrid.  
For the policy examined within the national health policymaking environment, party 
ideology of the central government at the time may have played a lesser role.  Rather, 
                                               
211 With the exception of the relative power and position of the health-sector kentrocrats for one policy as 
described above. 
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party politics between regional and national governments could have hand a hand in it.  
The overall economic climate at the time, which was essentially the period preceding 
the Great Economic Recession, may also have been a factor.  Furthermore, in Chapter 
6’s discussion, I spoke to the potential importance of differences in regional financing 
capacity and priorities, which may have confounded the ex-ante subnational results.  I 
also advanced the consideration that the relationship between policy networks and 
processes, political party alignment and financing capacities at both the national and 
regional level may affect policy actions and outcomes. 
Three principle implications can be drawn from my analysis and the case of 
Spain and provide lessons for other countries to learn from.  All three of these regard 
the design of decentralization and, particularly devolution, reform.  First, when 
planning a decentralization of a specific sector’s competencies, countries should 
consider details regarding the functional areas and key functions within the sector that 
would be affected by the decentralization and the consequences it may have on them.  
In Spain, for example, the health sector was decentralized along two dimensions: first, 
between different categories of health: health system, public health and pharmacy.  
Then, within these categories, the regions received different amounts of discretion for 
each functional area and key function.  To identify these for their health system, low- to 
lower-middle-income developing countries could use Bossert’s decision-space map and 
upper-middle to high-income countries could use my adaptation of Bossert’s decision-
space map.   
Second, when contemplating the design for decentralizing and especially 
devolving health care competencies (or those of any sector, really), countries should 
consider the resulting power dynamics of the three main actor groups identified for the 
national-level intergovernmental policy network.  Political party dynamics and their 
influence on the sector may change but these three actor groups are relatively stable and 
necessary overtime.  As we saw in the case of Spain, if the sectoral ministry is left with 
too little power, then they will be effectively organized out of politics at this level and 
their policy priorities and goals will be over looked.  On a related note, the third 
takeaway for other countries is that they should design devolution not only as a transfer 
of competencies to a subnational government, but they should prepare the subnational 
government for assuming such competencies as well as the sectoral ministry for their 
changing role after devolution, which usually requires them to become a steward of the 
system (kentrocrat within the subnational policy network).  Countries should not be 
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mistaken; stewardship is not an easy way of governing and managing a system.  It is 
completely different from the way they governed and managed before and requires a 
change of mind-set not only for the ministry as an institution but for individuals 
working within it.  Additionally, it is important to think about all three of these areas 
before decentralization (or devolution) and to prepare and make corresponding 
legislation for them before or at the same time as the reform; it is not timely to do so 
afterward.  In Spain, for example, not preparing for the MOH’s stewardship role in its 
new devolved health system (e.g. producing the 2003 LCQ after devolution) was a lost 
opportunity, making it more difficult for the MOH to support and coordinate the 
regions’ health service activities in a cohesive way and producing more inefficiencies 
and losses at both levels of government than it otherwise would have.   
Several areas for further research on the topics of the thesis present themselves; 
I begin with the most promising.  First, the adaptation of Bossert’s definition and 
method of measuring devolution to upper-middle- and high-income countries produced 
decision-space maps for two different periods in Spain, which could easily be 
compared.  As Bossert did with his decision-space approach for health system 
decentralization in developing countries, this adaptation could be scaled up and 
compared, for example, to later periods in Spain, to foral regions in Spain, and to other 
upper-middle- and high-income countries.   
Additionally, it would be interesting also to expand this analysis to cover the 
areas of public health and pharmacy.  Both policies often entail an increase in health 
expenditures.  At least in theory, public health policies it should be applied as 
homogeneously as possible across regional borders (e.g. communicable diseases do not 
respect geographic borders).  Pharmaceutical policy is an expensive and often 
contentious area of policymaking.  Therefore, it would be important to see how 
informal policymaking would play out in practice for these policy areas.   
Moreover, although the theory behind Blom-Hansen’s intergovernmental policy 
network approach to the national policymaking environment and the parallel approach 
introduced in this thesis for the subnational policymaking environment were sound, the 
analysis has two common limitations, for which further research areas can be identified.  
The first stems from the method of analysing expenditure advocates and guardians 
using von Hagen’s (1992) structural index for the national level and its adaptation at the 
regional level.  Essentially, grouping policy actors into expenditure guardians and 
advocates only allows for a meaningful analysis of policies that have a direct impact on 
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the level of health expenditures.  It is not conducive to analysing and anticipating 
policy priorities that are effectively cost-neutral or for which cost implications are 
indirect and difficult to quantify.  For example, the policy of contracting with private 
health centres and hospitals does not necessarily increase the overall cost of the system, 
though it may lead indirectly to increased cost by virtue of increasing volume; often it 
is implemented with the objective of increasing competition between providers, 
increasing efficiencies and lowering the cost of health care provision.  Further research 
could point to a more dynamic method for analysing these actor groups.  The second 
limitation is that, although the approach distinguishes the power, position, and priority 
goals of the expenditure guardians with regard to expenditure advocates within the 
health sector, it does not account for other factors, such as party politics and financing 
capacity, which are known to influence the use of this power.  For future research, as 
suggested in Section 6.5, regional financing capacity may also be a factor, which could 
be incorporated into the analytical framework of the thesis, using different indicators 
for revenue, expenditure and financial performance or even a separate index for it.   
Also, the party politics hypothesis could be further validated and quantified in 
relative terms, compared to the influence of the structural aspects of the 
intergovernmental policy networks (i.e., it would be important to understand how much 
weight party politics carries in the overall analysis of expenditure guardians and 
advocates and to modify the current analysis accordingly).  For such an analysis, one 
could consult party platforms, the political agenda of the government and/or examine a 
region’s pattern of allocating funds to different sectors, and whether (and, if so, how) 
this pattern changes with the governing political party and its agenda.   
As a further refinement of this hypothesis, researchers may consider how party 
politics influence intergovernmental relations and incorporate this feature into the 
analysis—for example, by assessing to what extent the political agenda of the central 
government influences the kentrocrats and their relationship with the subnational 
expenditure advocates and guardians in the subnational health policy network.  It would 
also be interesting to consider how the policymaking architecture and the resulting 
health policy priorities are affected when the national and subnational governments are 
controlled by opposing vs. the same political parties (and what difference it makes).  
For example, when asked how intergovernmental relations were with Aznar’s 
Administration in comparison to those with Zapatero’s Administration, one 
Extremadura interviewee said,  
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We had many problems with Aznar…and I do not believe this was a part 
of the Popular Party…it was because [he] considered the Autonomous 
Communities an additional barrier to governing and a bother to the 
system.  So, he always treated us at arm’s length.  Zapatero is completely 
the opposite; he is open, permissive, [and] comprehensive of some 
autonomous tendencies.  Relations are better with Zapatero, not only for 
ideological motives but because there is a concession in health care, in 
education, but also because of his sensitivity.  For example, he gives us 
the opportunity to be in delegations with the European Union (Novinskey, 
Interview no. 37).   
The extant research on intergovernmental relations and party politics could be 
incorporated into my analytical framework.  Such a modified framework could be used 
to re-examine the cases of Extremadura and Madrid as well as to expand the scope of 
analysis to other regions in Spain.  Finally, the analysis could be deepened by applying 
it to a broader set of health policies. 
Overall, the thesis’s analytical framework for policymaking within a devolved 
health system was only partially successful in anticipating the actual health policies.  
On the one hand, it was fully successful in defining and measuring health system 
devolution in Spain and describing the intergovernmental relations involved in a 
devolved health system.  Moreover, it provided greater insight into the ‘black box’ of 
policymaking, which policymakers can utilise to develop and plan more adequate 
strategies for pursuing their primary goals and priorities within their respective health 
policymaking environments.  Therefore, it could be particularly useful to national and 
subnational expenditure advocates as well as health-sector kentrocrats.  For example, in 
the period after devolution in Spain, national expenditure advocates and health-sector 
kentrocrats—both of which were effectively organised outside of health 
policymaking—could have used information from the analysis to prioritise re-
positioning themselves so that they would have more of a say and hand in the 
policymaking process (e.g. acting more to work with and through the regions, using 
‘softer’ stewardship methods and tools for encouraging coordination and cooperation 
from and among the regions, redesigning its framework to ensure better tools for 
implementation—e.g. greater financial incentives—, advocating greater political 
backing from other central government actor groups).  Moreover, with its application 
across all regions in a country, health-sector kentrocrats could also use the information 
resulting from the analysis to prioritise working with certain regions before others and 
ascertain the level of intensity with which they should work with each region, to 
achieve their overall priority goal of health policy cohesion and cooperation across all 
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regions in a more prioritised and systematic way.  In addition, researchers could use the 
information produced from the analysis to understand better the differences in health 
policymaking processes (e.g. the variants in policy network organization), priorities and 
policies across regions within the same country, and potential causes thereof.  
However, to be completely successful, the analytical framework must be complemented 
by political and financial analyses, and, if possible, adapted to health policies that do 
not only influence the sector by changing the expenditure level.     
In terms of the potential policy implications of future work, once the design is 
consolidated (e.g. accounting for and curbing its current limitations), the analytical 
framework could help to inform the ‘right’ design for analysing the health 
policymaking processes in a devolved health system.  Then, it could be scaled up and 
applied to the many politically decentralized, unitary states in the world that have an 
upper-middle- or high-level of income (perhaps, using and expanding upon the variants 
identified for the structural organization of intergovernmental policymaking).  The 
more case studies that are done, the more intelligence can be gathered and analysed on 
what the desired balance between the main actor groups of the intergovernmental 
policy networks is and how to achieve it (based on country experiences).  Moreover, if 
the method of the analysis for the expenditure advocates and guardians (i.e., the use of 
von Hagen’s structural index) is kept as is, then the framework could be pared down 
and focused explicitly on health policies that affect health expenditures.  In doing so, as 
it is scaled up and applied to more country and regional cases, it could eventually come 
to identify which health system functions are generally more tied to expenditures.  
Furthermore, this intelligence could be utilised to inform countries that are looking to 
reform their health system through a devolution, decentralization and/or centralization 
and, at the same time, aim to ensure the political and financial sustainability of it.    
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Appendix A.  The Potential Governance and Political Effects of 
Decentralization 
When a government changes its organisational structure through a decentralization (or 
re-centralization) of decision-making power process, what difference does it make?  
Wolman (1990, 30) argues, “Presumably structure is important because there are a set 
(or sets) of important values that are enhanced or impeded by decentralized as opposed 
to centralized structures”.  So, what are these important values and how might they be 
affected through decentralization?  The governance and political literature holds several 
accounts of the theoretical value for decentralization or a decentralized structure of 
government.  Advocates often bolster its potential value for improving responsiveness 
and accountability (and, ultimately, liberty), diversity and innovation in public policies 
at a more local level, as well as political stability and policy stability.  Antagonists 
often claim, however, that decentralization comes at the cost of inequalities and the 
nation’s interest as a whole (assuming inequality is the same as uniformity), and is 
likely to lead to additional pressure on the state and a lack of coordination if the design 
of the state does not eliminate duplicities and if national government controls and 
constraints are perceived as being soft (Costa-Font 2013).  In many cases, there exist 
raison d'être that both support the benefits of decentralization as well as purport its 
hindrances or support centralization (de Vries 2000).  In this section, I assess the main 
theoretical effects of decentralization presented mainly in the governance and political 
literature.      
A.1.  Responsiveness, Accountability and Liberty 
The political equivalent to the economic efficiency argument is that decentralizing 
brings government closer to the people, making it more responsive and accountable and 
increasing the liberty of the people.  Based on proximity and size212, local governments 
– which are closer to the people and smaller than central governments – are able to 
capture more and better information213 on individual preferences and, thus, respond to 
these preferences with corresponding policies.  According to Mill (1874), this is also 
because the local government has a greater interest in the results.   Thus, there is a 
better match (less divergence) between individual preferences and public policy 
                                               
212 Reducing the size of government helps to guarantee democracy through the above-mentioned 
increase in citizen participation, accountability and liberty (Treisman 2007a).   
213 Local knowledge is a prerequisite for the determination of individual preferences in local 
communities and, thus, local government responsiveness (Smith 1985).   
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(Wolman 1990).  In addition, individuals are more able to hold local governments 
directly accountable (than central government) because the smaller size is more 
comprehensible and easier to navigate.  As such, individuals are more likely to 
participate in government mechanisms to collect their preferences (e.g. elections, 
petitions, etc.) and, even, to coordinate better in small groups on voting strategies (D. 
Treisman 2007a).  Therefore, if they disapprove of local policies in their area, they can 
vote their local politicians out of office; thereby, changing the policies (Wolman 1990).  
It is assumed that voting out local politicians is easier for the individual to do than 
voting out central politicians because individuals in one locality are the main 
constituent of local politicians but only one of many constituents for central politicians.  
Moreover, voting out central government officials is more difficult because individuals 
have to weigh a multitude of policies and issues at both the central (e.g. foreign, 
defence, and macroeconomic policies) and local level (e.g. sewage, water supply, 
roads), and then can only cast a single vote.  Thus, local issues are only one dimension 
of central government performance, which are probably low in priority compared to the 
whole of issues that an individual voter would use to evaluate central government 
performance.  As a result, a decentralized system permits a closer match between 
individual user preferences and the policies implemented.   
Ylvisaker (1959, 32)(1959: 32) further argues that a decentralized system keeps 
power “close to its origins, and governmental officials within reach of their masters”.  It 
provides more points of access, pressure and control than a centralized system.  As 
such, minorities should be elected into office at the local government level more easily 
than at other levels.214  Political decentralization also enables a two-way flow of 
information between local government and the citizens (which other forms do not 
necessarily allow).  This two-way flow of information highly facilitates government 
responsiveness to local needs and helps to ensure democracy.   
By increasing accountability at the local level, it is thought that decentralization 
also promotes the value of liberty because it allows local communities to self-govern on 
issues relevant only to them (Smith 1985).215  This follows Mill’s (2002, 86) argument 
that there is “liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such 
                                               
214 Some even argue that political decentralization defuses ethnic conflicts.  See Treisman (2007a 
Chapter 10) for more on this argument and its counter argument.   
215 The argument is that local government preserves the liberty of the local community against 
centralizing power.  See Sharpe (1981) and Chapter 8 in Treisman (2007a) for more details on this 
argument and its counterarguments.   
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things that regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves.” And after seeing 
the high degree of decentralization in the USA and how it helped the government to be 
close and accessible to citizens at the most local levels, Tocqueville argued (2003, 73), 
“Town [local] institutions are to freedom [liberty] what primary schools are to 
knowledge: they bring it within people’s reach and give men the enjoyment and habit 
of using it for peaceful ends.  Without town institutions a nation can establish a free 
government but has not the spirit of freedom itself.”216  Therefore, decentralization 
makes it easier for individuals in local communities to exercise their right to self-
regulation; and, thereby, gives them more liberty (Smith 1985).   
While decentralizing may in one way contribute to accountability between local 
government and individual citizens by giving them more opportunities to participate in 
political activities (e.g. elections, petitions, political pressures, public debates, etc.), it is 
in all other ways and ultimately an a priori argument that requires empirical scrutiny 
(Smith 1985).  These same opportunities – although fewer in number – also could be 
offered in a centralised system with the same result: greater correlation between the 
individual preferences and public policies.  In some cases, a centralised (single-level) 
system may even be easier to navigate and attribute blame or credit than a decentralized 
(multi-level) one, especially when competencies are shared between levels (Treisman 
2007a).   
This theory affirming that decentralization promotes government 
responsiveness and accountability and citizen liberty makes several assumptions on 
local-level politics as well.  In general, it romanticises the political process at the local 
level by metamorphosing decentralization into a value in its own right (Felser 1965).  
Smith (1985, 29) argues, “It comes too close to presenting the identification of needs, 
and the right ‘mix’ of services to meet them, as a technical exercise in which a correct 
answer to the problem is found by tapping local knowledge and experience”.  In reality, 
the local political process may be more closed to the population, more susceptible to 
influence and domination by small, unrepresentative groups and, even, to corruption.  
Moreover, accountability may be abated if citizens do not see the importance in 
participating in political activities and voting (Wolman 1990).  Some authors believe 
voter turn-out will be greater for elections of the more decentralized level of 
                                               
216 The USA has changed dramatically since Tocqueville toured it to study the strengths and weaknesses 
of its evolving politics.  Some would argue that the schools of democracy, touted by Tocqueville and 
others, are broken: they claim that localities are too big and suburbanization weakens the educational 
potential of local politics.   
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government because an individual’s vote is greater in smaller units (Borck 2002, 155). 
217  Other authors find that empirical evidence supports the opposite, for example, the 
USA shows consistently low voter turnout for local elections (Treisman 2007a).218   
The theory that decentralization supports democracy assumes that the individual 
will be more informed of local government actions and policies than those of the 
central government are and, thus, have a direct effect on accountability.  If we assume 
that it is because voters are able to “absorb information about local government 
performance as a by-product of living in the local community” (Treisman 2007a, 165), 
then questions should be raised as to the reliability of this inadvertently acquired 
information.  Moreover, any level of government would have to be monitored very 
effectively for individuals to gain such transparent information.  More effective 
monitoring is done by third parties, which are often voluntary organisations (e.g. 
political non-governmental watchdogs, investigative journalists, interest groups, etc.).  
Wolman (1990, 37) writes, “In the American context political scientists have long 
observed the minority groups, the poor, urban interests and labour organisations are 
more influential at the federal level than in most states and are likely to have their 
interests less well served by decentralized policymaking.”   
Even considering a more-informed public on local issues, in general, it is 
thought that voting is a relatively poor mechanism for collecting information on 
grievances and bad administration, for measuring ‘consumer satisfaction’ with public 
policies and holding politicians accountable (Smith 1985; Treisman 2007a).  
Considering more-informed citizens formed small groups to consolidate voting 
strategies, these groups would have to be extremely small according to some authors 
(Yates 1973; Morlan 1984; Milner 2001).  Treisman (2007a, 13) doubts this, writing: 
“incumbents at any level of government can undermine such voter coordination by 
playing groups of voters off against one another, using "divide and conquer" 
strategies”.   
  
                                               
217 This is based on the argument that an individual has a greater incentive to vote in smaller units of 
government and, thus, to hold incumbent officials accountable.  It stems from the “paradox of voting” 
that states that “As the size of the electorate increases, the chance of any one voter’s being pivotal – that 
is, determining the outcome – diminishes” (Treisman 2007a, 169).   
218 Voting turnout in local elections in the USA is notoriously low: approximately 30 per cent.  At the 
same time, in less decentralized country systems, voter turn-out in local elections can be high: about 85 
per cent in Italy and 70 per cent in France (Goldsmith and Newton 1986, 146).  
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A.2.  Policy Diversity and Innovation 
The policy diversity and innovation argument follows from the above argument on 
democracy.  It maintains that decentralized systems promote greater diversity in public 
policies and opportunities for experimentation with policy innovations than centralised 
systems, which tend to impose uniform policies on local governments.  Oates (1972, 
12) adds that “the more monopolistic the government, the less the incentive to 
innovate.”  This argument is based on assumptions that local governments are better 
able to elicit and make use of local information than central governments (Treisman 
2007a); overall, providing citizens a wide variety of tax and services packages to 
choose from (Wolman 1990).  It also assumes that result of greater diversity and 
innovation in public policies leads to more successful policies that are eventually 
adopted by other local governments or even the central government.  Indeed, 
decentralization can create a laboratory of sorts for policymaking.  The idea is that 
decentralized governments have incentives to experiment at the local level, and that if 
cooperation mechanisms are in place for governments to emulate each other; then, 
innovations are extended to other areas (e.g. antismoking regulation in Scotland, Italy 
and Spain).   
There are four major critiques to this policy diversity and innovation argument.  
First, as with other arguments above, this argument is not theoretical but empirical.  
That is, it is not theoretically understood why a decentralized system would have any 
advantage or not over a centralised system in promoting diversity and innovation.  
Second, the policy innovation benefits of the diversity argument depend not only on the 
local government’s ability to elicit and use information but also on its ability to 
establish and implement the ‘right’ service package and successfully diffuse the 
effective policies to other local governments for adoption.  What is more, Wolman 
(1987) evidences that, in any case, policy adoption is more likely to be encouraged by 
central government than local government.  Therefore, while local governments may be 
more likely (inherently) to innovate, central governments will be more likely to 
promote adoption.  Third, the diffusion of successful innovation has been shown in the 
literature to depend on a whole slew of other factors that are unrelated to organisational 
structure (Berry and Berry 2007).  These factors include: (i) size of country, (ii) 
strength of professional networks among local government officials, (iii) strength of 
interaction among officials through local government associations and/or national party 
organisations (Wolman 1990).  The question that we are left with is whether these 
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factors are in turn predictors of decentralization themselves.  Fourth, policy diversity 
through decentralization implies that the levels of service and tax burdens for citizens 
in the same country will vary across jurisdictions.  Thus, it necessarily results in 
inequalities, presumably based on (or limited by) need and financial resource capacity 
(tax base per capita) (Wolman 1990).  That is, to provide the same quality (level and 
mix) of services, areas of greater need (e.g. more school-age children per capita, more 
handicapped individuals, more elderly per capita) will have to provide more services 
and, thus, charge higher tax rates than areas with lower needs.  This is also true of 
poorer areas, as they tend to have greater needs than wealthier areas.219  This is usually 
compensated for in decentralized polities with equalisation funds to level up poorer 
regions and guarantee equality of opportunities in the system of competition.  Of 
course, equalisation mechanisms are not perfect, as it is difficult to take into account 
unobservable characteristics that explain why some regions not well resourced.   
A.3.  Political Stability 
It is argued that decentralization performs a system maintenance function and leads to 
national political stability (Wolman 1990; Lederman, Loayza, and Soares 2005).  It 
does so by contributing to increasing citizen interest and participation in local 
government, which helps to promote and establish a connection between citizens and 
the political system, increasing democratic values.  One of the values that it is said to 
increase is citizen’s trust in the leaders they choose, which is a necessary condition for 
political stability.  There is one major counterargument for this argument: it is a priori 
argument, depending on empirical study.   
Moreover, the political stability argument is related with what some authors 
(Wolman 1990) call the “countervailing power” argument and others (Smith 1985) the 
“political equality” argument.  The political equality argument states that, by providing 
additional opportunities for citizens to participate in public policymaking (e.g. by 
voting and other forms of exercising freedom of speech), decentralization advances 
political equality and, at the same time, provides additional centres of power in the 
system (countervailing centres).  The countervailing power argument sets out that, by 
increasing the number of power centres in the political system, decentralization 
counterbalances the pre-existing power and influence; thereby, protecting democracy 
                                               
219 One practical response to this territorial equality issue in a decentralized system is to implement a 
national equalization fund or system to compensate areas with high needs and/or low tax bases (Wolman 
and Page, E 1987).   
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and increasing political stability.  This, however, has been dismissed as an argument 
more concerned with controlling central government behaviour than with 
decentralization.  “Opportunism by the national government is best constrained by 
fragmenting power at the national level” (Bednar, Eskridge, Jr., and Ferejohn 2001, 9).  
One of the issues from decentralization is the emergence of regional political cycles in 
addition to the national political cycle, which might make political decision-making 
more complex (Costa-Font 2012). 
With our example of voter turnout statistics earlier, we saw that greater 
decentralization does not necessarily lead to greater increased participation of citizens 
in government.  Empirical studies also show a lack of political stability in several 
countries following times of active local government (Smith 1985).  Ardanaz et al. 
(2012) illustrate the idea of countervailing centres in Argentina and the dire 
consequences it has had on the country due to the encroachment of political officials at 
the subnational government level on the authority and resources of other government 
officials above and below them.  An extreme version of such consequences, Myerson 
(2014) notes this potential risk of ‘federalism’ to exacerbate the threats of regional 
success.  He believes, however, that the solution is to limit the size of individual 
subnational governments (in particular, the provincial level governments in his study 
on the Government of Pakistan) so that they are not large enough to be viable 
independent states and, thus, their political officials are not tempted to lead a 
succession.  Moreover, some authors (Smith 1985) even question the relationship 
between local democracy and national stability altogether, as well as the normative 
desirability of ‘stability’.  Because the impact of decentralization on national political 
stability is at its core an application of the democracy and accountability argument 
above, I do not address it separately in the empirical review below.  Furthermore, there 
is an important measure of decentralization that determines political stability, which is 
the presence of countrywide parties at the subnational and national levels of 
government.  If the same party runs the national and subnational governments, then 
there is a problem of double agency and generally, the extent of power of the national 
government is maximised; while a difference in parties between these two levels 
reduces the probability of cooperation (Costa-Font and Rico 2006b). 
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A.4.  Policy Stability or Change 
There are several arguments for the political and governance value of decentralization 
regarding its ability to promote or contribute to policy stability (or change).  Most are 
rooted in the literature that considers the role of institutions (see the public policy 
literature review for more on ‘new institutionalisms’).  Institutions, especially political 
institutions, set the ‘rules of the game’ in policymaking.  They include institutions of 
federalism, bicameralism, judicial review, and a powerful president (Hallerberg, 
Strauch, and von Hagen 2009).  Most also use a variation of game theory to support 
their thesis.  This is the most relevant argument of decentralization for the thesis.   
The most prevalent of policy stability theories in the literature regarding 
decentralization are the veto power arguments, such as the veto players theory220 and 
veto points approach.  These arguments consider the institutional conditions (or 
constitutional configurations, including decentralization) as a potential driver of policy 
stability or change in different settings and periods.  They do not have an a priori 
assumption being able to find a best-fit solution (S. Atkinson 2007).  At their base, they 
theorise that the greater the number of veto points or veto players, the less likely current 
policy will change (i.e., policy stability).  According to Treisman (2007a), of all the 
arguments supporting decentralization, the policy stability (or change) argument is the 
most convincing.  However, he cautions, it is important to understand that policy 
stability does not have any normative value; rather, its value depends on the character 
of the policies established.   
In her study on health politics in Europe, Immergut (1992) argues that different 
political patterns or specific policy choices (over time or in different countries) can be 
understood across countries by applying her veto point framework, which adopts a 
dynamic perspective of policymaking as a chain of political decisions (Jochem 2003).  
Her veto point framework in general is based on constitutional rules and electoral 
results and focuses on transaction costs in politics.  The so-called veto points are not 
physical points but rather points in time of strategic political uncertainty over policy 
decisions, where particular actors have the potential to implement, transform, 
undermine or overturn policies.  Immergut (1992, 27) states, “even a small shift in 
electoral results or constitutional provisions may change the location and strategic 
                                               
220 I will not discuss if the veto players theory is actually theory or would be more appropriately deemed 
an approach.  Instead, I have chosen to follow the authors’ own terminology in their papers – though, 
when referring to both at the same time, I will use the term approaches in an effort to be more concise.   
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importance of such veto points”.  When referring to ‘institutions’, Immergut means 
mostly the constitutionally fixed ‘rules of the game’ that indicate where a point of 
decision may be in the political system.  These ‘institutions’ are taken to represent the 
political environment within which interest groups and potential interests manoeuvre.  
However, they do not determine the preferences and strategies of the political actors.  
Policy stability depends on the number of these veto points in a political system and the 
goal of legislators would be to close-off these veto points “to push their program 
unscathed through the political process” (Immergut 1992, 227).  Therefore, fewer veto 
points means fewer possibilities for policy change and, thus, greater policy stability.  
Huber et al. (1993) ‘multiple points of influence’ theory and Shugart and Haggard’s 
(2001) ‘veto gate’ theory approximates Immergut’s veto points approach. 
Despite its multidimensionality and realistic approach, the veto point theory 
does have drawbacks in particular for its application to the thesis.  Immergut begins her 
research on veto points not thinking about any classification or a priori 
conceptualisation of political actors, rather she carries it out inductively, starting with 
the health politics and ‘institutions’ in Europe in mind.  Her veto points approach 
necessitates an analysis of political systems as a whole, including their organisation and 
the overall logic within which they work to arrive at the number and location of the 
veto points in any given system (Immergut 1992).  Only afterwards can the strategies 
employed by political actors be identified empirically.  Additionally, the focus of the 
veto point approach is on the constitutional (‘institutional’) rules of the political game 
and their interplay with electoral results, not on the actors.  As such, the key actors are 
taken mostly to be the political parties in the executive and legislative decision-making 
processes that are crucial at a particular veto point and, at the same time, open to 
pressure from interests groups.  The focus of the thesis, however, is on institutional 
actors rather than partisan actors.  Finally, although it was constructed with specific 
regard to health politics, it does not look at decentralization policy in particular 
(though, a few cases have applied the veto point approach to decentralized contexts; see 
the empirical evidence section).   
Tsebelis’ (1995; 1999; 2002) veto players theory argues that a certain number of 
individual and collective actors (a.k.a. veto players) have to agree on a proposed policy 
change in order for it to be passed into legislation.  It determines such veto players 
through the constitution or political system in a specific country, which are respectively 
referred to as institutional or partisan veto players.  The theory provides its own rules 
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to both identify veto players and how they interact, which can affect the set of 
outcomes in the analysis.  For example, a mainstay of the theory is the rule of 
absorption.  That is, you cannot simply count the number of veto players; you also have 
to consider their policy preferences: If a veto player’s preferences are similar to any of 
the other veto players, then they will be absorbed into the same group and only counted 
once.  In the theory, the number of veto players, the ideological distance between them 
and the level of internal cohesion within each collective actor group are particularly 
important (Tsebelis 1995, 311).  Tsebelis (2002) addresses the issues of cohesion 
within collective veto players most, where more cohesion leads to higher policy 
stability under simple majority voting and less stability under qualified majority voting 
rules.  “If there is just one veto player, then that player gets his policy choice and there 
remains nothing more to explain.  If there are multiple players, then one must determine 
where they stand on relevant policy issues and whether it is realistic to treat them as 
one actor” (Hallerberg 2010, 22).  A change in policy is unlikely when the number of 
veto players is large, the ideological distances are great and their internal cohesion is 
strong.   
Tsebelis’s theory is quite elaborate – some suggest more so than the Immergut’s 
veto point theory (Jochem 2003) – and it puts forth a general theory of institutions and 
a common framework for analysing and understanding policy change or stability in 
different constitutional settings and periods.  Moreover, it provides researchers with an 
analytical tool for comparing institutional effects in seemingly distinctive countries and 
systems; e.g. those with presidential or parliamentary democracies, one- or multi-party 
political systems, single- or multi-level governments, industrialised or developing 
countries (though, admittedly, there is less supporting empirical evidence for the latter).  
Regarding multi-level governments, it can be used with regard to decentralization (see 
empirical section on this topic).  According to this theory, decentralization would most 
likely increase the number of actors in the decision-making process, making significant 
policy change at the national level difficult or impossible; thereby, contributing to 
increased stability (no change in the status quo) of policies.  In highly decentralized 
systems, such as the United States or Switzerland, one would expect that large-scale 
reforms would be less likely, due to the higher number of veto players (Tsebelis 2002).  
However, having more veto players may be an advantage for governments as they can 
more easily ‘share the blame’ or to ‘pass the blame’ for negative impacts or perceptions 
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of policies to other levels of government than governments with more concentrated 
power (Pierson 1994; Pal and Weaver 2003).   
The veto player theory has a few shortcomings in general.  In contrast to the 
veto point theory, the veto player theory assumes that there are no transaction costs in 
the politics between veto players (because it is so difficult to make these operational 
across countries and time) (Tsebelis 2002, 29).  Crepaz’s (2002) results differ from 
Tsebelis’s, arguing that there is a difference between veto players in practice.  They 
show that ‘collective’ veto players interact often and continuously and, thus, are more 
likely to pass legislation through logrolling; while ‘competitive’ veto players would be 
more likely block legislation.  Strom (2000) argues that partisan and institutional veto 
players are sufficiently different due to their respective opportunities and motives.  
Similarly, Ganghof (2003) argues that veto players are close enough to one another to 
agree on policy changes through logrolling.  He adds that veto players may also act to 
differentiate themselves from others in the eyes of their current and potential future 
constituents.   
This theory also has some shortcomings that specifically regard the thesis.  Like 
the veto point approach, the veto player theory does not examine intergovernmental 
actors in particular as needed by the thesis but rather focuses most generally on partisan 
actors.  Indeed, largely, its centre of interest is political party competition and its 
impacts on public policymaking.  Moreover, the veto player theory cannot be used to 
make any deductions about the direction of policy change, but rather the number of 
significant legislative changes (that is, a change in the status quo).  The thesis of this 
dissertation is interested not only on the pure number of legislative changes but it is 
interested on the general direction of those changes.  Furthermore, and most 
importantly, the number of veto players or veto points as overall indicators of the 
political system, which does not necessarily coincide with those of the health system.  
As Kotzian (2008, 243) puts succinctly, “Institutional or political veto players seldom 
have genuine interests at stake in health policy.  Therefore, the number of veto players 
or veto points as such offers no information about the probability of a veto actually 
being cast or a veto point being used to block application of a certain control lever.”     
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Appendix B.  Structure-based and Classical and New Institutionalism 
Approaches to Policymaking 
B.1.  Structure-based Approaches to Policymaking 
Structure-based approaches to policymaking look at the policy consequences of basic 
socioeconomic problems in society.  That is, they look at how the structure of a 
society’s socioeconomic development changes policy.  Two primary models of these 
approaches are the ‘socioeconomic school’ and the ‘cleavage’ approach.   
B.1.1.  The Socioeconomic School Model 
The socioeconomic school was pioneered Émile Durkheim and Karl Marx, arguably the 
fathers of sociology and main architects of all social science.  Durkheim and Marx were 
the first to study socioeconomic stratification221, among other topics, which is still 
mainstreaming the social science literature (Knill and Tosun 2012).  Their work was 
developed, and strongly associated, within the context of the modernisation (or 
industrialisation) of societies, beginning perhaps in 18th century Great Britain.  As such, 
the socioeconomic school is essentially a functionalist view of policymaking and 
argues that socioeconomic development produces positive and negative effects on 
societies and, thus, public policy’s main purpose is to balance out (or correct for) the 
more negative consequences with new policies to support these societies.  For example, 
as women began entering into the workforce, the ‘old’ concept of the family institution 
(i.e., traditional family structure) began to change, and the need for governments to 
provide ‘new’ public policies and services (mostly related to welfare) to support the 
‘new’ concept of the family institution grew.  Not all authors, however, think that there 
is a connection between socio-economic development and the need for government 
involvement/activity is positive; some have proposed that the relationship between the 
two is negative (e.g. Wagner’s law of increasing state activity (Henrekson 1993; 
Lamartina and Zaghini 2011).  With regard to health policy, the study of socio-
economic status and health began in the 19th century, when “researchers investigated 
differences in health outcomes among royalty, the landed elite and the working class in 
Europe” (Cutler, Lleras-Muney, and Vogl 2008, 1).  Today measures of socioeconomic 
status—including income, education, occupation, race and ethnicity—are prolific in the 
                                               
221 “The unequal distribution of valued goods or holdings in a society, including wealth, status and 
resources” (Knill and Tosun 2012, 71).   
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research on the determinants of health (and mortality) and widely utilised to inform 
those interested in designing policies.   
This model—like any other—has its strengths and weaknesses.  Its primary 
analytical strength is that it establishes a ‘functional’ understanding of public policy for 
systematically explaining policy variation across countries (M. G. Schmidt 2002).  A 
weakness that this model has for the thesis is that it considers policymaking to be 
primarily motivated and explained by socio-economic development pertaining to 
industrialisation.  By contrast, the thesis would like to examine a more micro-level 
understanding of policymaking, by looking at the specific policy of devolution of the 
health system. 
B.1.2.  The Social Cleavage Approach 
A second prominent example of structure-based approaches is the social cleavage 
approach by Lipset and Rokkan (1967).  It emphasises enduring socioeconomic 
conflicts in society as the main determinants of policymaking.  Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) propose four major social cleavages: (i) centre-periphery, (ii) state-church, (iii) 
rural-urban, and (iv) workers-employers.  Regardless of the type of social cleavage, this 
approach explains how certain political parties have formed through deep divisions in 
societal groups and how such divisions still today influence their current preferences, 
thinking and actions in the policymaking process.  The centre-periphery social cleavage 
relates directly to the topic of decentralization.  It is the division of social groups based 
on their support or opposition of the centralization of political power and administrative 
structures in a nation-state.  Generally, those opposing centralization do so by asserting 
their traditional autonomy.  They are mainly associated with separatist-nationalist 
parties.  While the centre-periphery social cleavage may partially characterise how 
some nation-states (including Spain) have arrived at a decentralization of power (i.e., 
through separatist-nationalist movements) as well as the general policy preferences of 
certain (separatist-nationalist) political parties, it says nothing about the effects of such 
decentralization on policymaking, institutions and agency.  With regard to health 
policy, the social cleavage approach has been used mostly to describe how issues with 
health policies echo and even re-enforce the more general social cleavage patterns in a 
society (e.g. Huang (2013)).   
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B.2.  Institutional-based Approaches to Policymaking 
Institutional-based approaches emphasise the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements as the main determinants of policymaking.  These approaches may be 
divided in two main groups depending on how they define the concept of ‘institutions’: 
(i) classical approaches to institutional analysis222 (e.g. Castles’ (1989) analysis of 
political-institutional variables and socioeconomic indicators) and (ii) new approaches 
to institutional analysis (e.g. sociological and historical institutionalisms).   
B.2.1.  Classical Institutionalisms 
Classical institution-based approaches to policymaking define institutions as their 
formal-legal arrangement or “public laws that concern formal governmental 
organizations” (Eckstein 1979, 1–2).223  These approaches dominated political science 
until the 1950s and, thus, are considered the “historic core of political science” today 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 5; Lowndes 2010).  They argue that, in addition to the socio-
economic situation, key governmental organisations and the ideas embedded in them 
are the institutions that matter to the policymaking process (March and Olsen 1984; 
Chevalier 1996; Lijphart 1999; Bevir and Rhodes 2010).  “Institutions also matter 
because they (or at least actors within them) typically wield power and mobilize 
institutional resources in political struggles and governance relationships” (Bell 2002).  
Some authors purport classical institutional analyses that combine both socioeconomic 
indicators and institutional variables.  For example, Castles (1998) gives a systematic 
and comprehensive account of the transformation of policymaking in OECD countries 
post-World War II.  With this approach, he makes an important contribution to the 
comparative public policy literature by arguing that public policy is the result of four 
family-specific policymaking processes among these countries: (i) an English-speaking 
policymaking family; (ii) a Continental European policymaking family; (iii) a 
Scandinavian policymaking family; and, (v) a Southern European policymaking 
family.224  The classical institution-based approach has been applied to health policies.  
A more recent example of this is Kitchener’s (1998) Quasi-Market Transformation: An 
                                               
222 Sometimes referred to as ‘old’ institutionalism or ‘traditional’ institutionalism in the literature.   
223 Rhodes (2008) contends that old institutionalisms can be categorized as ‘traditions in the study of 
political institutions, including modernist-empiricist, formal-legal, idealist and socialist traditions.   
224 The English-speaking policymaking family includes Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK 
and the USA.  The Continental European family includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands.  The Scandinavian policymaking family includes Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden; The Southern European policymaking family includes Greece, Portugal and Spain.   
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Institutionalist Approach to Change in UK Hospitals, which performs a comparative 
analysis on hospitals in the UK in the early 1990s and provides further understanding 
of the way in which changes in the institutional context influence the tracks of change 
within individual hospitals.   
What classical institutionalism approaches fail to address, however, is the ‘black 
box’ of policymaking between the formal-legal arrangements of governmental 
organisations and the resulting policies.  As such, it almost overlooks the broader social 
behaviour.  Because of this, and returning to our previous example, Castles (1998) 
analysis cannot explain why policy choices may differ among countries within the same 
policymaking family.  In addition, these approaches do not address policy change 
within countries over time when institutions have not changed.  These two aspects are 
essential to the thesis in its examination of a newly decentralized structure in the health 
system affects the policymaking process and agency, before and after one reform 
within one country.    
In the 1960s and 1970s, these gaps in the literature led researchers away from 
analysing the characteristics of formal institutions and towards the study of collective 
and individual actor behaviour as it relates to the political system, or behaviouralism in 
political science225 (Hall and Taylor 1996).  Moreover, behaviouralists prided 
themselves on studying the realistic, political side of how individuals behave in general 
rather than whether they abide by legal or formal rules of institutions (Grigsby 2011).  
In addition, behaviouralists prided themselves on their use rigorous methods and 
empirical research to validate their studies.  Therefore, they restricted their studies to 
measurable behaviours (e.g. social and economic position, attitudes, votes) and not 
institutions (Steinmo 2008).  While I do not review the behaviouralist approach, this 
brief is meant to provide a backdrop to the naissance of ‘new’ institution-based 
approaches to policymaking (or new institutionalisms226).   
B.2.2.  New Institutionalisms 
Just as the behaviouralism movement in the 1960s and 70s was a response in part to the 
weaknesses of the classical institutionalisms, new institutionalism, emerging in the 
1980s, was a response in part to weaknesses of behaviouralism (Thelen and Steinmo 
1992).  New institutionalism was developed in 1984 by March and Olsen in their 
                                               
225 Behaviouralism in political science was born and mostly studied in the United States.   
226 Also referred to as neo-institutionalisms in the scholarly literature.   
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seminal publication The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.  
According to these authors, it seeks to emphasise “the relative autonomy of political 
institutions, possibilities for inefficiency in history, and the importance of symbolic 
action to an understanding of politics” (1984, 734).   
New institutionalism is not just one stream of thought but it encompasses 
several.227  These streams of thought are similar in that they define the concept of 
‘institution’ with greater complexity than just the formal (physical) organisation of an 
institutional structure (Bell 2002).  That is, their definition also includes the informal 
institutions of an organisation: the ‘rules’, norms, coordination activities, collective 
action and standard operating practices that are set by, and exist within the confines of, 
physical institutions.  Thus, they contend that informal institutions also matter in the 
policymaking process.  For some new institutionalisms, the informal (or unstructured) 
institutions of an organisation matter even more than the formal (or structured) 
institutions (Ostrom 2007; Shepsle 2008).  “Institutions are also said to matter because 
they are seen as shaping and constraining political behaviour and decision making and 
even the perceptions and powers of political actors in a wide range of ways”  (Bell  
2002).  In essence, they underscore that institutions are a main, if not primary, factor in 
shaping or structuring the actions and interactions and, sometimes, preferences of 
actors (i.e., the nature of politics and political debate) and how such actions, 
interactions and preferences influence the policy change process (March and Olsen 
1984; 2005; Thelen and Steinmo 1992).  “Institutions in this sense provide arenas for 
conflict, and efforts to alter them stimulate conflict inasmuch as they change the rules 
of the game in such a way as to alter the allocation of advantages and disadvantages” 
(Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman 2008, xiv).   
Three streams of new institutionalism stand out for their potential utility in the 
thesis’ analysis: historical, sociological and rational choice institutionalisms.  These 
streams of thought within new institutionalism differ in how they view the political 
world (Hall and Taylor1 1996).  Historical institutionalism developed primarily in the 
political science literature.  It traces how the past shapes the future, arguing that 
policymaking is path dependent.  Sociological institutionalism has emerged from 
                                               
227 Normative institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, empirical 
institutionalism (sometimes referred to as modernist-empiricist institutionalism), international 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, network institutionalism, feminist institutionalism, and 
idealist institutionalism.  Most of these are outlined in Lowndes, V.  (2010), with the exception of 
modernist-empiricist and idealist institutionalisms, which are outlined in Rhodes (2008).   
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sociology and focuses on culture and norms, and an endeavour for legitimacy as the 
main determinants of policymaking.  Rational choice institutionalism arose from the 
economics literature.  It emphasises the (mostly) economic position of actors in a 
system of rules, interests and incentives (Goodin 1996; Hall and Taylor 1996; Sabatier 
2007; Rhodes 2008).  In this section, I discuss both historical and sociological 
institutionalism as they take a more institution-based approach to policymaking.  I will 
discuss rational choice institutionalism under the section on interest-based approaches 
to policymaking as it emphasises actor interest more than institutional structure as the 
primary determinant of policymaking.   
B.2.2.1. Historical Institutionalism: While historical institutionalism defines 
institutions in a similar way to the other new institutionalisms, it sets itself apart from 
them in many ways.228  First coined in 1992 by Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth229, 
historical institutionalism is a distinct stream of new institutionalism because it centres 
on history and contends that it matters as a main determinant of policymaking.  In 
particular, it argues that previous choices about institutions and policies affect 
subsequent ones, emphasizing the concept of path dependency in institutions and 
policies (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Hacker 1998).  Weir and Skocpol 
(1985) stress this point in their comparative analysis of state structures and ‘policy 
legacies’ in Sweden, Britain and the US.230  As such, historical institutionalism 
emphasises that institutions and certain ideas231 about public policy become “locked in” 
to a point where deviations from the path they are on become increasing difficult and 
costly (North 1990).  “In contexts of complex social interdependence, new institutions 
often entail high fixed or start-up costs and they involve considerable learning effects, 
coordination effects and adaptive expectation (North 1990, 95).  Pierson (1996) 
describes the path dependency process in his empirical account of policymaking in the 
European Community.  He, later, (2000) brings in lessons from the economics literature 
                                               
228 Though, as Hall and Taylor (1996) point out and Thelen (1999) elaborates, differences between these 
three ‘new’ institutionalisms fuzzy and often there are what they call “border crossers” who have 
muddled the lines between these three institutionalisms. 
229 The term grew out of a small workshop held in Boulder, Colorado in January 1989, including 
participants Steinmo, S., K.  Thelen and F.  Longstreth.   
230 Some authors (e.g. Immergut (2008)) consider Skocpol’s (1985) ‘state-centered’ approach and Hall’s 
(1986) model of state-society relations to be termed ‘political institutionalism’, which can be thought of 
as a type of historical institutionalism.  These approaches are different in that they focus on the impact of 
autonomy of state institutions on policymaking.  Of course, other authors explicitly disagree with the 
concept of state autonomy and the level of importance that Skocpol and other political institutionalists 
give it in policymaking (e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993)).   
231 The literature on historical institutionalism pays a lot of attention to the relationship between 
institutions and ideas.  A few references in this regard include Goldstein (1998) and  Weir (1989).   
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and conceptualises it as a dynamic of ‘increasing returns’.232  Consequently, then, in a 
way, historical institutionalism portrays the general state of policymaking as one of 
policy stability (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; 
Thelen 1999) or at least one of limited adaptive policy change (Capoccia and Kelemen 
2007).233  For more on policy stability with relation to decentralization see the 
theoretical sections in Appendix A.   
According to Hall and Taylor, historical institutionalism is also different from 
other new institutionalisms, in that its authors generally perceive the relationship 
between institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms (1996, 938-40).  
Indeed, historical institutionalists generally conceive of institutions as structures that 
not only provide an outline for moral and cognitive behaviour but also strategic and 
useful information; both of which “affect the very identities, self-images and 
preferences of the actors” (see March and Olsen (1989)).  Amongst themselves, 
however, historical institutionalists differ in the behavioural approach that they assume 
actors take; most apply either a calculus or a cultural approach.  While the calculus 
approach assumes that actors behave strategically to maximise their own objectives and 
utility, the cultural approach assumes that, while rational and purposeful, actor 
behaviour is ‘bounded’ by the information they have and, thus, their interpretation of 
the world.  By applying one of these approaches, historical institutionalists are able to 
explain the endurance of ‘regularised patterns of actor behaviour’ over time.  So, 
institutions either persist because actors understand that it would be more difficult or 
costly to change them (e.g. the Nash equilibrium in the calculus approach) or because 
actor behaviour in decision-making is so embedded in the institution that created them 
that they do not see any other way forward as fitting (the cultural approach). 
Lastly, historical institutionalists set themselves apart from the other new 
institutionalists by applying a similar perspective to punctuated-equilibrium theory in 
their analysis (Thelen 1999; Pierson 2004; Kickert and van der Meer 2011).  
Continuing from the notion that institutions and policies are path dependent and, thus, 
the general status of policymaking is stable, they tend to look for major events or 
‘critical junctures’ in periods of continuity to explain when and why a policy changes 
                                               
232 This is also referred to as policy feedback effects (Thelen 1999) as “path dependent patterns are 
characterized by self-reinforcing positive feedback” (Krasner 1988, 83).  Ikenberry (1994) provides a 
thorough summary of the literature on policy feedback in historical institutionalism.    
233 Such path dependency and policy stability could actually generate inefficiencies and unintended 
consequences.  See March and Olsen (1984) and North (1990) for further elaboration on these effects.   
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or branches off on to a new path (Krasner 1984; Gourevitch 1987; Collier and Collier 
1991; Hall and Taylor 1996).234  The challenge is to determine what constitutes policy 
stability and what creates change (Thelen 2003; 2004; Magnusson and Ottosson 2009).  
Streeck and Thelen (2005) examine institutional change theories, finding that they are 
not supported with analytical tools that allow them to identify change at the national 
government level in advanced political economies and proposing going beyond 
continuity and a new model of incremental but cumulatively transformative change 
processes.  Mahoney and Thelen (2010) develop a theoretical model for causality 
arguments by connecting contextual and organisational properties to the type of 
institutional change expected.  
B.2.2.1.1. Empirical Studies in the Health Policy.  The literature provides a 
wealth of empirical examples using the historical institutional approach.  Most of these 
are cross-country comparisons and are specific to a particular policy field (e.g. trade 
policy, health policy etc.)235.  Here I will first discuss two recent empirical case studies 
that apply historical institutionalism to Spain public policy.  Then, I will present a 
handful of empirical studies that apply it to mostly-OECD countries with a focus on 
health policies and reform.   
Chari and Heywood (2009) apply the historical institutionalism approach to the 
public policy process in Spain.  They argue that this approach advances previous 
literature on the policy process in Spain, which tends to use ‘periodisation’ in their 
explanations.236  In using it, they are able to uncover continuities and policy changes in 
the policymaking process by examining institutionally driven structures of Spanish 
democracy and socio-economic model of capitalism as well as the political composition 
of the governing party.  Important to the thesis, they demonstrate that the “increasing 
institutionalization of a very strong core executive in Spain … has been able to 
concentrate power in a systematic manner and dominate the policy process to the 
exclusion of parliament, interest group participation and even smaller, supporting 
                                               
234 Wilsford (1994) examines the historical institutionalism concept of path dependency and how it can 
be used along with the concept of conjuncture to understand – not only incremental changes – but major 
changes systematically.  He tests his hypothesis comparatively for health policy in Germany, France, 
Great Britain and the United States.  His results show that radical reform is not the general decision rule 
across the four health systems.  
235 E.g. for Finance and Welfare policy, see Steinmo (1993) on Sweden, Britain and the US, and  
Parrado (2008) on Spain.   
236Other authors that have paid attention to the policy process have concentrated mostly on specific 
policy domains or outcomes, including Subirats (1992), Subirats and Gomá (1997), Gomá and Subirats 
(1998), Gunther (1980; 1996a; 1996b), Gunther et al. (2004).  
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parties when policies are made by minority governments” (Chari and Heywood 2009, 
49).  They prove their hypothesis of path-dependency in the policymaking process in 
Spain with three case studies: (i) on privatisation, (ii) on Spain’s response to the draft 
EU Constitution, and (iii) on education policy.  Despite divergent policy outcomes, all 
three areas of policy followed the same policymaking process.   
Ferreira do Vale (2012) also uses the historical institutionalism approach as an 
analytical base for his study of the public policy process in Spain, as well as in Brazil 
and South Africa.237  Particularly interesting to the thesis, he looks at institutional 
change with regard to decentralization and federalisation after a democratic transition 
from an authoritarian regime in these three countries.  He explains how the institutional 
change of decentralization and federalisation affected intergovernmental relations by 
tilting power and authority towards subnational governments.  He does this by paying 
special attention to the causal mechanisms that drive federalisation and 
decentralization, and applying a framework that delineates the sequence of events 
leading to incremental changes in the intergovernmental balance of power.  Similar to 
Chari and Heywood (2009), Ferriera do Vale finds that intergovernmental bargaining in 
Spain is path-dependent – with a self-reinforcing shift of power towards the political 
elites at the subnational government level – and exhibits a sequential pattern of 
decentralization.  Overall, for all three cases, he concludes that internal factors—
including the sequencing in which legislative measures are approved, and the 
bargaining between constellations of intergovernmental actors—have mainly driven 
intergovernmental institutional changes of decentralization and federalisation.   
Turning to the health policy-specific literature, Immergut’s (1992) study of 
health politics in France, Sweden and Switzerland was groundbreaking (see Appendix 
A.4. for further information).  Through her institutional analysis, she was able to 
demonstrate that the structure of a country’s political institutions determines the 
relative (veto) power of main actor groups and the (veto) points in which they are able 
to exercise such power (Hall and Taylor 1996).  Following from this information, she 
was able to understand better the limits and types of political strategies and policy 
choices that different governments have (Immergut 1992; Steinmo 2008).  More 
specifically, regarding her country-case studies, Immergut found that the structure of 
the Swiss federal system strengthens the political influence of Swiss physicians, 
                                               
237 He chose these specific country case studies partially because intergovernmental negotiations were a 
fundamental element in the transition to democracy for all three countries.   
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allowing them to oppose legislation more easily than their counterparts in France and 
Sweden.   
Another notable empirical contribution to the historical institutionalism 
literature in health policy literature, Hacker (1998) studies the logic of National Health 
Insurance in Britain, Canada and the US.  Not only does his research evidence the 
application of historical institutionalism in the health sector, but it also helps to expand 
the scope and explanatory power of historical institutionalism in general.  Hacker’s 
study dates back to the early 20th century.  He investigates why countries with relatively 
similar cultural heritage, economies and battles over national health insurance could 
have such very different political institutions and end up on significantly different 
health policy paths.  His findings illustrate how such differences can be attributed to the 
‘critical junctures’ that each country took in policymaking.  He also demonstrates how 
historical institutionalists can go farther in their analyses by emphasizing the role of 
historical sequence and timing in political decision-making, and examining the 
evolution and effects of private sector institutions on policymaking.   
Extending his original historical institutional analysis, Hacker (2004) produces 
a comparative review of five countries, including Germany and the Netherlands.238  The 
results of the review show structural reform does not cause policy change as much as 
analysts give it credit for; instead, it suggests that conversion (or the decentralized 
restructuring of policies by actors empowered under them) and drift (or the failure to 
update policies to reflect changing circumstances are much stronger catalysts (Hacker 
2004, 722).  In the same year, Hacker joins forces with Béland to explore the American 
welfare state ‘exceptionalism’ in health and old-age insurance, 1915–1965 (Béland and 
Hacker 2004).  From this case study and building on previous works (e.g. Hacker 
(1998; 2002)), Béland and Hacker suggest that the institutional approach needs to 
broaden its analytical scope to cover private social policies and processes, and 
alternative policy paradigms and the agenda-setting processes that guide public officials 
and political leaders, including outside reformers, interest groups and social movements 
that influence policy.  As it is, Béland (2005, 4) affirms that “mainstream historical 
institutionalism is excellent for explaining how institutions create obstacles and 
                                               
238 Also, stemming from Hacker (1998), Hacker (2002) compares two social sectors—health and 
pensions—within the US, exploring why these two on opposite sides of the public-private welfare 
spectrum.   
Appendix B 
307 
opportunities for reform; however, it cannot shine a satisfactory light on the policy 
ideas that influence legislative decisions.   
Yet another major work in the health policy literature, Tuohy (1999) uses the 
historical institutionalism approach to examine health system reform in Britain, Canada 
and the US.  Her analysis, however, incorporates aspects of rational choice 
institutionalism (see below), producing an innovative conceptual framework for 
understanding change in the health policy arena.239  
It explores the distinctive logics of particular decision-making systems, 
within which actors respond, rationally, to the incentives facing them 
given the resources they can bring to bear.  But it also recognizes that 
the dynamics of change in decision-making systems cannot be 
understood entirely in terms of the “rational choice” of the actors within 
them.  Periodic episodes of policy change establish the parameters of 
the systems within which actors make their choices.  (Tuohy 1999, 6).   
Tuohy argues that health policy changes can be better understood by examining the 
‘accidents’ of history that have shaped political systems at critical junctures and the 
‘logics’ of both health and political systems.  With her case studies, she illustrates “why 
particular windows of opportunity for change in health policy opened at certain times 
and not others—a pattern of timing that derived from factors in the broader political 
system not in the health care arena itself” (Touhy 1999, 6).  She defines ‘accidents’ as 
by-products of ideas in wider circulation at the same time a window of opportunity 
opens, and ‘logics’ as parameters influenced by history, the sequencing of reforms, the 
‘institutional mix’ (defined as the balance of power between the State, professional-
colleges and the market) and ‘structural balance (defined as the balance of power 
between the State, healthcare professionals and private financial interests) (Dixon 
2006).  Despite a slightly different methodology, Tuohy’s research results do not differ 
significantly from those of Hacker (1998).  For example, her results show that policy 
change occurs when choices become available (timing).  In addition, she demonstrates 
that micro-economic characteristics and technological change are big factors for health 
system logic and change.  Tuohy also contends that the relationship between the 
medical profession and the state is a key feature of the policymaking process in all 
three healthcare systems.   
Looking particularly at Southern European health systems, Cabiedes and 
Guillén (2001) employ an historical institutionalism-based analysis240 to the 
                                               
239 Dixon (2006) applies Tuohy’s framework broadly for analysing change in the English NHS.   
240 They combine historical institutionalism with a social attitudes approach to policy change.   
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policymaking processes behind their reforms from social health insurance-based 
systems to universal, national health service systems.  Their analysis concludes that, 
with the exception of Italy, the democratization of authoritarian regimes was one of 
four main factors influencing the formulation and legislation of these reforms.  
Additionally, Cabiedes and Guillén notes that, in all four countries, the European 
Community influenced the decision to reform and left-wing parties governed and 
passed them all.  Lastly, in Spain and Italy, their research suggests that the subnational 
governments played a major role in pressuring the central governments to pass the 
reforms.  They also provide evidence for the influence of different factors in the 
implementation stage of these reforms.  For example, in Greece and Portugal, reform 
implementation met with difficulties due to economic constraints, and the low levels of 
coverage rates and public opinion of the social insurance systems at the initial point of 
implementation in these countries.  Furthermore, and in accordance with Hacker’s 
(1998) suggestion to incorporate private sector institutions into the historical 
institutionalism approach, Cabiedes and Guillén found that reform implementation in 
Greece and Portugal was also majorly hindered by their extensive private sector 
involvement in health, including powerful physician associations (similar to Touhy’s 
(1999) results for Britain, Canada and the US) and pre-existing insurance funds.   
Similar to Cabiedes and Guillén (2001), Rico and Costa-Font (2005) study the 
impact of devolution on the reform of the health system from one based on health 
insurance to a national health service.  However, in contrast to both Chari and 
Heywood (2009), and Cabiedes and Guillén´s (2001) analyses regarding Spain, they 
dispute the idea that theories of path dependency were at play in Spain.  They argue, 
rather, that consolidation of the NHS stemmed from regional diversity and policy 
innovation that was created through the egalitarian socio-political structure of Spain 
after democratisation.   
B.2.2.1.2. Historical institutionalism for the thesis.  Although a promising 
approach to analysing policymaking, historical institutionalism is a poor fit for the 
thesis because of a few main reasons.  First, the focus of historical institutionalism 
differs from that of my research.  As mentioned above, historical institutionalism 
focuses on history (path dependency) as the main factor in the policymaking process; 
whereas, the focus of my research is more on the relationships between main actor 
groups, how it affects their behaviour and, then, strategy and policy choice.  In relation 
with this, the historical institutionalism approach gives a broad view of the relationship 
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between institutions and actor behaviour and it does not look at change as much as it 
does continuity (Streeck and Thelen 2005); whereas, my research examines closely the 
nexus of these aspects of the policymaking process, looking acutely at the causalities a 
change in institution may have on actor behaviour.  Lastly, historical institutionalism 
views the policymaking process in a similar way to the punctuated equilibrium 
theory241 in that it identifies major points in history that may change the path of policy.  
My research differs in that it does not look at critical moments in policymaking but 
rather at the influence of—perhaps, what could be considered a critical juncture in 
policymaking—devolution on subsequent policies.  As such, I look at the smaller 
changes in health policies to discern what—if any—impact health system devolution 
may have had on them.   
Despite theoretical differences, the empirical evidence reviewed above for the 
historical institutionalism approach provides some interesting insight into the 
policymaking process for Spain and, above all, health policy in Spain.  Regarding the 
former, Chari and Heywood’s (2009) analysis characterises the executive branch in 
Spain being very strong and having relatively more power in the policymaking process 
than the parliament, interest groups and, sometimes, smaller parties.  In addition, 
Ferriera do Vale (2012) points to the importance of intergovernmental bargaining in 
Spain, and how decentralization changed power dynamics between governments, by 
shifting it towards political elites in the subnational governments.  In the particular 
realm of health policy in Spain, Cabiedes and Guillén (2001) highlight that 
democratisation, the European Community, left-wing parties and the subnational 
governments all played significant roles in reforming the health system.  In addition, 
Rico and Costa-Font (2005) emphasise the importance of the egalitarian socio-political 
structure in the policymaking process after democratisation.  They also show that pre-
existing regional diversity and striving for policy innovation at the regional level are 
also factors in the policymaking process.   
B.2.2.2. Sociological Institutionalism:  Sociological institutionalism (closely 
related to normative institutionalism in the literature) is another main institution-based 
approach to policymaking and policy change in the scholarly literature.  It was first 
                                               
241 The punctuated equilibrium model by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) is a comprehensive model of 
agenda setting over time.  They argue that, in any give policy area, dramatic policy changes occur with 
intermittent phases of instability that exist among long periods of stability.  They also suggest that human 
beings process information in parallel rather than one at a time; that is, until they are forced to process 
them in serial during times instability.   
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born in the organisation theory literature of sociology (Selznick 1949).  As a breed of 
the sociology literature, sociological institutionalism stems from the study of human 
social behaviour and focuses on social actions, structure and functions.  It believes 
humans are fundamentally social and, thus, act within social norms and the confines of 
everyday practices and established routines.  It is a separate branch within sociology 
because its perspective departs from the centre of organisations or institutions.   
Sociological institutionalists define institutions slightly differently from other 
new institutionalists.  They specify that institutions are not only formal but also 
informal structures.  Much like historical and rational choice institutionalists, they 
believe institutions as the ‘formal’ rules and procedures and norms.  However, they also 
believe these ‘formal’ structures more than often fail in their explanation of the less-
rational dimensions of organisational behaviour (Selznick 1949, 25).  Therefore, they 
emphasise the importance of ‘informal’ structures such as (a network of) symbol 
systems, cognitive scripts, moral templates and set routines (Swidler 1986; March and 
Olsen 1989).   
In accordance with this definition, sociological institutionalists believe that 
institutions are largely autonomous, evolving mostly due to their internal dynamics and 
less so to factors in their environment (March and Olsen 1984).242  This happens, for 
example, when institutions continue to exist despite not serving a useful purpose any 
longer.  Consequently, sociological institutionalists believe that people act more on a 
collective basis than on an individual one.  They do not analyse single organisations 
with their specific context and environment, but rather the population of organisational 
fields (DiMaggio 1982), including professional bodies (doctors, teachers, etc.) and civil 
servant bodies/bureaucracies of public organisations.  The ‘organisational field’ is the 
“institutional context within which each single organization plots its courses of action” 
(Thoenig 2003, 130).  For example, empirical investigations examined the following 
organisational fields: city administrations (Tolbert and Zucker 1983), nation-state 
features (see mention of empirical studies in Meyer et al. (1997)), institutional change 
in the EU (Stacey and Rittberger 2003), European regional policy (Baudner 2003), 
European environmental policy (Knill and Lenschow 1998), private and public 
elementary schools, or health care programs (Scott and Meyer 1994), rape prevention 
                                               
242 As opposed to a functionalist view of institutions, which believes that institutions evolve in an 
efficient way to better solve political or societal problems (Hall and Taylor 1996).  Similarly, in political 
science, institutions are ‘functions of political life’ (John 1998, 39)).   
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programs (Townsend and Campbell 2007). 243 Thus, an understanding of the ethos 
within organisations (how people understand their world and how it should be) 
provides insight into how actors behave and institutions operate (Hall and Taylor 
1996).   
Following from this, sociological institutionalists believe that institutions 
provide a frame for guiding human action and decision-making.  According to March 
and Olsen (1984; 1989), institutions generate a certain type of order and predictability 
as well as a space within which actors can manoeuvre and make decisions.  This space 
delimits and directs their behaviour and actions.  Thus, institutions affect actor 
behaviour.  For sociological institutionalists, they do so by shaping and influencing 
their preferences, perceptions and identities over time (Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman 
2008).  Moreover, and differently from other new institutionalisms, sociological 
institutionalists believe that institutions imbue actors to behave appropriately and do 
the ‘right’ thing in accordance with the ethos of their organisation.  They contextualise 
agency within the ‘logics of appropriate’ conduct in institutionalised settings.  They 
believe that institutions “empower or constrain actors differently and make them more 
or less capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of appropriateness” (March and 
Olsen 2008, 3).  These ‘rules of appropriateness’ are embedded within each institution, 
communicated through socialisation and adhered to because they are viewed as being 
socially legitimate (March and Olsen 1984; 2006).  In essence, sociological 
institutionalists redefine ‘culture’ as ‘institutions’ (Zucker 1991; Meyer 1994).  This 
blurs the traditional conceptual line that political scientists, for example, hold between 
culture and institutions (Hall and Taylor 1986).   
Following from this, and referring back to the earlier discussion within the 
historical institutionalism review, there are two broad approaches to conceptualizing 
the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour: the calculus approach 
and the cultural approach.  Sociological institutionalists largely take the cultural 
approach, looking at actor behaviour as if it were ‘bound’ by their worldview and to a 
point where they only see certain viable options for making decisions.  As opposed to 
the calculus approach, they see individuals acting ‘rationally’ according to their social 
constitution244 rather than in their own self-interest.  Moreover, they view individuals 
                                               
243 I will not review the empirical evidence for sociological institutionalism because, as a theory, it does 
not fit my case (see weaknesses and complications below).  See also empirical evidence in Nee and 
Brinton (1998).   
244 See the classic works by Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Wendt’s (1987).   
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as bound by common values, working and making decisions with a sense of duty and 
obligation to their institutions and self-fulfilment (Selznick 1949).  As such, they 
believe people are more ‘satisficers’ than ‘utility maximisers’ within organisations, 
valuing the broader cultural environment more than towards achieving the 
organisation’s efficiency goals.  They also emphasise that individuals are generally 
habit-forming and usually act on established routines and procedures, as well as 
practical reasoning in order to make decisions and devise a course of action.  In 
accordance, they see an individual’s decisions and choice actions as tightly bound 
within a given context and heavily dependent on interpretation.   
With this perspective of institutions and their relationship with actors, 
sociological institutionalists seek to explain how institutional practices originate and 
change.  They generally examine why organisations take on particular sets of 
institutional forms, procedures or symbols, and how these are disseminated through 
specific organisational fields and across countries.  For example, there are theories as to 
why, despite the different local conditions and environment, education reform has 
converged across the world, showing similarities in organisational form and 
procedures.  DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) lead research in this area with their theory 
regarding ‘institutional isomorphism’ and explanation of why there is so much 
homogeneity of organisational forms and practices.  Their theory suggests three—not 
always empirically distinct—mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change for 
understanding politics the politics of organisational life better: “1) coercive 
isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; 2) 
mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and 3) 
normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization” (1983, 150).245  Returning 
to the education-field example, they believe that the type of education reform was 
responding to primarily coercive pressures; that is, countries around the world have 
changed their education systems to emulate the ‘successful’ organisation model in the 
US in an attempt to also become successful in this field (See also Dobbins and Knill 
(2009) and Dobbins (2011)).  Moreover, change happens not because of functional 
efficiency per se but rather because it enhances the social legitimacy of the 
organisations (sees also Meyer et al. (1977)).  DiMaggio and Powell also explain that, 
“in the long run, organisational actors making rational decisions construct around 
                                               
245 Beckert (2010) shows how these mechanisms of isomorphic change can also support processes of 
divergent institutional development and change as well. 
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themselves an environment that constrains their ability to change further in later years” 
(1983, 148).  The institutional sociological idea that actors within organisations are 
bound by common values, develop shared ‘cognitive maps’ and act according to a 
‘logic of social appropriateness’ also helps to explain why organisation have such a 
capacity to ‘unreflectively’ reproduce themselves (Campbell 2010).  Other more radical 
(forcibly exogenous) changes may be difficult to implement against, for example, the 
will and determination of actors, such as civil servants.  As such, sociological 
institutionalism generally explains policy continuity (by comprehensible and routine 
processes) or stability rather than policy change (March and Olsen (1984; 1989); see 
also Goodin (1996, 34–35)).   
B.2.2.2.1. A Garbage Can Model for Decision-Making.  Within this literature, 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) put forward a Garbage Can Model for organisational 
decision-making.  This model suggests that decision-making in organisations has a ‘by-
chance’ or anarchical (as opposed to rational) nature.  It views organisations as 
“collections of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision 
situations in which they may be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might 
be an answer, and decision-makers looking for work” (M. Cohen, March, and Olsen 
1972, 1).  When all of these things mix together with good timing, then a ‘choice 
opportunity’ becomes available.  As they state, “the mix of garbage in a single can 
depends on the mix of cans available, on the labels attached to the alternative cans, on 
what garbage is currently being produced, and on the speed with which garbage is 
collected and removed from the scene” (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972, 2).  In this 
model, solutions search for problems and the outcomes are a function of the mix of 
problems, decision-makers and resources.   
This type of model is interesting to the thesis because it incorporates the ‘role of 
ideas’ into explanation of the policy process and can be used for explaining policy 
change over time.  One of the most well-known public policy studies that use this 
model is John Kingdon’s (1984) study of Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies 
using qualitative interview data from elites inside and out of the US Federal 
Government.  Kingdon adapted the ‘garbage can model’ of organisation choice to 
explain the policy change through the agenda-setting process.  He conceives this 
process as one that emerges from a discordance of the three streams: the political 
stream sets the government agenda; the policy stream offers alternative policies or 
strategies that can be implemented to solve the problems or issues that the government 
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has to address; and, the problem stream carries information on current problems and 
various problem definitions, all of which are brought to the attention of policymakers 
by way of indicators, events and feedback.  The policy stream—referred to as the 
primeval soup—Kingdon’s alternative metaphor to the garbage can—where ideas float 
around, meet one another and combine—involves the advocates of solutions to policy 
problems and results in a list of alternative proposals to the governing agenda.  In the 
primeval soup, Kingdon introduces the concept of policy entrepreneurs: “people who 
are willing to invest resources of various kinds in hopes of a future return in the form of 
policies they favor” (Kingdon 1984, 151).  These policy entrepreneurs may be 
interpreted as lobbyist and advocacy or interest groups.  They introduce the various 
policy alternatives to the government agenda.  When one of these alternatives or 
solutions is attached to a problem, a ‘window of opportunity’ opens and the likelihood 
of it getting put on the government agenda increases.   
While this ‘by chance’ way of explaining policy change over time has often 
been used in the study of health policies, it is however not fitting with the thesis for two 
main reasons.  First, its generalisability to country case studies in Europe is 
questionable.  Kingdon’s study was focused on the structure and internal workings of 
the US political system.  In particular, the US’ presidential system with a separation of 
powers between different branches of government is different from most political 
systems in the EU246, which are relatively centralised parliamentary systems (Cairney 
2012).  In more centralised, parliamentary political systems, the garbage can model 
with all of its ambiguity is less likely to occur because the policy environment tends to 
be less crowded, access to decision-makers is more guarded and politically appointed 
civil servants are fewer and less significant (Zahariadis 2007).  Secondly, Kingdon’s 
model does not weight the influence of the different streams and portrays policy 
advocacy and competition as indifferent to the distribution of power between actors.  
There is a whole literature on theories and approaches to power in society and its 
influence on the policy process (see Chapter 2 in Hill (2013)).  Because these focus on 
the change in decision-making power between actors, the thesis requires a model that 
would examine the exercise of power in the making of policy as well as the sources and 
nature of that power.  Further discussion regarding this view of the policy process is not 
within the scope of the thesis.   
                                               
246 That is not to mean ‘EU policymaking’.  Kingdon’s multiple streams theory has been applied to EU 
policymaking by Zahariadis (2008) and other authors.   
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B.2.2.2.2. Sociological institutionalism for the thesis.  Sociological 
institutionalism analysis does have its weaknesses and complications in general and for 
the thesis.  First, the causal relationship between institutions and actors is complex and 
even unclear at times, portraying a causality similar to ‘the chicken or the egg’ 
dilemma.  For example, does the institution affect how actor behaviour influences the 
structure of institutions?  Moreover, some organisations are dependent on their 
environment and others are more independent in their decision-making (Perrow 1986).  
Additionally, the blurred line between the conception of institutions and culture 
challenges the distinctions between traditional ‘institutional explanations’ based on 
organisational structures and ‘cultural explanations’ based on shared attitudes and 
values.  Regarding the thesis of this dissertation, these causal relationships in multilevel 
and multi-centred organisations (e.g. decentralized or federal systems) are also more 
difficult to disentangle (March and Olsen 2008).   
Second, theoretically, the informal rules as understood by sociological 
institutionalists may not be clear, having different meanings to different people within 
the same organisation.  Alternatively, people may choose not to follow the rules in 
making their different policy decisions.  People may also ‘wear many hats’, having 
different roles and tasks to perform for one or more organisations, which can be 
contradictory.  In general, according to Peters (2005, 26) “individuals must pick and 
choose among influences and interpret the meaning of their institutional commitments”.  
In this case, the analyst also needs to understand how the rules are understood by 
people to understand their behaviour.  Lastly, sociological institutionalism does not put 
power relations between actors at the forefront in explaining policymaking and change.  
Rather, it defines the institutional context as an organisational field and bureaucrats as 
the main actors in institutional organisation and decision-making.  For March and 
Olsen (1984, 739), for example, political structures are “relatively invariant in the face 
of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and 
expectations of individuals”.  As such, it pays little attention to the influence of 
actors—including policy elites—and other organisations outside the organisational 
field of the analysis.  Elites clearly have an important role in policymaking and may 
even set the overall goals of organisations (Perrow 1986).  This contrasts with the thesis 
of the dissertation, which emphasises the role of policy elites in policymaking and 
considers the interactions between different organisational fields and between levels of 
government, as well as their interactions and policymaking patterns.   
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Appendix C.  An Example Interview Guide (Spanish Only) 
C.1.  Guía de la Entrevista para Actores Clave en las Regiones 
 
Fecha: ______/_______/________        
ID#________________________ 
Institución: _____________________ 
 
C.1.1.  Introdución 
Encantada de conocerle. Me llamo Christina Novinskey. Soy de la London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE) y estoy conduciendo un estudio sobre las relaciones 
entre las Comunidades Autónomas y el gobierno central en referencia al proceso de 
descentralización del Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS).  
 
Con este estudio, quiero analizar los cambios que se dieron con la última transferencia de 
competencias sanitarias en la gestión del SNS en 2002.  Por lo tanto, se concentra en las 
CCAA de ‘vía lenta’ y, en particular, en las de Extremadura y Madrid.  
 
Para el estudio, planeo realizar aproximadamente 30 entrevistas para la producción de datos 
primarios basados en las opiniones de los actores clave del sistema sanitario. Habiendo 
usted cubierto un papel importante en este proceso, es muy importante para mí el hecho de 
poder escuchar directamente de usted cómo se dio el proceso y su opinión sobre ello.  
 
La información obtenida a través de las entrevistas será solamente para mi uso, y estará 
presentado en mi tesis doctoral de LSE sin identificar las opiniones individuales a no ser 
que en un segundo momento yo le pida y usted me conceda el permiso de reportar 
literalmente una cita específica.  
 
Tomaré notas para así tener información clara de lo que usted me habrá dicho. También 
grabaré la entrevista para mayor apoyo, claridad y exactitud a la hora de interpretar la 
información ya que el castellano no es mi lengua materna. Todo lo que me pueda contar 
será tratado de forma confidencial y su anonimato será respetado. 
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C.1.2.  Características de los Actores 
Para empezar, me gustaría recoger algunos datos preliminares sobre usted y su 
trabajo.  (Esto es parte de los datos que necesito para el análisis / Quiero 
confirmar la información que tengo y por favor corrígeme si estoy equivocada) 
1. Nombre________________________________________________________  
(to be converted into a number to preserve anonymity - be sure to keep the key for this number 
to assign by type of official) 
2. Grupo de Actores_________________________________________________   
(to be converted into a letters to preserve anonymity - GDN, AVC, MAD, EXT, OTH) 
3. Tipo de Oficial___________________________________________________ 
(to be converted into a letters to preserve anonymity - P, T, A, O) 
4. Fecha__________________________________________________________ 
(To be used in code only if necessary (i.e., more than one interview has been done with the 
same actor on the same questions) 
5. Cargo actual_____________________________________________________ 
6. Cargos anteriores (desde 1994)  
Desde 1994, ¿Cuáles son los principales cargos/responsabilidades que ha 
tenido? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
7. Orientación política________________________________________________ 
8. ¿A qué se dedicaba antes de entrar en la administración? 
________________________________________________________________ 
9. No estoy muy familiar con el sistema institucional de España todavía y le voy a 
preguntar algo que le puede parecer obvio.  ¿El cargo que usted ocupa es un 
cargo que se obtiene por nombramiento, elección, progreso en la carrera 
profesional u otra forma? 
________________________________________________________
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C.2.3.  La Entrevista 
Ahora le voy a hacer algunas  preguntas sobre la política sanitaria en general y el antes 
y después de la última transferencia sanitaria (en la gestión del SNS) en 2002.   
 
 Preguntas Notas/Preguntas de Seguimiento 
1.0 ¿Quiénes son los principales protagonistas 
(individuos o instituciones) implicados en el 
proceso de adopción de decisiones relativas 
a la política sanitaria? 
A ambos niveles el central y el regional 
 a. ¿Son estos protagonistas diferentes a los que 
participaban en este proceso antes de las 
transferencias sanitarias de 2002? 
¿De qué manera es diferente y por qué 
razones? 
2.0 ¿Cómo ha sido la relación de su CA con 
estos protagonistas desde las transferencias 
sanitarias? 
¿Cómo trabajaron con ellos? (bien, poco 
bien, mal, etc.)  
¿Hay diferencias significativas entre su CA 
y las otras instituciones?  
a.   ¿Estas relaciones eran diferentes antes de las 
transferencias sanitarias de 2002? 
¿Por qué? 
3.0 En su opinión, ¿Qué significaron para 
España y para su Comunidad en particular 
las transferencias sanitarias de la gestión del 
SNS? 
 
4.0 ¿Qué objetivos perseguía la política de 
transferencias sanitarias de 2002? 
  
a. En su opinión, a día de hoy, ¿cuáles de estos 
objetivos se han cumplido? 
 
5.0 ¿Qué beneficios han traído a su CA las 
transferencias sanitarias? 
  
6.0 ¿Qué desventajas o desafíos le han supuesto?  
7.0 ¿Cuál de estas categorías describe mejor la 
posición de su CA en el proceso de 
aprobación de las transferencias sanitarias? 
 
1.  la apoyó mucho,  
2.  la apoyó algo,  
3.  no la apoyó ni se opuso,  
4.  se opuso algo,  
5.  se opuso mucho. 
Si diga 1, 2 o 3, CONTINUO con “apoyo”.  
Si diga 4 o 5, CONTINUO con “opuso” 
para las siguientes sub-cuestiones  
a. ¿Por qué su CA la apoyó o se opuso a ella?   
b. ¿De qué manera la apoyó o se opuso? ¿Fue su CA la primera en apoyar (oponerse 
a ella) la transferencia? 
d ¿Cuáles eran los factores que influyeron en 
la política de apoyo u oposición de su CA? 
¿Fue está apoyo u oposición anunciado 
públicamente? 
8.0 ¿Qué otros instituciones apoyaron o se 
opusieron la transferencia? 
p.ej.  Ministerios, gobiernos de otras 
CCAA, otros niveles de gobierno u otros 
actores privados 
a. ¿Estas instituciones según Usted ganaron o 
perdieron algo con la transferencia? 
  
b. ¿Cuál fue la primera institución en tomar la 
iniciativa para apoyar/oponerse la 
descentralización? 
¿Cómo lo hicieron? 
9.0 ¿Según Usted, hubiese sido posible traspasar 
las competencias sanitarias antes de 2002?  
Si, sí, por favor explíquemelo por qué. 
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10.0 ¿Con la descentralización, los partidos han 
tenido contrastes en su interior sobre los 
objetivos y las políticas sanitarias entre el 
nivel autónomo y el nivel central?  
En particular entre el estado y las CCAA 
a.   ¿Y cómo eran esas relaciones antes de la 
descentralización? 
  
11.0 ¿Pensando en el desarrollo futuro del SNS, 
apoyaría una mayor descentralización? 
  
a. ¿Por qué?   
   
12.0 Ahora le voy a hacer 6 preguntas cortas 
sobre cómo ha afectado la descentralización 
al poder de su CA en la toma de decisiones 
en 6 áreas funcionales. 
 
5 son las respuestas posibles: 
 
1.  significativamente más que antes,  
2.  algo más que antes,  
3.  el mismo,  
4.  algo menos qué antes,  
5.  mucho menos que antes 
 
 
a. En el área funcional de financiación ¿qué 
diría usted? 
Decisiones relativas a las fuentes de 
recursos/ingresos y asignación de gastos 
para el sistema sanitaria  
 
¿Si, es algo menos o mucho menos, quién 
tiene el poder en la toma de decisiones de 
esta área funcionar? 
b. ¿En la planificación sanitaria? ¿Si, es algo menos o mucho menos, quién 
tiene el poder en la toma de decisiones de 
esta área funcionar? 
c. ¿En recursos humanos?  
d. ¿En la organización del servicio de salud? Sobre salaries, contractos, el Servicio Civil 
y como asumir/despedir/trasferir. 
 
¿Si, es algo menos o mucho menos, quién 
tiene el poder en la toma de decisiones de 
esta área funcionar? 
e. ¿En las prácticas de supervisión y control? Monitoring & evaluation, incentives, 
sanctions etc.   
 
¿Si, es algo menos o mucho menos, quién 
tiene el poder en la toma de decisiones de 
esta área funcionar? 
f. ¿En la gobernanza sanitaria?  
(cómo se gobierna) 
 
(facility boards, health offices, community 
participation) 
 
¿Si, es algo menos o mucho menos, quién 
tiene el poder en la toma de decisiones de 
esta área funcionar? 
      
13.0 ¿Existen publicaciones, documentos u otros 
materiales que usted cree puedan ayudarme 
en este estudio?  
  
14.0 ¿Cree que existe alguna persona que debería 
entrevistar sin falta para proseguir con éxito 
con mi proyecto de investigación? 
(¿Madrid? ¿los actores del gobierno 
central?) 
¿Cuándo contacte con ellos les puedo decir 
que he entrevistado usted anteriormente? 
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15.0. En particular, tengo una seria de preguntas 
técnicas acerca de las áreas funcionales del 
sistema sanitario de su CA.  Pero ya le he 
quitado demasiado tiempo y no le quiero 
molestar con este tipo de detalles.  Es por 
eso, que me gustaría preguntarle si puedo 
contar con su ayuda directa o indirecta para 
entrevistar o encontrarme con los jefes 
técnicos de esas áreas funcionales. 
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Appendix D.  List of Key Stakeholders Interviewed 
Note: This is an alphabetical list of the key stakeholders interviewed for the thesis.  The 
interview numbers in the text are the author’s own reference, and are not a direct cross-
reference, in order to protect the interviewees’ anonymity.  In addition to giving their 
consent for sourcing their interviews in person, all interviewees listed gave their 
consent (via email or other electronic source) to be included in this list; those who 
could not be reached for the latter are not listed.  
 
Interviewee Name /  
Date of Interview(s) Relevant Position(s) During Period of Study 
Antonio Beteta Barreda 
8 October 2007 
Regional Member of Parliament (MP), Madrid (1983-
2000, 2003-2011)  
Regional Minister of Finance, Madrid (1995-2000)  
Secretary General of Fiscal, Territorial and Community 
Policy, Regional Ministry of Finance, Madrid  (2000-
2003)  
Speaker of the PP Group, Parliament of Madrid (2003-
2008) 
Josep María Bonet 
Bertomeu 
21 June 2007 
Director-General, INSALUD (2000-2002)  
Enrique Castellón Leal 
16 April 2007 
Vice Minister of Health and Social Services, Madrid 
(1995-1996) 
Secretary of the Ministry of Health (1996-2000) 
José Luis Conde 
Olasagasti 
16 April 2007  
Director-General, INSALUD (1992-1999)  
Under Secretary of Health and Consumer Affairs, 
Ministry of Health (1993-1994)   
José Ignacio Echániz 
Salgado 
9 October 2007 
Regional MP, Castile-La Mancha (1991-1999)    
Regional Minister of Health, Madrid (1999-2003)  
Advisor to the PP Parliamentarian Group in the 
Congress and the Senate (1999-2003)  
Regional MP, People’s Party, Valladolid, Castile Leon 
(1996-2000, 2004-2008)   
Regional MP, Parliament of Madrid (2003-2007) 
Francisco Javier Elola 
Somoza 
20 April 2007 
Director-General of Health Planning, Ministry of Health  
(1991-1994)  
Director-General of Health Coordination and Planning, 
Ministry of Health (1995-1996)  
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Interviewee Name /  
Date of Interview(s) 
Relevant Position(s) During Period of Study 
Luis Espadas 
Moncalvillo 
4 May 2007 
Director-General for Financial Economic Planning, 
Ministry of Health (1994-1996)  
Deputy Director-General of Budgetary Policy, Ministry 
of Finance (2003-2004)         
Director-General of Budgets (2004-2006)   
Secretary General of Budgets and Expenditures, 
Ministry of Economics and Finance (2006-2011) 
Guillermo Fernández 
Vara 
21 March 2007 and 
10 November 2007  
Regional Minister of Social Welfare (Health), 
Extremadura (1996-1999)         
Regional Minister of Health, Extremadura  (1999-2006)            
President of the Government of Extremadura (2007-
2011)             
José Luis Ferrer 
Aguareles 
19 April 2007 
Director-General of Health Planning, Ordination and 
Coordination, Regional Ministry of Health, 
Extremadura     (2003-2007) 
Jesús Galván Romo 
30 May 2007 
Director-General of Health Planning, Regional Ministry 
of Health, Madrid (1999-2002)    
Director-General of Planning for Health, Innovation and 
Technology, Regional Ministry of Health, Madrid 
(2002-2004)  
Head of Regional Ministry of Evaluation and Quality, 
Institute of Public Health, Madrid (2005-2011) 
Francisco Manuel 
García Peña 
18 April 2007 
Director-General of Extremadura Regional Health 
Service (2001-2007) 
Victor Manuel García 
Vega 
2 October 2007 
Secretary General of the Regional Ministry of Health, 
Extremadura (2002-2007)  
Enrique Gómez Campo 
16 May 2007 
Advisor, General Directorate of Autonomous Policy, 
Ministry of Public Administration (1996-2004)     
Director-General of Autonomous Cooperation, Ministry 
of Public Administration (2004-2005)  
Director-General of Autonomous Development, 
Ministry of Public Administration (2005-2009)  
Fernando Lamata 
Cotanda 
29 May 2007 
Director-General of Health Planning, Regional Ministry 
of Health, Castile-La Mancha (1999-2000)   
Regional Minister of Health, Castile-La Mancha (2000-
2004)  
Secretary of the Ministry of Health (2004-2005)  
First Vice President of the Government of Castile-La 
Mancha (2005-2008) 
Appendix D 
  323 
Interviewee Name /  
Date of Interview(s) 
Relevant Position(s) During Period of Study 
Cristobal Montoro 
Romero 
17 March 2008 
MP and Speaker on the Economy for the PP (1993-
1996, 2000-2004, 2004)  
Secretary of State for the Economy (1996-2000)  
Minister of Economy and Finance (2000-2004)  
Member of European Parliament for Spain, European 
People's Party, Committee for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (2004-2009)  
Alberto Núñez Feijóo 
4 July 2007 
Secretary General of Health Assistance, Ministry of 
Health (1996-2000)  
Executive President, INSALUD (1996-2001)  
Secretary General of the Regional Ministry of Health, 
and Vice President and Secretary General of the 
Galician Health Service, Galicia (1992-1996)  
Vice President of the Government of Galicia (2004-
2005)  
Regional President of the PP, Galicia (2006-Present) 
Jorge Juan Relaño 
Toledano 
25 April 2007 
Deputy Director-General of Economic Analysis and the 
Cohesion Fund (2004-2012) 
José Ignacio Sánchez 
Amor 
4 October 2007 
Director of the Cabinet of the President of the 
Government of Extremadura (1996-2004)  
Vice President of the Government of Extremadura 
(2004-2007)  
Speaker of the PSOE Parliamentary Group, Parliament 
of Extremadura (2007-2011)  
Ana María Sánchez 
Fernández 
14 May 2007 
Director-General of High Inspection and Coordinator of 
the NHS, Ministry of Health (2002-2004)      
Director-General of the Hospital of Fuenlabrada, 
Madrid  (2004-2007) 
Francisco Sevilla Pérez 
9 July 2007 
Director-General of Public Health, Regional Ministry of 
Health, Castile-La Mancha (1998–1999)  
Regional Minister of Health and Health Care Services, 
Principality of Asturias (1999–2003)  
Social Affairs Attaché at the Embassy of Spain to 
France and the Embassy of Spain to the OECD (2004–
2007)  
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Interviewee Name /  
Date of Interview(s) 
Relevant Position(s) During Period of Study 
Xavier Trias i Vidal de 
Llobatera 
21 June 2007 
Regional Minister of Health, Catalonia and Vice 
President of the CISNS (1988-1996)   
Regional Minister of the Presidency of the Government, 
Catalonia (1996-2000)    
MP, and President and Speaker of the Catalonian 
Parliamentary Group Convergence and Union, 
Parliament of Catalonia (2000-2003)  
Convergence and Union Councillor to the City of 
Barcelona and President of the Convergence and Union 
Municipal Group to the City of Barcelona (2004-2011) 
Pablo Vázquez Vega 
4 May 2007 
Director of the Regional Ministry of Welfare and 
Education, the Presidency of the Government (2000-
2002)   
Under Secretary of Health and Consumer Affairs, 
Ministry of Health (2002-2004)   
José María Vergeles 
Blanca 
23 March 2007 
Director-General of Health Education, Inspection and 
Quality, Regional Ministry of Health, Extremadura 
(2003-2007) 
Celia Villalobos Talero 
8 May 2007 
Minister of Health, President of the CISNS (2000-2002)  
MP for People’s Party, Malaga, Andalusia  (1986-1993, 
1996-2008) 
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Appendix E.  Interview Information Sheet and Written Consent Form 
 
 
Making Health System Decentralization Work:  
Policies & Politics in Modern Spain 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project of a PhD student in Health and Social Policy.  This 
information sheet explains what the project is about and what will happen if you decide to participate 
in it.  Whether or not you decide to participate is entirely your own choice.  Please feel free to ask 
any questions you have about the research and I will try my best to answer them. 
 
Decentralization of health systems is a widely used strategy for improving resource allocation, 
efficiency and efficacy of health services; however, little is known about the processes and politics 
behind the making and implementation of these policies.  Spain, in particular, has been noted for its 
model of health system decentralization from the central to the regional level.   
 
The purpose of this project is to investigate and report on the implementation process of health 
system devolution from the central government to the regional governments, and a cross-regional 
comparison of the policies put in place.  This is done in search of further insight into the policy 
process and the reasons behind it in Spain.  
 
If you agree to participate in this research, you will be asked about the politics and policies of health 
system decentralization in Spain since the transition to democracy (1978) to date.  I expect the 
interview to last 45 minutes to an hour, but you may finish it at any time.  I will take notes so that I 
will have clear records of what you have told me.  After the discussion, you will decide whether they 
will be used in the research.  I will also tape record the interview for backlogging, clearness and 
accuracy of interpretation as Spanish is not my native language.  Everything that you will say will 
be treated as confidential and your anonymity will be preserved. 
 
This research has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (University of London). 
 
It is important that you know that you do not have to participate in this research.  You are free to 
decide not to give any information on the topics discussed.  If you decide not to participate, this 
decision will not have any consequences for you.  If you are concerned about this research in any 
way, or would like more information, please contact Christina Novinskey at the address below: 
 
Ms. Christina Novinskey 
 
Permanent Address:  
LSE Health and Social Care, J8 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
c.m.novinskey@lse.ac.uk 
Tel. +44(0)7891714821 
 
Current Address:  
C/ Eloy Gonzalo, 7, 3º Izquierda I 
28010 Madrid 
Mobile: +34. 617906078 
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Written Consent Form 
 
Title of research project: Making Health System Decentralization Work: Policies & 
Politics in Modern Spain 
 
Name:  
Address: 
Telephone: 
Email: 
 
Please tick the boxes to indicate that you have read and agreed on the following statements: 
 I have been invited to participate in this research through an interview. 
 I have read the information sheet concerning this study [or have understood 
the verbal explanation] and I understand what will be required of me and what 
will happen to me if I take part in it.  I have a copy of the information sheet to 
keep. 
 Ms. Novinskey has answered my questions concerning this study. 
 I understand that at any time I may withdraw from this study without giving 
a reason and without affecting my normal care and management.  
 I agree to participate in this study. 
 I decided that the content of our conversation could be used in the study. 
 I decided that I could be directly quoted in the study.  
 I know that if there are any problems, I can contact: 
Ms. Christina Novinskey 
 
LSE Health and Social Care, J8 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
c.m.novinskey@lse.ac.uk 
Tel. +44(0)20.7955.6476 
 
 
Signed …………………………………………  Date: ……………… 
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La Política Sanitaria Española: Un Estudio Sobre la Descentralización de las 
Competencias del Estado a las Comunidades Autónomas (CC AA) 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Documento Informativo 
 
Está usted invitado a tomar parte en la investigación del proyecto de doctorado de un estudiante de 
política social y sanitaria. Este documento informativo explica sobre el proyecto en sí y lo que 
ocurrirá si usted decide participar en él. Que decida o no participar es una decisión que le pertenece 
exclusivamente. Por favor, siéntase libre de preguntar lo que desee y de consultar cualquier duda 
sobre la investigación e intentaré contestar lo mejor que pueda. 
 
La descentralización de los sistemas sanitarios es una estrategia ampliamente usada para la mejora 
de la distribución de los recursos y la eficacia del sistema; sin embargo, poco es sabido sobre los 
procesos y las políticas detrás la creación, implantación y ejecución de estos sistemas. España, en 
particular, ha sido destacada por su descentralización del modelo de sistema de salud pública del 
nivel nacional al nivel regional.   
 
El propósito de este proyecto es el de investigar e informar sobre la implantación y ejecución del 
proceso de devolución del sistema sanitario por parte del gobierno central a los gobiernos regionales, 
y también hacer una comparación entre las distintas políticas aplicadas en las distintas regiones. Esto 
se hace en busca de un mayor entendimiento de las políticas y las razones detrás éstas en España.  
 
Si usted estás de acuerdo con participar en esta investigación, será entrevistado sobre las políticas de 
la descentralización política general y la del sistema sanitario en España desde la transición a la 
democracia (1978) hasta ahora. Espero una entrevista de entre 45 minutos a una hora, pero usted 
puede acabarla en cualquier momento que desee. Tomaré notas para así tener información clara de 
lo que usted me habrá dicho. Después de la entrevista, usted decidirá si esa información será usada 
o no en la investigación. También grabaré la entrevista para mayor apoyo, claridad y exactitud a la 
hora de interpretar la información ya que el castellano no es mi lengua materna. Todo lo que me 
pueda contar será tratado de forma confidencial y su anonimato será respetado. 
 
Esta investigación ha sido aprobada por el comité de ética de la London School of Economics and 
Political Science (University of London). 
 
Es importante que usted sepa que no tiene ninguna obligación de participar en esta investigación. 
Usted puede decidir lo que quiere hablar sobre los temas planteados en la entrevista. Si usted decide 
no participar, esta decisión no traerá consigo ninguna consecuencia para usted. Si usted está 
interesado de alguna manera por esta investigación o le gustaría obtener más información acerca de 
la misma, por favor contacte con Christina Novinskey en las direcciones siguientes: 
 
D.ª Christina Novinskey 
 
Dirección permanente: 
LSE Health and Social Care, J8 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
c.m.novinskey@lse.ac.uk 
Tel. +44(0)7891714821 
Dirección actual:  
C/ Espronceda, 28, 2º dcha. 
28003 Madrid, España 
Móvil: +34. 617906078 
Global Tel.: +1.248.841.4925 
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Formulario de Consentimiento por Escrito 
 
Título del proyecto de investigación: La Política Sanitaria Española: Un Estudio Sobre la 
Descentralización de las Competencias del Estado a las Comunidades Autónomas (CC AA) 
 
Nombre: 
Dirección: 
Teléfono: 
Email: 
 
Por favor marque las casillas para indicar que ha leído y que está de acuerdo con los siguientes 
puntos: 
 He sido invitado/a a participar en esta investigación a través de una entrevista. 
 He leído el documento informativo sobre este estudio (o he entendido la explicación 
verbal) y comprendo  lo que se me pide y lo que pasará si participo en ella. Tengo una 
copia de este documento para conservar. 
 D.ª Novinskey ha contestado a mis preguntas acerca de este estudio. 
 Entiendo que, en cualquier momento, puedo retirarme de este estudio sin tener que 
dar ninguna explicación y sin que esto me afecte de manera alguna.  
 Accedo a participar en este estudio. 
 He decidido que el contenido de nuestra conversación puede ser usado en este estudio. 
 He decidido que doy permiso para ser citado textualmente en este estudio.  
 Sé que si surge algún problema puedo contactar a : 
D.ª Christina Novinskey 
Dirección permanente: 
LSE Health and Social Care, J8 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
c.m.novinskey@lse.ac.uk 
Móvil. +44(0)7891714821 
Dirección actual:  
C/ Espronceda, 28, 2º dcha. 
28003 Madrid, España 
Móvil: +34. 617906078 
Tel. Global: +1.248.841.4925 
 
 
 
 
Firma: …………………………………………………………Fecha: …………………………… 
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Appendix F.  Excerpt from the Codebook for the Thesis, in Nvivo 9 
3/26/2015 1:43 PM 
I am changing my coding today to fit better with my interview data and its use.  First, I 
created note classification sheets for both Interviewee Attributes and Places Attributes.  
The places included each AACC and the Central Government, divided into National 
Expenditure Advocates and Guardians.  Then, I made nodes for each one and mapped 
the interviewee nodes to the Places Nodes.  I created three Node Classification Profiles: 
one for stakeholder interviewees (people), one for key informants (people) and one for 
Governments (places).  
 
The key Informant Profile contains the 
following attributes:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Actors Profile contains the 
following attributes:  
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The Government Profile contains the following attributes:  
 
 
Next, I sorted the Thematic Nodes into Before and After the 2001 Health Care 
Devolution Reform as well as Other nodes that did not depend on a timeframe.  Here is 
a snapshot of the new node format (NB: all interviewees are under Places and People, 
'delete or no' is an old categorisation that I have not decided to delete yet):  
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Within People and Places Folder:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Thematic Node '01 Before 2002':  
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In Thematic Node '02 After 2002': 
 
 
In Thematic Node '03 Other': 
In nodes that became unnecessary for the analysis, I went through each already-coded 
reference and deleted and/or allocated the reference to a newly created node (according 
to the new sort).  
I have a feeling that some of these classifications might not work or may be 
superfluous.  I will only see this during the next round of coding.  
 
4/21/2015 12:20 PM 
After a first round of primary coding, I am starting secondary coding and some write up 
of results.  I am focusing on the section for validating main actors in the national and 
subnational policy networks.  This at first has meant rearranging of old codes and 
adding some new ones.  
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I have decided that instead of having separate categories for the different actor groups 
that I have proposed, and an "other" category that answers to each of these questions 
should go to only one node.  To do this, more easily with the software restraints, I will 
move categories that do not pertain to this question out from under the "policymaking 
environment" nodes and then aggregate at this level and eliminate any duplications of 
codes.  I will use these aggregate nodes as the only node for responding to the questions 
about "who the main actors are before and after the reform".  In addition, I have moved 
some previously coded items within these categories to new categories regarding the 
competencies of certain organisations, such as the MOH, MOE, and Autonomous 
Communities (AACC).  
 
Here are my current thematic nodes:  
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Appendix G.  Health Expenditure and Population Coverage Data247 
Table G.1.  Public health expenditure in Spain, 1999–2003 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Millions of euros 30.64 33.09 35.50 38.55 42.95 
As a percentage of GDP 5.42 5.42 5.43 5.48 5.72 
As a percentage of total 
public administration 
spending 
13.48 13.57 13.72 13.72 14.45 
Table G.2.  Pending health debt in Spain, Extremadura and Madrid, 1999–2003 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Pending health debts, Accumulated debt at the end of the year  
Thousands of euros 
Extremadura 0 0 0 14,400 40,311 
Madrid 0 0 0 125,038 223,579 
Total  
(All Regions) 
2,817,304 3,271,637 3,757,946 4,355,286 6,036,233 
Pending health debts, Debt contracted in each year 
Yearly variation 
Extremadura - - - 14,400 25,911 
Madrid - - - 125,038 98,541 
Total  
(All Regions) 
67,633 462,974 439,450 597,340 1,680,947 
Table G.3.  Consolidated health expenditures in Spain, Extremadura and Madrid, 1999–
2003 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Consolidated health expenditures 
Thousands of current euros 
Extremadura 728,914 785,622 828,450 971,320 1,028,778 
Madrid 3,411,976 3,589,472 3,899,619 4,155,492 4,606,433 
Total (All 
Regions) 
27,372,222 29,713,798 31,829,188 34,640,003 38,648,620 
Consolidated health expenditures 
Percentage of inter-annual variation 
Extremadura  7.78 5.45 17.25 5.92 
Madrid  5.20 8.64 6.56 10.85 
Total (All 
Regions) 
 8.55 7.12 8.83 11.57 
  
                                               
247 With the 2001 health system devolution came a change in the way that health system data was 
reported.  Because of this, it is hard to find data from before and after 2001 that are comparable.  This 
data comes, however, from the Report for the Analysis of Health Expenditures (Ministerio de Economía 
y Hacienda and Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo 2005), which worked to harmonize data from 1999-
2001 with 2002 and 2003. For this reason, only these data are reported here and not data for the whole 
study period (1996-2006).  
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Table G.4.  Health expenditures as a percentage of regional GDP in Spain, Extremadura 
and Madrid, 1999–2003 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Extremadura 7.45 7.41 7.43 8.02 7.91 
Madrid 3.51 3.41 3.41 3.42 3.56 
Total (All Regions) 4.84 4.87 4.87 4.96 5.19 
Table G.5.  Population covered by the NHS in Spain, Extremadura and Madrid, 1999–
2003 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Population covered by the NHS 
Extremadura 1,004,837 999,343 1,002,907 1,002,061 1,002,666 
Madrid 4,709,391 4,775,061 4,947,132 5,101,101 5,295,677 
Total  
(All Regions) 
37,980,437 38,281,497 38,905,395 39,618,276 40,497,751 
Table G.6.  Indicators for health expenditure per population in Spain, Extremadura and 
Madrid, 1999–2003 
Health expenditure per population covered by the NHS 
Euros 
Extremadura 725 786 826 969 1,026 
Madrid 725 752 788 815 870 
Total  
(All Regions) 
721 776 818 874 954 
Health expenditure per person / GDP per capita 
percentage 
Extremadura 7.96 7.93 7.95 8.59 8.47 
Madrid 3.84 3.71 3.71 3.70 3.84 
Total  
(All Regions) 
5.13 5.15 5.15 5.24 5.48 
Health expenditure per person / Gross disposable income per capita 
percentage 
Extremadura 10.58 9.89 10.62 11.63  
Madrid 6.52 5.84 6.55 6.48  
Total  
(All Regions) 
7.84 7.51 8.06 8.20  
Health expenditure per person / Total public expenditure per person 
Percentage 
Extremadura 45.20 37.90 36.87 38.00 37.81 
Madrid 47.55 41.04 38.62 36.72 39.87 
Total  
(All Regions) 
40.52 38.83 38.35 37.95 39.68 
Average health expenditure per equivalent population covered by the NHS  
Seven age groups 
Euros 
Extremadura 712 768 801 936 988 
Madrid 766 792 830 859 920 
Total  
(All Regions) 
727 781 818 874 953 
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Appendix H.  Relevant Human Resource Regulation  
Table H.1.  Relevant Human Resource Regulation in Extremadura, 2002–2006 
Law 11/2002, 12 December, 
of the Presidency of the 
Extremadura 
Completed the normative framework of the 
Associations and Professional Councils of 
Extremadura (Colegios y de Consejos de 
Profesionales de Extremadura)  
Resolution, 13 September 
2004, of the Minister of the 
Presidency 
Agreed to publish the adaptation of the By-laws of the 
Physicians College of Cáceres to Law 11/2002 (12 
December) of the Associations and Professional 
Councils of Extremadura 
Decree 165/2004, 9 
November, of the Regional 
Ministry of the Presidency 
Constituted, by segregation, the Association of 
Psychologists of Extremadura 
Resolution, 25 January 
2005, of the Minister of the 
Presidency 
Agreed to publish the adaptation of the By-laws of the 
Physicians Association of Badajoz to Law 11/2002 
(12 December) of the Associations and Professional 
Councils of Extremadura 
Resolution, 26 January 
2005, of the General 
Directorate of Health Care 
Training, Inspection and 
Quality 
Established that educational activities would be 
determined by the Training Programme in Health 
Sciences and made its first call for proposals of 
educational activities 
Resolution, 25 February 
2005, of the Management 
Directorate 
Modified the relationship between health worker jobs 
and the RHS 
Decree 26/2005, 9 February, 
of the Regional Ministry of 
the Presidency   
Created the Council of the Extremadura Pharmacist 
Associations 
Order, 4 March 2005 Created and regulated the composition and 
functioning of the Council for Specialised Training in 
Health Sciences 
Resolution, 6 April 2005, of 
the General Directorate of 
Health Care Training, 
Inspection and Quality 
Scheduled the 2005 activities and courses 
programmed for the Continuing Education Plan for 
the Extremadura RHS  
Decree 76/2005, 12 April Modified the ratio of workplaces to functionaries in 
the Extremadura RHM 
Order, 27 May 2005 Requested the authorisation of financial assistance to 
fund 2005 training activities for health professionals 
Order, 27 May 2005 Announced that financial assistance would be held for 
socio-health research projects for 2005 
Resolution, 31 May 2005, 
of the General Directorate 
of Health Care Training, 
Inspection and Quality 
Determined the 2005 training activities for the 
Extremadura Health Sciences Training Plan and made 
its second call for proposals of training activities 
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Resolution, 13 June 2005, 
of the Minister of the 
Presidency 
Agreed to publish the adaptation of the By-laws of the 
Nurses Association of Cáceres to Law 11/2002 (12 
December) of the Associations and Professional 
Councils of Extremadura 
Resolution, 20 June 2005, 
of the Minister of the 
Presidency 
Agreed to publish the adaptation of the By-laws of the 
Pharmacists Association of Cáceres to Law 11/2002 
(12 December) of the Associations and Professional 
Councils of Extremadura 
Resolution, 20 June 2005, 
of the Minister of the 
Presidency 
Agreed to publish the adaptation of the Bylaws of the 
Official Pharmacists Association of Badajoz to Law 
11/2002 (12 December) of the Associations and 
Professional Councils of Extremadura 
Order, 20 June 2005 Created new categories of health professionals: 
Continued Care Medical Doctor (Médico de Atención 
Continuada) and Nurse (Enfermero/a de Atención 
Continuada) 
Resolution, 14 July 2005, of 
the Minister of the 
Presidency 
Agreed to publish the adaptation of the By-laws of the 
Psychologists Association of Extremadura to Law 
11/2002 (12 December) of the Associations and 
Professional Councils of Extremadura 
Resolution, 27 October 
2005, of the Secretary 
General 
Published the Resolution from the Minister of Health 
that entrusted the Foundation for the Training and 
Research of Extremadura Health Professionals 
(Fundación para la Formación e Investigación de los 
Profesionales de Salud de Extremadura, 
FUNDESALUD) with implementing the activities of 
the Extremadura RHM   
Resolution, 27 October 
2005, of the Regional 
Ministry of the Presidency 
Approved the benefit plan called “Urgent and 
Emergency Health Care 1.1.2” and its public 
dissemination 
Decree 237/2005, 9 
November, of the Regional 
Ministry of the Presidency 
Created the Council of Extremadura Physician 
Associations 
Resolution, 28 December 
2005, of the Management 
Directorate of the 
Extremadura RHS (errors 
corrected in Resolution, 10 
January 2006) 
Established the procedure for the election of posts 
announced with Resolution 12, May 2005, by the 
Management Directorate of the RHS, in the category 
of faculty specialist in the area of anaesthesiology and 
resuscitation for health centres of the Extremadura 
RHS 
Resolution, 22 December 
2005, of the Director-
General of the Extremadura 
RHS 
Modified the ratio of working posts to statutory 
personnel in the Extremadura RHS 
Resolution, 12 December 
2005, of the Minister of the 
Presidency 
Agreed to publish the adaptation of the statutes of the 
Official Podiatrist Association for Extremadura to 
Law 11/2002, 12 December, of the Associations and 
Professional Councils of Extremadura 
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Decree 37/2006, 21 
February 
Regulated the personnel planning instruments of the 
Extremadura RHS and the structure of staffing 
statutory personnel 
Resolution, 27 May 2006, 
of the General Directorate 
of Health Care Training, 
Inspection and Quality 
Determined the 2006 training activities for the 
Extremadura Health Sciences Training Plan and made 
its second call for proposals of training activities 
Decree 109/2006, 13 June, 
of the Regional Ministry of 
the Presidency 
Approved the name change of the Association of 
Dentistry and Stomatology of the IX Region to the 
Official Association of Dentists of Extremadura 
Order, 19 July 2006 Created the statutory categories of Pharmacist and 
Veterinary of the Primary Care Team 
Resolution, 21 July 2006, of 
the Minister of Health 
Agreed to publish the By-laws of the Council of 
Physician Associations of Extremadura and its legal 
status 
Resolution, 24 July 2006, of 
the General Directorate of 
Health Care Training, 
Inspection and Quality 
Scheduled the 2006 activities and courses 
programmed for the Continuing Education Plan for 
the Extremadura RHS 
Law 4/2006, 10 October Created the Extremadura Association of Occupational 
Therapists 
Decree 203/2006, 28 
November 
Established the procedures for the integration of civil 
service and non–civil service personnel who provide 
health services in the Extremadura RHS within the 
regimen of statutory personnel of the health services  
Sources:  (Consejería de Presidencia 2004a; 2005e; 2005f; 2005h; Consejería de Presidencia 2006b; 
Consejería de Presidencia 2004b; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2005i; 2005j; 2006a; Consejería de 
Sanidad y Consumo 2005c; 2005d; 2005g; 2005h; 2005i; 2005j; 2005n; 2006e; 2006h; 2006n; 
Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2006p; Junta de Extremadura 2005; Presidencia de la Junta 2002; 
2006; Servicio Extremeño de Salud 2006c; 2006b) 
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Table H.2.  Relevant Human Resource Regulation in Madrid, 2002–2006 
Decree 47/2003, 3 April, of 
the Governing Council 
Laid out the procedure for integrating tenured medical 
personnel who were transferred into its health 
institutionsa as part of the 2001 devolution 
Resolution, 10 October 
2003, of the General 
Technical Secretary of the 
Regional Ministry of Health 
Delegated the competencies under Article 5, 
paragraph 1 of Decree 50/2001, on the proceedings 
before the Directorate General of Human Resources 
regarding the authorisation and other steps necessary 
for the interim coverage of job posts reserved for 
public officials, to the Director-Generals of the 
Instituto Madrileño de la Salud, Instituto de Salud 
Pública y de la Agencia “Pedro Laín Entralgo” for 
health care training, research and studies for the 
interim coverage of job posts in their respective 
institutions 
Order 1380/2004, 3 
November, of the Regional 
Ministry of Health 
Convened the 2005 course of Health Care Diploma 
Resolution, 22 November 
2004, of the General 
Directorate of Human 
Resources 
Regarding the retirement and extension of active stays 
of statutory staff of the Community of Madrid 
Agreement, 18 February 
2005, of the Council for the 
Monitoring of the 
Framework Agreement  
Regulated the proposals of the reduced working hours 
laid out in Article 60.4 of Law 55/2003, Statutory 
Framework for Statutory Personnel 
Agreement, 18 November 
2005, of the Council for the 
Monitoring of the 
Framework Agreement 
Regulated the general criteria for the professional 
career model of the Community of Madrid for 
licensed (licenciado) and graduate (diplomado) 
statutory (permanent) health personnel 
Agreement, 21 November 
2005, of the Council for the 
Monitoring of the 
Framework Agreement 
Regulated the general criteria for professional 
promotion of statutory (permanent) personnel 
Agreement of the Sectoral 
Round Table on Health, 24 
January 2006 
Regulated the selection of temporary personnel for 
health centres dependent on the Regional Ministry of 
Health 
Decree 22/2006, 9 
February, of the Governing 
Council 
Regulated the process of voluntary integration of the 
statutory regimen of labour (non–civil service) and 
civil service personnel who provide health services at 
the Hospital Carlos III 
Resolution, 14 February 
2006, of the General 
Directorate of Human 
Resources 
Approved the single package for the recruitment of 
temporary staff in the professional category of Family 
Doctor and SUMMA 112 Doctor in all health centres 
dependent on the Regional Ministry of Health 
Resolution, 15 February 
2006, of the General 
Approved the single package for the recruitment of 
temporary staff in the professional category of 
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Directorate of Human 
Resources 
Paediatric Primary Care Doctor in all health centres 
dependent on the Ministry of Health 
Resolution, 9 March 2006, 
of the General Directorate 
of Human Resources 
Approved the single package for the recruitment of 
temporary staff in the professional category of 
ATS/DUE of Primary Care, Specialised Care and 
SUMMA 112, in all health centres dependent on the 
Ministry of Health 
Agreement, 11 May 2006, 
of the Governing Council  
Approved the Agreement of 22 November 2005 of the 
Sectoral Round Table of the Staff in Health Care 
Institutions of the Community of Madrid regarding the 
various measures of the Agreement of 10 December 
2004 of the Monitoring Committee of the Working-
Day Agreement 
Order 1436/2006, 21 July, 
of the Ministry of Health  
Approved the Comprehensive Plan for the Sick Health 
Professional, for health care institutions of the 
Community of Madrid 
Order 1806/2006, 2 
October, of the Ministry of 
Health  
Convened the 2007 course of Health Care Diploma 
Agreement, 5 December 
2006, reached at the 
Sectoral Round Table on 
Health, between the 
Regional Ministry of Health 
and the trade unions 
Regulated the career of licensed and graduate health 
professionals 
a The transfer of health care service management responsibilities also meant the transfer of 
approximately 132,000 civil servants from the central to the regional-level governments.   
Sources: (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2003b; 2004n; 2004o; 2005e; 2005o; 2005p; 2006c; 
2006d; 2006f; 2006m; 2006o; Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo and Las Organizaciones Sindicales 
2006; Consejo de Gobierno 2003a; 2006a; 2006b). 
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Appendix I.  Accountability and Public Participation Regulation 
Table I.1.  Extremadura Health Regulation Related to Accountability and Public 
Participation, 2002–2006 
Decree 4/2003, 14 January  Developed the legal status, structure and (independent 
and autonomous) functions of the Ombudsman for 
Patients 
Order, 26 November 2003  Regulated the handling of complaints and suggestions 
regarding health care activities 
Instruction 1/2004, 13 
January 
Regulated the procedure for handling claims and 
suggestions for the Extremadura RHS 
Decree 16/2004, 26 
February 
Regulated the right to a second medical opinion 
within the Extremadura Public Health System 
Decree 31/2004, 23 March Regulated health care protection for foreigners in 
Extremadura and created the health care card for the 
Extremadura Public Health System 
Decree 189/2004, 14 
December; Correction of 
Errors, 15 January 2005 
Regulated the organisational structure of the Health 
Areas of the Extremadura RHS as well as the 
composition, powers and functions of the Health 
Councils in the Health Areas  
Order, 4 March 2005; 
Correction of Errors, 5 May 
2005 
Regulated the basic minimum set of data for speciality 
care  
Law 1/2005, 24 June  Regulated waiting times for specialised health care in 
the Extremadura Public Health System 
Decree 166/2005, 5 July Approved the Health Map of Extremadura 
Ley 3/2005, 8 July  Regulated health information and patient autonomy  
Decree 228/2005, 27 
September 
Regulated the content, organisation and functions of 
the Registry for the Waiting List of Patients of the 
Extremadura Public Health System and created a 
personal data file for the registry 
Sources: (Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2003a; 2003c; 2004b; 2004d; 2004e; 2004h; 2005f; 
2005m; 2005l; Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura 2005a) 
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Table I.2.  Madrid Health Regulation Related to Accountability and Public 
Participation, 2002–2006 
Order 605/2003, 21 April, 
of the Regional Ministries 
of the Presidency and of 
Health  
Developed the customer service platform for the health 
sector; regulated the System for Handling Suggestions, 
Complaints and Claims for the Unique Health Network 
for Public Utilisation and created the Commission for 
the Monitoring and Evaluation of Suggestions, 
Complaints and Claims under the RHM 
Decree 10/2004, 29 
January, of the Governing 
Council   
Guaranteed the independence and autonomy of the 
Ombudsman for Patients of its RHS 
Decree 62/2004, 15 April, 
of the Governing Council 
Created the Central Management Unit, Ethics 
Committees, the Central Commission for Monitoring 
and Evaluating, and the Unified Patient Registry of the 
Integrated Plan for the Reduction of Waiting Time for 
Surgery 
Order 602/2004, 14 June, 
of the Community of 
Madrid 
Regulated the management of the Patient Registry for 
the Surgery Waiting List 
Order 676/2004, 24 June Created the personal data file for the management of 
patients on the Surgery Waiting List, under the General 
Directorate of the Unique Health Network for Public 
Utilisation of the Madrid RHM 
Order 1195/2004, 5 
October 
Created the personal data file for the Ombudsman for 
Patients of the Madrid RHM 
Order 1285/2006, 22 June Regulated the individual health card for the Community 
of Madrid 
Sources: (Consejería de Presidencia and Consejería de Sanidad 2003; Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid 
2004; Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo 2004k; 2004m; Consejo de Gobierno 2004a; 2004b) 
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Appendix J.  Author’s Implementation of von Hagen’s Structural Index of the Budget Process 
Table J.1.  Author’s Implementation of von Hagen’s (1992) Structural Index (SI2) for Spain, 1991–1992 and 2004–2006  
 
Item 1.  Structure of Negotiations within Government 
(Government's Preparation of the Budget) 
Item 2.  Structure of Parliamentary Process 
(Parliament's Enactment of the Budget) 
Indicators General 
Constraint 
Negotiations within Government 
Total 
score 
Amendments Joint 
vote 
on all 
GS 
Global 
vote on 
budget 
Total 
score Agenda set 
by 
Type 
Budget 
negotiations 
Are 
ltd. 
Are off-setting 
Can cause 
fall of 
government 
1991–1992 
(von 
Hagen 
1992) 
None [0] Cabinet [2] 
General budget 
guidelines [4] 
Cabinet [0] 6 
Yes 
[4] 
Yes, unless 
authorised 
otherwise by 
government 
[4]a 
No [0] 
Yes 
[0] 
After 
general 
debate 
[0] 
8 
2004–2006 
(Author) 
"Zero 
deficit" rule, 
goes beyond 
golden [4]b 
MOF 
proposes 
budget 
norms to be 
voted on by 
cabinet [3]c 
General budget 
guidelines plus 
specific "budget 
stability 
objectives" 
[2.66]c 
Bilateral 
between SMs 
and MOF [4] 
13.66 
Yes 
[4]d 
Yes [4]e No [0] 
Yes 
[0] 
After 
general 
debate 
[0] 
8 
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   Table J.1.  Author’s Implementation of von Hagen’s (1992) Structural Index (SI2) for Spain, 1991–1992 and 2004–2006 (cont.) 
 
 Item 4.  Flexibility of Budget Execution 
(Observance of the budget during the budget year) 
Final Total Scoreg 
Indicators 
MOF can 
block 
expenditure 
Cash limits 
on SMs 
Disbursement 
approvalf 
Transfers 
between 
Chapters 
Budget 
changes 
authorised by 
Carry-over 
to next year 
Total 
Score 
1991–1992 
(von Hagen 
1992) 
n/a [0] n/a [0] n/a [0] 
Limited 
[0.8] 
New law [4] Limited [1] 5.8 19.8 
2004–2006 
(Author) 
Yes [4]h No [0] No [0] 
Requires 
consent of 
MOF [1.6]i 
New law [4]j Limited [1]k 10.6 32.26 
a Von Hagen (1992, 41) reports that, for Spain during 1991–1992, amendments are off-setting; however, this is not consistent with the final table of his appendix, in which he writes 
that they are not off-setting.  I use the figure in the text because it is also supported by Article 134 (7) of the 1978 Spanish Constitution.  b Modification from 2001 Budget Stability 
Laws.  c Modification from 2001 Budget Stability Laws and 2003 General Budget Law.  d OECD and World Bank (2002); Verified by Spanish public finance specialist.  e Spanish 
Constitution of 1978, Article 134 (7) mandates prior approval by government before passage of amendments that involve an incr ease in public expenditure or decrease in budget 
revenue.  In general, amendments must be off-setting: “Standing orders of both houses [of parliament in Spain] require that all amendments that result in an increase in expenditure on 
one budgetary item must be presented in combination with a parallel decrease in another expenditure in the same section” (OECD 2004, 392).  f By authority other than executive of 
resource ministries, e.g. minister of finance or financial comptroller.  g Final total score is out of 60 points.  h With extraordinary budget measures and parliament approval (von Hagen 
2005a; 2005b).   i 2003 General Budget Law: transfers between lines of appropriations (Chapters) are possible but with a series of limitations (Article 52).   
j 2003 General Budget Law, Article 59.  k Carry-over of appropriations are generally forbidden (Article 49 of the 2003 General Budget Law), with some exceptional circumstances 
(Article 58) (OECD 2004, 395).  See also Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2004, 17). 
Source: von Hagen (1992), Tables A3, A6 and A8, for 1991-1992 data; author’s modifications and own analysis for 2004-2006 (using legislation leading up to 2004). 
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Legend for Country Analyses248 
B: Public Debt; D: Deficit; GS: Government Spending; ltd.: limited; MOF: Ministry of Finance: PM: Prime Minister; P: Parliament; SMs: Spending 
Ministries; Y: Nominal GDP; “Golden Rule” refers to the provision that the budget deficit must not exceed investment or capit al expenditure.   
Criteria used to assign values to each item indicator 
Item 1:  
a) General constraint: none [0], B/Y [1], B/Y and D/Y [2], G/Y or Golden Rule [3], G/Y and D/Y [4]  
b) Agenda setting for budget negotiations: MOF or cabinet collects bids from SMs [0]; MOF or cabinet collects bids subject to pre-agreed guidelines 
[1]; cabinet decides on budget norms first [2]; MOF proposes budget norms to be voted on by cabinet [3]; MOF or PM determines  budget parameters 
to be observed by SM [4].   
c) Scope of budget norms in agenda setting: expenditure or deficit [0]; ‘specific’ [1.33]; ‘broad’ and ‘specific’ [2.66]; ‘broad’ [4].   
d) Structure of negotiations: all cabinet members involved together [0]; multilateral [2]; bilateral between SMs and MOF [4].   
Item 2:  
a) Amendments unlimited [0]; limited [4].   
b) Amendments required to be offsetting: no [0]; yes [4].   
c) Amendments can cause fall of government: no [0], yes [4].   
d) All expenditures passed in one vote: yes [0]; mixed [2]; votes are chapter by chapter [4].   
e) Global votes on total budget size: final only [0]; initial [4].   
Item 4:  
a) MOF can block expenditures: no [0]; yes [4].   
b) SMs subject to cash limits: no [0]; yes [4].   
c) Disbursement approval required from MOF or controller: no [0]; yes [4].   
d) Transfers of expenditures between chapters: unrestricted [0]; limited [0.8]; require consent of MOF [1.6]; require consent of P [2.4]; only within SMs 
possible [4]; only within SMs and with consent of MOF [5].   
e) Changes in budget law during execution: at discretion of government [0]; by new law, which is regularly submitted during fiscal year [1]; at 
discretion of MOF [2]; require consent of MOF and P [3]; only by new budgetary law to be passed under the same regulations as  the ordinary budget 
[4].   
f) Carry-over of unused funds to next year: unrestricted [0]; limited [1]; limited and requires authorisation by MOF or parliament [2]; not possible 
[3].  
                                                
248 Source: von Hagen (1992) with author’s modifications.  In particular, there is a mismatch in von Hagen’s (1992) values for indicator f) of Item 4 as explained in his criteria and 
as used to assess the countries.  I am representing here and adopting the values that he actually used in his country assessments. 
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Table J.2.  Author’s Implementation of von Hagen’s (1992) Structural Index (SI2) for Extremadura, 2004–2006 
 
 
Item 1.  Structure of Negotiations within Government 
(Government's Preparation of the Budget) 
Item 2.  Structure of Parliamentary Process 
(Parliament's Enactment of the Budget) 
Indicators 
General 
Constraint 
Negotiations within Government 
Total 
score 
Amendments Joint 
vote 
on all 
GS 
Global 
vote on 
budget 
Total 
score Agenda set 
by 
Type 
Budget 
negotiations 
Are ltd. 
Are 
off-
setting 
Can cause 
fall of 
government 
Extremadura 
2004–2006 
"Zero 
deficit" 
rule, goes 
beyond 
golden 
[4]a,d 
RFM 
proposes 
budget 
norms to be 
approved 
by 
Governing 
Council 
[3]a,e 
General 
Economic 
Policy 
guidelines plus 
specific "budget 
stability 
objectives" 
[2.66]a,f 
Bilateral 
between 
RSMs and 
RFM [4] 
13.66 
Limited 
[4]g 
Yes 
[4]a,h 
No [0]i 
Mixed 
[2]j 
Initial 
[4]k 14 
 
 Item 4.  Flexibility of Budget Execution 
(Observance of the budget during the budget year) 
Final Total Scorec 
Indicators 
RFM can 
block 
expenditure 
Cash limits 
on RSMs 
Disbursement 
approvalb 
Transfers 
between 
Chapters 
Budget 
changes 
authorised by 
Carry-over to 
next year 
Total 
Score 
Extremadura 
2004–2006 
No [0] No [0]l Yes [4]m 
Require 
the 
consent of 
RFM 
[1.6]n 
New law [4]a,o 
Limited and 
requires 
authorisation 
by RFM [2]p 
11.6 39.26 
a Indicators that do not change between the central government and the regions because they are set by a national budget law or  the Spanish Constitution, with which the regions then 
comply through regional legislation.  b By authority other than executive of resource ministries, e.g. regional minister of finance or financial comptroller.  c Final total score is out of 
60 points.  d Modification of 2001 Budget Stability Laws, which affect all levels of administration in Spain.  Compliance with this is noted in Fernandez Llera and Monasterio Escudero 
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(2010, 146; 2008): by 2007, all regions complied except Catalonia and Valencia.  e Articles 9–11 of Law 3/1985 of Public Finance (Comunidad Autónoma de Extremadura 1985).  
Coherent with modifications of 2001 Budget Stability Laws and 2003 General Budget Law.  f Article 41.3 of Law 3/1985 (and Article 35.1 of Law 5/2007, which states in the Exposition 
of Motives that this law updates in writing what has been happening in practice).  Coherent with modifications of 2001 Budget  Stability Laws and 2003 General Budget Law.  g No 
reference to a limitation on the number of amendments in regulations of the parliament (or in Law 3/1985), but “off-setting” is considered a limitation and Article 110 states that there 
are limitations as to the number of days to submit an amendment, who can submit it (deputies and parliamentary groups) and th e specific approval process (Asamblea de Extremadura 
1983).  h Article 125.3 of Regulations of the Parliament of Extremadura.  i Assumption because not stated otherwise.  j Article 126.3 of Regulations of the Parliament of Extremadura 
states that voting takes place according to the preference of the chairperson.  k Article 126.1 of Regulations of the Parliament of Extremadura states that a global vote on total budget 
size is to occur at the beginning of the budget debate.  l No mention in any documents of “cash limits”.  m Articles 45 and 57.1 of Law 3/1985 state that the heads of the line ministries 
or the Governing Council will approve disbursements.  n Articles 54 of Law 3/1985 states that at the proposal of the various regional spending ministries (RSMs), the RFM can agree 
to transfer appropriations with the limitations.  o Exposition of Motives and Article 49 of Law 3/1985 (effective until 2007).  p The carry-over of appropriations is generally forbidden, 
with exceptions, over which the RFM has decision-making authority (Article 47.1 of Law 3/1985).   
Source: Author’s modification and analysis of the regional budget process in Spain for the situation in 2004–2006, using von Hagen’s (1992) structural index 2 (Tables A3, A6 and 
A8) and Spanish national and regional legislation leading up to 2004.    
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Table J.3.  Author’s Implementation of von Hagen’s (1992) Structural Index (SI2) for Madrid, 2004–2006 
 
 
Item 1.  Structure of Negotiations within Government  
(Government's Preparation of the Budget) 
Item 2.  Structure of Parliamentary Process  
(Parliament's Enactment of the Budget) 
Indicators 
General 
Constraint 
Negotiations within Government 
Total 
score 
Amendments Joint 
vote 
on all 
GS 
Global 
vote on 
budget Total 
score 
Agenda set 
by 
Type Budget 
negotiations 
Are ltd. 
Are 
off-
setting 
Can cause 
fall of 
government 
Madrid 
2004–2006 
"Zero 
deficit" 
rule, goes 
beyond 
golden 
[4]a,d 
RFM proposes 
budget norms 
to be approved 
by Governing 
Council [3]a,e 
‘Broad’ and 
plus specific 
"budget 
stability 
objectives" 
[2.66]a,f 
Bilateral 
between 
RSMs and 
RFM [4] 
13.66 
Limited 
[4]g 
Yes 
[4]a,h 
No [0]i 
Mixed 
[2]j 
After 
debate 
[0]k 
10 
  
 
Item 4.  Flexibility of Budget Execution 
(Observance of the budget during the budget year) 
Final Total Scorec 
Indicators 
RFM can 
block 
expenditure 
Cash limits 
on RSMs 
Disbursement 
approvalb 
Transfers 
between 
Chapters 
Budget 
changes 
authorised 
by 
Carry-over 
to next year 
Total 
Score 
Madrid 
2004–2006 
No [0] No [0] No [0] 
Requires 
consent of 
RFM [1.6]l 
New law 
[4]a,m 
Limited with 
RFM 
approval [2]n 
7.6 31.26 
a Indicators that do not change between the central government and the regions because they are set by a national budget law or  the Spanish Constitution, with which the regions then 
comply through regional legislation.  b By authority other than executive of resource ministries, e.g. Regional finance minister or financial comptroller.  c Final total score is out of 60 
points.  d Modification of 2001 Budget Stability Laws, which affect all levels of administration in Spain.  Compliance with this is noted in Fernandez Llera and Monasterio Es cudero 
(2010, 146; 2008): by 2007, all regions complied except Catalonia and Valencia.  e Article 48 of Law 9/1990 states that the RFM will develop the procedure for elaborating the general 
budgets of the community.  f In order to be coherent with modifications of the 2001 Budget Stability Laws and 2003 General Budget Law, it would have to include these, although 
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Law 9/1990 does not explicitly state that it does include them.  g Article 141 of the Regulations of the Parliament of Madrid states that there are limitations as to the number of days to 
submit an amendment, who can submit it (deputies and parliamentary groups) and the specific approval needed (although there i s no limit on the number of amendments possible).  
Amendment “off-setting” is also considered a limitation.  h Article 162.2 of the 1997 Regulations of the Parliament of Madrid.  i This is an assumption because it is not otherwise stated 
in the relevant legislation.  j Paragraph (c) of Article 164 of the 1997 Regulations of the Parliament of Madrid.  k The law does not make any specific reference to a global vote on total 
budget size in the initial phase (as does the legislation for Extremadura).  l Article 62.2 of Law 9/1990 states that the RFM may authorise transfers from the provisions contained in the 
global programme to any of the chapters of expenditure in the Budget, the regional ministry of finance should justify such transfers and they should be presented at a hearing of the 
Budget Committee.  See Articles 54, 61.1, 61.2, 62.1, 62.3, 62.4 and 62.5 for more informat ion on transfers.  Article 64 states the general limitations of the above transfers.  m Article 
58 of Law 9/1990.  n Article 56 of Law 9/1990 states that unspent appropriations will be cancelled if they do not comply with one of the exception s to this rule established in Article 
67.  Article 67 states that, through the decision of the RFM, appropriations may be carried over to the next year if they are (a) extraordinary and supplementary appropriations and 
transfers, which were granted or authorised, respectively, in the last month of the budget year, and could not be used within that month for good reason; (b) appropriations tha t cover 
commitments made but that, for good reason, cannot be implemented during the budget year; (c) appropriations for capital op erations.   
Source: Author’s modification and analysis of the regional budget process in Spain for the situation in 2004–2006, using von Hagen’s (1992) structural index 2 (Tables A3, A6 and 
A8) and Spanish national and regional legislation leading up to 2004.   
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Legend for Regional Analyses of Extremadura and Madrid249 
B: Public Debt; D: Deficit; GS: Government Spending; ltd.: limited; RFM: Regional Ministry (Consejería) of Finance; P: Parliament; RSMs: Regional 
Spending Ministries; Y: Nominal GDP; “Golden Rule” refers to the provision that the budget deficit must not exceed investment or capital expend iture.   
Criteria used to assign values to each item indicator 
Item 1:  
a) General constraint: none [0], B/Y [1], B/Y and D/Y [2], G/Y or Golden Rule [3], G/Y and D/Y [4] 
b) Agenda setting for budget negotiations: RFM or cabinet collects bids from RSMs [0]; RFM or cabinet collects bids subject to pre-agreed guidelines 
[1]; cabinet decides on budget norms first [2]; RFM proposes budget norms to be voted on by cabinet [3]; RFM or President of the Government 
determines budget parameters to be observed by RSM [4].   
c) Scope of budget norms in agenda setting: expenditure or deficit [0]; ‘specific’ [1.33]; ‘broad’ and ‘specific’ [2.66]; ‘broad’ [4].   
d) Structure of negotiations: all cabinet members involved together [0]; multilateral [2]; bilateral between RSMs and RFM [4].   
Item 2:  
a) Amendments: unlimited [0]; limited [4].   
b) Amendments: required to be offsetting: no [0]; yes [4].   
c) Amendments: can cause fall of government: no [0], yes [4].   
d) All expenditures passed in one vote: yes [0]; mixed [2]; votes are chapter by chapter [4].   
e) Global votes on total budget size: final only [0]; initial [4].   
Item 4:  
a) RFM can block expenditures: no [0]; yes [4].   
b) RSMs subject to cash limits: no [0]; yes [4].   
c) Disbursement approval required from RFM or controller: no [0]; yes [4].   
d) Transfers of expenditures between chapters: unrestricted [0]; limited [0.8]; require consent of RFM [1.6]; require consent of P [2.4]; only within 
RSMs possible [4]; only within RSMs and with consent of RFM [5].   
e) Changes in budget law during execution: at discretion of government [0]; by new law which is regularly submitted during fisca l year [1]; at discretion 
of RFM [2]; require consent of RFM and P [3]; only by new budgetary law to be passed under the same regulations as the ordinary budget [4].   
f) Carry-over of unused funds to next year: unrestricted [0]; limited [1]; limited and requires authorisation by RFM or parliament [2]; not possible [3].
                                                
249 Source: von Hagen (1992) with author’s modifications.  In particular, there is a mismatch in von Hagen’s (1992) values for indicator f) of Item 4 as explained in his criteria and 
as used to assess the countries.  I am representing here and adopting the values that he actually used in his country assessments. 
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Appendix K.  Indices for Topocrat Strength and Health-Sector Kentrocrat Stewardship 
Table K.1.  Index for Topocrat Strength in the National Policymaking Environment in Spain, Before 2001 and 2004–2006 
Item Spain 
Before 2001 2004–2006 
1. Do the local government association exist in the country 
and sector of investigation?  no [0]; yes, in the country 
only [1]; yes, in the country and sector [2]. 
Yes, in the country and sector [2] 
NB: Although it existed, the CISNS was 
weak, especially for regions without health 
care competencies. 
Yes, in country and sector [2] 
NB: By this time, the CISNS had gained 
strength as a local government 
association in the health sector. 
2. Do local government associations routinely interact 
with, and have exclusive and systematic access to, the 
central government?  no [0]; yes, for routine, exclusive 
access only [1]; yes, for routine, systematic access only [1]; 
yes, for routine, exclusive and systematic access [3]. 
Yes, for routine, exclusive access only [1] 
NB: CISNS plenary sessions and 
agreements were sparse at this time and not 
systematic. 
Yes, for routine, exclusive and 
systematic access [3] 
3. How involved are local government associations in 
policy formulation at the national level?  They are not 
involved at all [0]; they are consulted because of standard 
operating procedure only [1]; they provide some influence 
on policy formulation beyond standard operating 
procedures [3]; formal agreements and other mechanisms 
between them and the central government are used as an 
alternative to parliamentary decision-making [4]. 
They are consulted because of standard 
operating procedures [1] 
NB: This is especially true for regions 
without health care competencies at this 
time, like Extremadura and Madrid. 
They provide some influence on policy 
formulation beyond standard 
operating procedures [3] 
NB: During this period, CISNS 
agreements were not executive but 
recommendations.  While executive, 
CPFF agreements needed final approval 
from the parliament. 
Total Score 4 8 
Explanatory Note: The higher the score, the stronger the influence of the topocrat in the national health policy network.    
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Table K.2.  Index for Stewardship Functions of Health-Sector Kentrocrats in Spain, 2004–2006 
Stewardship Functions 2004–2006 
1.  Ensuring tools for implementation: powers, incentives and sanctions  
a) Do health-sector kentrocrats have sufficient funding for setting incentives and ensuring the compliance of the subnational 
governments on nationally-established health policies?  no [0]; yes, for setting incentives only [1]; yes, for ensuring 
compliance only [2]; yes, for setting incentives and ensuring compliance [3].   
0 
b) Do health-sector kentrocrats identify, motivate and enforce subnational governments to comply with nationally-
established laws and regulations?  no [0]; yes, for identifying and motivating only [1]; identifying and enforcing only [2]; 
identifying, motivating and enforcing [3]. 
0 
2.  Ensuring accountability  
a) Do health-sector kentrocrats have sufficient accountability and public participation mechanisms in place?  no [0]; some 
[1]; yes [2]. 
2 
b) Are health-sector kentrocrats able to ensure that subnational governments comply with the nationally-established 
mechanisms for accountability?  no [0]; yes, in part [1]; yes, fully [2].   
2 
3.  Generating intelligence  
a) Have health-sector kentrocrats been able to provide subnational governments with the data and intelligence necessary to 
carry out their responsibilities?  No [0]; yes, some necessary data and intelligence  [1]; yes, all necessary data and 
intelligence [2]. 
0 
b) Have health-sector kentrocrats been able to do this in a timely manner?  no [0]; yes, in part [1]; yes, for all necessary data 
and intelligence [2].  
0 
4.  Building partnerships  
a) Have health-sector kentrocrats built active and effective partnerships with subnational governments?  no [0]; yes, for 
activity only [1]; yes, for activity and effectiveness [2].  
1 
b) Have health-sector kentrocrats sustained their activities and effectiveness in these partnerships overtime?  no [0]; yes, in 
part [1]; yes, fully  [2].  
1 
Total Score 6 
Explanatory note: The higher the score, the stronger the health-sector kentrocrat.    
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Appendix L.  Principle Health Regulations, 2001–2006 
Table L.1.  Principal Health Regulations of the Central Government and their 
Responsibilities for the Regions 
Law/Article Regional Responsibilities 
Law 41/2002 Patient autonomy, rights and duties on clinical information and 
documentation 
Article 14, 
Paragraph 4 
Medical Records Protection: The regions will approve provisions 
ensuring that health centres will adopt adequate technical and 
organisational measures for archiving and protecting patient 
medical records and avoiding their accidental destruction or loss. 
Article 16, 
Paragraph 7 
Access to Medical Records: The regions will regulate procedures 
for access to and use of medical records.   
Law 16/2003 Cohesion and quality of the NHS 
Article 25  Waiting time guarantees.  The regions will define the maximum 
waiting times for access to services in their health care benefit 
package.   
Article 57, 
Paragraphs 1-5 
Individual health care card.  Citizen access to health care will be 
given by the NHS through an individual health care card (tarjeta 
sanitaria individual) … the MOH, in collaboration with the regions 
and the rest of the counterpart public administrations, will establish 
the requirements and necessary standards for this card.  …  [T]he 
individual health care card should be adapted, where necessary, to 
the standardisation established by all public administrations and 
within the European Union.   
Article 61, 
Paragraph 1 
NHS quality plans.  The MOH and the competent bodies of the 
regions will periodically elaborate, within the CISNS, plans for 
NHS quality, without prejudice for regional health planning and 
service organisation.  These plans will contain quality objectives for 
the relevant period.   
Law 55/2003 Framework statute of statutory professionals in the health 
services 
Article 40, 
Paragraph 1 
General criteria for the professional career.  The regions, 
following negotiations in the appropriate boards, will establish, for 
statutory staff of its health services, professional career mechanisms 
in accordance with what has been established in general in the 
norms applicable to the rest of the public services, so that the law 
allows the promotion of this staff together with the better 
management of health care institutions.   
Article 41, 
Paragraph 4 
General criteria for remuneration.  The RHSs and their 
management bodies will establish the necessary mechanisms, such 
as management of job posts, management of fringe benefits and 
decoupling of teaching positions, to ensure payment for activity 
actually performed.   
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Appendix M.  Waiting Time Legislation and Regulation 
Table M.1.  Extremadura Waiting Time Legislation and Regulation, 2004–2006 
Law 1/2005, 24 June  Regulated waiting times for specialised health care in 
the Extremadura Public Health System 
Decree 228/2005, 27 
September 
Regulated the content, organisation and functions of 
the patient registry for the waiting list of the 
Extremadura Public Health System and created a 
personal data file for the registry 
Decree 132/2006, 11 July Reduced waiting times for specific health care 
specialities  
Sources: Presidencia de la Junta de Extremadura (2005a), Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo (2005b, 
2006).   
Table M.2.  Madrid Waiting Time Legislation and Regulation, 2001–2006 
Article 27 of Law 12/2001  Granted citizens the right to receive health services 
within pre-defined and known waiting periods  
Resolution, 12 February 
2004, of the Madrid 
Regional Parliament 
Established that the RHM would elaborate a 
comprehensive plan for the management and 
monitoring of waiting lists 
Comprehensive Plan for the 
Reduction of Waiting Times 
for Surgery, March 2004 
Presented the Government of Madrid’s strategy to 
gradually reduce the maximum waiting time for 
accessing elective surgical interventions to 30 
business days by the end of 2005 
Decree 62/2004, 15 April, of 
the Governing Council 
Created the Central Management Unit, the Central 
Commission for Monitoring and Evaluation, the 
RULEQ, and ethics committees 
Order 602/2004, 14 June, of 
the Community of Madrid 
Regulated the management of the patient registry for 
the waiting list for surgery 
Order 676/2004, 24 June, of 
the RHM 
Created the personal data file for the management of 
patients on the surgery waiting list, under the General 
Directorate of the Unique Health Network for Public 
Utilisation of the Madrid RHM 
Pact on the Programme for 
Motivating Professionals to 
Reduce the Waiting Times 
for Surgery, 14 October 
2004 
Created an incentive programme to reduce the surgery 
waiting list 
Sources: Presidencia de la Comunidad de Madrid (2001b); Comunidad de Madrid (2004); Consejería 
de Sanidad y Consumo (2004a, 2004b); Consejería de Sanidad y Consumo and Organizaciones 
Sindicales (2004); Consejo de Gobierno (2004b); Pleno de la Asamblea de Madrid (2004). 
 
 
 Appendix N 
   357 
Appendix N.  Legislation on Health Benefit Package Expansions  
Table N.1.  Legislation on Health Benefit Package Expansions in Extremadura, 2004–
2006 
Legislation Description of Content Effect on 
Expenditures 
Decree 
16/2004, 26 
February 
Guaranteed its citizens the right to receive a second 
medical opinion within the Extremadura Public 
Health System on information initially received 
regarding diagnostic and therapeutic procedures (not 
to be confused with medical referrals) 
Increased cost 
Decree 
31/2004, 23 
March 
Regulated health protection for foreign residents in 
Extremadura and created the Health Care Card in the 
Extremadura Public Health System.  Foreign 
residents are offered the same level and number of 
rights and services as offered to its citizens   
Increased cost 
Decree 
80/2004, with 
correction 19 
June 2004 
Established a grant programme that would permit 
low-income senior citizens (over age 65) who 
received prescriptions for specific orthoprosthesis 
products (including digital or analogue hearing aids, 
dental extractions and multifocal glasses) to pay the 
amount set out in the Decree’s Annex I in periodic 
payments without interest to the financial institutions 
administering the grants  
Increased cost 
(from interest 
payments and 
programme 
administration) 
RHM Internal 
Circular, 
October 2004 
Regulated the availability of the post-coitus 
(abortion) pill free of cost if administered in a health 
care or family planning centre in Extremadura.  It 
should be noted, however, that the cost of the pill 
was not financed by public health care but rather a 
third partya   
Cost neutral 
Decree 
195/2004, 19 
December 
Regulated free full-coverage child dental care 
through the Dental Health Programme for resident 
children age 6-14 years old and indicated how the 
programme would be managed (effective January 
2005) 
Increased cost 
Law 1/2005, 
24 June 
Regulated patients’ right to waiting time guarantees 
for specialised health care within the Extremadura 
Health System 
Increased cost 
Law 3/2005, 5 
August 
Recognised patients’ right to advance care directives 
(Articles 17-22) 
Cost neutral 
Decree 
6/2006 
Regulated the reimbursement of expenses related to 
pharmaceutical products, orthoprosthesis and health 
services from outside the Extremadura Public Health 
System, including financial support for travel and 
subsistence expenses  
Increased cost 
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Decree 
55/2006, 
repealed and 
replaced 
Decree 
80/2004 
Expanded the benefits from Decree 80/2004 to all 
senior citizens and persons with a disability pension.   
Increased cost 
(from interest 
and 
programme 
administration) 
a As per central government regulation, the pill is available in all of Spain, including Extremadura, with a 
prescription in pharmacies and paid 100 per cent by the patient. 
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